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

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COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

PLATO

GORGIAS

EDITED

ON THE BASIS OF DEUSCHLE-CRON'S EDITION

BY

GONZALEZ LODGE

PROFESSOR IN BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

GINN & COMPANY

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PREFACE.

THIS edition is based on Deuschle-Cron's fourth edition, Leipzig, 1886, but the original has been treated with considerable freedom.

In more than sixty cases, where the text varies from that of Cron, the readings of Schanz have been adopted. A few conjectures have been introduced, but the editor has endeavored to follow a middle course between those who do not allow emendations, and those who, like Schanz, employ them too freely.

The introduction is a free rendering of the original, with additions.

The commentary will be found to differ materially from the German, especially in grammatical matters. The editor has not thought it advisable to deviate from the line of literary interpretation adopted by the German editor, but the exact study, which has been bestowed of later years in the United States upon the subject of Greek Syntax, has rendered it possible to make this part of the book to a certain extent American.

The appendix, which is much more extensive than that of the German edition, will be found to contain, in addition to the register of textual variations, much matter which could not be inserted in a commentary, but which students should know.

Much assistance has been drawn from other editions, especially those of Hirschig and Thompson. Woolsey's edition also has been in the hands of the editor.

The editor is under great obligations to Professor Gildersleeve, who examined the commentary in manuscript and made many

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valuable suggestions. Those who may use the book will share the editor's regret, that owing to delay in the printing he was unable to avail himself fully of Professor Gildersleeve's kind offer to read and criticise the proof-sheets.

The edition owes much also to Professor Seymour, who has read all the proof, and has cheerfully given the editor the benefit of his scholarship and editorial experience.

Reference is made throughout to Riddell's *Digest of Platonic Idioms* (Rid.), printed with his edition of the *Apology* (Oxford, 1877). Occasional references are made to Madvig's *Griechische Syntax*, and to Meisterhans' *Grammatik der Attischen Inscriften*.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE, October, 1890.

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INTRODUCTION.

1. The Beginnings of Rhetoric.[1]

The mighty impulse which the Hellenic spirit, throughout the 1
whole extent of the Hellenic nationality, received from the successful result of the great conflict waged by the might of the people against the overwhelming power of the Barbarians, had made Athens, the city which had distinguished itself beyond all others by the sagacity and self-sacrificing courage of its citizens, the centre of all the intellectual effort and life of Greece. Poetry, which in conjunction with its sister arts had not become merely inseparably associated with all religious and national feasts, but had acquired also a recognized position in every-day life, obtained by the new and especially brilliant productions of this period a much wider influence upon the culture and public life of the people. Meanwhile the political activity and progress of the time was pushing forward with rapid and irresistible strides to the development of Prose, to which up to this time the artistic genius of the Greeks had been less directed than to Poetry. With the fortunes of this new medium of human thought were inseparably connected those of a new department of Literature, — History, — which had its real beginning, artistically considered, in that magnificent work whose worthy subject was the famous struggle between the Greeks and the Barbarians, so remote in its origin, so long in its duration, so momentous in its character, so fortunate in its result. An inexhaustible opportunity for practice in the art of public speaking was afforded by the assemblies of the people and the courts of law. From these

[1] Principal source: *Συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν sive artium scriptores ab initiis usque ad editos Aristotelis de rhetorica libros. Composuit* L. Spengel, Stuttgartiae, 1828. — In addition: Westermann, *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom.* Leipzig, 1833. — Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Uebersicht*, 2d ed. Leipzig, 1885, — and especially Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, 1^2, Leipzig, 1887.

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were derived two varieties of political oratory, the Forensic (*τὸ συμβουλευτικόν* or *τὸ δημηγορικόν*) and the Judicial (*τὸ δικανικὸν γένος*). Very soon it became the duty of those most noted for their talents in speaking, to deliver speeches in honor of those citizens who had fallen in battle for their country. Hence Aristotle in his Theory adds to the two varieties already mentioned a third, — *τὸ ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος*.

2 But it was not in accordance with the intellectual character of the Greek people to rest content with a merely practical skill in the employment of language. They rather, by virtue of their disposition towards investigation and science, turned their attention to the discovery of the means through which speech might attain its greatest power, and thereby be the more likely to bring about any desired result. The unprejudiced mind could not but see that this oratorical success was not always due to a deeper insight and more thorough knowledge of the question at issue. Consequently their attention was directed to the formal side of the art, and thus the first rude beginnings, naturally empirical, were made of a Theory, *i.e.* of a scientific conception, which claimed for itself the ability to communicate to others the skill and knowledge which had been acquired, or in other words, to teach to others this new art, so useful, nay, almost indispensable for practical life.

3 That such an art should find ready acceptance and cultivation in Athens is but natural. We need only refer to the orator Antiphon, who both as the founder of a school of oratory and as a composer of written speeches, as well as from his political activity, exercised a wide influence there. But Athens was not the earliest home of this art. That honor belongs to Sicily. Under similar circumstances the beginnings of oratory would probably have been made simultaneously in Attica and Sicily. But in the latter country the conditions were somewhat different. The population was very composite, given to disputation, and less fully organized than that of Athens. Besides, the severe measures of the tottering tyrants to preserve their power had caused many changes in the ownership of land and the rights of property. Consequently the overthrow of the tyranny was

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followed by a perfect tempest of litigation out of which oratory emerged as a fully established art. Its invention is ascribed to Corax, — a man who had taken a leading part in the political upheavals and governmental changes of his country, but who in the new order of things devoted himself to the teaching of Rhetoric — especially that in use in the courts — of which he composed also a short 'techne.' His pupil and successor was Tisias, who, according to the story,[2] used his newly acquired skill in speaking to defeat his teacher in a lawsuit, — a course of action which could not but show the tendency of the new art, and which drew down a scathing rebuke from the judge.[3] Tisias had many pupils who afterwards became famous; among them Lysias and Isocrates, as well as Gorgias, after whom this dialogue is named.

2. Gorgias' Life and Activity.[4]

Gorgias was the son of Charmantides[5] of Leontini. The year 4
of his birth as well as that of his death is uncertain. Apollodorus and Quintilian state that he lived to the age of 109, while others allow him only 105 years. Quintilian also says that he outlived Socrates, a statement which may or may not be confirmed by *Apol.* 19 e.[6] With these data alone to build on, it is not strange that authorities have been unable to agree on the dates to be assigned for his birth and death. We may assume that he was born between 492 and 483 B.C. and died between 384 and 375.[7] Of his family and early life and training we have very scanty notices. We hear of a sister married to a certain Deïcrates and of a brother Herodicus. It is likely that he early became acquainted with the teachings as well as the dia-

[2] Spengel, p. 26.

[3] The indignant exclamation *κακοῦ κόρακος κακὰ ᾠά.*

[4] See Foss, *De Gorgia Leontino*, Hallae, 1828. Frei, *Quaestiones Protagoreae*, Bonnae, 1845.

[5] The inscription on a statue of Gorgias at Olympia reads *Χαρμαντίδου Γοργίας Λεοντῖνος.* Suidas and Pausanias give it wrongly as *Καρμαντίδου.*

[6] Sittl, *Gesch. d. Gr. Lit.* ii. 36 n. thinks that Quintilian's statement may be based on Socrates' words.

[7] Foss gives the dates 496–388; Deuschle, 492–384; Frei, 483–375, which is agreed to by Zeller, Diels, and Susemihl; Fränkel, 487–379; Unger, 507–500. Blass thinks Gorgias was born probably before 480. *Att. Bered.* i. p. 47 n.

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lectic of the Eleatic school, as we may judge from the fact that he employed their arguments in his philosophic work. It was reported in antiquity that he had been a pupil of Empedocles, and it is probable that he wrote a philosophic treatise in the spirit of the Empedoclean theory. His natural gifts, however, as well as the spirit of the times, inclined him to the newly invented art of speech. And if Empedocles was really the inventor, as Aristotle declares, it is probable that he gained some light from him. Tradition made him also the pupil of Tisias as already mentioned, but Blass does not believe in the truth of the story. It is certain that he soon became a formidable rival of Tisias. He gained a great reputation in his native city as an orator and teacher of rhetoric, and many students flocked to his lectures. Among these was his truest follower Polus, who accompanied him on his travels afterwards. Soon came an opportunity for him to make his art felt and his name famous outside of his country. The inhabitants of Leontini were hard pressed by the Syracusans, and in their distress sent Gorgias as embassador to Athens in 427 B.C. to plead the claims of kinship and to beg assistance. Gorgias was eminently successful in his mission.[8] The Athenians — the most loquacious people of Greece — were charmed by the magic of his graceful eloquence. Never before had they heard an orator who was such a master of form as Gorgias, or whose words fell so sweetly and melodiously upon the ear. Consequently he was soon able to return to Leontini and announce the prosperous issue of his mission. But he did not stay. The poison of Athenian life had penetrated, and he was drawn back. He had recognized also that the field was more favorable there for the practice of his profession than in Sicily. The Athenians were seized with enthusiasm for him. Crowds of young men and older men also of the best families in the state

[8] *Hippias Mai.* 282 b Γοργίας τε γὰρ οὗτος ὁ Λεοντῖνος σοφιστὴς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἴκοθεν πρεσβεύων, ὡς ἱκανώτατος ὢν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἔν τε τῷ δήμῳ ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ συνὼν τοῖς νέοις χρήματα πολλὰ εἰργάσατο καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως. Thucydides does not mention the name of Gorgias in his account of the matter (iii. 86), but Diodorus does (xii. 53).

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crowded around him and paid gladly extraordinary sums for the privilege of hearing his instructions. The days on which he lectured they called festivals. His phrases were compared to gleaming torches, and Plato[9] himself goes so far as to compare him with the Homeric Nestor, the ἡδυεπὴς λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητής.

Gorgias was especially happy in the discourses he delivered 5
for display, or on festive occasions, called ἐπιδείξεις, and found many occasions to show his ability. But he also came forward as a teacher of oratory and found a ready body of pupils among the higher classes. See *Apol.* 19 e, *Gorg.* 449 b. He does not, however, appear to have remained very long at Athens despite his success. This may have been due to the fact that Athens soon became the resort of a numerous company of Sophists, whose mutual relations were not always pleasant, and the bustle and instability of Athenian life may have become somewhat irksome to a man now well advanced in years. He therefore soon left Athens, — though he must have returned thither several times. He travelled considerably, but when or where, we cannot with certainty state. We only know that he discussed in Olympia, before the concourse of assembled Greeks, with great applause, a purely national theme, — afterwards treated by many others, — the 'Eastern question.'[10] The most of his time, however, he spent in Thessaly, for which he seems to have conceived a great fondness. There the tyrants, especially those of Larissa, honored him, and the rich young nobles became infatuated[11] with him and flocked in great crowds to hear his teaching.[12] Among his pupils were Meno, one of Cyrus' generals

[9] *Phaedr.* 261 b. It is likely also that the fact that Gorgias, like Nestor, 'saw three generations of men,' had something to do with this comparison.

[10] Philostr. *Epis.* 73, ii. p. 257 K. Blass, i. § 54.

[11] The expression γοργιάζειν, which we find applied to this infatuation, is probably of later origin, and has some allusion to the story of the charmed Gorgon head.

[12] *Meno* 70 b τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν αἴτιός ἐστιν Γοργίας (*i.e.* that the Thessalians, especially those of Larissa, are so noted for their wisdom). ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἐστιν Ἀρίστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἅτε

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in the march of the Ten Thousand, Proxenus, another of these generals, and Aristippus, an Aleuad, and of noted Athenians, at least Philostratus, Thucydides, Critias, and Alcibiades, besides the celebrated teachers Isocrates and Antisthenes. Gorgias was not a cheap teacher; his charge was 100 minæ for each pupil. It seems, therefore, strange that he should have left only 1000 staters, or 200 minæ, behind him when he died; that too, when he had neither wife nor family to spend his money for him. But although he lived simply, he loved parade and to make an imposing display in public. In imitation of the priestly garb of his old master, Empedocles, he used to wear a purple mantle and golden sandals.[13] It is said also that he had a golden statue of himself set up at Delphi, at the dedication of which he delivered a great oration.[14] Otherwise even his enemies could find nothing in his manner of life to criticise, and were obliged to feel the highest respect for him. To his simple manner of life is attributed the fact that he not only reached a very great old age, but retained his bodily freshness and vigor until the end. Anecdotes are related of him to show his preference for old age instead of a disgust at it.[15] When finally his death was approaching, — a death which was without sickness and rather like a falling asleep, — he is said to have murmured, 'Now Sleep is beginning to conduct me to his brother Death.'

6 Gorgias left behind him various writings, six speeches — he seems not to have written a work on rhetoric — and a philosophical treatise *περὶ φύσεως ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*. It is not certain that any of these have come down to us. It is true that we possess two declamations which pass under Gorgias' name, the Encomium of Helen and the Defence of Palamedes; but the genuineness of these speeches cannot yet be said to be beyond question.[16] We

καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὑτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται.

[13] Aelian, *V. H.* xii. 32.

[14] Whether Gorgias had it set up, or it was set up in his honor by friends, and whether it was solid gold or only gilt, are questions not yet settled. *Cf.* Blass, i.[2] 58, n. 1, where the authorities are given.

[15] Blass, i.[2] 51, ns. 6, 7.

[16] In his first edition Blass restricted himself to the view that these speeches were either genuine, or had been designedly counterfeited, inclining rather to the latter alternative.

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also know the contents and arguments of the philosophical treatise from two sources.[17] Gorgias tries to prove: 1, that nothing exists; 2, if anything exists, it cannot be recognized or known; 3, even if it could be known, it cannot be communicated by words. To prove these statements he employs two modes of proof, — one of his own invention, and the other an adaptation of the arguments of the Eleatics.[18] If one considers the result desired only, there appears to be a contradiction between the theory of Gorgias and his actual practice. How, we may ask, can a man come forward as an orator and profess to teach the art of speaking (or communication) who denies the possibility of communicating knowledge? On closer examination, however, the inconsistency disappears. What Gorgias attempted to prove was, in the first place, the impossibility of objective existence or of a knowledge of such existence; in the second place, granted that there was such a thing as existence and a knowledge of it, the impossibility of bringing this fact by means of speech to the knowledge of others. He was not, however, bound by this view to deny the appearance of existence, or the possibility of conception and opinion. On the contrary, he rests the proof of his second point just on this argument, that the existent is of itself not a matter of thought, because otherwise what every one thinks must exist, and this would do away with the possibility of a false conception. He denied, therefore, that there was any connexion between human thought and conception, and existence, but he by no means denied the existence of conceptions. Hence the use of the art of speech must be on the supposition that the art of speech is designed to inspire in the hearers, without any reference to the

In his second edition, p. 79, n. 1, he distinctly abandons his earlier position, saying he was too much influenced by the spirit of the times, and comes out squarely on the side of the genuineness of the speeches. Diels had done the same in 1884, *Ber. d. Ber. Akad.*

[17] Pseudo-Aristoteles *de Gorgia*, c. 5. 6, and Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Math.* vii. 65–87. These two versions do not agree in all respects, and have been made the subject of careful study lately by O. Apelt in *Rhein. Mus.* 43. 202–219. Apelt shows that the account of Aristotle must be held as more accurately giving the mode of argument of Gorgias than that of Sextus Empiricus.

[18] Apelt, p. 204 f.

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actual existence, simply those conceptions which will be useful to the design of the speaker. In addition, however, the speaker is at liberty so thoroughly to acquire the power of expression that he may be able, by the perfection of form, to awaken in his hearers feelings of pleasure and assent.

7 Such, then, was Gorgias' view of Rhetoric. The contents, or subject of the speech, were a matter of indifference to him; the form was the great object. Hence he undertook to speak on any subject whatever, no matter whether he was acquainted with it or not. He challenged his hearers to put to him any question they pleased, and pledged himself to speak concerning it better and more elegantly[19] than any one else, and at whatever length might be desired.[20] Through the art of speech he undertook to make the great appear small, the small great, the old new, the new old; in short, to make anything appear its exact opposite. He cared nothing for the real nature of anything, but only sought to make it assume some particular appearance. His pupils were to acquire the same skill in the use of form, and to this end he imparted to them certain rules and artistic conceptions, or a technique of speech. Of course the most of his directions applied to the outward form merely; and his great merit lies in the fact that he was the first to direct attention to this side of oratory. He was the first to recognize the importance of figures of speech, and is said to have invented the names 'antithesis,' 'paronomasia,' 'parisosis' (or repetition of the same expression in different connexions), etc. He loved to give a poetic coloring to his ideas, and he laid especial weight on the symmetrical balancing (*ἰσοκωλία*) and rhythmical swing of his clauses. Probably, however, because he was a pioneer, he did not reach the degree of perfection in his treatment of form, which either himself, or the laws of symmetry and beauty demanded. His metaphors were

[19] *Gorg.* 447 c, Cic. *de Or.* i. 22. 103 (Gorgias) permagnum quiddam suscipere ac profiteri videbatur cum se ad omnia de quibus quisque audire vellet, esse paratum denuntiaret. *Cf.* also iii. 32. 129, *de Fin.* ii. 1. 1.

[20] *Gorg.* 449 c, *Phaedr.* 267 b (*Τεισίας Γοργίας τε*) *συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνεῦρον.*

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often harsh and bald, and his affectation of distinctly poetic words and phrases drew upon him the ridicule of later critics.[21] He could not get beyond a certain uniformity; for example, he seems to have considered the mere division into two corresponding or opposing halves to be entirely sufficient for symmetry. In short, the means at the command of Rhetoric were still too limited for perfection. But Gorgias nevertheless exercised an immense influence upon the later Attic literature, and his merit cannot be over-estimated, in awakening in the Greek mind the consciousness that the laws of beauty should prevail in every literary effort, in prose as well as in the domain of poetry. His example was followed by many men of high literary importance. Besides those already mentioned, the influence of Gorgias can be traced in Antiphon, Thucydides, Critias, the dramatist Agathon, Aeschines, and others.

3. Aim and Principle of the Dialogue.

The culture of the time in which the activity of Gorgias fell 8
is called the Sophistical. Its peculiar characteristic lies in the fact that it denied the reality of knowledge, morality, and justice, and admitted only an appearance of knowledge, morality, and justice, or rather, declared to be true, moral, and just only that which appeared so subjectively, to this person or that, — and this, of course, was different with every different individual. Gorgias, it is true, looked down upon the Sophists with scorn, and refused to be classed with them;[22] but this scorn was not directed against the immoral view of life which the Sophists held, in looking towards the appearance, and not the reality; for, as we have seen from the sketch just given of his teaching, he agreed with them in this; what he found ridiculous was that the others who called themselves Sophists should claim to teach wisdom and virtue, or human culture, while imparting knowledge of every variety. For him there was but one art, which was the

[21] See references in Blass, p. 64.

[22] *Meno* 95 c *καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα ταῦτα ἄγαμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο (ἀρετὴν διδάσκειν) ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς.* The feeling is shared by Callicles.

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essence of all arts, and made all knowledge unnecessary, the acquisition of the so-called virtue needless; namely, the art of speech or Rhetoric. But the Sophists also were well aware of the great value of a ready command of language, for it was this on which their mental superiority over others rested; and the most important of them, *e.g.* Protagoras and Prodicus, had paid great attention to linguistic investigation. Hence Gorgias, in point of fact, came to their assistance with his art of speaking; for it was just in so far as he declared the contents of the speech a matter of indifference, and laid the greatest emphasis on the development and perfection of form, that the art of speaking became the means of commending to the minds of others, according to the pleasure of the speaker, an appearance of truth, morality, and justice. Thus behind Rhetoric, so defined, lay hidden the worst and most dangerous form of Sophistic. For it not only urged the man who employed it to the practical accomplishment of any design, no matter how arbitrary, but provided him with the means best suited to it. Under the constitutional government of the majority of Hellenic states, a man's success in politics depended largely upon his ability to address an audience with readiness and force. This ability Gorgias professed to give by his new art of speaking. But when thus equipped what else could his pupils expect or strive for by means of their new weapon but the highest possible power in the state? And by power, what else could they understand but the power of doing whatever they pleased and of managing affairs according to their own caprice? And only then would the orator have achieved his object most completely when he had succeeded in raising himself to a tyranny and putting his fellow-citizens under his feet. Such was in reality the necessary aim of this rhetorical training; for it recognized beside itself no other knowledge as legitimate, and not only offered itself no moral view of state relations, but even declared the knowledge of justice to be useless, inasmuch as it was the office of the orator to decide first for himself what justice was, and then to make use of the art of speaking to compel from others the acknowledgment and acceptance of his view.

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Now of course Gorgias did not recognize these necessary con- 9
sequences of his principles, much less did he declare them. He did not even seem to see the close relationship of his efforts with those of the other Sophists. And this was one reason, perhaps, why so many of the cultured men of the period who were seeking certain practical ends in politics — that is, the rising statesmen — flocked so eagerly to hear him. Behind their praise of Rhetoric they concealed their sympathy with Sophistic. It was not long, however, before they ventured to proclaim their designs openly. For the moral sense of the period was declining so rapidly that but few, at least in Athens, its home, were disposed to object to the new culture. Plato therefore rendered the Athenian state a great service when he drew off the mask from this influential art of appearances, and showed it in its true nature as a form of Sophistic, and the worst form, too, because the emptiest. He had inherited likewise from his master Socrates the calling of scientifically destroying Sophistic in all its forms, and the founding and defence of a moral view of life in opposition to it. His theory of Ethics, as can be abundantly recognized from the dialogue before us, was already fully developed in its essential characteristics, and was quite strong enough to carry through this struggle successfully. If, however, the opposition in which Ethics stood to this so-called Rhetoric and its results was to be entirely understood, and if it was to be brought out a victor over its opponent, then it was necessary to lay quite bare the immoral principles on which Rhetoric rested, whether any one of his rhetorically trained contemporaries was acquainted with the real bearing of those principles or not. The aim of that method of training was seen to be the domination of the individual's caprice, wantonness, or arbitrary will. This assumes as the true principle of action, since it denies the validity of the existing laws of the state, the so-called law of nature, so widely defended by the Sophists, which is nothing more nor less than the law of the stronger. But this principle also can be traced to a far deeper-lying spring, the source of all immoral views of life; namely, the idea that the guide of a man's action should be not his mental but his sensual nature, and the therefrom resulting

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impulses and passions. Satisfaction of these, therefore, or in other words, sensual enjoyment, is obedience to this law of nature, which was synonymous with happiness according to the spirit of the times. The idea of happiness is common to both the moral and immoral views of life; but they look at it in different lights, and define it differently in consequence. Plato conceived happiness to lie in the absolute freedom of the mental and spiritual nature of man from the domination of sense. His opponents, on the other hand, looked upon this Platonic freedom as a matter of no consequence, and held that happiness could be reached only when the sensual nature was as free as possible, and could hurry without restraint from pleasure to pleasure. This opposition was the chief motive which led Plato to the composition of this dialogue, with which he may be said to have entered the lists in his contest with the tendency of the age.

To this motive for the composition of the dialogue must be added certain external causes which are of value for its correct understanding. The trial and condemnation of Socrates in open court had really been a contest between the old and dominant system and the new ethical theory. In this conflict Ethics experienced a defeat at the hands of its enemy, which showed that it must not extend its operations too far into the domain of political life. If it was to conquer, it must be in the domain of scientific and philosophical investigation and criticism. The Socratic theory of Ethics was confined to the teaching of virtue to the individual. Plato widens the circle of investigation. He starts the question, What relation does the Socratic ethical theory hold to the state, and has the dominant political principle any real justification in opposing it? If, as is to be supposed, the death of Socrates gave a mighty impulse to these investigations of the young philosopher, it must have led him to a sharper limitation and deeper conception of the department of science which he had entered. Another probable supposition may be added. Plato must have undergone much unfavorable criticism for holding himself aloof from all political activity, and making philosophy his calling; for the cultured men of his time looked upon politics

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as the only worthy pursuit for a free man. And Plato may have wished to defend himself against such attacks.

Plato was led, therefore, both by sincere differences of opinion 11
as well as by external circumstances, to make the question of the false and true theories of life — the former claimed and taught by the rhetorical culture of the time, the latter by philosophy — the subject of discussion for a public treatise. We should not, accordingly, expect in the *Gorgias* a full criticism of Rhetoric from all sides, for the various rules which it laid down for the correct arrangement of a speech have no place here; but we must also not lose sight of the fact that the discussion of the moral question already mentioned necessarily involves also the question as to the real nature and principles of Rhetoric. We cannot, therefore, consider Rhetoric as the general subject of the dialogue, as the περὶ ῥητορικῆς which the manuscripts affix to the title would indicate. Rhetoric enters into the discussion only as far as its relation to actual life is concerned; that is, so far as it was the means through which the business of the state was conducted. Now because, according to the general view, the duties of the citizen began, continued, and ended in politics, Rhetoric soon claimed and was admitted to be the real art of life. In this way, then, the consideration of Rhetoric may easily and naturally be made the occasion for a consideration, also, of the more general question of the true principle of life. This hand-in-hand consideration can, however, only continue to a certain degree, for the opposition of the two questions soon becomes evident as the discussion proceeds. The proper opposite to Rhetoric is Philosophy; but just as the former is represented by politics, the latter also appears in the form of ethics. Plato shows first, that real, genuine politics can only be founded upon the same ethics which prescribes the rules of life for the individual man; secondly, that the individual is only justified in turning his attention to politics, when he has made himself ethically perfect; and thirdly, that he must enter politics only in order to discharge his duty to his fellow-citizens, — in a word, only to make them better. In this way, philosophy becomes also the true art of life, not merely for the individual, but also for the association of individuals

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which is called a state. The aim of the false art of life is to satisfy the caprices of an ever-changing passion; that of the true, is to bring about the supremacy of the good. Hence Plato undertook in this dialogue to set forth scientifically the distinction that exists between the good and the pleasant.[23]

4. Scenery of the Dialogue.

A. Persons.

12 In the artistic development and arrangement of a dialogue in which alone, as an artistic form of prose, it can be opposed to the poetic drama, a matter of the utmost importance is the choice of the characters which are to carry on the conversation. That it is not those who give their names to the dialogues who are to be considered as the chief characters, is shown by a cursory glance over the various works of Plato. None of these works bears the name of Socrates, although (or rather because) not in one only, but in the majority of them, he is the leading character, *i.e.* the one whom the author makes the exponent of his own opinions, feelings, and efforts. Thus in our dialogue, likewise, Plato has assigned this role to his beloved teacher. He is throughout the leader of the conversation, for even the sections which seem to form exceptions to this rule serve only to show the inability of any one else to fill this position. In the most intimate connexion with this skill of Socrates stands the moral feeling, which he defends with especial emphasis and earnestness against a very different method. He shows himself here, as in other dialogues, to be a man in whom reason and will, thought and action, have been blended, by conscientious effort, into an almost ideal harmony. According to 461 c, we must suppose him to be already well advanced in life.

13 Compared with Socrates, all the other characters who take part in the dialogue fall somewhat into the background, because no single one has been chosen to bear alone the role of respondent,

[23] The various opinions of modern commentators are well discussed in the introduction to Cope's translation of the *Gorgias*. They agree, generally, with the view expressed by Cron. Cope bases his opinion on 527 b, c, which seems to be an explicit statement of the results of the dialogue.

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which is divided, but unequally, between three persons. Hence it is that Gorgias cannot be called the leading character next to Socrates, as may be said of Protagoras in the like-named dialogue, but he rather has a position analogous to that of Laches in the dialogue which bears his name. The fact, however, that he is less prominent in this dialogue than his importance would seem to require, is more than balanced by the marked respect which all parties to the discussion show him, as a man of upright aims and high attainments. For even though his theory did contain the germ of that immoral view of life which Plato made it his business to combat, yet it was only an undeveloped germ, and his whole life had been so honorable, and had borne testimony to such a high degree of moral feeling, according to the general Greek conception, that he could scarcely be held responsible for the results which were first drawn by his pupils and followers. As far as he was himself concerned, he only desired to be a master of language and of speaking, with skill to communicate to others also the art which he had practised with so much success. It was his fault that he had no clear insight into the nature of this art, and did not notice the inconsistency in which it involved him as regards his own moral feelings and opinions. The immoral principles which naturally corresponded to the art which he practised were championed not by him, but by his followers. He himself, the aged master, retires with unimpaired dignity from the discussion, in which he has shown no dialectical skill, it is true, but still a certain appreciation of dialectical methods. With him, Socrates reaches his aim without difficulty. But even when he has been defeated he does not take offence, but still shows a lively interest in the investigation, and when the excitement or sensitiveness of his pupils threatens to put an end to it, he comes to the rescue, and by his personal dignity causes its continuance.

Polus is one of the pupils of Gorgias, and assumes immediately 14
after him his position as respondent in the discussion. As regards the facts of his life, we know that he was born in Acragas, a Sicilian city of great wealth and power, and was therefore a countryman of the celebrated philosopher and statesman Empedocles. He became a disciple of the new school of rhetoric, and

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attached himself to Gorgias, whom he also accompanied on his travels, partly still to profit from his instruction, partly to obtain some reputation for himself by his dexterity in the handling of words. In this way he had now come with him to Athens. He is still young, as Plato emphasizes, but doubtless, according to 462 b, had already composed his treatise on Rhetoric.[24] But we must not look upon this so-called τέχνη as a theory based upon acknowledged principles. For such a work Polus was much more incapable than Gorgias. He had only learned from him the means of dazzling the minds of his hearers, a species of word-jugglery[25] in the practice of which he had obtained considerable readiness. The picture which Plato draws of him shows him to be an immature young man, not yet beyond the phrases of his student life, the height of whose self-conceit is only to be measured by the shallowness of his performances. He has absolutely no appreciation of dialectical methods; hence he has to be instructed in them repeatedly by Socrates, only to make the same mistakes again.[26] In moral questions he displays weakness and uncertainty.[27] He cannot deny a certain innate feeling for a moral standard in human actions (τὸ καλόν); and yet all his efforts are directed to the acquisition and possession of external power. Whenever this comes before his vision in all its glitter, he is filled with admiration for it, and overlooks entirely the immoral means which are employed in the attainment of his end. The examples of good and bad rulers, of well-ordered and lawless government, which his own country furnished, have taught him nothing. Nay, rather, his own case serves to show most clearly how small a foundation of truth lies in the admission wrung from Gorgias, that some knowledge of the principles of right and morality was an indispensable necessity for his instruction in rhetoric.

[24] Chronological accuracy is hardly to be demanded.

[25] In *Phaedr.* 267 b he is said to be the inventor of such devices of εὐέπεια as διπλασιολογία, γνωμολογία, εἰκονολογία, and artistic word-coinage after the fashion of Licymnius. See Thompson's note on this passage.

[26] What Socrates says with unmistakable irony of the pupils of Gorgias in *Meno* 70 b, applies excellently to Polus: καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν (Γοργίας), ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας κτέ.

[27] *Cf.* 470 c.

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The small formative power of this instruction is well shown by the case of the trained disciple himself, while the opposition of its pretended aims to all moral principles is clearly brought out by the inconsistency and self-contradiction displayed in the views which he advances. For a refutation of these false views, nothing further is necessary than the exposition of the few remnants of truth still remaining in them. From what has been said, we can easily appreciate the importance of the character of Polus for the artistic development of the dialogue.

Next in importance to Polus is Callicles, who, however, stands 15
in a different and much freer relation to Gorgias, although he may also in a certain sense be looked upon as his pupil. Of the circumstances of his life we know nothing more than can be gathered from this dialogue. He must have been of noble rank and rich, else Gorgias would hardly have been staying at his house. He seems to be abreast of the culture and spirit of his age, is versed in the poets, and wholly devoted to politics. From 515 a, we judge that he must have entered practical life not long before; and we may accordingly consider him as a man in the early prime of life. He is no theorist, like the other two, but a practical politician; not a teacher, but a statesman, who from his past life has drawn much useful experience, and now prosecutes his designs with definite purpose. For him the art of speech is only that for which it was intended, — namely, the means of acquiring a high position in public life. Since he was already fully in possession of the training of the period, he was well adapted to disclose all the principles on which his view of life was founded, and in accordance with which he was now pursuing his public career. Hence he represents the materialistic tendency, which recognizes profit only in enjoyment, only in the sensual pleasures, and scorns as an antiquated prejudice all acting in conformity with moral principles. But his materialism is by no means either coarse or effeminate; it is joined with a delicate culture and an energetic spirit; at least, he would wish it so. Hence he appears as an aristocrat (καλὸς κἀγαθός in its political sense) and despiser of the ignoble crowd, while at the same time he holds himself aloof from philosophy, because it makes men unpractical

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the discussion is immediately opened in the name of Socrates by Chaerephon, without any intimation of a pause or change of place, which would hardly be consistent with the simple setting of the dialogue, therefore it follows of necessity that the whole discussion takes place in the very spot where Gorgias had just held his splendid harangue. But since the house of Callicles, where Gorgias is staying as a guest, cannot be the scene of this harangue, we must lay aside any idea of a private dwelling, such as is the scene of the *Protagoras*, and imagine the scene of the *Gorgias* to be, perhaps, one of the gymnasiums so often mentioned in Plato's writings, which owing to its size and arrangement, was well adapted for such exhibitions before a large number of hearers, with the view of drawing pupils. Other persons, beside those already named, must also have been present at this discussion as silent listeners, as we can assume from several passages;[31] and the use of θόρυβος in 458 c seems to indicate that their number was considerable.

C. Time.

18 The time[32] at which the dialogue is to be conceived as taking place must be determined by the different allusions which occur in the course of it. These unfortunately refer to events so various that their dates mutually exclude each other; and the author seems to have allowed himself almost a poet's license. We must, therefore, from all these different allusions, try to select that especial circumstance which would be likely to have made the deepest impression upon the minds of contemporaries; and having decided upon this, we have a good basis from which to assume a date for the dialogue. The most important event alluded to is the death of Pericles (503 c), which compels us in any case to assume a time different from that which the mention in the *Protagoras* of Pericles and his sons as living, causes us to assume for

[31] 447 c, 455 c, 458 c, 473 e, 490 e. See note on 455 c.

[32] A complete discussion of the various views regarding the supposed date of the *Gorgias* is given in Cron's *Beiträge*, pp. 35–47. Since that time (1870) there has been but little discussion. Hirschig (1873) does not agree with Cron, — nay, does not even mention his view; Thompson (1871) and Schmelzer (1883) do not touch the question.

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that dialogue. At first sight the addition of the adverb νεωστί, "lately," seems to go far towards fixing the date, but the indefiniteness of νεωστί (see the note) and its entirely relative meaning forbid us to trust to it as a backward limit of time. The fact that Gorgias came from Leontini to Athens as ambassador in 427, Ol. 88. 1, also gives us no certain help, for we have no reason to suppose that he was only *once* at Athens — rather the contrary — and in the passage there is no definite allusion to that especial period. Still, the assumption that we have to imagine the period of this apparently first acquaintanceship of the Athenians with Gorgias as the time of our dialogue, would harmonize well enough with the above-mentioned allusion to Pericles's death, and also with the circumstance, that in 472 a, Nicias and Aristocrates are referred to as living, of whom we know that the former perished in the expedition against Syracuse, and the latter was one of the condemned[33] after the battle of Arginusae. This allusion prevents us from setting the date of the dialogue later than 413, and at the same time weakens the value of the otherwise especially noteworthy passage in 473 e, where Socrates speaks of his unskilfulness in political matters as shown by his conduct in the assembly. The mention of his office as senator and the duty of ἐπιψηφίζειν reminds us strikingly of the chronologically exact account of this same occurrence in the *Apology*. But Plato has avoided an express reference to the historical event mentioned there, perhaps designedly, in order not to give any too definite chronological background to his story. Hence we may possibly, if not probably, consider that he is alluding to some other event than the celebrated trial of the impeached generals, and need not be compelled to hold to the year 405 as the supposed time of our dialogue. The citations from the *Antiope* of Euripides, which was brought out in 410, need not cause us any trouble either, since it is just in such matters that Plato allows himself the greatest liberties, as is shown by the celebrated anachronism in the *Protagoras*, the mention of the Ἄγριοι of Pherecrates.[34]

[33] *Apol.* 32 b.

[34] This play was brought out in 420, while the supposed time of the *Protagoras* is put at 432 or 433 by most editors. See Towle-Sauppe's Introd. pp. 6 f.

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19 The important references seem therefore to point to a period of time included between the years 427 and 413.[35] Other allusions to circumstances and events also agree with this assumption. Thus in 481 **d**, Alcibiades, who was born in 450, and Demus, son of Pyrilampes, are contrasted, — the former as the sweetheart of Socrates, the latter as that of Callicles. Again, in 519 **a**, there is an allusion to the political activity of Alcibiades. Finally in 470 **d** we find a reference to Archelaus, who seized the kingdom of Macedon in 414, as a ruler who was now at the height of his fortune, the admiration and envy of the world. To fix the date more definitely within this period seems to be a matter of impossibility. If we assume it to be nearer to 413, we do not attach so much weight to the reference to the death of Pericles as it apparently deserves. If from other grounds we desire to keep the year 427 for the visit of Gorgias to Athens which we are now discussing, the reference to Archelaus adds another anachronism to the one already mentioned of the *Antiope* of Euripides. Such an anachronism, it is true, would not be more strange than the well-known one in the *Symposion*, where the violence shown the Mantineans by Sparta, fifteen years after the death of Socrates, is mentioned at a banquet, at which Socrates is represented as being a guest; but the rise of the kingdom of Macedon could not but have a very important bearing on the politics of Greece, and it is likely that the Athenians regarded, even at this early day, the intrusion of a new force into the political arena as more momentous than even the death of Pericles. This reference would then be a clear indication for the time when the star of the Macedonian king was already in the ascendant.

20 Certain other references to persons and facts are also found, such as the mention of the painters Polygnotus and Zeuxis in 448 **b**, 453 **c**, and of the dithyrambic poet Cinesias in 501 **e**, but these are not definite enough to be exactly dated, and therefore need not be taken into consideration in the present question.

[35] Zeller, in an article *Uber die Anachronismen in den Platonischen Gesprächen* (*Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie*, 1873), places the assumed date before 420, and Susemihl seems now (Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, i. 5) to hold the same view. *Cf.* his *Kleine Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte* in Fleckeisen's *J. J.* cxv. pp. 793 ff., and Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, xix. p. 144.

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5. Plan of the Dialogue.[36]

The plan of the dialogue would depend of course on the object 21
which the author had in mind. The third section of this Introduction has already shown that that object was to make clear and emphasize the opposition from the moral point of view between Rhetoric, as the generally recognized medium of political activity and ambition, and Philosophy, the true calling and aim of a man's life, as claimed by Socrates. This contrast is, however, not made prominent at once, but is the subject of the discussion with Callicles, which must therefore be considered as the most important part of the dialogue. This is preceded by the conversation of Socrates with Gorgias and Polus, which although it is divided between the two persons, is still shown clearly to be practically a single discussion. For not only are the discussions with these two persons outwardly united by the forwardness of Polus, whose pushing egotism is only equalled by his dialectical incapacity, but they betray also an internal connexion in their subject-matter, inasmuch as they both treat the question as to the nature and value of rhetoric, and both likewise are marked by vagueness of idea and uncertainty of moral feeling in the answers given it. This vagueness and uncertainty is in striking contrast to the reckless decision with which Callicles announces and defends his principles, — a contrast, too, which must be the more mortifying to Gorgias and Polus, since they, as theorists and teachers, are opposed to the mere practical statesman, who, however, of himself more than overbalances both the others together. In like manner, the discussion with Callicles, as its subject is more important, has a much wider compass than both the preceding together. A certain parallelism with the previous double discussion is also very apparent, in the fact that the discussion with Callicles is broken nearly in the middle by the

[36] Bonitz (*Platonische Studien*, Wien, 1858, i. p. 33) well says: "It can hardly be doubted any longer that the substance and object of the whole dialogue is given in the question, 'Is Philosophy in the Platonic sense, or is political Rhetoric, in the condition in which it at that time actually was, a worthy calling for life?'" See Cron, *Beiträge*, 47–65.

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interruption caused by Callicles' refusal to take part further in the discussion; owing to which refusal and because no one else is willing to enter the lists,[87] Socrates is compelled to answer his own questions in Callicles' place, until he succeeds in drawing him again into the conversation. With this section the dialectical development reaches its highest point; now begins that change (*μετάβασις*) which in the poetical drama is denoted by the term *περιπέτεια*, — the catastrophe; for up to this point the opponents of Socrates' view of life and its duties, in the case both of the individual in private and of the public aggregations of individuals into a state, have been continually increasing their efforts, partly owing to the growing heat of argument, partly also because they have had to call all their resources to their aid; now, however, a relaxation takes place — they have failed in the opposition — and it only remains for Socrates to expound more fully the theory which he has defended so successfully. Very effectively as far as the chief object of the dialogue is concerned, and also with admirable artistic feeling, the author makes Socrates begin this final section with a resumé of the results obtained in the conversation with Callicles. But inasmuch as the latter, in accordance with his deeply rooted manner of thinking and living, even at the last moment obstinately clings to his view of what the true man ought to do, Socrates finds it necessary to show the universal and eternal application of his theory, the inevitable and decisive victory of truth over error, in an independent section. In striking contrast with the dialectical sharpness and accuracy of the previous discussions, this conclusion appears couched in the guise of a mythical story. There is, however, a special fitness in this, for its religious coloring causes the whole exposition to appeal with convincing power to the feelings of the reader, and goes far to prepare him for the earnest and solemn warning with which the dialogue closes. This conclusion, short in compass, in contents and form intensely oratorical, serves also to preserve the due artistic proportions of the work; for it corresponds to the short introductory conversation between Callicles, Socrates, and

[87] 505 d ΣΩ. *τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; sc.* *ἀποκρίνεσθαι* or *διαλέγεσθαι.*

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Chaerephon. And just as this introduction, through the medium of the question which Chaerephon propounds to Gorgias, and which Polus presses forward to answer, leads naturally and gradually to the progressively developing scientific discussion, — so this discussion through the medium of this mythologically colored λόγος is led over to the concluding exhortation in which we, whose eyes are opened, can see clearly the power and warmth of deep moral conviction.

Simple as is the setting of the *Gorgias*, it yet belongs among the greatest, from the point of view of artistic perfection, of the dialogues of Plato.[38] For, aside from the absorbing interest of the question discussed, one can hardly fail to notice as he reads, both in the choice and characterization of persons (ἦθος), and also in the progressive development of the discussion, how completely all the requirements of art are satisfied, thus making the Gorgias as a prose work fit to challenge comparison with any of the works of the poetical drama.

6. Summary of the Dialogue.[39]

Introduction. Preliminary conversation on the scene of Gorgias' just concluded speech. Socrates desires to have some conversation with Gorgias. Callicles invites him to his house for the purpose. Socrates bids Chaerephon ask Gorgias what he professes to be. 22

[38] In the Introd. to *Apol.* § 52, Dyer-Cron divides the dialogues of Plato into three classes, according to their setting: (1) the simplest form, which 'has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occasional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Socrates, while the other may be successively assumed by various persons.' Then the narrated dialogues: (2) those 'without preface, and with no account of the persons to whom the narrative or reading is made, or (3) those introduced by a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon become his attentive listeners.' Typical examples are *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and *Phaedo*.

[39] This summary, which is not found in Cron's edition, is drawn from Deuschle's *Dispositionen der Apologie und des Gorgias von Platon* (2d ed. by Cron, Leipzig, 1867), and adapted to the short skeleton of the dialogue which is given by Cron in his *Beiträge* (Leipzig, 1870), pp. 73 ff.

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Discussion. 447 d–527 a.

I. 447 d–481 b. Dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias and Polus. What is Rhetoric, and what is its power?

Introduction. 447 d–448 d. Chaerephon puts the question to Gorgias. Polus pushes forward and attempts to answer the question, of what art Gorgias is master, by praising the art.

A. 448 d–461 c. Dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias. Attempt to define the nature of Rhetoric and its relation to moral principles, — with self-contradictory results.

Introduction. 448 d–449 d. Socrates shows the error into which Polus has fallen. Definition of his art, Rhetoric, by Gorgias. Socrates insists upon a discussion according to dialectical methods.

1. 449 d–457 c. Attempt to obtain a definition of Rhetoric.

a. 449 d–453 a. Determination of the specific class to which Rhetoric must be assigned.

α. 449 d–451 a. First attempt at definition. But the characteristic is too general and only external.

β. 451 a–453 a. Second attempt at definition. Rhetoric (with its varieties) is classed under the specific idea πειθώ.

b. 453 a–457 c. An examination of the definition just obtained.

α. 453 a–455 a. Its meaning.

αα. up to 454 c. Determination of the object to which the πειθώ is directed, — right and wrong.

ββ. up to 455 a. Determination of the nature of the πειθώ, — pretence without knowledge.

β. 455 b–457 c. Its compass.

αα. up to 456 c. Indefinite extension of the field of Rhetoric.

ββ. up to 457 c. Admission of the possibility of a misuse of the power Rhetoric gives.

2. 457 c–461 c. Proof of the contradiction between Gorgias' conception and presentation.

Transition. 457 c–458 e. Question as to the continuation of the discussion.

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a. 458 e–460 d. A definite statement of Gorgias' view.

α. up to 459 c. In general, the orator need have no knowledge of the matters on which he speaks.

β. up to 460 d. In the special case of right, however, he must be able as well as desirous to know it.

(This involves an inner contradiction.)

b. 460 d–461 c. Proof of the (external) contradiction between this definitely stated view and the admission made above of the possibility of a misuse of Rhetoric.

B. 461 c–481 c. Dialogue between Socrates and Polus. Value of Rhetoric according to the standard of moral principle.

Transition. 461 c–462 b. Polus objects to Socrates' method. Socrates exacts a condition in regard to the manner of conducting the discussion.

1. 462 b–468 e. Exposition of the real nature, and little value of Rhetoric (in general).

a. 462 b–466 a. The real nature of Rhetoric.

α. 462 b–463 d. Vain attempt of Polus to lead the discussion by propounding the questions himself. General characterization of Rhetoric.

β. 463 e–466 a. Complete presentation and exposition of Socrates' view of the nature of Rhetoric.

b. 466 a–468 e. From this determination of the nature of Rhetoric is deduced the result that it is of little value.

α. 466 a–467 c. Polus questions unskilfully. Socrates *declares* as a consequence of the definition the entire weakness of Rhetoric.

β. 467 c–468 e. Socrates takes control of the discussion and *proves* this consequence from the difference between *βούλεσθαι* and *δοκεῖν*.

2. 468 e–479 e. Declaration of the moral principles which serve as the standard for this judgment.

Transition. 468 e–470 c. A discussion in which the meaning of Polus is formulated (by a limitation) in opposition to the principle enumerated by Socrates.

a. 470 c–474 a. Negative portion. Vain attempt of Polus to combat the moral principles of Socrates.

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α. 470 c–472 d. Vain attempt of Polus to refute the proposition, 'If any one do wrong, he is not happy.' — Criticism of the argument by Socrates.

β. 472 d–474 a. Vain attempt of Polus to refute the proposition, 'He who suffers punishment for a wrong committed is happier than he who escapes such punishment.' — Criticism of the argument by Socrates.

b. 474 b–479 e. Positive portion. Socrates brings forward his proofs.

α. 474 b–475 e. Proof of the proposition, 'Doing wrong is a greater evil than suffering wrong.'

β. 476 a–479 e. Proof of the proposition, 'To remain without punishment for a wrong committed is the greatest possible evil.'

Conclusion. 480 a–481 b. Results in regard to the employment of Rhetoric

α. For protection of one's self or one's friends.

β. For the injury of one's enemies.

23 II. 481 b–522 e. Dialogue between Socrates and Callicles. What is the true theory in life, — the rhetorical-political or the philosophical-ethical?

Introduction. 481 b–482 c. Callicles recognizes that the ethical theory of life advocated by Socrates and the ordinary practice of men are diametrically opposed. Socrates shows that all human effort should be the outcome of a harmony of the soul in thought and action.

A. 482 c–505 c. Negative portion. Exposition and refutation of the rhetorical-political theory of life (Attack and Defence).

1. 482 c–495 a. Exposition of the rhetorical-political theory of life.

a. 482 c–486 d. General exposition. Commendation of the political, rejection of the philosophical calling.

(Rhetorical part.)

Introduction. 482 c–e. Criticism of the manner of procedure which Socrates has followed towards Polus and Gorgias.

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a. 482 e–484 c. Opposition between natural right and legal right.

αα. up to 483 c. Explanation of the nature of both and of the origin of the latter.

ββ. up to 484 c. Alleged proofs of the right of the stronger, drawn from history and from Pindar.

β. 484 c–485 e. Opposition between political and philosophical activity.

αα. up to 485 a. Objections to the latter.

ββ. up to 485 e. Its usefulness is limited to a preparation for political activity.

Conclusion. 485 e–486 d. Recommendation of the rhetorical-political activity for Socrates, on the ground of the danger which threatens him.

Transition. 486 d–488 b. Socrates shows the importance of the question under discussion and the conditions which allow the hope of a satisfactory result.

b. 488 b–495 a. Exposition of the view of Callicles from the point of view of its leading principle in a dialectical discussion.

a. 488 b–491 b. (Preparatory portion.) Test of the proposition as to the right of the stronger.

αα. up to 489 b. First limitation of the stronger, to that which is more powerful in bodily strength or greater in mass.

ββ. up to 491 b. Second limitation to that which is more clever.

β. 491 b–495 a. Disclosure of the fundamental principle of the theory of Callicles.

αα. 491 c–492 d. In general. The essence of happiness and the end of human effort is the satisfaction of the desires, however great they may be.

ββ. 492 d–495 a. In particular. Passion of itself without limitation, or the pleasant, is the good.

2. 495 a–505 c. Refutation of the theory of Callicles as shown in its fundamental principle.

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a. 495 a–499 b. Refutation of the theory that pleasure is the chief end of man. Arguments against the identity of the pleasant and the good.

α. 495 a–497 d. Direct proof.

β. 497 d–499 b. Indirect proof.

Transition. Acknowledgment that only a part of man's desires are good, the other part being evil.

b. 499 b–505 c. Deduction of the immediate consequences of that principle.

a. 499 b–501 d. Determination of a general antithesis, to serve

αα. up to 500 d. As a standard of judgment in regard to human actions.

ββ. up to 501 d. As a means of determining the principles which underlie human occupations.

β. 501 d–505 c. Application of it to special occupations.

αα. up to 502 d. To the varieties of music and poetry.

ββ. up to 505 c. To Rhetoric in particular. The standard of judgment for the actions of the statesman.

B. 505 c–522 e. Dialectical exposition of the philosophical-ethical theory of life, as opposed to the rhetorical-political.

1. 505 c–513 c. This theory must determine the life of the individual. Ethics *per se*.

a. 505 c–508 c. Positive arguments to show that this theory must determine the life of the individual.

α. up to 507 c. The teaching of virtue for its own sake.

β. up to 508 c. The teaching of virtue in relation to the attainment of happiness.

b. 508 c–513 c. Negative justification. Refutation of the objection that life according to philosophical principles must make a man incapable of helping himself.

α. up to 511 a. Determination of what true self-help is: Defence against wrong doing, not wrong suffering.

β. up to 513 c. Refutation of the idea which lies at the basis of this objection, viz. that under any circumstances a man should try to live as long as he can.

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2. 513 c–521 a. Application of the ethical principle to Politics.

a. 513 c–517 a. Empirical determination of the business of the statesman

α. 513 c–515 c. By establishing the preliminary conditions which must be fulfilled.

β. 515 c–517 a. By a criticism of the most celebrated Athenian statesmen, from the point of view of their skill as displayed in the results of their efforts.

b. 517 a–521 a. Logical confirmation of this judgment

α. 517 a–519 b. By a distinction between the true art of statesmanship and that which is only time-serving (pretended).

β. 519 b–521. By the demonstration of the necessary connexion which exists between the statesman's course of action, and the behavior of the citizens toward him. Analogy between Rhetoric and Sophistic.

Conclusion and transition, 521 a–522 e. Choice between the two kinds of statesmanship. Callicles commends the time-serving or flattering art with regard unto the danger of death which would otherwise threaten. Socrates declares himself as one who under existing circumstances intends, as far as possible, to practise the true statecraft in spite of the danger of death which threatens.

III. 523 a–527 a. Epilogue. Mythical exposition of the object, 24
after death, to which the efforts of a man should be directed in life.

A. 523 a–524 b. Myth of the origin of the judgment of the souls of the dead, and how this is conducted.

B. 524 b–527 a. Results.

a. up to 525 b. The nature of death and the form in which the soul appears after death.

b. up to 527 a. The condition of the soul after death, under a system of rewards and punishments, in accordance with each man's life in this world.

Conclusion. Recapitulation of the leading contents of the dialogue, and exhortation of Callicles.

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7. Time of Composition of the Dialogue.

25 This must of course be distinguished from the time assumed for the meeting of Socrates, Gorgias, and Callicles (§§ 18 ff.). Hence to determine it, the very anachronisms which offer so much difficulty in determining the assumed time are often of great value. This is not so much the case, however, in the *Gorgias* as in some other dialogues, since, leaving out of account the anachronisms, no ground exists for assuming the date of composition to be before 405. Nay, rather, the subject and whole tone of the work, as shown in the many passages which must strike every reader as plain allusions to the fate of Socrates as an already accomplished fact, compel the assumption of some time subsequent to this tragic event. But that it was written not very long after Socrates' death is shown by the evident traces of moral indignation in the references to the existing government and the actions of prominent statesmen. This assumption would fix the date as shortly after the composition of the *Apology* and *Crito*.[40] This is supported, though one could hardly say confirmed, by the statement of Athenaeus, that Gorgias was still living when this dialogue was brought out.[41]

[40] This is the view generally adopted. The majority of the editors are content to give this period, rather than a definite date. Thompson puts it at 395, and Cope in the period between 395–388. The most recent treatment of the question is by S. Sudhaus in *Rhein. Mus.* xliv. pp. 54–63, who thinks that the *Gorgias* is directed against Isocrates, who is represented by Callicles, and is a kind of reply to the Πρὸς Νικοκλέα (377 B.C.). Isocrates, on this view, defends himself against the strictures of the *Gorgias* in the Νικοκλῆς (375 B.C.). Hence the date of the composition of the *Gorgias* must be 376.

[41] Athenaeus xi. 113 (505 d).

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5- ἀστείας – like Eng. nice – in a slang sense.

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ, ΠΩΛΟΣ.

Stephanus I. p. 447.

I. ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ἦ τὸ λεγόμενον κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν;

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτῆς. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.

447 a I. 1. **πολέμου καὶ μάχης**: Socrates and Chaerephon come just after Gorgias has finished his lecture. Callicles receives them with a jest, the point of which lies in the *οὕτω*. In the double expression, the more general precedes, as is natural, the more definite. — **μεταλαγχάνειν**: occurs also in *Rep.* 429 a with *ἐπιστήμης*, and *Leg.* 873 c with *αἰσχύνης*. It is rare.

3. **τὸ λεγόμενον**: in appos. with the sentence. See G. 137, 3; H. 626 b. — **κατόπιν ἑορτῆς**: proverbial, like post festum. This would call up to the Greek mind their public exhibitions, and the banquets with which they closed. Here is probably also an allusion to the extravagant enthusiasm which led the Athenians to designate as festivals those days on which Gorgias lectured. See Introd. § 4 *fin.* 447 a

5. **καὶ μάλα γ' ἀστείας**: Hirschig remarks the frequency of such answers as these, which avoid the repetition of the last word of the preceding question. *Cf. Theaet.* 168 e ἀλλ' *οὔ τοι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον, Crat.* 391 b. — **ἀστείας**: properly *belonging to a city*. It became an adj. of quality inasmuch as city festivals and celebrations are naturally superior to those of the country. It is used here in a good sense, though it may also mean "citified."

6. **ἐπεδείξατο**: the aor. is necessitated by the time-limit (*ὀλίγον πρότερον*). — **ὀλίγον πρότερον**: the first word is an acc. of extent; the second is adverbial.

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Σω. Τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῖψαι. b

Χαιρεφων. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, εἰσαῦθις.

Καλ. Τί δέ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου;

Χαι. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.

Καλ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε, παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει, καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.

447 a 7. **τούτων**: the pl. refers to the fact and its consequences. — **ὅδε**: is deictic. — **ἐν ἀγορᾷ**: the omission of the art. shows that this was a phrase like 'in town,' 'on change.' By this time, *ἀγορά* had come in Athens to mean simply the exchange, or market-place, where people assembled not for public debate (that was in the Pnyx), but for business. It was a favorite resort of Socrates, since there the concourse of people offered him the best opportunity for prosecuting his god-given vocation (*cf.* Introd. to *Apol.* § 25, and *Apol.* 33 a ff.). *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 10 *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνός γε ἀεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ· πρωί τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ᾔει καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερὸς ἦν, κτέ.* — **ἀναγκάσας**: the literal meaning is not to be pressed. Chaerephon as the constant companion of Socrates took the liveliest interest in all his actions.

b 9. **οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα**: shows the asyndeton of ordinary conversation. — **ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι**: prob. contains some allusion to the story of Telephus, who when wounded by Achilles received from the oracle the assurance *ὁ τρώσας (καὶ) ἰάσεται.* The myth was made the subject of a noted tragedy by Euripides. 447 b

10. **ὥστε ἐπιδείξεται**: **ὥστε**, when combined with the ind., can for all practical purposes be treated as if it were compounded of *οὕτως* and *τέ*. *Cf.* Lat. itaque. See on 458 d. — **ἐπιδείξεται**: here used absolutely in the same sense as above. The fut. has two sides, one corresponding to each condition; thus it is equiv. to (1) *ἐθέλει ἐπιδείκνυσθαι εἰ δοκεῖ*, and (2) *ἐπιδείξεται ἐὰν βούλῃ*. *Cf.* a different case in 502 b, with note.

12. **τί δέ**: the question shows that Chaerephon had not anticipated any great eagerness on Socrates' part.

14. **ἐπ' αὐτό**: the pronoun is emphatic. See on 458 a. The emphasis is heightened by *γέ*.

15. **ὅταν βούλησθε** *κτέ.*: contains an invitation, the basis of which is given by the clause with *γάρ*. The original conclusion of the condition was to be *ἐπιδείξεται*, but in the course of the *γάρ* clause the speaker lost sight of this and continued with the co-ordinate construction. — **παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε**: this shows that the speakers are neither in nor before the house of Callicles. On the place of meeting, see Introd. § 17.

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Σω. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, c τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης [τοῦ ἀνδρός,] καὶ τί ἐστιν ὃ ἐπαγ-
20 γέλλεταί τε καὶ διδάσκει· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν εἰσαῦθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.

ἐστιν

Καλ. Οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἦν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα
25 ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

Σω. Ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. Ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

447 c 17. **ἐθελήσειεν ἄν**: Socrates uses the opt. with *ἄν* a great deal, esp. when he first meets a person. It is the mood of courtesy, but not of argument. In this dialogue the opt. preponderates at the beginning, but the subjv. overtakes it in the argumentative passage 471, 472; while in the whole dialogue the proportion of subjs. to opt. is 3 to 2.

18. **διαλεχθῆναι**: emphasized in order to contrast Socrates' method with the *ἐπίδειξις* of Gorgias.

19. **δύναμις** (vis): *i.e.* the power and inner meaning of the art, with which the *ἐπάγγελμα* should correspond, — the scope or compass. — **ἐπαγγέλλεται κτέ.**: *cf. Apol.* 33 b *ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα. ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι* is the regular word in Greek for 'advertise,' 'profess.'

20. **τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν**: it does not follow from this that Socrates considered the *διαλεχθῆναι* as a kind of *ἐπίδειξις*. It is only an example of the idiomatic Greek usage of *ἄλλος*, which does not include but excludes the word with which it is connected. *Cf.* 473 c *πολιτῶν καὶ ἄλλων ξένων, Apol.* 36 b. See G. 142, 2, N. 3; H. 705. We must use a circumlocution, or another word, in English. In Callicles' answer, however, the attributive force is regained. 447 c

21. **ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις**: const. closely with *εἰσαῦθις*, as referring to the invitation of Callicles to come to his home.

22. **οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν**: *there is nothing like asking the man himself.* The articular infinitive is a favorite with Plato. He uses it most commonly in the acc. The nom. comes next in frequency, with the gen. a close third. The dat. is much less frequent. The pr. tense occurs nine times oftener than the aor., showing a great advance on Pindar. See *Am. Jour. Phil.* III. 193–201.

23. **αὐτῷ**: on account of its meaning ("the master," Kr. 51. 5, 4; H. 681 c) is placed in this emphatic position. On the matter itself see Introd. § 7, and the passage from *Meno* quoted Introd. N. 12. Auditors are present also at the following dialogue (*cf.* Introd. § 17 *fin.*). — **ἐκέλευε**: imperf., because the same bidding or invitation was given to the different members of the group. *He bade us all.*

26. **καλῶς λέγεις**: expresses more satisfaction than *εὖ λέγεις* just before.

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Χαι. Τί ἔρωμαι; d

Σω. Ὅστις ἐστίν.

Χαι. Πῶς λέγεις;

Σω. Ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

II. Χαι. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;

Γοργιας. Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ 448 ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.

Χαι. Ἦ που ἄρα ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρινεῖ, ὦ Γοργία.

Γορ. Πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.

Πωλος. Νὴ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ.

447 d 27. τί ἔρωμαι: deliberative subjunctive.

28. ὅστις ἐστίν: ὅστις is regularly used to ask the question 'who' after a neg. (*cf.* 524 e, 526 b); but in all cases it may be used to express the idea of quality. See on 453 b.

30. ὥσπερ ἂν . . . ἀπεκρίνατο ἄν: ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ is phraseological, and the second ἄν comes in unconsciously with the conditional apodosis. The use of the aor. with ἄν in the apodosis, following an imperf. with εἰ in the protasis, where both refer to the present sphere of time, is not common, and according to GMT. 414, occurs chiefly in Plato and in such phrases as εἶπον ἄν, ἀπεκρινάμην ἄν. Similar constructions in the past sphere are found with other verbs im Dem., Aristoph., Soph., Eur., Xen., *etc.* *Cf.* Dem. xix. 162, Ar. *Eq.* 507. — δημιουργός: see on 452 a.

II. 1. μανθάνω: one example suffices 447 d to make the idea of Socrates clear to Chaerephon; two are not enough for Polus. This is, however, due to the fact that Chaerephon is familiar with Socrates' methods, while they are new and strange to Polus.

2. ἀποκρίνεσθαι κτέ.: this is the τί of Socrates' question above in c. The tense shows that it is a general standing announcement.

7. ἦ που ἄρα κτέ.: spoken in a 448 a wondering, admiring tone which expects an answer. "Surely, then, you must have but little difficulty in replying, Gorgias." The irony lies in (the inferential) ἄρα as well as in ῥᾳδίως. On the pushing nature and insolence of Polus, see Introd. § 14. What is said generally in *Meno* 70 b (see Introd. n. 12) of the pupils of Gorgias applies excellently to him.

9. ἐμοῦ: by a very natural shift,

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Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.

ΧΑΙ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; οἴει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς; b

ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα.

ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν; c

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.

ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν

448 a after τούτου. — 'Gor. *You may try the experiment if you please, Chaerephon.* Pol. *Yes, 'egad, and upon me too, if you like, Chaerephon.*' Cope.

10. καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι: gives the ground of Polus' offer. Possibly he may also wish to intimate that Gorgias may now fairly retire, and yield the field to another.

b 14. τί δὲ τοῦτο: sc. διαφέρει. "What difference does this make?" *Cf.* 497 e. Polus does not wish to slight his master, but only to win admiration for himself.

18. Ἡρόδικος: this brother of Gorgias (see Introd. § 4) must not be confounded with another physician of the same name who came from Selymbria (*Rep.* iii. 406 a, *Phaedr.* 227 d, *Prot.* 316 d), and was famed as the first to insist upon the value of gymnastics for health. 448 b

19. ὅπερ: after τίνα by an easy transfer to the actual idea, — 'name.'

24. Aristophon's brother was the celebrated painter Polygnotus of Thasus.

30. Polus speaks as from a book — c perhaps from his own book (462 b).

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ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ηὐρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

III. Σω. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ. d

Γορ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σω. Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Γορ. Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

Σω. Οὔκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος

448 c He overdoes the use of those figures, with which Gorgias also was accustomed to amuse himself, *e.g.* 'paronomasia' (*κατὰ τέχνην . . . κατὰ τύχην*) and other phonetic figures in regard to the names of which theorists themselves were not at one. He uses the poetic *αἰῶνα* instead of *βίον*. His statements are indefinite and cloudy, and finally he brings forward a wholly general attribute — as Socrates proves in e by the distinction between *ποία* and *τίς* — of the matter in question, instead of its name. To speak of rhetoric as *καλλίστη τῶν τεχνῶν* is furthermore dialectically inappropriate, although it well agrees with the artistic design by drawing attention thus early to this idea. For other examples of similar mannerisms, see the speeches which go under the name of Gorgias (*e.g.* in the appendix to Blass' edition of Antiphon), and which, whether genuine or not, show admirably the peculiarities of the Gorgianic school. 448 c

III. 1. **παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς**: *equipped for*. The phrase is a military one; hence *λόγους* is almost equiv. to the later *λογομαχίαν*, 'disputation.' The reference is to the readiness with which Polus begins his harangue. d

4. **τί μάλιστα**: *how so, pray?* To Gorgias' view the question has been well answered.

8 f. **οὔκ . . . ἀλλά**: the construction is colloquial. *οὔκ* is to be translated *no!* The following clause with *γέ* serves to give the reason for *οὔκ*, "that is, if." The negative color of the whole complex causes the speaker to ground his position by *ἀλλά* where one would more naturally find *γάρ*. It is not necessary to fill out the ellipsis with *ἂν ἥδιον σέ* either in Greek or English.

9. **δῆλος γάρ μοι**: on the personal construction, see on 449 b.

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καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

Πωλ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σω. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

Πωλ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη;

Σω. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἠρώτα ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς καὶ ὁντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν· ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπέ, τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.

Γορ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σω. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;

Γορ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

Σω. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

448 d 11. **διαλέγεσθαι**: the most unassuming name by which Socrates can characterize his practice, so completely the reverse of the commonly used rhetoric. The inf. is an acc. verbal noun.

e 15. **ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος**: equiv. to ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἔψεγε.

19. **ὑπετείνατο**: *cf.* the Eng. use of 'lay down a proposition or principle' to serve as analogy for future guidance. Note the asyndeton which appears somewhat harsh, but is not uncommon in clauses with ὥσπερ. *Cf. Alcib. I.* 108 d τί οὖν τὸ κατὰ ταύτην ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐγώ σοι τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τὴν γυμναστικήν, καὶ σὺ δὴ οὖν οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τί φῂς; 448 e

21. Socrates accepts tentatively 449 a the statement which has been so continually advanced, that ῥητορική is a species of art, in order to proceed with the discussion. The correctness of this statement is brought under question later.

26. **ἀγαθόν γε**: the self-satisfaction of Gorgias is so great that he speaks like a Homeric hero. Note the condescension (perhaps unconscious) in the following κάλει δή (*you may call me so, then*), of which, however, Socrates takes no notice. — **εἰ δή**: *if . . . really*.

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Γορ. Κάλει δή.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν; b

Γορ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι; . . . ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Γορ. Εἰσὶν μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν c
ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.

449 b 32. **ἄλλοθι**: on these travels, see Introd. § 5. The vagueness of the adverb stamps the whole statement as somewhat boastful.

35. **τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων**: Socrates does not mean that the answers should be restricted to a certain length; but he wishes to exclude those answers which, instead of keeping strictly to the question under discussion, branch off and lose themselves in different trains of thought. By using *καί* before Πῶλος, Socrates gives us to understand that he fears something similar from Gorgias.

36. **εἰσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι**: *put off till another time.* — **ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ**: with reference to 447 e.

38. **εἰσὶν κτέ.**: though Gorgias speaks like a master, with the air of authority, he would still like to leave a way of escape open for himself, — which unfortunately his boastful **ἐπάγγελμα** has rendered impossible, although he had not yet distinctly promised to speak with brevity.

449 c 39. **ἀναγκαῖαι . . . ποιεῖσθαι**: the personal construction proceeds from the 'prolepsis' of the subject of the inf., — a common occurrence with *δίκαιος* and *δῆλος*. The real subject of the infinitive is then *ἐνίας τῶν ἀποκρίσεων*. Of this construction Plato affords other examples. *Cf. Meno* 79 d *ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων . . . ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι*, *Phaedo* 92 d *τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις*. In translation the adj. must be made neuter, or a circumlocution must be used. "There are certain answers in which it is necessary for one to deliver himself more at length." See H. 944 a; Rid. § 230.

40. **διὰ βραχυτάτων**: simply a circumlocution for the superlative adv., and accordingly const. with *ὡς* acc. to the usual rule. Kr. 49, 10, 1; H. 651 a. In the next sent., *ἐν* seems to have much the same force as *διά* here.

41. **μηδένα ἄν . . . εἰπεῖν**: the use of *μή* here is not to be considered as due

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Σω. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξω αὐτοῦ τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰσαῦθις.

Γορ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

IV. Σω. Φέρε δή· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῂς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ἡ ῥητορικὴ d περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἦ γάρ;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.

Γορ. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

Σω. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;

Γορ. Περὶ λόγους.

449 c to indir. disc. which would require *οὐ*, but as being in an inf. clause which is in apposition with *ἕν*.

IV. 1. **ῥητορικῆς γὰρ κτέ.**: *γάρ* introduces the reason for the question which is announced in the challenging phrase, *φέρε δή*. Hence the position of the causal clause.

d 3. **περὶ τί**: '*περί* with acc., ordinarily of *action*; *περί* with gen., ordinarily of *thought* or *speech*; but *thought* or *speech* may be considered as *action*, and shifts are not uncommon.' B.L.G. *Cf.* *περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς* below (12).

8. **νὴ τὴν Ἥραν**: Socrates rarely uses the same oath twice in the same dialogue. *Cf.* *νὴ τὸν κύνα* 466 c, *μὰ τὸν* — 466 e, Δί' 470 e, 516 d, *τὸν κύνα* 449 d *τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν* 482 b, *τὸν Ζῆθον* 489 e. See on 463 d.

9. **ὅτι ἀποκρίνει**: the explanatory clause freq. borders on the causal, as here.

10. **πάνυ ἐπιεικῶς**: *fairly well*. In this self-laudation, Gorgias has in view only the form of his answers without reference to their connexion with the subject-matter. He only wants to show that he is a master of brachylogy, and therefore answers in the shortest formulae of affirmation and negation.

13. **ἐπιστήμη**: not really different from *τέχνη*, inasmuch as the orator is *ἐπιστήμων ῥητορικῆς τέχνης*.

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Σω. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἆρα οἳ δηλοῦσι τοὺς e
κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν;

Γορ. Οὔ.

Σω. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορικὴ
ἐστιν.

Γορ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Σω. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὥνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;

Γορ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἣν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν 450
καμνόντων δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;

Γορ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σω. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;

Γορ. Μάλιστα.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τοὺς
περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;

449 e 15. **ποίους τούτους**: the acc. instead of the nom. on account of the proximity of λόγους. The const. of the previous clause is continued. — **τοὺς κάμνοντας**: an example of one of the most common kinds of anticipation, where the subj. of the dependent sent. is drawn forward under the government of the leading verb.

18. **οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας** κτέ.: accordingly the definition of Gorgias is too wide. *Cf. Prot.* 312 d *ἴσως ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν.*

23. **οὐκοῦν περὶ ὥνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν**: *sc. ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς* with each clause. Apparently Socrates makes no immediate use of this point, so that it might appear unnecessary. But by contrasting thought with speech he thus at the beginning of the discussion emphasizes the importance of the contents as opposed to the form, a distinction on which he subsequently bases his refutation of Gorgias. 449 e

26. **δυνατοὺς εἶναι** (*sc. ποιεῖ* from 449 e): on the difference between ἆρα and ἄρα οὐ, where an affirmative answer is expected, see on 479 c. 450 a

33. **εὐεξίαν τε . . . καὶ καχεξίαν**: opposites are regularly connected by τε . . . καί.

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Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἑκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους, οἷ τυγ- b
χάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὗ ἑκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.

Γορ. Φαίνεται.

Σω. Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἣ ἂν ᾖ περὶ λόγους;

Γορ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λό- c
γων ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.

V. Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν;

450 b 36. **ἑκάστη**: when the second clause explains the first, the asyndeton is but little felt.

37. **ἡ τέχνη**: const., in spite of the article, not with *ἑκάστη*, but with *οὗ*. This is the pred. while *ἑκάστη* is subject. "Of which each (art) is the art."

41. **ἣ ἂν ᾖ**: the indef. rel. sentence is necessary, owing to the very general character of Gorgias' statements hitherto. — **ταύτην**: as referring to *ἣ ἂν ᾖ* is also indefinite. "If this you call rhetoric — any art which has to do with discourses."

43. **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**: this phrase occurs in Plato 77 times (GMT. 777, 1). The *ὡς* is not to be considered as final, as in the Eng. 'so to speak,' but is rather comparative, in the meaning 'in a word,' though it is often convenient to translate by 'so to speak.' It is closely connected with the following *πᾶσα*, as in 456 a with *ἁπάσας*, 450 d with *οὐδενός*, *Phaedo* 78 e with *οὐδαμῶς*. *Cf.* Kr. 55, 1, 2. Its force 450 b is shown by its opposition to *ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ* in *Rep.* i. 341 b *ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντα, τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ*, and its employment here shows the inability of Gorgias to give a clear and sharp definition of his art.

45. **κύρωσις**: *accomplishment*, consequently *effect, power*. This unusual word, which Thucydides vi. 103 uses in the meaning *decision, resolution, determination*, is replaced below in e by the equally unusual *κῦρος*. More common is the verb *κυροῦν confirm* and *κυροῦσθαι bring to pass*, 451 b, c. *Cf.* also *ἄκυρος void, inoperative, Crito* 50 b, *Prot.* 356 d.

47. **ὀρθῶς λέγων ὡς ἐγώ φημι**: this c addition is also characteristic of his self-confidence.

V. 1. **ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω κτέ.**: this question is put without any expecta-

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τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἦ γάρ;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστιν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοι- d αύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φῂς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι· ἢ οὔ;

Γορ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σω. Ἕτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ

450 c tion of an answer. *οἵαν* is used, and not *τίνα*, because there is no inquiry after the name of the art (which for the moment is considered satisfactory), but after its nature or kind, which must now be more clearly defined. In the following methodical discussion Socrates makes clear what was present, but in a confused form, in Gorgias' mind. The question now is as to the *means* of the *κύρωσις*. The ground of distinction is formed by the contrast so familiar to the Greeks between *λόγος* and *ἔργον* (*λέγειν* and *πράττειν*). *Cf. Apol.* 32 a.

5. **τῶν μέν**: in part. apposition with *πασῶν*. See H. 624 d. The correlative is *ἕτεραι δέ* (12), while *ἔνιαι δέ* is to be connected with *δέονται* as one division of the *τῶν μέν*, and as correlative with the implied subject (*αἱ μέν*) of *δέονται*. Below we find *ἢ . . . ἢ* instead. 450 c

7. **τὸ τῆς τεχνῆς**: *the business, function of the art.* See H. 730 b.

9. **οὐ φῂς**: on the adhaerescent *οὐ* see GMT. 384; H. 1028. d

14. **ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστική**: arithmetic is the theoretical science of numbers; logistic, the practical art of reckoning. See the following chapter. On the omission of the article, see Kr. 58, 2, 1; H. 660 a; and note on 469 d.

15. **πεττευτική**: seems to be a general name for various games which were played on a board with pieces, whether dice or checkers. The addition of *γέ* indicates that the member of the series is not usually classed with the others; *cf. Crito* 47 b *ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον κτέ.*

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πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. τῶν τοιού- e
των τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικήν.

Γορ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σω. Ἀλλ' οὗτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι "ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν," καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, "τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικήν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις;" ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.

Γορ. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπο- 451
λαμβάνεις.

VI. Σω. Ἴθι νῦν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν

450 e 18. **αὐταῖς . . . ἐστίν**: *cf.* below in ē ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα.

22. **οὐχ ὅτι**: *not but that, although.* —**τῷ ῥήματι**: *as far as actual words are concerned;* "but you could not have earnestly meant it."

24. **ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις**: regular formula for introducing an objection; *cf. Apol.* 20 c. The opt. is potential. —**δυσχεραίνειν**: in the proper sense of δυσχερής, *hard to manage, i.e.* to make difficulties. *Cf.* 483 a κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Remark the delicate irony of the words ἀλλ' οὐκ κτέ., which consists in this, that Socrates apparently passes very gently over the contradiction which exists between the words and the actual meaning of the teacher of oratory.

451 a 28. **ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει**: acknowledges and accepts the suggestion made by Socrates. Note the oratorical swing in the addition of **δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις**, which serves also to preserve the dignity of the master who is ever ready to encourage good work in the pupil. 451 a

VI. 1. **ἴθι**: is simply an encouraging interjection like φέρε δή 449 c. —**καὶ σύ**: acknowledges the courtesy of Gorgias' preceding words. —**τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην**: is brachylogic for τὴν ἀπόκρισιν τοῦ ἐρωτήματος ὃ ἠρόμην.

2. **διαπεραίνειν**: denotes the suitable conclusion which Gorgias ought to make to his answer, by establishing some distinction characteristic of rhetoric. Socrates assumes then a little ironically that this object has already been almost attained. Since, however, he wishes in what follows to make clear that two or more arts can belong to the same species and yet be entirely distinct from one an-

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λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν· "ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη;" εἴποιμ' ἄν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος b ἐχουσῶν· καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο· "τῶν περὶ τί;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν, ὅσα ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνῃ ὄντα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο· "τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο· "ἡ περὶ τί;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει· περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ c γάρ ἐστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστική. καὶ εἰ

451 a other, it is necessary for him to give and compare several examples.

6. **ἂν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον**: logically follows *τεχνῶν*.

b 9. **τῶν περὶ τί**: the sentence would be correctly filled out thus: *τῶν περὶ τί διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἐχουσῶν*. The use of *τῶν*, both here and in the following answer, shows that the inquiry is directed to the function of a class. On the other hand *ἡ περὶ τί;* just below inquires after the function of the individual art. As an example of Plato's *ποικιλία*, notice the variety in the expressions *ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα*, *διὰ λόγων τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα* and *λόγῳ κυρουμένων*.

10 f. **ὅσα ἂν τυγχάνῃ**: *however great each happen to be, i.e.* to any magnitude you please.

14. **ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι**. Socrates refers to those who bring forward motions in the assembly of the people or have them recorded by the *γραμματεύς* to be then communicated to the assembly, at 451 b the command of the president, by the herald. If there was a previous motion either of the senate or an orator on the same subject before the body, instead of recording and reading the common preamble of both motions, the words *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ βουλή* (or whatever the name of the proposer was) were employed, followed by the modification or amendment. This corresponds in a general way to our 'amend after the words,' *etc.*

17. **πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα** c *κτέ.*: '*the relative as well as the absolute properties.*' Cope. The reckoning can only be made with odd and even numbers; hence *πρὸς αὑτά* means even to even, *etc.*; *πρὸς ἄλληλα*, even to odd, *etc.* The definition of *λογιστική* runs thus in *Charmides* 166 a *ἡ λογιστικὴ ἐστί που τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ ἐπιστήμη, πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα*. The pl. must be construed according to the sense, not the form.

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St. 1. p. 451.

τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη
20 λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, "οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας," εἰ φαίη, "περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φορὰν· καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. d

25 ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων τις· ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; ⟨τί⟩ ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων,
30 περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;

ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

VII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἶομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν e
τοῖς συμποσίοις ᾀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν

451 c 19. **ἀνέροιτο**: *sc. τίς ἐστιν*, the subject of which is given in the proleptic accusative. *Cf. Prot.* 351 e *τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.*

d 25. **ἴθι σύ**: the rest of the sentence is to be supplied from the preceding words of Gorgias. The clause with *γάρ* gives the basis of the following question. *Cf.* 449 c, d.

30. **περὶ οὗ**: according to analogy we should expect *περὶ ὅ*. But *cf.* a similar shift in 453 b and e with *πειθώ*. See also 491 a and note on 449 d.

31. **τὰ μέγιστα**. Gorgias, like Polus, finds it extremely hard to come out of the rut into which he has fallen, and give a scientific definition of his art.

e VII. 3. The scolion was a peculiar kind of drinking-songs, *παροίνια*, sung at banquets. The one here alluded to is mentioned by Plato in *Euthyd.* 279 a, *Phileb.* 48 d, *Legg.* 631 c, 661 a. It probably was composed by Simonides, although according to some it was by Epicharmus. After Bergk's (Poet. Lyr. Gr. iii.[4] 645) rhythmical changes the words acc. to the Scholiast read as follows: 451 e

Ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,
δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

The last line of the scolion is omitted by Socrates, because, for his argument, only those advantages can be cited which involve the practice of some art.

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ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ἅδοντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὡς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.

Γορ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

Σω. Ὅτι σοι αὐτίκ' ἂν παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὧν ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἰατρὸς ὅτι "ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμή." εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· "σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν ταῦτα λέγεις;" εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι "ἰατρός." "τί οὖν λέγεις; ἦ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν;" "πῶς γὰρ οὔ," φαίη ἂν ἴσως, "ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ' ἐστὶν

451 e 4. καταριθμοῦνται: the advantages are arranged according to their value in the enumeration. Instead of an object the clause with ὅτι follows, introducing the dir. discourse.

452 a 8. δημιουργοί: the word is found as early as Homer and denotes all who carry on a business which is public and useful to the people; as, physicians, soothsayers, singers, goldsmiths. Later, the expression was extended to free manual laborers, without, however, losing any of its respectability. Hence it corresponds to our use of the word 'master' (master-workman, master-mason). *Cf.* 455 b. It is noteworthy that only such things are enumerated as, like the assumed result of rhetoric, were reckoned among external advantages; for rhetoric, according to the view of Gorgias, should procure in the state either high office or honors. Hence the scolion is very applicable. Socrates brings forward the physician, the body-trainer, and the banker, in order to contrast with the subjective judgment of Gorgias the subjective opinions of others, and thus to show the subjectivity of the answer.

452 a 10. παιδοτρίβης: the *body-trainer* for boys taught in the gymnastic schools (παλαῖστραι). He is often confounded with the γυμναστής, whose proper office was the scientific treatment of the whole subject of bodily exercises, and whose field was the public γυμνάσια, where he instructed grown men in general and also those who were training for the games (ἀθληταί). Both the παιδοτρίβης and the γυμναστής are often mentioned alongside of the physician, since the nurture and care of the body was their common aim. *Cf. Crito* 47 b. — εἴποι πρῶτον: the ἄν before παρασταῖεν is felt as extending over the whole sentence.

b 16. ὑγίεια: if the word is sound, it must be taken as an absolute addition to the proper question which ends with ὦ Σώκρατες. The diffuse-

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μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγιείας;" εἰ δ' αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι ὅτι "θαυμάζοιμι τἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτός, εἴ σοι ἔχοι Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς·" εἴποιμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον· "σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον;" "παιδοτρίβης," φαίη ἄν, "τὸ δ' ἔργον μού ἐστιν καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα." μετὰ δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἴποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων· "σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι c πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἢ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἢ παρ' ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν." φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· "τί δὲ δή; ἦ σὺ τούτου δημιουργός;" φαίη ἄν. "τίς ὤν;" "χρηματιστής." "τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον;" φήσομεν. "πῶς γὰρ οὔκ;" ἐρεῖ. "καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὑτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν," φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ' ἄν· "καὶ τί ἐστιν d τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας." ἴθι οὖν νομί- σας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ,

452 b ness of the whole passage favors the view that the construction must not be rigidly pressed here.

18. **τἄν**: for **τοι ἄν**, as we frequently find **μεντἄν** for **μέντοι ἄν**. *Cf. Apol.* 29 **a δεινὸν τἂν εἴη**.

18 f. **καὶ αὐτός**: like et ipse, "likewise," while recognizing the claims of the physician, shows also a consciousness of his own importance as compared with Gorgias. This calls forth in the reply the address **ὦ ἄνθρωπε**, which indicates some degree of contempt and surprise.

c 25. The very mode of speaking declares the pride of wealth. — **δῆτα**: with the imv. makes the claim for recognition more urgent than the simple **δή**. Kr. 69, 20; H. 1037, 6. — **ἐάν**: *whether*, introducing the indir. question. But Goodwin (GMT. 493, 680) denies that **ἐάν** can ever mean 'whether,' insisting that every expression like the present is conditional. The side-thrust at Gorgias is very appropriate, as he himself received much money from his teaching and lived magnificently upon it.

452 c

31. **ἀμφισβητεῖ**: *affirms* (in contradiction of his opponent), "disputes this and says."

d 33. **τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο**: adverbial acc. H. 600 a; 719 b.

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St. I. p. 452.

ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ φῂς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

Γορ. Ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
40 ποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ.

Σω. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

Γορ. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν e
δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ξυλλόγῳ παντί,
45 ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς ξύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν

452 d

37. **αὐτοῦ**: shift from the rel. to the leading clause. G. 156; H. 1005.

39 f. **αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις**: the pronoun emphasizes personal freedom as opposed to power over others. In thus stating the aim and purpose of all the sophists' efforts, Gorgias (acc. to Plato) fails completely to notice the mutual contradiction of the two members.

40. **τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν**: Heindorf desires *τῶν ἄλλων*, which would better accord with the ordinary usage. Still the indefiniteness of the expression may not be without object in showing the inexactness of thought which naturally prevailed at a time when the art of speaking was just being brought within the reach of all.

e 42. Construe *ἔγωγε* (*λέγω*) *τὸ οἷόν τε εἶναι πείθειν κτέ.* — **οἷόν τε**: expresses 'position,' *οἷος* 'disposition.' Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 165.

44. **καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ξυλλόγῳ** (*sc. τῶν πολιτῶν*): is paraphrased with a limitation in the following clause. In this division of the various kinds of bodies in which the orator would have occasion to display his powers we see the basis of the three chief varieties of oratory (*γένη*, genera) which are generally recognized by later critics. The first, *τὸ δημηγορικόν* (*συμβουλευτικόν*, deliberativum), was employed *ἔν τε τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις καὶ ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις*. The second, *τὸ δικανικόν* (iudiciale), was employed *ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις*. The germ of the third, *τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν*, which was not distinguished by Anaximenes, can be discerned in the words *καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ξυλλόγῳ κτέ.* This last was first defined by Aristotle, who used as the basis of his division the oratorical characteristics of the several varieties, not the place of their delivery, as Gorgias does here.

452 e

45. **ἐν δυνάμει κτέ.**: "the possession of this power will involve the servitude of the physician," etc.

46. **δοῦλον**. This expression seems to be Gorgias' own, as is to be gathered from the passage in *Philebus* 58 **a**, cited by Heindorf. Protarchus says there: *ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν (δύναμις) πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν· πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὑτῇ*

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St. I. p. 452.

παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

VIII. Σω. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγεῖ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι 453
ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς
5 τοῦτο τελευτᾷ· ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;

Γορ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὁρίζεσθαι· ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.

Σω. Ἄκουσον δή, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὡς

452 e δοῦλα δι' ἑκόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν. — The Gorgianic balancing δοῦλον μὲν . . . δοῦλον δέ gives a certain dignity to the words.

47. οὗτος: is scornful, as in *Crito* 45 a. — The thought is expressed first positively, then negatively, then again (by a kind of apostrophe — since σοί cannot be considered as addressed to Socrates) positively. Gorgias cannot refrain from again declaring more distinctly what he has already indicated by ἄλλῳ. *Cf.* 464 c ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, where, however, the same device is of value in giving more clearness to the statement.

49. τὰ πλήθη: *sc.* in the different assemblies.

VIII. 1. ἐγγύτατα: *more definitely.* The answer given comes nearer to being an answer indeed.

453 a 3. πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς ἡ ῥητορική: this definition which Socrates has gathered from Gorgias' verbiage, was not invented by Plato, but was apparently well known in Athens at the time. — πειθοῦς: to be understood in a passive sense, as πειθὼ ποιεῖν below shows. 453 a

4 f. εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ: instead of the regular εἰς, occasionally ἐν and πρός are used with but little difference of meaning.

5. τι: is not the object of λέγειν, but is probably to be construed with ἔχειν somewhat as follows, *have you any reason to say.* The object of λέγειν is contained in the following ἐπὶ πλέον . . . δύνασθαι ("its power extends further than"), with which indeed Hirschig construes τι.

9. εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι: is occasionally found construed with the inf. like an ordinary verb of perception, even in cases where there is no intervening clause as here to attract a following inf. *Cf.* Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2. 2 Λύσανδρος τοὺς φρουροὺς . . . ἀπέπεμπεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας . . . εἰδὼς ὅτι ὅσῳ ἂν πλείους συλλεγῶσιν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, θᾶττον τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔνδειαν ἔσεσθαι: Owing to the shift in the construction, ἐγώ is left absolute at the beginning of the sentence.

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ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλόμε- b
νος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, καὶ ἐμὲ
εἶναι τούτων ἕνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ.

Γορ. Τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σω. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ,
ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων
ἐστὶν πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγεω καὶ περὶ ὧν· οὐδὲν μέντοι
ἧττον ἐρήσομαί σε, τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ
τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ ἕνεκα δὴ c
αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ
σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προΐῃ, ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν
ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ εἴ
σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν
σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἶ μοι εἶπες ὅτι

453 b 10. **εἴπερ** κτέ.: the leading idea of the pred. lies in the participle.

13. **τί οὖν δή**: inquires what to follow from the admission of the statement.

14. **τὴν πειθώ**: proleptic.

15. **ἥτις ποτ' ἐστιν**: but *ἣν οἶμαι* is used below, according to the rule that *ὅστις* is required after a negative, while it may occur — though *ὅς* is regular — with a positive. *Cf.* 447 d, and see Morris on Thuc. i. 136. 4. — **ἣν σὺ λέγεις**: indispensable addition to *ἥτις*. On *περὶ ὧντινων*, see on 451 d.

19. **τοῦ ἕνεκα δή**: an example of the 'rhetorical question' which Demosthenes uses to great advantage. Rid. § 325 cites also from *Gorgias* 457 e, 458 a, 487 b.

c 20 f. **οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα**: in this answer we have merely an indefinite contrast between person and thing; which is much more clearly defined below in 457 d *κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν* 453 c *ἑαυτῶν λέγειν* and e *οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα λέγειν . . . ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ*. Socrates guards himself against any suspicion that he may be influenced by personal feelings in his criticism of Gorgias. *Cf.* 454 c.

21. **ὡς**: not to be joined with *μάλιστα* as a superlative phrase, but correlative with *οὕτω*.

23. **ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ**: introduces frequently, as an illustration of a general principle, a supposed case similar to it. It is easy to add a second hypothetical clause, not coördinated with the first, but which, combined with the apod., has the first as a common protasis. *Cf.* below, 468 d, and *Apol.* 27 d.

24. Zeuxis, the celebrated painter and contemporary of Socrates, was a native of Heraclea in Lower Italy. He was the pupil of Apollodorus,

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ὁ τὰ ζῷα γράφων, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῴων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῷα; d

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

453 c who, by a more delicate appreciation and application of the principles of light and shade in painting, greatly furthered the development of the art, and obtained for himself the surname of 'Sciagraph.' The paintings of Zeuxis, who belonged to the Ionic school, were noted for their delicacy and fine coloring. Besides the Helena which he painted for the Crotoniates (Cic. *de Inv.* ii. 1. 1), his most celebrated picture was the Penelope, wherein he depicted with great success pure matronly modesty. The story of his contest with his rival Parrhasius is well known.

25. **ζῷα**: a general expression for every kind of pictures.

26. **καὶ ποῦ**: Socrates wishes here to make clear that if we wish to define an object exactly, *i.e.* so as to make it easily recognizable, it is not sufficient to give the characteristic which it has in common with other objects, but rather it is necessary to mention that characteristic which belongs to it alone and distinguishes it from all other objects. So, for example, it is not sufficient to say that Zeuxis is a painter, *i.e.* one who either paints or has painted pictures; but in order to distinguish him from other painters, who also paint or have painted pictures, we must state more nearly the kind of pictures which he has painted (*ποῖα*), as 'he who painted the Helena or the Penelope.' But even this is not entirely sufficient, for there are still other painters who have painted these same objects; but when we say, 'he who painted the Helena in Croton (*ποῦ*),' we have definitely defined Zeuxis. *ποῦ* could also, and more naturally, refer to the scene of his labors, — where he had his studio. We must note (1) that *ὁ τὰ ζῷα γράφων* is only the common designation of all painters, by which they are distinguished from the *λόγους* or *νόμους* or *συγγράμματα γράφοντες*, (2) that *ὁ γράφων* can and must be understood in the same way in which we so often understand *ὁ ἀδικῶν*, *ὁ κρατῶν*, etc., *i.e.* as a generic word, not limited in time (H. 827), (3) that *ποῖος* is often scarcely to be distinguished from *τίς* (*cf.* Xen. *Anab.* iii. 1. 14 *ἐγὼ οὖν τὸν ἐκ ποίας πόλεως στρατηγὸν προσδοκῶ ταῦτα πράξειν; ποίαν δ' ἡλικίαν ἐμαυτῷ ἐλθεῖν ἀναμένω;*). With these points understood, we see that the present example suffices to show that to define rhetoric as *πειθοῦς δημιουργός*, *i.e.* *ἡ τὴν πειθὼ ἀπεργαζομένη τέχνη* is insufficient, so long as the *πειθώ* wrought by it is not more exactly specified in order to distinguish it from that wrought by other arts which come under the same general definition. *Cf.* moreover the answer of Gorgias, below, **454 b**, which corresponds to the example before us exactly, even as far as the *ποῦ* is concerned. 456 c

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Σω. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἂν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο;

Γορ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποιεῖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει, ἢ οὔ;

Γορ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

Σω. Πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὥνπερ e νυνδή· ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς, ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;

Γόρ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστιν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική.

Γορ. Φαίνεται.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς, ποίας πειθοῦς· καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρωούμεθά που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστίν. καὶ τὰς 454

453 d 31. **ἔγραφε**: *were a painter.*

38. **οὐ δῆτα** (*sc.* **οὐ πείθει**) **ἀλλὰ κτέ.**: chiastic with the question preceding. The affirmative of the first member of the question is made much more emphatic by the previous express denial of the second member, which must therefore itself be emphatically uttered. Usually the answer does not follow so closely the words of the question; *cf.* below, 501 c, and *Parm.* 128 a **οὕτω λέγεις ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω; Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καλῶς συνῆκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται.** Different, however, are 454 a, b, and 496 d, below. *Cf.* Rid. § 305.

40. **ὥνπερ**: on the omission of the prep. see Kr. 51, 11, 1; H. 1007. *Cf.* below, 517 c **ἐν παντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διελεγόμεθα**, *Apol.* 27 d. So in Lat., *e.g.* Nep. *Cim.* 3. 453 e

41 f. **τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ**: *the properties of number. Cf.* **τὰ τῆς ψύχης, τὰ τοῦ βίου.** See on 450 c.

50. **τὸ περιττόν**: in such combinations the article is usually omitted with the second member, and only inserted when the two members are to be looked upon as more distinct. *Cf.* above, 451 b with c, and 454 e, 455 a; see Kr. 58, 2, 1. — **ὅσον**: sing. because each antecedent is of equal value.

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ἄλλας ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἁπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὔσας καὶ ἥστινος καὶ περὶ ὅτι· ἢ οὔ;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστιν δημιουργός.

Γορ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

IX. Σω. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, "ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστιν τέχνη;" ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι; b

Γορ. Ἔμοιγε.

Σω. Ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτω.

Γορ. Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἃ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.

Σω. Καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὼ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, ἐὰν

453 e Neither ὅσον ἐστίν, nor ὅσα ἐστίν, above, conflict with the passage 451 b, c.

454 a 3 f. **ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί**: *cf.* above, *ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί*.

4. **τέχνη**: no one need be disturbed by the substitution of *τέχνη* for *δημιουργός*, as the two words have kindred ideas. There is also no appreciable difference between *ποίας* here and *ἥστινος* a few lines above. *Cf.* 453 e, and see on 453 c.

b 6. **ἔμοιγε**: the form of the question shows that an affirmative answer is expected.

9. **ταύτης**: draws attention to the earlier explanation in 452 e, from which is drawn (*τοίνυν*) the following definition, which in form follows as an epexegesis to *ταύτης τῆς πειθοῦς*. The definition answers the *ποῖον* as far as the external matters of persons (speakers) and place are concerned, and is used by Socrates (c) in order to obtain a definition that characterizes the nature of the *πειθώ*. Gorgias does not use *ὄχλοις* with the disparaging feeling which it sometimes has, but as a general word for assemblies. 454 b

11. **περὶ τούτων κτέ.**: answers the question *περὶ τί* 4, above. On the change of case, *cf.* 449 d.

13. **ἀλλ' ἵνα κτέ.**: this sentence is a good example of those curious anacolutha which occur so often in the conversation of ordinary life, where a slight emphasis on a single word may perhaps change the whole construction, and cause the speaker to lose

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ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν c
δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ· ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἕξῃς
ἕνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλ'
ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ
λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν
βούλῃ περαίνῃς.

Γορ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σω. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμα-
θηκέναι.

Γορ. Καλῶ.

Σω. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;

Γορ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Πότερον οὖν ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι d
καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;

Γορ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.

Σω. Καλῶς γὰρ οἶει, γνώσει δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε

454 b himself in a network of clauses, of which, while the idea is clear enough, the grammatical construction is hopeless. The idea here is this: "I thought you meant that, but still I asked; and you must not be surprised if I again ask something which seems to be evident enough; for it is absolutely essential for our argument that we proceed upon definitely expressed statements, and not upon mere suspicions, which may prove to be misunderstandings." In the construction the speaker proceeds well enough until he is thrown off the track by ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ. The use of this seemingly independent clause (it is really, together with δοκεῖ μέν, in dependence on ὅ) causes him to branch off, in the clause ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, in order to explain the reason for his repeated questioning, and at the same time to reiterate one of the fundamental principles of dialectic. 454 b

15. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω: refers to 453 b.

17. ὑπονοεῖν: "to form a pre-opinion of what another is likely to think on a subject without his having expressed himself," to impute to him certain views, and thereby to forestall his explaining himself. c

18. ὑπόθεσιν: is a plan or principle which Gorgias has laid down for himself, and which conditions the direction in which (κατά) the thesis is to be developed until the end is reached (περαίνῃς).

21. ἴθι δὴ κτέ.: see on ταύτῃς, in b, above.

29. καλῶς γὰρ οἶει: see on 451 a. d Note the difference in tone of Gorgias' answer, as compared with 450 c.

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ἔροιτο· "ἆρ' ἔστιν τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;" φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Τί δ'; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;

Γορ. Οὐδαμῶς.

Σω. Δῆλον γὰρ αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν.

Γορ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σω. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.

Γορ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Σω. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην;

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;

Γορ. Δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ[illegible] ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.

454 d 31. **φαίης ἄν**: has the force of an affirmative. *You would say 'yes'*; so *οὔ φημι* often means *I say 'no,' I deny*. See Kr. 64, 5, 4.

33. **ἐπιστήμη**: from *ἐπίστασθαι to understand, i.e.* properly, *correct understanding, knowledge*. This takes the place of *μάθησις*, which strictly denotes the *process of learning*, whose *result* is *ἐπιστήμη*, because this idea better suits the above opposition between *μεμαθηκέναι* and *πεπιστευκέναι*.

35. **δῆλον γὰρ αὖ**: confirms the distinctness of the two ideas which Socrates had already affirmed much more 454 e positively than Gorgias.

37. **πεπεισμένοι**: so far as the inward conviction is concerned, *μάθησις* and *πίστις* agree; objectively, however, they are very different, for *μάθησις* involves the acquisition of knowledge, while ignorance is the necessary concomitant of *πίστις*. 454 e

40. **βούλει οὖν κτέ.**: Socrates now proceeds to analyze (*διαίρεσις*, divisio) the general definition in order to obtain that special definition (*ὁρισμός*, definitio) which, according to the requirements of logic, must include, together with the statement of genus (*τὸ γένος*, genus proximum) also the addition of the characteristic (*διαφορὰ εἰδοποιός*, differentia specifica) which separates it from other species of the same genus.

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Σω. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς δημιουργός 455
ἐστιν πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε
καὶ ἄδικον.

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων
τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ
πειστικὸς μόνον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο το-
σοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.

Γορ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Χ. Σω. Φέρε δή, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατα- b

455 a **48. ἡ ῥητορικὴ** κτέ.: the first definition which had its origin in the technic of the rhetorical schools (see on 453 a) has now acquired a more exact and complete expression by the help of this dialectical investigation. Note the change from *περὶ τῶν δικαίων* to *περὶ τὸ* [illegible] *Cf.* 454 b, e.

54. πειστικός: *able to persuade.* Equiv. to *ἱκανὸς πείθειν*, as *διδασκαλικός* to *διδασκαλίαν παρέχων* or *ἱκανὸς διδάσκειν*. Neither this nor *πιστευτικός* used above can properly be construed with the genitive. With *διδασκαλικός*, however, we find examples, as *Euthyph.* 3 c *Ἀθηναίοις οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἄν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας.* See Kr. 47, 26, 9; H. 754, b. In the addition of *μόνον* lies a gentle intimation of some defect, the result of which for the estimation of rhetoric appears more plainly later.

55. ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ: draws attention to a great defect of the Athenian judicial system. It was often impossible to present before the court a clear exposition of the points at issue, as the speeches were limited to a certain length, which was carefully measured by the *κλέψυδρα*, — a practice which Socrates also complains of in *Apol.* 19 a *ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ*, and 37 a *ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον διειλέγμεθα.* 455 a

X. 1. **φέρε δή** κτέ.: introduces a new discussion designed to test the definition just obtained, which, although from the point of view of form it satisfies excellently the double requirement made above in 454 a, still leaves some uncertainty as to the *exact* meaning of Gorgias. Hence the question, 'What do we *really* mean thereby?' Socrates professes to be not yet quite certain himself (*οὐδ' αὐτός*), notwithstanding that he has contributed the most to the more close definition of the *ποῖον*. His doubts are directed especially to the *περὶ τί* as it has been just defined according to the specifications made by Gorgias. This discussion forms the transition to the examination of the true value and ethical tendency

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νοῆσαι ὅτι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι. οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἱρέσεως πέρι ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ᾖ, ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὔ· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε φὴς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητής σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως αἰσχύ-

455 a of rhetoric. On the use of καί in questions, *cf.* Xen. *Hell.* iii. 3. 11 τέλος αὐτὸν (τὸν Κινάδωνα) ἤροντο (οἱ ἔφοροι) τί καὶ βουλόμενος ταῦτα πράττοι, *what purpose he actually had in so doing.*

b 3. **ὅταν περὶ κτέ.**: on the whole passage, *cf. Prot.* 319 b. — **ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως**: during the rise of philosophy in Greece, a science of medicine also gradually developed, which became hereditary among the priests of Aesculapius. Among these various schools arose; as in Cos, Cnidus, Rhodes, and in several cities of Magna Graecia. After a while it became customary for a state to take a noted physician into the public service; as Democedes, who was hired one year by the Aeginetans, the second by the Athenians, and the third by Polycrates of Samos (Hdt. iii. 131).

5. **ἔθνους** (from the same root as ἔθος, εἴωθα): denotes a class of people drawn into association either for the purposes of habitation or from force of custom (calling, trade). For δημιουργοί see on 452 a. In such formulae as ἄλλο τι ἤ and οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ the copula is frequently omitted. See H. 1015 b. 455 b

7. **οὐδ' ὅταν**: is in close connexion with ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει.

12. **ἢ πῶς λέγεις κτέ.**: intimates that possibly Gorgias will not accept this limitation of rhetoric.

13. **εὖ ἔχει**: *it is proper, it is in order.* c *Cf. Phaedo* 107 a εἰ δή τι Σιμμίας . . . ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι. — **τὰ** (not τὸ) **τῆς τέχνης**: because the question is no longer as to the nature of the art, but as to its claims and effects, one by one.

15. **τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν**: *consult your interest.*

17. **τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς**: Cron would take this in its entirety as almost

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παρά τωα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπῃ βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι ἰατρόν, c οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρόν, ἀλλ' αἱρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὁντιναοῦν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἑλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν περὶ ὅτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις

456 b 6. **παρασχεῖν**: *cf.* *Apol.* 33 b *καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν*. As here 475 d, *Prot.* 348 a. See Kr. 55, 3, 21.

8. **ὅπῃ βούλει**: more exactly we should expect *ὅποι*, and some of the inferior Mss. have it here. But the ideas of 'where' and 'whither' are often confounded in Greek, while in Eng. 'where' has become the rule for 'whither' in ordinary conversation. The remark here is very fitting in the mouth of Gorgias, in view of his extensive travels. *Cf.* Introd. §§ 4, 5.

c 11. **οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι**: *cf.* Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 52 *ἀναπείθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους ὡς αὐτὸς εἴη σοφώτατος, καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας, ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν*. Also *Phaedo* 72 c. Similarly in Latin. *Cf.* Cic. *de Fin.* v. 30. 90 tantam vim esse virtutis ut omnia, si ex altera parte ponantur, *ne appareant quidem* and ii. 28. 90 Socrates voluptatem *nullo loco* numerat. Compare also the exactly similar Eng. colloquialisms, 'to be nowhere,' and 'to be left quite out of sight.' 456 c

11 f. **τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν**: *λέγειν* is more usual; but the same difference which exists between *ἔλεγε* and *ἔλεξε* or *εἶπε* exists also between their infinitives. So here *εἰπεῖν* means *to make or deliver a speech*. *Cf.* *Prot.* 329 a *τάχ' ἂν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν*.

16. **ἐν πλήθει**: though properly much more general in its meaning than *ἐκκλησίᾳ* or *συλλόγῳ* used above, is probably employed only for the sake of variety. The distinct and definite statement with which Gorgias closes his characterization (*ἡ μὲν οὖν κτέ.*) brings up to his mind the thought that perhaps some might object to the indiscriminate employment of such an art. He is thus led to a defence of it which is so injudicious that it affords the adversary the very best weapons for attack.

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τοσαύτη ἐστὶν καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης· δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς d
ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθε πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν· οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι. ἢ οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία ἐάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν e
μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆσθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμυνομέ-

456 d 18. **τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ**: carried away by the excitement of his own thoughts, Gorgias forgets the caution which he had hitherto exercised in his conversation with Socrates, as well as the definition of rhetoric which the two had agreed upon above, and is led to set forth his art quite in the manner of the Sophists (the Eristics), as a means of defence and offence; a weapon which, though it required the use of the mind instead of the body, the lips instead of the arms, was no less a department of the science of fighting than boxing or the other exercises of the soldier. Some Sophists —*e.g.* Euthydemus and Dionysodorus —were at the same time teachers of fencing. Boxing, *πυκτεύειν*, which, in connexion with *παλαίειν*, or wrestling, formed the *παγκρατιάζειν*, went beyond the range of ordinary gymnastics, and belonged to the peculiar art of the athletes. Fighting in full armor (*ὁπλομαχία*) was not followed as a profession until after the Peloponnesian War. As in all these exercises, so in rhetoric the great object was not public, but private, not advantage to the community, but advancement for the individual. 456 d

20. **ἔμαθε**: the unexpressed subject, as of *χρῆσθαι*, is the indefinite 'one.'

23. **ἀποκτεινύναι**: if one gets as far as the *κεντεῖν*, it is but a short step to the *ἀποκτεινύναι*.

24. **φοιτήσας**: *φοιτᾶν* is the regular word for attendance at a school; hence *φοιτητής*, a 'scholar.' — **εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα**: not merely by the gift of nature, but also, as *πυκτικὸς γενόμενος*, by education.

29. **παρέδοσαν**: used like `tradere` in the sense 'impart, or transmit by teaching.' The object (afterwards taken up in *τούτοις*) is to be supplied from the sense of what precedes. e

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νους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας· οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται τῇ 457
ἰσχύι καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὔκουν οἱ διδάξαντες
πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου
ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι, οἶμαι, ὀρθῶς. ὁ αὐτὸς
δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς
ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε
πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν
βούληται· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε b
τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο
ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ
τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δέ,

457 a **31. μὴ ὑπάρχοντας**: an integral part of the subst. inf. clause; hence the *μή*. *ὑπάρχειν* has here its primitive meaning, *to be the first cause, to be there to begin with*, as opposed to *ἀμύνεσθαι*. *Cf. Leg.* ix. 879 d *μήτε γὰρ ὑπάρχων μήτε ἀμυνόμενος τὸ παράπαν τολμάτω πληγαῖς τὸν τοιοῦτον νουθετεῖν.* *ἄρχειν* is also similarly used in *Leg.* ix. 869 c *ἀμυνόμενος ἄρχοντα χειρῶν πρότερον*, but with a different feeling. The asyndeton of two opposites is not unfrequent. — **μεταστρέψαντες**: which is regularly transitive (*e.g. Rep.* ii. 367 a *μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν*, utriusque vim pervertentes) is used here absolutely in the sense *reversing the matter*. *Cf.* Hom. *β* 67 *θεῶν δ' ὑποδείσατε μῆνιν,|μή τι μεταστρέψωσιν* (*cause a reverse*) *ἀγασσάμενοι κακὰ ἔργα.*

32. τῇ ἰσχύι: corresponds to *εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα*, as *τέχνῃ* to *πυκτικὸς γενόμενος*, so that both are considered dependent upon training. — **οὐκ ὀρθῶς**: a case of litotes.

34. οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι: equiv. to *οἱ ἂν μὴ χρῶνται ὀρθῶς*. Hence the *μή*.

35 f. πρὸς ἅπαντας: as above, 456 d. 457 a

37. ἔμβραχυ: denotes what is otherwise expressed by *ὡς ἐν βραχεῖ (συνελόντι) εἰπεῖν*, and shows that the following *περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται* is absolutely without limitation.

38. οὐδέν τι: the dangerousness b of the art is to be offset by the natural feeling of equity which will compel each of the two aspirants to leave uninjured the public position which both desire, as well as the *δόξα*, which is the orator's continual and chief aim. — **οὐδέν τι**: strengthens the negation. *Cf.* the Eng. 'none the more.' The acc. of this neg. is used, but never the dat. with the comparative.

39. ὅτι: is correlative with *τούτου ἕνεκα*. For the following double *καί*, see on 457 e.

41. ἐὰν δέ κτέ.: shows again the opposition of practice to theory. Gorgias continually recurs to the same thoughts, as if the rolling swell (*ὄγκος*) of words could conceal the poverty of ideas. This belongs to the mimetic element of the dialogue.

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οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾆτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς c χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

XII. Σω. Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περί d του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ

457 b 42. **κᾆτα**: as well as **κἄπειτα**, is often used after a partic. as if it were following a finite verb.

c XII. 1. **οἶμαι**: the asyndeton shows that Socrates himself is not overpleased. — **ἔμπειρον**: *sc.* by having taken part in them either as speaker or listener.

2. **λόγων**: employed here as the general word including both the public speech as well as the private conversation, which is more properly διάλογος. *Cf. Prot.* 335 **d** ἐὰν σὺ ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔσονται ἡμῖν οἱ διάλογοι with 337 **a** χρὴ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς. The word συνουσία is similarly used in 461 **b**. — **καθεωρακέναι**: the compound verb, as compared with the simple, shows that the opinion has been gained by a consideration of a number of cases. *Cf.* 465 **d**.

3. **δύνανται**: *sc.* οἱ λέγοντες or οἱ διαλεγόμενοι, from the preceding λόγων. — **διαλέγεσθαι**: belongs to ἐπιχειρήσωσιν. The οὕτω sums up and re-emphasizes the preceding participles, on which lies the chief weight. 457 c

4. **διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους**: "after having, by mutually giving and receiving information, defined to each other's satisfaction the nature of the question under discussion." — **μαθόντες** and **διδάξαντες**: stand to each other as active and passive; they denote the means by which the disputants have been enabled to define the question at issue (διορισάμενοι), and are hence subordinate to the preceding participle. Plato rather likes such collocations of active and passive ideas. *Cf.* **d** below, εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες, and 462 **a**.

7. **ἢ μὴ σαφῶς**: an afterthought. Had it been present originally in Socrates' mind, he would have said μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ κτέ.; but not being present, the negative was attracted to the verb of saying, by the regular Greek rule. Looking at it in this light, it is not necessary (with Cron) to supply a d

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φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικοῦντας ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευ-
10 τῶντες αἴσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων e
ἀνθρώπων ἠξίωσαν ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα
15 λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς

457 d second φῇ from the preceding μὴ φῇ, which would hardly come under the head of the simple following the compound. — **χαλεπαίνουσι**: the pl. occurs here as it did with ἀμφισβητήσωσιν above, because from ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον we naturally draw the idea "both." *Cf.* in Latin, Cic. *de Fin.* iii. 2. 8 quod cum accidisset, ut *alter alterum* necopinato *videremus*, etc., and the expression for 'both' in the Romance languages. — The use of the pronouns throughout this long sentence is both interesting and instructive; ἀλλήλους, ἑαυτούς, ἕτερος, ἕτερον, ἑαυτῶν, σφῶν αὐτῶν (bis). The distinction between reciprocal and reflexive is sometimes very narrow.

8. **φιλονικοῦντας** κτέ.: when both reproach each other thus, they place themselves on the same level as participants in a disputatious contest, where each seeks his own honor, not the truth, as Socrates shows in *Phaedo* 91 a, where he contrasts the φιλοσόφως and φιλονίκως ἔχοντες, and says of the latter, ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. *Cf.* e, below, on πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα. *They bear it hardly, and think that out of envy, envy of themselves, the opponent said it, actuated by a factious spirit, and not by a desire to search into the matter before them in the discussion.* 457 d

10. **λοιδορηθέντες** κτέ.: the two following participles, though logically co-ordinate with λοιδορηθέντες, really give its two sides.

11 f. **οἷα . . . ἄχθεσθαι ὑπέρ**: the use of the acc. with the infin. after forms of οἷος is very rare, and seems to be an extension of the use of the simple infin. with οἷος. See GMT. 759; Madv. 166 c, and note on 452 e. *Cf. Apol.* 23 e Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν κτέ. We soon feel anger and indignation for one whom we consider abused.

14. **οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα**: '*not quite* e
consistent.' Cope.—**ἀκόλουθα**: denotes the naturally following result; σύμφωνα, the inner agreement of two statements standing in juxtaposition. *Cf.* Xen. *Anab.* ii. 4. 19 νεάνισκος δέ τις . . . εἶπεν, ὡς οὐκ ἀκόλουθα εἴη τὸ ἐπιθήσεσθαι καὶ λύσειν τὴν γέφυραν, *Lach.* 193 e τὰ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ τοῖς λόγοις. Plato delights in applying musical terms to logical conditions; hence the frequency of συμφωνεῖν and διαφωνεῖν, as also of συνᾴδειν, συνῳδός. *Cf.* 461 a, 482 b.

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ῥητορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὥνπερ καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἄν σε διερωτῴην· εἰ δὲ 458
μή, ἐῴην ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων, εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγξάντων, εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι το-

457 e 16. **φοβοῦμαι**: has here a double reference, (1) to an action to be performed (inf.); (2) to an effect to be avoided (*μὴ* with subjv.). *Cf.* Xen. *An.* i. 3. 17 *ἐγὼ γὰρ ὀκνοίην μὲν ἂν εἰς τὰ πλοῖα ἐμβαίνειν ἃ ἡμῖν δοίη, μὴ ἡμᾶς ταῖς τριήρεσι καταδύσῃ, φοβοίμην δ' ἂν τῷ ἡγεμόνι ᾧ δοίη ἕπεσθαι, μὴ ἡμᾶς ἀγάγῃ ὅθεν οὐκ ἔσται ἐξελθεῖν.* In the first we have the will-side of the fear; in the second, the apprehension.

17. **οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα**: the neg. *οὐ* is regular with the inf. of the indir. discourse. — **πρός**: denotes the end which the subject has in view. In the present case this is paralleled by *τοῦ* with the infin., — one of the many Greek modes of expressing finality (H. 960; GMT. 798). With *πρὸς σέ* also the main idea of the *πρός* is that of *hostile* purpose; the hostility, however, does not lie in the *πρὸς*, but in the general tone. In a certain sense *φιλονικεῖν* might also be applied to Socrates, as his search for truth was a continual struggle throughout his whole life.

18 f. **καὶ σὺ . . . καὶ ἐγώ**: when the second member of a comparison is contained in a relative clause with *ὅσπερ* or *ὥσπερ*, the Greek idiom requires *καί* in both members. 457 e

21. **ἡδέως ἂν ἐλεγξάντων . . . λέγοι**: of these two conditional clauses the first is logical, the second ideal. The present conversation is a practical example of Socrates' view; hence the logical conditional form is used for the practical present case. The rest of the sentence follows naturally in the opt. as being rather theoretical, and applicable to some other time than the present. The participles represent the same tenses of the optatives. 458 a

22. **οὐκ ἀηδέστερον κτέ.**: *cf.* 506 c *καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγχῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι, ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψει.*

23. **μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτό**: the correlative to *ὅσῳπερ* is wanting, as is often the case. *αὐτὸ* is always emphatic; the unemphatic pronoun is *τοῦτο*.

25. **οὐδὲν κτέ.**: Socrates was convinced that correct views determine the will and actions, and that sin and error are due to lack of knowledge. Hence instruction, if it carry conviction with regard to what is good and true, must also bring about moral improvement. *Cf.* what he says in *Apol.* 26 a *δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύ-*

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σοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν b
τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὤν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῂς
τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐᾶν,
ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς
τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷον σὺ ὑφηγεῖ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν
καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς
ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν
ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἢν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν c
χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομέ-
νους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

XIII. ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώ-
κρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων

458 a σομαι δ γε ἄκων ποιῶ, and the celebrated phrase ascribed to him, οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει.

26. δόξα ψευδής: the force of οἶμαι extends over the whole sentence, and we should therefore logically expect δόξαν ψευδῆ. But by the use of the nom. Socrates holds the object up to view like an image.

b 28. εἰ δὲ καί: the contrast would rather be given by the harsh εἰ δὲ μή, but Socrates modifies it with his usual courtesy.

29. τὸν λόγον: in the same sense as in 457 d, above.

31. ὑφηγεῖ: *indicate, sc.* by your words and example. Gorgias reconsiders his assent by the expression χρῆν ἐννοεῖν. With χρῆν and ἔδει the opposition is to the inf., not to the obligation. By giving his reason, Gorgias stimulates himself to change from 'we ought to have' to 'we must' (σκοπεῖν οὖν χρή).

32. καὶ ὑμᾶς: as contrasted with the others, who had come earlier.

34. ἀποτενοῦμεν: to be completed according to 465 e συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα and 466 a. So frequently, *e.g. Prot.* 335 c, 336 c, 361 a. 458 c

35. μή τινας: is connected, in a loose kind of epexegesis, with τὸ τούτων, and hence also depends on σκοπεῖν. For the ind., *cf. Lach.* 196 c, ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεταί τι λέγειν, *Lysis* 216 c ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε σκεψώμεθα μὴ ἡμᾶς λανθάνει τὸ φίλον ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν τούτων ὄν.

XIII. 1. τοῦ μὲν θορύβου: here we recognize the importance of the silent listeners, whose presence we infer from such remarks as this, and who serve at this juncture to keep the discussion going. Next to them is Chaerephon, who here acts as their spokesman, and answers the βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν. The θόρυβος simply denotes a rather loud expression of protest against the apparent purpose of Gorgias, and of pleasure in the continuation of the dialogue.

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ἀκούειν, ἐάν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὐργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.

ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.

ΓΟΡ. Αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βού-

458 c 3. **μὴ γένοιτο κτέ.**: a most emphatic denial in the form of a wish. The sentiment is similar to that of Pindar (*Isth.* i. 1 f.), alluded to in *Phaedr.* 227 **b** *οὐκ ἂν οἴει με κατὰ Πίνδαρον καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα ποιήσασθαι τὸ σήν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἀκοῦσαι.*

d 7. Callicles is very eager to get the conversation directed to his own more especial field — politics. Hence his support of Chaerephon's protest, which he emphasizes by the addition of the expression *καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτός*, where the *καὶ μέν* approximates closely in force to *καὶ μήν*.

8. **οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ**: commonly equiv. to haud scio an, sometimes, as here, to haud scio an non. On *εἰ* in this double meaning, see Kr. 65, 1, 8.

9 f. **ὥστε . . . χαριεῖσθε**: compare with *ὥστε . . . πράττειν*, a few lines above.

11. **τό γ' ἐμόν**: has almost the same force as *ἐγώ*, only less personal. Like the phrases with *περί* and *ἀμφί*, it became very common in later Greek. *Cf. Rep.* vii. 533 **a** *ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι* with *Symp.* 210 **a** *ἐρῶ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ, καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω.* Kr. 43, 4, 26. 458 d

13. **αἰσχρόν**: note that Gorgias is impelled to a continuation of the dialogue only by regard for his own honor. This motive was especially strong with the Sophists; *cf. Prot.* 352 **d** *αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐμοὶ σοφίαν μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι.* With *αἰσχρόν* and similar words which imply a negation, it is more usual to find *μὴ οὐ*. GMT. 817. It is also more common to employ the dat. of reference, instead of the acc. with the infinitive. Rid. § 183. — **τὸ λοιπόν**: not 'furthermore,' with Kr. 46, 3, 2, but "finally," "in conclusion," after those present have expressed their desires.

14. **ἐπαγγειλάμενον**: for the meaning, see on 447 **c**. Here it acquires almost the force of "challenge," since the subject of the inf. must be supplied out of the following *ὅτι τις βούλεται.*

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λεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι e
βούλει.

Σω. Ἄκουε δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ
ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φὴς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι,
ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν.

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι
οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;

Γορ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 459

Σω. Ἐλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ
ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.

Γορ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν;
οὐ γάρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος
ἔσται.

Γορ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ
εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκ ἰατρός γε ὤν. ἦ γάρ;

458 e 23. **οὐ διδάσκοντα**: the regular neg. with **ὥστε** is **μή**. The **οὐ** here may be due to the **φὴς** above, which throws an indir. disc. coloring over the whole. See Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 174.

459 a 27. **ἔν γε ὄχλῳ**: Gorgias wishes to protect himself by a restriction which, while it defers, for a brief interval, his defeat, shows plainly the weakness of his professions. See the criticism of Socrates which follows.

28. **ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι**: the reason for a change of neg. such as occurs in this and the following clauses is often hard to perceive. Here it seems to be the oscillation from generic to particular, which is going on continually in Socrates' mind. Having made his general point with **μή**, he recurs to the case under discussion with **οὐ**. So **ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός . . . ἀνεπιστήμων** (*cf.* before, **ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι**), but **ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς, ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι**. It would be possible, but not so good, to take the latter cases as examples of adhaerescent **οὐ**. 459 a

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ΓΟΡ. Ναί. b

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων.

ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική; αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς ηὑρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων; c

XIV. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι

459 b 42. **τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι**: according to the position of ἄλλο τι before or after the ἤ is the latter to be translated "than" or "or."

43. **ἐνταῦθά γε**: Gorgias notices the danger of such a concession, but still thinks he can limit the force of the argument to the single case. Perceiving this, Socrates immediately extends his statement to make it apply *καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας.*

45 f. **πράγματα . . . μηχανὴν πειθοῦς**: Socrates never lets slip an occasion to emphasize the essential opposition of the aim of rhetoric to the truth of facts, an opposition admitted, indeed, by the Sophists themselves. *Cf.* the statement of Tisias in *Phaedr.* 272 d *ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι . . . τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν εἶναι.* 459 b

XIV. 1. **πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη**: Gorgias is continually wandering away from the discussion of the nature of rhetoric to the praise of it, and being set right again by Socrates, who, while he brings back the discussion to the subjects which Gorgias had declared to be the proper province of rhetoric, is at the same time paving the way for an examination of its moral value. c

5. **διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν**: *sc. μὴ μαθόντα κτέ.* — **αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα**: a formula for getting rid of a side issue like *εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα Prot.* 357 b. — **τι**: is adverbial.

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ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ἦ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα d
τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν
καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορι-
κὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι
τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακόν ἐστιν ἢ
τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ
αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος, ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν
οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ e
προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα
μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικήν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς
διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον
— οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον — ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν
εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν
εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσει αὐτὸν
διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν
ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς 460
Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ
τίς ποθ' ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν;

Γορ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ
εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.

Σω. Ἔχε δή· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ

459 d 6. **πρὸς λόγου**: *to the advantage of our discourse.* But little different from *πρὸς λόγον*. *Cf. Prot.* 351 e *ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα.* — **τόδε**: draws the attention in advance to the series of closely interconnected questions, introduced by **ἆρα**, which, by their very intimate relation one to another, oppose, with a certain importunity, Gorgias' continual wandering and vagueness, and also, by their delicate allusion to the somewhat extravagant expression used above (455 d), have a decidedly ironical tinge, which is rendered more apparent by the doubtful *οἶμαι* of Gorgias' answer. — **ἆρα**: see on 476 a. 459 d

14. **προεπιστάμενον**: the partic. is again the most important part of the statement, as in 457 c, 453 b. e

22. **τῆς ῥητορικῆς**: this passage differs from 455 d only in arrangement.

26. **ἔχε δή**: a request to pause, whereby the point reached is declared to be an important one, which merits further consideration. *Cf. Prot.* 349 d *ἔχε δὴ . . . ἄξιον γάρ τοι* 460 a

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St. I. p. 460.

τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

30 Σω. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὔ; b

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ
35 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;

40 Γορ. Πάντως δήπου.

Σω. Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν [ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν c δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι ⟨ἀεὶ⟩ δίκαια πράττειν;

460 a ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. When thus used, ἔχειν is of course intransitive. H. 810.

28. ἤτοι . . . ἤ: *or at least.* In English we should naturally use γε with the second member. *Cf. Apol.* 27 d τοὺς δαίμονας ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας.—παρὰ σοῦ: const. with ὕστερον μαθόντα alone; πρότερον with εἰδέναι.

b 30. τὰ τεκτονικά: "the principles of building."

34 f. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον: *according to the same principle* (analogy). 'The argument which follows is to our notions sophistical enough. Not so, however, from the Socratic point of view, according to which every virtue is a form of knowledge, and every vice the result of ignorance.' Thompson. See on 458 a. 460 b

43. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη κτέ.: a few lines c below is found a repetition of the first clause of this sentence, in almost the same language, where, too, the statement is natural, and is used as a basis for a further deduction; here, on the contrary, it is out of place, and besides, is not followed up at all in the next sentence. These reasons have led to the omission of the bracketed words, by which we get a clearly logical argument, as follows: "The just man performs just actions." "Yes." "Must he not therefore wish always to perform just actions?" "Apparently." "The just man will never, then, wish to perform unjust actions," etc.

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Γορ. Φαίνεταί γε.

Σω. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.

Γορ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σω. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι.

Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.

Γορ. Οὐ φαίνεταί γε.

XV. Σω. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδικῇ; ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;

Γορ. Ἐρρήθη.

Σω. Νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὔ;

Γορ. Φαίνεται.

Σω. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἦ γάρ;

460 d XV. 1. **λέγων**: equiv. to ὅτι ἔλεγες, *that you were saying*.

2. **οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν**: when two verbs which govern different cases are construed with but one object, it is customary to construe this object with the nearer verb. *Cf.* below (5).

3. **χρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδικῇ**: the co-ordination of the two ideas by τε . . . καί brings into greater prominence the impropriety of thus misapplying otherwise useful skill, than the more usual ἀδίκως χρῆται of the following clause.

6. **ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι**: the μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν is a result which may or may not follow the ἐγκαλεῖν, according to circumstances. The real opposition is between τῷ διδάξαντι and τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, hence the second is put in the same case as the first, although the acc. would be required by ἐξελαύνειν. *Cf. Prot.* 327 a πᾶς πάντα ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα.

460 d

460 d

10. **ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας**: represents the same tense of the optative.

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Γορ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σοῦ τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον, ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γ' ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες, ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ κἂν ἀδίκως χρῷτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνᾴδειν τὰ 461 λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν χαίρειν· ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γορ- b γία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

XVI. Πωλ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἴει, ὅτι Γοργίας

460 e 17. **ὅ γε**: gives the basis of the statement. The neuter may be due to the *πρᾶγμα* immediately preceding (H. 631 a), or it may simply be used ad sensum. *Cf.* 465 d.

461 a 20. **οὕτω**: *under these circumstances.* See on 503 d. — **συνᾴδειν**: a musical term. See on 457 e.

24. **ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτός**: properly the following clause should be independent, stating the conclusions reached in the investigation; but by bringing it under the government of the inserted *ὁρᾷς κτέ.* an appeal is again made to the fairness of the opponent. *Cf. Apol.* 24 d *ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾷς, ib.* 31 b *νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι κτέ.*

b 26. **μὰ τὸν κύνα**: *cf.* 466 c, 482 b, *Apol.* 22 a. Socrates is rather fond of this formula of asseveration, possibly out of aversion to any light handling, even of the Greek divini- 461 ties. See on 463 d. b

27. **οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας**: a delicate allusion to 458 c, which shows Socrates' fine feeling in not insisting on a discussion which must be unpleasant and also humiliating to Gorgias. The word *συνουσία* is elsewhere employed so as to include the discourses (*διάλογοι*), *e.g. Prot.* 310 a *τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν*; *i.e.* in the sense of the Eng. "meeting."

XVI. 1. On Polus, who here again thrusts himself into the discussion, see note to 448 a, and Introd. § 14. — **καί**: belongs, according to the sense, with *δοξάζεις. Is what you say also really your opinion?* We should expect a second *καί* with *ὥσπερ*, according to usage. See on 457 e. Others construe *καί* with *σύ.*

2. **ἢ οἴει**: *or do you think.* The

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ἠσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τοῦτο ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα — ἐπεὶ τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν; ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους.

Σω. Ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς, ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθῶτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ

461 b second question repeats the first in a varied form. Both questions are 'rhetorical,' expecting no answer, and express a protest against the idea that the art of rhetoric has anything to do with a knowledge of what is right.

4. **μὴ οὐχὶ . . . εἰδέναι κτέ.**: two negs. after *ἠσχύνθη μὴ προσομολογῆσαι*, on account of the negative force of the expression. *Cf. Prot.* 352 c, d. See H. 1034 b, and on 458 d. The construction is the same as that after *ἀπαρνήσεσθαι* below, which is followed by a double neg. because the question *τίνα οἴει* veils the assertion *οὐδείς. οὐχὶ* is merely more emphatic than *οὐ*.

5. **ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδώς**: more logically, *ἐὰν ἔλθῃ ταῦτα μὴ εἰδώς*. — **διδάξειν**: depends upon some verb of saying to be supplied from *προσομολογῆσαι*. The asyndeton with *ἔπειτα* instead of *κἄπειτα* (*cf. Apol.* 23 c) is not uncommon, and the clause is to be construed in dependence on *ὅτι* (*because*). By this time, however, Polus' flow of words has run away with him; he has only energy enough left to hurl at Socrates the words *τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς*, before he abandons his struggling sentence altogether and starts afresh. Such passages as this show Plato to have been no mean dramatist.

6. **ἴσως**: gives expression in passing to the hint that perhaps the contradiction was not so clearly deduced from Gorgias' words as Socrates supposed. The whole sentence, however, shows Polus' complete inability to grasp the real point at issue.

10. **ἀγροικία**: is the reverse of *παιδεία*. By this very criticism, Polus betrays that he himself just as lacking in the polish of a gentleman, which he denies to Socrates, as in scientific knowledge.

11. **ὦ κάλλιστε**: the epithet suits the pompous rhetor excellently.

12. **υἱεῖς**: the addition of the word "sons," though not strictly necessary, is quite natural, especially among people where the support of the parent by the son was so strictly enjoined as among the Greeks.

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In Plato λέγειν quite often means "mean" rather than "say"

νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου· δίκαιος δ' εἶ· καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἓν μόνον φυλάττῃς.

Πωλ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

Σω. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθέρξῃς, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.

Πωλ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι;

Σω. Δεινὰ μεντἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος

461 d 15. **ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας**: besides being the Greek idiom, the initial position of *ἐγώ* softens the supposition for Gorgias. The Latin has the same position.

16. **δίκαιος δ' εἶ**: the sense is to be supplied from what precedes. *Cf. Lach.* 180 d *εἴ τι ἔχεις τῷδε τῷ σαυτοῦ δημότῃ ἀγαθὸν συμβουλεῦσαι, χρὴ συμβουλεύειν· δίκαιος δ' εἶ.* The regular neg. of the inf. after *δοκεῖ* would be *οὐ*. *μὴ* is here due to the conditional color. For the personal const. see on 449 c.

18. **ἀναθέσθαι**: the figure is drawn from the draughts-board; it is the regular word for 'taking back' a move. Similarly, *Prot.* 354 e *ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν, εἴ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι.*

20. **τί τοῦτο λέγεις**: equiv. to *τί ἐστι τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις.* Kr. 57, 3, 6; H. 1012 a.

21. **ἐὰν καθέρξῃς**: as it were, by a dam or a fence.

461 d 22. **χρῆσθαι**: because in *μακρολογία* the orator has at his disposal all the devices of his art.

e 25. **Ἀθήναζε**: Athens was noted as a *πόλις φιλόλογος* (*Leg.* I. 641 e), and freedom of speech (*παρρησία*) was held to be the fundamental principle of a democratically governed state. *Cf.* Dem. *Phil.* iii. 3 *ὑμεῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὕτω κοινὴν οἴεσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεδώκατε.*

26. **τῆς Ἑλλάδος**: is the part. gen. dependent upon *οὗ*. The Eng. would find *ἐν* with the dat. more natural. — **ἔπειτα**: *after all.* GMT. 856.

28. **ἀντίθες**: equiv. to *but consider on the other hand*; lit. *put in opposition.* — **σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος κτἑ.**: Socrates makes a similar remark in *Prot.* 335 c, when he really prepares to leave the gathering rather than waste his time in words.

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τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι,
30 εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἴ τι 462
κήδει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν
βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν
τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ
Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῂς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ
35 ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας· ἢ οὔ;

Πωλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἑκάστοτε
ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;

Πωλ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

40 Σω. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ b
ἀποκρίνου.

XVII. Πωλ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι,
ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῂς εἶναι;

Σω. Ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;

5 Πωλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ
τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι.

462 a 31. **κήδεσθαι**: implies personal interest in the matter.

32. **ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον**: is to be taken with the following clause, *ἀναθέμενος*.

34. **φῂς γὰρ δήπου**: by quoting his own vaunting words against him, Socrates compels Polus also to adopt the dialectic form. — **δήπου**: throws a tinge of irony into the question.

b XVII. 1. **ταῦτα**: is simply the proposition which Socrates makes, and the words *ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα* is a formula of acceptance. — **ἀλλά**: *well then*, is often thus used in answers. After an imv., as here in Soph. *El.* 376 ff., ΗΛ. *Φέρ' εἰπὲ δὴ τὸ δεινόν . . .* 462 b
ΧΡ. *ἀλλ' ἐξερῶ σοι πᾶν ὅσον κάτοιδ' ἐγώ.*

3. **τίνα φῂς εἶναι**: though assuming it as self-evident that rhetoric is a *τέχνη*, Polus is compelled, in commencing, to put his question quite generally. Socrates, in his answer, confines himself simply to deducing the consequences of Gorgias' admissions. The substitution of *ἥντινα* for *τίνα* is according to the strict rule, which, however, is not rigorously adhered to.

6 f. **ὡς . . . εἰρῆσθαι**: *cf. Rep.* x. 595 b *ὡς πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι.* The active *εἰπεῖν* is more common. See Madv. 151; H. 956; GMT. 777. 2.

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Πωλ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

Σω. Πρᾶγμα ὃ φῂς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμ-
ματι ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνων. c

Πωλ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

Σω. Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.

Πωλ. Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

Σω. Ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

Πωλ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία;

Σω. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

Πωλ. Οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, — χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

Σω. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ, ὅτι φημὶ
αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ οὐ καλή μοι d
δοκεῖ εἶναι;

Πωλ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῂς εἶναι;

Σω. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν
τί μοι χαρίσασθαι;

462 b 9. ὃ φῂς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην: is to be explained according to 448 c πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ηὑρημέναι, according to which an art arises from experience. Polus, however, has by this time forgotten his own words. — ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι: see on 448 c and Introd. § 14.

c 13. ἐμπειρία: here not an empirical science, but merely a dexterity acquired by much practice. *Cf.* 463 b. The following question is no advance on his first one, and seems to show that Polus has no definite plan.

16. χάρις: is the grace which causes pleasure, and depends principally on the person of the orator; ἡδονή, the pleasure with which the hearer is inspired by his speech. Quintilian (*Inst. or.* ii. 15. 24) translates the expression by the words peritia gratiae ac voluptatis. Polus has not yet heard the specific difference which distinguishes rhetoric from other ἐμπειρίαι of the same class. Hence he again falls into the same error in his question as he did in his answer above, 448 c. In this way, however, the conversation is again turned to the consideration of the value of rhetoric. 462 c

20. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: see on 452 c. — εἰ οὐ κτέ.: οὐ because Polus expects an affirmative answer. — εἰ: *whether*. d

24. τιμᾷς: equiv. to καλὸν φῂς εἶναι or περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, as in *Crito* 47 a.

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Πωλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.

Πωλ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιά;

Σω. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.

Πωλ. Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.

Σω. Φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις.

Πωλ. Τίνος; φάθι.

Σω. Φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. e

Πωλ. Ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική;

Σω. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.

Πωλ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;

Σω. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα· ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν 463
Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο, τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται· ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.

Γορ. Τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς.

462 d — **τὸ χαρίζεσθαι**: pres. for the habit. — **χαρίσασθαι**: aor. for the single example.

e 34. **ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστίν**: with surprise and disgust. Polus overlooks the fact that there can be two orders belonging to the same species.

37. **τίνος . . . ταύτης**: in close connexion with what precedes. See on 461 d and 449 e.

38. **μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ**: it is not necessary to supply a verb of apprehension, though that is the idea suggested by *μή* with the subjv. GMT. 309; H. 867. The employment of the form here is an attempt to conciliate. In 486 c, 509 a *καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστι*, Socrates has laid aside all idea of conciliation, and speaks the truth with boldness. **ἄγροικος** is opposed to **ἀστεῖος**, and means *rude* (see on 447 a). It is to be taken in connexion with the reproof administered by Polus in 461 c. Truth often incurs the reproach of **ἀγροικία**. Note that Socrates still preserves towards Gorgias his courtesy and respect.

462 e

44. **οὐδενός**: explanatory of **τινός**.

463 a 45. **μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς**: *cf.* Hom. *γ* 96 *μηδέ τί μ' αἰδόμενος μειλίσσεο.*

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XVIII. Σω. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἓν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποικική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τήν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικήν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω. οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται, ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ, εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον,

463 a XVIII. 2. **ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς κτέ.**: in this characterization, Socrates includes all the good that can be said of the art of rhetoric. It requires cleverness in perceiving and distinguishing between various relations, hardihood to work before the eyes of the world, and skill in dealing with men. — **στοχαστικῆς**: is originally connected with shooting and throwing, but is often metaphorically used. With this definition, *cf.* Isoc. *c. Soph.* 294 d *ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι.* In regard to courage in speaking, *cf.* Cic. *de Or.* i. 26. 121.

b 4. **κολακείαν**: the Greek word means more than the English "flattery." Under it is included everything whose aim is the agreeable rather than the good.

5. **ἐπιτηδεύσεως**: notice the variety in the use of the words **ἐπιτήδευσις** and **ἐπιτήδευμα**, which are to be distinguished as **πρᾶξις** and **πρᾶγμα**, 463 b the one being a concrete manifestation of the other.

7. **ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή**: these words are but little distinguished. The first denotes, as has already been said (on 462 c), the result obtained by practice; the latter is more especially that which is derived from work without any definite object or clear consciousness. So rhetoric is called in *Phaedrus* 260 e *ἄτεχνος τριβή*, and in 270 b *τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία*. See on 462 c.

9. **κομμωτικήν**: is not only finery c in dress, but also hair-curling, ointments, cosmetics, *etc. Cf.* Quint. ii. 15. 25 mangonum artificium, qui colorem fuco et verum robur inani sagina mentiuntur. The addition of **γε** emphasizes the examples newly thought of.

13. **εἰ οὔ**: see on 462 d.

14 ff. **ἀποκρινοῦμαι . . . πρὶν ἂν ἀποκρίνωμαι**: after the model of the anticipatory conditional. **πρίν**, "before,"

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εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν, πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα, ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.

Πωλ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι, ὁποῖον μόριον.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ d ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.

Πωλ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;

Σω. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ· ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.

Γορ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.

Σω. Εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, e Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.

463 c takes the inf.; "until," the indic. subjv. or opt., according to the sphere of time. See Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* ii. 465 ff.

d 20. **ἆρ' οὖν** κτέ.: the question implies doubt, and is intended to stimulate Polus' attention; but for some cause, probably dulness, he merely renews his previous question. — The meaning of εἴδωλον is made clear by *Theaet.* 150 e ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

23. **τὰ γὰρ κακὰ** κτέ.: that which according to its nature can be characterized as ἀγαθόν, must be esteemed καλόν. If, however, it is κακόν, then it must be esteemed αἰσχρόν.

24. **ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι**: is a stinging rebuke to Polus.

25. **μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ** κτέ.: Socrates' words implied that Polus was either too dull or too careless to understand him. Gorgias, while tacitly admitting Polus' incompetency, tries to smooth over his defeat by confessing to his own inability 463 to catch Socrates' meaning as it is at d present stated. If the master, αὐτός, cannot understand, the pupil may be pardoned for the same fault. Polus, though defeated in his attempt to rout Socrates (461 b ff.), only retires to recover breath before making a final effort (466 a). — **μὰ τὸν Δία**: is a real asseveration, used designedly by Gorgias, who is too much of a gentleman to indulge in oaths, — this being the only instance in this dialogue. It is significant that Polus, in spite of his heat, is likewise only once (473 a) betrayed into the common ναὶ μὰ Δία. Callicles uses oaths roundly enough, but restricts himself to νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ναὶ μὰ Δία, and μὰ Δία. On Socrates' habit, see on 449 d, 461 b.

28. **Πῶλος δὲ . . . ὀξύς**: in this re- e mark Socrates both apologizes for and explains the reason of the obscurity of his statements; but it is, at the same time, an excellent char-

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Γορ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπέ, πῶς λέγεις
πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.

Σω. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι, ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο, Πῶλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν;

Γορ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 464

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;

Γορ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δ' οὔ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν ἄλλος ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.

Γορ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σω. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὅτι ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.

463 e acterization of the impetuosity and heat of Polus, whether he be the questioner or the respondent. It also contains an allusion to the name itself (*πῶλος a colt, filly*).

464 a 35. The division of *κολακεία* given above was made without specifying the standard of division, and only enumerates the different varieties. Socrates now, at Gorgias' instance, reduces the whole subject to a regular system, by referring *κολακεία* back to a higher species, *θεραπεία*, on the basis of a distinction according to reality and appearance. Now, since *θεραπεία* has for its object the *εὐεξία τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, we get two more points of view: (1) that of the *object* (*ἀνθρώπου*), as composed of *body* and *soul*; and (2) that of the *treatment*, as being either *positive* or *negative*.

37. **οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω**: is a formula 464 a for introducing an example or a special case in illustration of a general statement.

38. **εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα**: *τὰ σώματα* here, as well as *τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν* below, is acc. of specification. H. 718 a.

42. **τὸ τοιοῦτον**: the article is used on account of its reference to what has just been described. This is more definitely given in the *ὅτι* (relative) clause which follows.

43. **ἔχει δὲ κτέ.**: in this change of subject lies no ambiguity either to the Greek mind or to us. It was, besides, a regular way in Greek of expressing "although." The subject is the same indefinite one which must be supplied as the object of the preceding *ποιεῖ*. See on 456 d.

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45 Γορ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. b

XIX. Σω. Φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ 5 οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ c ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε 10 ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ, ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσίν τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν

464 b XIX. 2. **δυοῖν κτέ.**: the dual in Plato's time is fast fading out, and he uses it as an artistic feature. It disappears entirely before the close of the fourth century B.C. Notice the asyndeton.

4. μίαν ὀνομάσαι: like *ἑνὶ ὀνόματι καλεῖν, προσαγορεύειν.* — **οὕτως**: is idiomatically used, "thus briefly" or "thus at the moment." See on 503 d. — **οὐκ ἔχω**: *I am not in position,* regularly takes the aor. infinitive.

6 f. **ἀντίστροφον μὲν . . . ἀντίστροφον δέ**: an example of 'anaphora.' — **ἀντίστροφον**: denotes a part corresponding to a similar part on the opposite side of the symmetrical whole. The function of gymnastic and nomothetic is to lay down, each in its own department, certain *positive* directions whereby the constitution of the subject under treatment is preserved and improved. The arts of healing and the administration of justice seek in practice to put a stop to the disregard of these directions, and to restore the normal condition. According to their object, therefore, medicine and gymnastic, as well as the making and administration of law, all belong to the same class, *ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις.* 464 b

8. **δικαιοσύνη**: is used here in the same sense as *δικαστική* 520 b below; why, it is hard to understand. It may have been chosen in view of the earlier definition of the object of rhetoric in 454 b, 455 a. The *ἰατρική* is beyond cavil good; on the contrary, *δικαστική* is susceptible of a bad construction, whereas here there was need of no doubtful word. Though not customary, there is no reason why *δικαιοσύνη* should not be understood as the practical exercise of that character of the *δίκαιος*, which for an Athenian was naturally to be found in the *δικαστική*. The word, then, means here "administration of justice." That the word is genuine is shown by Quintilian's translation iustitia in ii. 15. 28. c

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τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω, ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανεί-
15 μασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν d
φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκεν καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ
20 βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαΐει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ e
ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν. κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ,
25 καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Πῶλε — τοῦτο γὰρ 465
πρὸς σὲ λέγω — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν,

464 c 13 f. **αἰσθομένη** and **γνοῦσα**: are distinguished both as regards the object and the manner of their activity. *γνῶσις* is directed to the nature, which is only comprehended by thought; *αἴσθησις* is merely the visual perception of the outward form or effects, the cause of which, lying in the nature of the object, is not comprehended. By **ἀλλὰ** *στοχασαμένη* the idea of *αἰσθομένη* is not merely repeated, but also more exactly defined. Similarly, 452 e, and in a different order 521 d, e. On the heaping up of participles and their subordination, see Kr. 56, 15 with notes.

15. **ὑποδῦσα**: as it were under a cloak or mask by which its real nature is concealed. The usage is borrowed from the stage; *cf.* Luc. *Pisc.* 33. The simple acc. with this verb is not uncommon.

d 17. **θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν**: the application of the figure of the hunt to those arts which seek only the appearance, is frequent in Plato, and most developed in the *Sophistes*. With the same employment of abstract for concrete Demosthenes expresses himself, *Ol.* ii. 7 *τὴν γὰρ ἑκάστων ἄνοιαν ἀεὶ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτὸν ἐξαπατῶν καὶ προσλαμβάνων οὕτω ηὐξήθη.* 464 d

22. **ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες** (*sc.* *εἰσιν*): in such comparisons the nom. is as common as the attracted case. Madv. *Syn.* 20, 3. — **ἐπαΐει περὶ** *κτέ.*: this otherwise poetic verb is used several times by Plato. *Cf.* 518 c; *Apol.* 19 c; *Crit.* 47 b, 48 a; *Lach.* 186 e. It also takes the acc. Kr. 68, 31, 2.

25 f. **τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω**: brings up again Polus' persistent efforts to make Socrates say that rhetoric was *καλόν* (462 c, 463 d, e). 467 a

26. **στοχάζεται**: here equiv. to *aim at*; above 464 c in the derived mean-

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ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὧν προσφέρει, ὁποῖ' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα· τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.

XX. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀψοποικὴ b κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτική, κακοῦργός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθήσει ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵν' οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι — ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθή-

465 a ing *guess at*. — **ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου**: is brachylogic. *Without regard to what is best.*

28. **ὧν προσφέρει**: denotes the means which each employs, and whereby it works upon others.

29. **ὥστε . . . μὴ ἔχειν**: the *μή* could very well be omitted, but Greek usage sanctions the redundancy.

31. **ὑποσχεῖν λογόν**: *to render account*. *Cf. Prot.* 338 d *πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω.*

b XX. 1. **ὀψοποική**: is not attributive to *κολακεία*, but the latter is predicate with *ὑπόκειται, as flattery*. Hence the point of the following *κατὰ λόγον*.

2. **ὑπόκειται** (equiv. to *ὑποτέθειται*): is not used in the sense which we elsewhere find, *lie at the foundation of*, as in *Prot.* 349 b *ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία*, but like *ὑποδέδυκεν* above, 464 d.

3. **κακοῦργος κτέ.**: these four adjectives go in pairs. The two first describing the nature of *κολακεία* per se, contain the *κακόν* of it; the first is more general, the second adds the special (Kr. 69, 32, 2), at the same time emphasizing the result for the world at large. The second pair contains the *αἰσχρόν*, the verdict on the value of such skill. The following participle, with its datives, defines more narrowly *ἀπατηλή*.

8. **οἱ γεωμέτραι**: the word denotes "mathematicians" in general. So *e.g.* Theodorus of Cyrene is continually called *γεωμέτρης* in the *Theaetetus*. Higher arithmetic also is included under geometry, because the Greeks employed geometrical methods to represent the higher relations of numbers. In the following proportion, *we* are reminded at once of an arithmetical formula; while the Greeks were reminded of the due proportion of lines and figures, in accordance with the development of mathematical science among them. The relations of the ideas can, by means of this threefold division into pairs, be brought into a simple but complete scheme. See on 464 a above. — **ἤδη γὰρ κτέ.**: mathematics was looked upon by Plato as a preparation for 'dialectic.'

465 b

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σαις — ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο ὀψο-
ποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ c
πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν,
καὶ ὅτι ὃ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς
δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκεν οὕτω φύσει·
ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ
σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσωνται
οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ

465 b 9. **ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν**: in this formula *ἐστί* is always wanting.

c 10. **μᾶλλον δέ**: introduces a comparison equally true, but more to the point of the argument (*cf.* 449 a), by the completion of the proportions already worked out, and by their extension to the whole system of ideas thus far developed. — It might seem strange that sophistic is paired with nomothetic, and not with philosophy. Philosophy, however, is the science of *principles* in general, while in this dialogue only *ethical* and *political* principles are discussed. These latter, however, the law-giver must make use of, — *i.e.* must be a philosopher, as is proved in the much more comprehensive and thorough discussion in the *Republic*.

13. **ὅπερ λέγω**: refers, as it always does, to a previous statement; here to 464 c, where the close relationship of the *τέχναι*, which have to do with the same object (*body* and *soul*) was spoken of. This idea is here expressed by the words *ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων*, which recall at once the expression above, *ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι*. The subject of *διέστηκεν* is not expressed, but is a general one, to be taken out of the preceding proportions, which embrace all *τέχναι* and *ἐμπειρίαι*, and the same subject must 465 c be thought of with *ὄντων*. On account of the position of *ἅτε ἐγγὺς ὄντων* the *δέ* is drawn away from the second member of the contrast, *φύρονται*. — **φύσει**: means the essential peculiarity, actual nature, of the ideas. Instead of these, however, with *φύρονται* we have the persons introduced who employ and practise the *τέχναι* and *ἐμπειρίαι*, and who from ignorance of their true nature bring them into activity at the same time, and thus mix together matters which, properly considered, are quite distinct.

14. **ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ**: probably denotes the soul as the place of action, and *περὶ ταὐτά* the moral questions treated, both of which are reckoned together above (464 c) in the expression *περὶ τὸ αὐτό*. Socrates restricts himself to the two *ἐμπειρίαι* to which *ῥητορική* belongs, inasmuch as the object of the whole investigation is only an exact understanding of the nature of rhetoric. This passage is referred to below, in 520 a. — Plato can explain more accurately the relation of sophistic and rhetoric to each other, because he was the first to explain the difference scientifically, whereas Gorgias, though he was unwilling to be reckoned among the sophists, could give no reason therefor.

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γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ d
αὑτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἥ τε
ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθ-
20 μώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου
ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὦ φίλε Πῶλε — σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος, —
ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄν-
των τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν. ὃ μὲν
οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον
25 ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν e
ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς λόγους λέγεω
αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγ-

465 d 17. **ἐπεστάτει**: we have to imagine such *ἐπιστάται* as, like the *κυβερνήτης, παιδοτρίβης, ποίμην*, are at the same time *ἐπιστήμονες*. *Cf. Prot.* 312 **d**, where the sophist is defined as *ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν, i.e. ἐπιστάμενος ποιῆσαι κτέ.*, a definition which furnishes, at the same time, an example for the *φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ* above.

18. **κατεθεωρεῖτο**: *cf.* 457 **c**. Here is meant a thorough critical examination from a higher point of view.

20. **τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου**: see on 450 **c**, 453 **e**, and Kr. 47, 5, 10. Anaxagoras, the friend of Pericles, agreed with the Atomic school and Empedocles, in holding that, in their original condition, the elements or atoms (according to him, unlimited in number, but of a certain definite quality) were mixed all together, without any definite arrangement. Into this confusion order was introduced by *νοῦς*, or the thinking spirit; or at least, this spirit gave the impulse towards it. His thesis describing the primitive condition of matter was this: *ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν*. *Cf.* Dyer-Cron, Introd. to *Apol.* § 10. 465 d

21. **τούτων**: perhaps with an intentional ambiguity. — Gorgias himself was not entirely without philosophical culture. See Introd. § 6. But as to Polus, we have no information.

23. **τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν**: both expressions are frequently connected to denote the same idea, both subjectively and objectively. Now, since *ὑγιεινόν* is that which *ὑγίειαν ἐμποιεῖ* (*Rep.* iv. 444 **c**) and *ἰατρική* is *ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ*, the latter must perforce be the art whose object is to restore the body to a healthy condition.

23 f. **ὃ μὲν οὖν κτέ.**: with this the discussion returns to the point which had given occasion to the above digressions (*ὅπερ μέντοι*).

25. **ἐκεῖνο**: refers to *ὀψοποιία*. The e employment of a neuter demonstrative or relative referring to an antecedent in the masculine or feminine adds to the generalness of the conception. *Cf.* 463 **b**, 460 **e**. But *ἐν σώματι* may have had some influence.

27. **μὲν οὖν**: here, as also in *ἴσως*

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γνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν. λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἣν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην, οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. 466 καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

XXI. ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν φῂς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική;

ΣΩ. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἆρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες; b

ΣΩ. Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

465 e μὲν οὖν and ὃ μὲν οὖν just preceding, οὖν does not denote sequence, but adds force to the statement about to be made in view of what has already been said. — ἐμοί: hints a contrast.

466 a XXI. 1. τί οὖν φῂς: Polus braces himself, and assumes again the office of questioner; but shows, by the vagueness (*cf.* above, 462 c with note) and inappropriateness of his question, that he is either singularly inattentive or stupid. Hence he receives a sharp rap over the knuckles with the admonition that his question had been some time settled (465 d).

4. τί τάχα δράσεις: is taken by Cron to mean "what can you possibly (τάχα) bring forward?" *i.e.* in the course of the discussion. The scholiast understood it as meaning "what will you do presently," when you get old, as we see by the addition πρεσβύτης γενόμενος. Probably it is 466 a but an exclamation of wonder and surprise; our colloquial "What'll you do next?"

5. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι: is to be connected with φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι. In spite of his qualification, Polus proceeds to put as bad a color on his assumed view of Socrates as possible, by adding ἀγαθοί (*cf.* 449 a) to ῥήτορες. *Cf.* 469 a. He does not aim at a refutation of Socrates; with him the question is still not the true nature of Rhetoric, but its value and power in the state.

7. ἐρώτημα κτέ.: probably Socrates only wishes to show that, from the point of view of dialectic, the preceding question is so inappropriate that he is obliged to look upon it as a merely *rhetorical* one, by which Polus only states his own sentiments. *Cf.* below c.

10. οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι: much more b

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Πωλ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;

Σω. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

Πωλ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε.

Σω. Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσιν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.

Πωλ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε c ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

Σω. Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἑκάστου ὧν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.

Πωλ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.

Σω. Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;

Πωλ. Πῶς δύο;

Σω. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἀποκτεινύασιν οἱ d ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς.

Πωλ. Ἔγωγε.

466 b crushing than φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι. "They are not considered at all," "they have no value whatever." On νομίζεσθαι, *cf.* Ar. *Nub.* 962 ὅτ' ἐγὼ (ὁ δίκαιος λόγος) τὰ δίκαια λέγων ἤνθουν καὶ σωφροσύνη 'νενόμιστο ("was in high repute").

15. μέν: almost equiv. to μήν, *indeed*. — δή: equiv. to *just*. "But that is indeed just what I do (γε) say."

c 18. ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι: by this comparison Polus endeavors to emphasize the importance of his art, careless of the fact that he thereby detracts from its moral value. He employs his strongest expression of power actually used (ἀποκτεινύασιν), not even using the circumlocution οἵοί τ' εἰσίν. In spite of his following reassertion, however, the question is really only a rhetorical one, in which he voices his own statements. See on a above. 466 c

21. νὴ τὸν κύνα: see on 461 b. — ἀμφιγνοῶ . . . λέγεις: '*I am in doubt at every word you say.*' Cope.

25. εἶεν: "very well," accepts the issue.

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XXII. Σω. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· e
ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.

Πωλ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;

Σω. Οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησιν Πῶλος.

Πωλ. Ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; φημί μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.

Σω. Μὰ τὸν — οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι φὴς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

Πωλ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.

Σω. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα, ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς μέγα δύνασθαι;

Πωλ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ

466 d — XXII. 4. **δύνασθαι μέν**: the correlative has *μέντοι*, which is much stronger than *δέ*.

e — 5. **ἂν βούλονται**: is a circumlocution for the part. gen.; hence the indicative. — **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**: see on 450 b.

7. **οὐκοῦν κτέ.**: Polus is surprised that Socrates should see any difference in the two phrases.

9. **οὔ φημι** (*nego*): repeats *οὔχ, ὥς φησι*. Polus does not understand Socrates, who has in mind the results of the admission that the possession of power is a *good*. The question is merely rhetorical, with an accent of astonishment.

10. **μὰ τόν**: the omission of the divinity occurs not infrequently. *Cf.* Ar. *Ran.* 1374 *μὰ τόν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδ' ἄν, εἴ τις ἔλεγέ μοι τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων, ἐπιθόμην κτέ.* H., 723 a, says that the deity is omitted with humorous effect; but it is much more likely here that Socrates is a little vexed, but stops at once any exhibition of it. The Scholiast's note, *εὐλαβείας χάριν*, may be interpreted as indicating this motive, or the motive assigned to Socrates on 461 b. — **φής**: with a clear reference to Polus' previous statements in b, which he is thus led to reiterate.

466 e — 12. **γὰρ οὖν**: is frequently found thus in phrases of acquiescence.

17. **οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις κτέ.**: the fut. in neg. questions forms a lively expression for urgent demand. Kr. 53, 7, 4; H. 844 a. — The pred. noun with the supplementary partic. follows the same rule of agreement, as with the supplementary infinitive.

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τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; 467
εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν
τοῦτο κεκτήσονται. ἡ δὲ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φῂς, ἀγα-
θόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν
εἶναι· ἢ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραν-
νοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώ-
λου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΠΩΛ. Οὗτος ἀνήρ — b

ΣΩ. Οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλά μ' ἔλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλ-
τιστα εἶναι, τούτου πρόσθεν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΣΩ. Οὔ φημι.

467 a 18. **ἐξελέγξας**: the refutation consists in the proof, and the proof is at the same time a refutation. We must not insist on the priority of the aorist participle (H. 856 b); but the complex is to be considered, and from that point of view it would make no difference whether we had *ἀποδείξεις ἐξελέγξας* or *ἀποδείξας ἐξελέγξεις*.

21. **ἡ δὲ δύναμις κτέ.**: contains one of the propositions on which Socrates bases the statement made above (466 e) and afterwards repeated, *πῶς ἂν . . . μέγα δύναιντο*. The other proposition is that the possession by the orators of the power of doing what they please is not a good possession.

26. **ἐξελεγχθῇ**: in the pregnant sense. "If by a refutation of the position taken he be not convinced." *Cf.* 482 b.

28. **οὗτος ἀνήρ —**: 'aposiopesis.' Polus is so astonished that he does not know what to say. The complete exclamation (always without the article) occurs 489 b. *Cf.* 505 c. Polus' astonishment, as well as stupidity, are still more evident in the words which follow, *σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυᾶ*. *σχέτλιος* is taken from Homer, where, however, it is only used of persons (except rarely in the Odyssey); *ὑπερφυής* is not unknown in Attic, but occurs in Plato (except here and 477 d) only in the adverbial form. 467 b

31. **τούτου πρόσθεν**: can, of course, be considered as a gloss on *ἄρτι*, but it heightens the effect, from a mimetic point of view, as well by its meaning, "a moment ago," as by its position at the end of the sentence.

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Πωλ. Ποιοῦντες δὲ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;

Σω. Φημί.

Πωλ. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυᾶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σω. Μὴ κατηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.

Πωλ. Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις.

XXIII. Σω. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν;

Πωλ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε· τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οἶμαι, οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν.

35. **δέ**: almost equiv. to "although." It is often used in the second of clauses thus connected to emphasize the opposition.

38. **ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε**: 'paronomasia' in Polus' style. See on 448 c.

41. **ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ**: expresses curiosity, rather than a desire for information. Socrates, as leader of the discussion, makes at once an advance, by fixing a very important distinction.

XXIII. 2 f. **ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν, ὃ πράττουσιν**: the former is generic, the latter is a circumlocution. A few lines below **ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν** is the special case, explanatory of **τοῦτο**.

4. **πίνοντες παρὰ κτέ.**: the preposition is personal; "from the hands of."

8. **οἱ πλέοντες**: the merchants (**ἔμποροι**) who engage in transmarine trade. Notice the confusion of the order, in which we can see the natural freedom of conversation. The subject of **ἐστίν** is **οὐ τοῦτο ὃ ποιοῦσιν**, the predicate **ὃ βούλονται**. The subject **οἱ πλέοντες** floats until the plural verb appears. The neg. in **οὐκοῦν** is not felt here. H. 1048 a (**β**).

11. **πράγματ' ἔχειν**: is passive to **πράγματα παρέχειν**.

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Πωλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων, ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει;

Πωλ. Ναί. e

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;

Πωλ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων;

Πωλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε 468 δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά;

Πωλ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

Σω. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ;

Πωλ. Τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

467 d 14. **ἄλλο τι**: 'ἄλλο τι ἤ challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence; ἄλλο τι challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.' Riddell, § 22.

e 18. **ἆρ' οὖν ἔστιν κτέ.**: see a more detailed investigation of this theory in *Lysis*. *Cf.* 216 d *δοκεῖ μοι ὥσπερεὶ τριῶν ὄντα εἶναι γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ δ' οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν.*

20. **πολλὴ ἀνάγκη**: the answer is not according to the form of the preceding question, but according to the sense, as if *οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων* had preceded. 467 e

21 f. **σοφίαν, ὑγίειαν, πλοῦτον**: types of the three great classes of property, — mental, physical, and material.

25. **ἆρα**: for position, see on 472 d.

28. **αὖ**: *on the other hand.* To *actions* are opposed *things*, which, however, belong to a similar category. 468 a

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Σω. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βα- b
δίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν,
ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τινα ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ
ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον
εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;

Πωλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Ἕνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ
ποιοῦντες.

Πωλ. Φημί.

XXIV. Σω. Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦ- c
μεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα
ποιοῦμεν;

Πωλ. Μάλιστα.

Σω. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ
τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ'
ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλα-
βερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα,
ὡς φῂς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα,
οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. ἢ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε,
ἢ οὔ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει;

468 b 36. **βέλτιον**: *sc.* than its opposite. When the comparison is self-evident, the Greek, like the English, frequently omits the second member.

c XXIV. 2. **ἐκεῖνα, ἐκεῖνο**: the immediate repetition of the same pronoun with different reference is remarkable. — **ταῦτα**: refers back to ἃ.

5. **σφάττειν**: is purposely substituted as a harsher word for *ἀποκτεινύναι*. It implies that the person killed is defenseless: "to slaughter like an ox." — **ἁπλῶς οὕτως**. *thus simply*, "without limitation," as one would have to assume if the view of Polus is to stand. *Cf. Prot.* 351 c *οὐκ οἶδα ἁπλῶς οὕτω, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν κτέ. Cf.* 464 b. 468 c

11. **τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει**: a challenge in the form of a question, because Polus hesitates to answer. He is beginning to feel concerned for his fondly cherished view and bold state-

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Πωλ. Ἀληθῆ. d

Σω. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἦ γάρ;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει;

Πωλ. Ἀλλ' οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

Σω. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ e πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;

Πωλ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

Σω. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

Πωλ. Ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι

468 c ments. The same form recurs a few lines below, where Polus is just clearly recognizing his defeat. These artifices belong to the dramatic side of the dialogue, and take the place of the tedious repetitions which weary us in the narrative form; *e.g.*, in *Prot.* 360 c, d *συνέφη — ἐπένευσεν — καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν — πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν — οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὔτ' ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε.*

d 13. **εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν**: is the general premiss, while what follows up to *οὐ κάκιον* is the special application of this to tyrants and orators. For the structure, see on the similar case in 453 c.

15. **αὐτῷ**: is said from the standpoint of the critic, although referring to the subject of *οἰόμενος*. The Greek does not cling to the reflexive. Kr. 468 d 51, 2, 5; H. 684 a.

15 f. **τυγχάνει δὲ κτέ.**: is connected with the participle as an independent clause, — a usage common after relatives. Kr. 59, 2, 6. 9; H. 1005. The Eng. idiom requires 'although' or 'whereas.'

21 f. **ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ**: *in this* e undefined *city* of which they were speaking, the abode of the tyrant or orator under criticism (*ὁ τοιοῦτος*).

25. **ὅτι ἔστιν**: *that it is possible.* There need not be in all cases a conflict between what one wishes and what seems best, but the possibility of a single case is enough for Socrates' argument.

28. **ὡς δὴ σὺ κτέ.**: is quite ironic; *as if you would not!* It is really a com-

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ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς
30 ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.

Σω. Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;

Πωλ. Ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν; 469

Σω. Εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.

35 Πωλ. Τί δή;

Σω. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν.

Πωλ. Τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

40 Σω. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Πωλ. Ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεεινός;

Σω. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.

Πωλ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;

45 Σω. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεεινόν b γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.

Πωλ. Ἡ που ὅ γε ἀποθνῄσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.

Σω. Ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ
50 δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκων.

Πωλ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

468 e parison, "it is just as true as the fact that," *etc.* By this fling Polus seeks to evade confession of his defeat.

31. **δήσαντα**: equiv. to *εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀγαγόντα*.

33. **ζηλωτόν**: *enviable*. By an easy 469 a shift, the personal idea is transferred to the action itself.

34. **εὐφήμει** (fave lingua): says Socrates, because the denial of all moral principles implied in the words 469 a of Polus seems to him like a sin against divinity. *Cf. Prot.* 330 d.

39. **τῶν**: the art. with incorporated antec. is Platonic. Kr. 51, 12, 8.

41. **δικαίως**: is slipped in unfairly by Polus. *Cf.* 466 a.

46. **πρός**: is the only preposition b that occurs at all frequently in Attic prose as an adverb.

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Σω. Οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

Πωλ. Ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον;

Σω. Ἧκιστά γε.

Πωλ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

Σω. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον c εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

Πωλ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;

Σω. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.

Πωλ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ δόξαν.

XXV. Σω. Ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ d

469 b 52. **οὕτως κτλ.**: 'Life is not the highest good, but guilt is certainly the greatest evil.' This was one of the life principles of Socrates. *Cf.* the beautiful exposition in *Apol.* 28 **b** ff., especially 29 **b** and 30 **d**, *Crito* 48 **b**.

c 57. **βουλοίμην ἂν οὐδέτερα**: *I would* WISH *neither;* because also to suffer wrong is not a good thing. With Polus wish and preference coincide. —This quibble of Socrates is interesting, as showing the difficulties by which early thinkers were beset. For an accurate statement of principles, an accurate use of synonyms was indispensable; and this was not yet possible, even with the cultured.

60. **σὺ ἄρα κτλ.**: Polus cannot tear himself away from his fast-rooted ideas. Hence all teaching is vain.

XXV. 1. **ὦ μακάριε**: has somewhat of an ironical coloring. The nearest English equivalent is the half serious "Oh, you awful fellow!" — 469 c **ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος**: as an offset to Polus' words **ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω**. "Let us have, then, argument for argument." The gen. may depend on **ἐπιλαβοῦ**, as in 506 **b**, but it is more likely gen. abs. See on **ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι**, 506 **a**, and *Symp.* 214 **e** **ἐάν τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαβοῦ, ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ εἰπὲ ὅτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι.** The original meaning is made clear by *Prot.* 329 **a** **τὰ χαλκεῖα πληγέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηταί τις** (*unless one takes hold of it*). —**τῷ λόγῳ**: instrumental dat., "with your argument."

2. **ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ**: is not temporal, as in Xen. *An.* i. 8. 1 **ἤδη δὲ ἦν ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν**, *i.e.* towards noon. It simply indicates the presence of a multitude. d

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μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι "ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει"· εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχει- e
ρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι "ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντιν' ἄν σοι δοκῇ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια"· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι' ὅτι μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύ- 470
ναμιν;

469 d 3. **ἐγχειρίδιον**: is not a "dagger," but a short sword for striking and thrusting; the former is shown by κατεαγέναι τῆς κεφαλῆς. *Cf.* Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 23 παραγγείλαντες νεανίσκοις . . . ξιφίδια ὑπὸ μάλης ἔχοντας παραγενέσθαι.

6. **τεθνήξει**: one of the two Greek verbs with fut. perf. active. See H. 467. The fut. perfect expresses the certainty as well as the immediateness of the result; *cf.* κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, and see GMT. 79.

7. **τῆς κεφαλῆς**: is a gen. of the part affected. H. 738 b. *Cf.* Ar. *Ach.* 1180 τῆς κεφαλῆς κατέαγε περὶ λίθον πεσών. The acc. could have been used; *cf.* 515 e τὰ ὦτα. — **αὐτῶν**: follows τινά, — a case of 'hyperbaton.'

e 14. The art. is omitted before τριήρεις, although it has a different gender from that of the preceding substantive. *Cf.* *Phaedo* 111 c καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα. Omission of the art. where both substantives are of the same gender is not uncommon. The two kindred ideas are thereby brought together into one conception. In the present passage, by this means we have the objects enumerated divided into classes: (1) the navy-yard, with the war-vessels therein contained; (2) the remaining vessels, whether they be public or private property. Similarly, Dem. *Ol.* ii. 9 τῷ τὰ χωρία καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα προειληφέναι. 469 e

17. **οὕτω γε**: limits the answer, as if Polus still wished to save something from his earlier statement.

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ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δή; λέγε.

ΠΩΛ. Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἔπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι· σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε b μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτεινύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζει.

470 a 26. **οὐκοῦν κτέ.**: the sentence is merely a statement in the form of an interrogation, and assumes an assent by the opponent, provided no express demurrer is raised. Socrates gives opportunity for this after *δύνασθαι* (29), but as none is made, he proceeds again with *σκεψώμεθα κτέ.* — **πάλιν αὖ**: because in this new conception is contained a correction of the former view held by Polus.

27. **φαίνεται**: has its subject in *τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι*, and its predicate in *ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι*. "Does not then this great power of yours (*πάλιν αὖ*) appear to you (only provided the one who does what seems good to him proves to be doing what is profitable) to be both a good thing, — and that, as it seems, is the real (*τό*) great power; otherwise it is an evil thing and small power." The sentence begins with a question which is lost in an affirmation. 470 a

29. **εἰ δὲ μή**: is phraseological, "otherwise." The contrast is with *τοῦτο*, and through this with *ἐὰν μὲν κτέ.* The subject of *κακόν (ἐστι) καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι* is, of course, the phrase *τὸ πράττειν ἃ δοκεῖ*, to be supplied from the context. H. 904, 906 a, b.

30. **ἄλλο τι**: see on 467 d. b

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Πωλ. Σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο.

Σω. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ ἡδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.

XXVI. Πωλ. Χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;

Σω. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.

Πωλ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν.

Σω. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

Πωλ. Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;

470 b 40. **σὺ μὲν οὖν κτέ.**: Polus evades the answer and forces it upon Socrates, partly because he is not able to give it, for the distinction demanded lies equally remote from the circle of his thoughts and his feelings; partly because he does not wish it, for he has a suspicion that it will contradict all the views which he has thus far expressed. The less, however, he is in position to confute Socrates by arguments, the greater is his confidence in his ability to do so by facts.

c XXVI. 1. **χαλεπόν**: is ironic; but in **ἀλλ' οὐχί** the irony turns to sober earnest. Not so with the irony of Socrates.

5. **μὴ κάμῃς, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε**: note the difference between positive and neg. imperative. — **εὐεργετῶν**: is to be explained according to 458 a. On the supplementary partic., see G. 279, 1; H. 983.

7. **τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην**: means "recent events." Homer also uses the phrase **χθιζά τε καὶ πρώιζα**, B 303. The Greek idiom requires *καί* where the Eng. uses "or." 470 d

8 f. **πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι**: in most cases when the participle is used as an attribute, we can still feel the participial plus as compared with the adjective. Here, however, that has almost completely disappeared, and the participle is as much an adj. as *προσήκων, πρέπων, etc.*

10. **τὰ ποῖα**: it is a matter of individual preference whether the art. be used or not; *cf.* 449 e. When used, the article limits the attention to what has been already alluded to; here, *τὰ ἐχθὲς . . . ταῦτα*. In Eng. one also occasionally hears the art. with the interrogative.

11. **Ἀρχέλαον**: Archelaus, an ille-

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Σω. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.

Πωλ. Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;

Σω. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.

Πωλ. Τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ; e

Σω. Μὰ Δί', οὐ δῆτα.

Πωλ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.

Σω. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

Πωλ. Τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;

Σω. Ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

470 d gitimate son of Perdiccas, seized the throne in B.C. 414, after his father's death, and reigned until 399, when he was murdered by Craterus or Crateuas (name and motive are alike uncertain). The facts brought forward by Polus in their darkest colors are probably correct; but Archelaus laid the foundation for the later importance of Macedonia by introducing Greek culture. He invited famous artists, among others Euripides, to his court. There is also a tradition that he invited Socrates, but that is hardly credible. — **ὁρᾷς**: well expresses the lively interest which Polus, as well as many other Greeks, took in that admired ruler, whose apparent success was doubtless envied by many an aspiring and ambitious man. The answer of Socrates sounds somewhat pedantic, but it is probably jesting, and designed to cool the extravagant ardor of Polus, while at the same time it prepares the way for *οὔπω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί* below. 470 d

13. **ἀλλὰ . . . γε**: *nevertheless, at least.* H. 1046, 2, a.

15–26. This passage is translated by Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 12.

16. **αὐτόθεν**: "instinctively," "of yourself." This is not translated by Cicero, but it forms a good contrast to *συγγενόμενος*. Polus thinks the very fact of Archelaus being a ruler implies that he is fortunate. That the Persian king was generally esteemed the personification of happiness is shown by *Apol.* 40 e. e

21 f. **παιδεία** and **δικαιοσύνη**: together denote moral cultivation. — **ὅπως ἔχει**: construed with the part. gen. See G. 168, N. 3; H. 757 a.

25. **ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα**: virtue, and hence also the foundation of *εὐδαιμονία*, is, according to Socrates, one and the same for all, while the pupils of Gorgias recognized different varie-

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Πωλ. Ἆθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν 471
σὸν λόγον;

Σω. Εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.

Πωλ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν
τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἣν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἣ ἦν δούλη
Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον
δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν,
ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λό-
γον· νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέ- b
γιστα ἠδίκηκεν· ὃς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν
δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν
ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ κατα-
μεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν
αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἅμαξαν, νύκτωρ
ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους· καὶ
ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ

470 e ties for different classes. *Cf. Meno* 71 e *πρῶτον μὲν εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν κτἑ.* On the omission of the art. with *γυναῖκα*, see on 469 e.

471 a 27. **οὗτος . . . ὁ Ἀρχέλαος**: the position emphasizes the name; 'this man — Archelaus!'

30. **πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος**: *sc. ἐστίν*. This admission, coupled with the opinion that Archelaus is an enviable and happy man, which is very evident from the ironical narrative which follows, shows most plainly the utter opposition between Polus' view and the moral principle which Socrates champions. — **ᾧ γε**: introduces the authority of indisputable facts. See on 460 e.

32 ff. **καὶ, καὶ, καί**: is in sense almost equiv. to "and therefore." The construction begun in the clause **ᾧ γε** 471 a **. . . ἀδελφοῦ** is naturally varied in **καὶ . . . Ἀλκέτου** by being made personal.

33. **εἰ ἐβούλετο, ἦν εὐδαίμων**: is an unreal conditional sentence, with opposition to the present. The close proximity of the two clauses in the apodosis explains the omission of the second **ἄν**.

37. **δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον**: denotes b two kinds of moral obligation to which Archelaus paid no attention; *ξενίσας* adds a third, the violation of which was considered among Greeks the worst of crimes, a sin against *Ζεὺς ξένιος*. *Cf.* Hom. N 624, Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 4. The heaping up of the words *καταμεθύσας, ἐμβαλών* (like a thing), *ἐξαγαγών, ἀπέσφαξεν, ἠφάνισεν* makes the impression of the repeated acts of violence very vivid.

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οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν γνήσιον τοῦ Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἑπτέτη, οὗ ἡ c
ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, well
ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν ἐν
Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος. d

XXVII. Σω. Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπῄνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἠμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ᾧ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὠγαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φῄς.

471 b 43. **τὸν ἀδελφόν**: is emphasized by its position in advance of its governing verb (partic.).

c 44. **Περδίκκου**: Perdiccas II. reigned from B.C. 454 (?) until 414 or 413, after having dispossessed his brother Alcetas. During the Peloponnesian war he pursued a very prudent but faithless policy. — The extraordinary number of participles employed by Polus has an artistic value in showing the tumultuousness of his feelings.

45. **οὐκ ἐβουλήθη** (*he did not choose*) **εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι**: is very sarcastic. The conclusion introduced by *τοιγάρτοι* is equally emphatic. Polus admires in Archelaus the strength of will which hesitates at nothing to accomplish its aim; regret with him is weakness.

51. **καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις κτέ.**: in these words, in spite of their sarcastic form, lies the only attempt at proof which Polus makes, *i.e.* an appeal to the opinion of others; he of course thinks that no one will own himself to be such a man. 471 c

XXVII. 1. **καὶ κατ' ἀρχάς**: leads us to expect in the following *καὶ νῦν* a confirmation and climax of praise, — which, however, is changed instead to blame by *τοῦ . . . ἠμεληκέναι*. Note the zeugma in combining *τοῦ . . . ἠμεληκέναι* with *ἐπῄνεσα*. See on 520 b *ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ*. The praise was bestowed in 448 d. d

6. **πόθεν**: is a question with a negative force, to which the affirmative *καὶ μήν* corresponds.

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Πωλ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω. e

Σω. Ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τἀναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς 472
τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τί. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν

471 e 8. **ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ**: in such phrases the *ἐπεί* has the force of "although," "whereas." *Cf. Prot.* 335 c *σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τ' εἶναι. Apol.* 19 e. The conj. merely indicates a relation between the two ideas. If these two ideas harmonize, the relation becomes causal; if not, it becomes adversative.

9. **ὦ μακάριε** (*cf.* 469 c): implies the reproof which follows.

10. **ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις**: the manner of argument practised there frequently incurs Plato's disapproval. *Cf. Apol.* 34 b ff. The emphasis is laid on *ἡγούμενοι* and *δοκοῦσιν*.

13. **ἕνα τινά**: the indef. pron. emphasizes the number, "a paltry one."

472 a 15 f. **καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις**: the Greek idiom does not require intr. verbs to be used impersonally in the passive. *Cf.* Xen. *Apol.* 24 *καταψευδομαρτυρεῖν ἐμοῦ* with Dem. *in Meid.* 136 *καταψευδομαρτυροῦμαι.*

16. **δοκούντων εἶναι τί**: equal to *εὐδοκίμων*. *Cf.* the English colloquialism 'he pretends to be something.'

472 a 17. **ὀλίγου**: *almost;* the remnant of the phrase *ὀλίγου δεῖν*. H. 743 b.

19. **μαρτυρήσουσι κτέ.**: Nicias, the celebrated general in the Peloponnesian war, who met his death in the Sicilian expedition (B.C. 413), was leader of the moderate wing of the aristocratic party. Aristocrates, the son of Scellias or Scellius, belonged, as we can judge from Ar. *Av.* 125 and Thuc. viii. 89, to the extreme or oligarchical order. He was one of the generals condemned to death for negligence at the battle of Arginusae. Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. Socrates here speaks of both as if they were still living. (See Introd. § 18.) Next to them, Socrates mentions the house of Pericles; he could not name the statesman himself because he was already dead when Gorgias visited Athens for the first time; but he, with his house, was a champion of the Athenian democracy. So we have here representatives of the chief political parties as witnesses for Polus. They agreed with each other in that they esteemed power in the state, — even tyranny,

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μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἑστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἔστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περι- b
κλέους ὅλη οἰκία, ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ c

472 a — though purchased at the price of wrong-doing, to be the highest good.

20 ff. **ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, ἐὰν δέ βούλῃ**: are not pleonastic after *ἐὰν βούλῃ*, but are due partly to courtesy (*cf. Prot.* 353 **b** *εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον*), and serve also by specifying to emphasize the possibility of a free choice among all parties.

21. **ὧν οἱ τρίποδες**: in this way these men show that they were *δοκοῦντες εἶναί τί*. They also, by the magnificence of their offerings, proved their piety, and their 'testimony' would be therefore the more weighty. Nicias was, according to all accounts, an honorable man. Thucydides says (vii. 86) of him, in referring to his mournful death: *ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν.* By Dionysion is to be understood not a temple, but a spot sacred to Dionysus, — a sacred precinct. Nicias built there a kind of shrine, which possessed, among other treasures, some very costly tripods which he had dedicated to Dionysus after he had discharged the office of Choregus — a very costly liturgy in itself. The tripods were arranged 472 a apparently *ἐφεξῆς* with a kind of ostentation.

22 f. **ἐν Πυθίου**: *sc. ἱερῷ*. The offering of Aristocrates must have been, according to the words of Socrates, also costly and well-known.

26. **ἀναγκάζεις**: *sc.* to agreement b by convincing reasons; often followed by *ὁμολογεῖν*, but without it in *Theaet.* 196 **b** *τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν.*

27 f. **ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς**: this is ambiguous, for *οὐσία* can denote property, material possessions as well as physical existence. Accordingly Polus appears here in the investigation as a tyrant, who drives others from house and home. But it is this same power which the orator wishes to obtain (before a court) by his speech.

28 f. **σὲ αὐτὸν . . . μάρτυρα**: the dialectical proof is a course of logic, a process of reasoning, which Socrates carries through, with the help of his adversary, by question and answer. Hence by his enforced agreement a man becomes a witness against himself.

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λόγος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα, περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἢ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ ὅστις μή. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ d νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ ἡγεῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγεῖ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ· ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

XXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἓν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται. ἆρ' ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;

472 c 33. ἔστιν κτέ.: Socrates does not hereby recognize this adducing of 'testimony' to be a correct τρόπος ἐλέγχου, but rather implies by the words ὡς σύ τε οἴει κτέ. (*cf.* 471 **d**, 473 **b**) that it is only a pretended one, which cannot stand against the true one.

37. σχεδόν τι: does not weaken the idea, but merely softens the expression. The question under discussion is really the cardinal one of life, 'How can I be happy?'

d 40. αὐτίκα: is one of the ways of introducing an example in Greek. *Cf. Prot.* 359 **e** πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἃ οἵ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. The addition of πρῶτον shows that there are still other conflicts between their 472 d views; *e.g.* in reference to the nature and value of punishment.

41. εἶναι: is thrown forward for the sake of emphasis, as ἔστι above. After ἡγοῦμαι, νομίζω, and similar verbs the pred. is often found without a copula. *Cf.* 473 **a**.

XXVIII. 1. ἕν: with this are connected other points of difference.

2. εἶεν: see on 466 **c**. — ἆρα: the position here is still more remarkable than in 467 **e** and 476 **a**. — The whole weight of the question falls on ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης καὶ τιμωρίας. The former, δίκη, usually denotes simply the carrying out of the law, the infliction of justice; the latter, τιμωρία, the fine or penalty which falls to the

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ΠΩΛ. Ἥκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται; e

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος, ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

ΠΩΛ. Ἄτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. 473

ΣΩ. Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ· εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.

472 d injured person or the state. These are both external demands on the criminal, called forth by his crime, and by which an expiation of it is to be effected. On the other hand, *κόλασις* is the discipline which the guilty party himself undergoes, designed to prevent further transgression; while *ζημία* (470 a) is only the injury or damage which he sustains in expiating his crime. From the outset Socrates shows that, even according to the view of his opponent, wrongdoing does not give happiness under *all* conditions. This point is not made superfluous by the discussion of 469 c–470 c; for there the question concerns *δύναμις*, not *εὐδαιμονία*.

e 11. **καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης**: seems a strange addition after *διδῷ δίκην*, with which it appears to be almost synonymous. But the two phrases are probably intended to be but the subjective and objective, the active and passive expression of the same idea; as the *ὑπό* with the gen. would indicate. 472 e

15. **φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι**: therefore Socrates does not allow himself to be deterred by the trouble it will involve to bring Polus to the same opinion. *ταὐτὰ λέγειν* (*καὶ φρονεῖν*) is held as a sign of friendship, just as *διαφέρεσθαι* of enmity. See on 510 c and Sall. *Cat.* 20 nam idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est. At the same time the words contain a delicate reply to Polus' discourteous exclamation. Socrates will soon bring him to say what is in his own view *ἄτοπον*. 473 a

16 f. **ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν**: *cf.* 469 b.

17. **τὸ ἀδικεῖν . . . εἶναι**: is cited as an example of rather uncommon use of the indir. disc. inf. after *εἶπον* (GMT. 753, 3), but the clause is to be looked at rather as the object of *εἶπον* in the sense of "declare."

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Πωλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.

Πωλ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία.

Σω. Ὡς σὺ οἴει, ὦ Πῶλε. b

Πωλ. Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως.

Σω. Σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.

Πωλ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Σω. Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἧττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;

Πωλ. Ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.

Σω. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

Πωλ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραν- c
νίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται

473 a 22. καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ: of course the addition of Socrates after Polus' reply throws a quite different coloring over this sentence. Polus' self-assurance is apparent in *ναὶ μὰ Δία*, his positiveness in *ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος*. *ἴσως* shows no uncertainty, but is only the conscious under-statement which is common in English. See on 480 a.

b 31. ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτο κτέ.: refers to 470 c and is just as ironical. In sharp contrast with the false assurance which trusts its own cleverness is Socrates' faith in the immutability of truth, *τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται*.

35. ληφθῇ: pictures vividly the 473 c actual scene. In compound verbs the metaphorical meaning often predominates, and leaves the actual in the background (*cf. ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι*). In what follows, notice the rhetorical heaping up of the most frightful punishments; which reminds us of Aesch. *Eum.* 186 ff. *καρανιστῆρες ὀφθαλμωρύχοι | δίκαι σφαγαί τε σπέρματός τ' ἀποφθοραὶ | παίδων, κακοῦ τε χλοῦνις ἠδ' ἀκρωνία, | λευσμός τε καὶ μύζουσιν οἰκτισμὸν πολὺν | ὑπὸ ῥάχιν παγέντες*. *Cf. Rep.* ii. 361 e *μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τὼφθαλμώ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται*.

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καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνα-
40 σταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται, ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῷ ποιῶν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονι-
ζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα d
λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;

XXIX. Σω. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν· "ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι," εἶπες;

5 Πωλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ διδοὺς δίκην· δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος

473 c **37. καὶ ἄλλας** κτέ.: notice the *ὁμοιοτέλευτα*.

39. ἐπιδών: *sc.* λωβηθέντας.

40. καταπιττωθῇ: an especially severe manner of punishment. The criminal was put into a sack smeared with pitch, — the so-called tunica molesta, — which was then set on fire.

41. διαφυγών: "if he succeed"; opposed to λῃφθῇ.

42. ὅτι ἂν βούληται: Polus has again forgotten the explanation of the difference between *δοκεῖν* and *βούλεσθαι*. — **εὐδαιμονιζόμενος**: to be thought *εὐδαίμων* by the multitude is to be so, in Polus' estimation.

43. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων: *cf.* Hom. B 191 ἀλλ' *αὐτός τε κάθησο καὶ ἄλλους ἴδρυε λαούς*, 480 d, *Phaedo* 110 e *λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς*. The same idiom is found in Latin, as equites et aliud vulgus. See on 447 c. 473 c

43 f. ταῦτα λέγεις: Polus is triumphant, as if Socrates' position (*ταῦτα*) were now overthrown. d

XXIX. **1. μορμολύττει**: the expression for terrifying with ghost stories. The 'mormo' was the 'bad man' with which children were frightened. *Cf. Crito* 46 c. — **ὦ γενναῖε**: is probably designedly used because the means employed are unfair,' being only a pretended, not a real proof. *Cf.* 471 e.

2. ὅμως δέ: although in reality no point has been made, yet Socrates is ready to assume one and proceed upon that.

3. ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων: can be completed from c. The change in the expression is due to the collocation of the two words.

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μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφεύγων καὶ τυ- e
ραννεύσας. τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο
εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγ-
χειν δὲ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα
λέγῃς, ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τωα
τουτωνί.

ΣΩ. Ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βου-
λεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με
ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψη- 474
φίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς

473 e 9. **ὁ διαφεύγων**: "whoever *remains* unpunished."—**τυραννεύσας**: "he who *attains* to the tyranny." The more important idea precedes.

10. **τί τοῦτο**: *what can this mean?* The inappropriate laughter of Polus is probably in accordance with the precept of Gorgias that in serious things one must draw the audience to his own side by laughing. Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 18 (*Rhet. Gr.* ed. Sp. i. 160): *δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι, τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ.*

11. **καταγελᾶν**: *to laugh it down.* Socrates' opinion of the *ἄλλο εἶδος ἐλέγχου* is shown by the addition, *ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή.*

14 f. **ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί**: by again having recourse unto the opinion of others, Polus again reverts, though in a different manner, to his 'witnesses' (469 e), and shows that the *rhetorical* method of proof is alone comprehensible to him. By inviting Socrates to put the question to those present, he reminds him of the analogous practice of *ἐπιψηφίζειν* (rogare populum), and gives him a chance to plead his own inaptitude as an excuse for not employing rhetorical methods. Socrates in his reply also shows that to accept the opinion of the majority — the method which the state had settled upon as the best way of establishing the truth — was as unsatisfactory, when employed by the individual, as the rhetorical methods. The fact to which Socrates alludes is the well-known trial of the generals who had won the battle of Arginusae and afterwards fell victims to political intrigue. The full proceedings are detailed by Xen. *Hell.* i. 6. 33 ff. and 7. Socrates was senator this year (Ol. 93. 3, 406 B.C.), and in the memorable assembly *ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων.* As such, he opposed the unlawful proceeding with an intrepid courage which he here humorously calls inaptitude in *ἐπιψηφίζειν.* Socrates mentions the circumstance also in *Apol.* 32 b, but in a different manner. On the chronological difficulty, see Introd. § 18.

17. **ἡ φυλή**: of course that to which Socrates belonged, *ἡ Ἀντιοχίς.*

18. **γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ** κτέ.: 'hysteron proteron.' See Rid. § 308. 474 a

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παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου, οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτόν, πρὸς ὃν ἄν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾖ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν, εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον b ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

ΠΩΛ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ; c

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ' ἐρεῖς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι, ἵν' εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἠρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

474 a 20. **τούτων**: *i.e.* the various means with which Polus had hitherto attempted to confute Socrates. — **ὅπερ νυνδή**: 472 c.

21. **παράδος**: *viz.* **τὸν ἔλεγχον**. *Cf.* below, **διδόναι ἔλεγχον** "to give a chance for refutation."

25. **οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι**: because scientific investigation by means of conversation is naturally confined to individuals.

b 32. **ἐπεὶ . . . ἀδικεῖν**: this is not meant in earnest, but is a reductio ad absurdum of the preceding words of Socrates, which are so opposed to Polus' view. On **ἐπεί** *cf.* 471 e, and see GMT. 718, where this clause is cited as interrogative. 474 b

c 37. **καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ**: implies a doubt whether Socrates can really advance anything in support of his view. On the following answers of Polus, see Introd. § 14.

39. **ὥσπερ κτέ.**: as an actual fact, the discussion has been concerning the question whether **ἀδικεῖν** or **ἀδικεῖ-**

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ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; αἴσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

XXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἴσχιον;

ΠΩΛ. Ἥκιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖ σύ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. d

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονήν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς

474 c σθαι were the greater evil, since the middle of ch. XXIV.

43. τί δὲ δή; *how so, then?* — The predicate is thrown forward in the following clause, because the chief weight of the contrast falls upon it.

XXX. 1. οὐκοῦν κτέ.: the καλόν is here the species under which the ἀγαθόν and the ἡδύ are subordinated.

3. ὡς ἔοικας: logically, in such cases as this, an inf. is to be supplied; but it is doubtful if any such ellipses were felt by the Greeks. — καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, — κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν: 'chiasmus.'

d 6. τόδε: is probably an acc. with λέγεις understood. *Cf. Phaedo* 65 d τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε and Xen. *Mem.* iii. 1. 10 τί δὲ τοὺς κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας. On the other hand, *Phil.* 27 e τί δὲ ὁ σὸς βίος and Soph. *Aj.* 101 τί γὰρ δὴ παῖς ὁ τοῦ Λαερτίου make for the nom. The context must be the guide.

8. εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων: *with regard* 471 d *unto nothing*, that is, without searching for some characteristic common to all these things, in accordance with which you would be justified in calling them καλά. The word ἀποβλέπω is used also when reference is made to an idea or principle, which conditions a person's action or the manner of appearance of any phenomenon.

9. κατά: is used of the scale according to which a thing is to be measured.

10. πρὸς τοῦτο: points emphatically back to πρὸς ὅ κτέ., in a way more remarkable here than in 469 c. The relative clause itself is an extension of κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, laying especial stress on the relativity of the καλόν.

11. ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι: notice the use of the passive to denote the point of view from which σῶμα is καλόν.

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θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος e
κάλλους;

Πωλ. Οὐκ ἔχω.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονήν τινα ἢ διὰ ὠφελίαν ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;

Πωλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα ὡσαύτως;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλά, ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφότερα.

Πωλ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως; 475

Πωλ. Πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ;

474 e 12. **ἐκτὸς τούτων**: *i.e.* the points of view mentioned in ἢ . . . ἤ.

17. **προσαγορεύειν**: *i.e.* to designate by the addition of a characteristic, as if one were addressing a person by name.

22. **καὶ μήν**: introduces us to a new variety of the beautiful, *i.e.* the results of mental activity. The *νόμοι*, *ἐπιτηδεύματα*, and *μαθήματα* are, with reference to the subject of investigation, fittingly introduced as representatives of this class. — **τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους** *κτέ.*: it must be confessed that we could do very well without *τὰ καλά*. If kept, it must be considered as a repetition and restriction of *τά γε κατὰ κτέ.*, and *τούτων* must be explained by *ἢ ὠφέλιμα κτέ.* in apposition. See H. 950. But Rid. § 271 b seems to have a different view of the sentence, which he holds to be a case of inversion of government, and with this Cope seems to agree in his translation: "And moreover, in all that belongs to laws and habits of life, their beauty, I presume, is to be found nowhere beyond these limits; that is to say, either the utility or the pleasure that is in them, or both." 474 e

475 a 27. **καὶ καλῶς** *κτέ.*: this lively assent of Polus shows that he thinks that Socrates is at last veering round to his position. The manner in which he is gradually undeceived is interesting.

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Πωλ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σω. Ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾖ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.

Πωλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἴσχιον ᾖ, ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ b ἀνάγκη;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;

Πωλ. Ἔλεγον.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;

Πωλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

XXXI. Σω. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα λύπῃ c ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;

Πωλ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.

Σω. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.

Πωλ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.

Πωλ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

475 b 36. ἤτοι κτέ.: if the text is sound, Socrates here speaks with less exactness than above, omitting what can be easily supplied.

39. φέρε δή: the result obtained is applied to the case under discussion.

XXXI. 1. λύπῃ: here denotes, as the following ἀλγοῦσι explains, only physical pain. No reference can be meant to the gnawings of conscience. 475 c

2. ὑπερβάλλει: here construed with gen. like ὑπερέχει (5). *Cf. Leg.* v. 734 a.

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St. I. p. 475.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Τῷ κακῷ;

Πωλ. Ἔοικεν.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

Πωλ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι. d

Σω. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.

Πωλ. Ἔοικεν.

Σω. Δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον; μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσει· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ. e

Πωλ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σω. Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;

Πωλ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

475 d 17. **ἄλλο τι**: see on 467 d. Polus had several times given as an authority the opinion of the masses, and had even, in 474 b, by the words *οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς* spoken in their name. He thus appears, like Protagoras in *Prot.* 353 a, as their representative. *ὡμολογεῖτο* properly applies to *ὑπὸ σοῦ*, and the present is to be supplied to *ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων*.

23. **δέξαιο ἄν**: pays back for Polus' remark in 474 b. The construction is varied by the substitution of *ἀντὶ* with gen. instead of *ἤ* after *μᾶλλον*.

24. **ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον**: *sc. κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ*. 475 d

25. **γενναίως**: *bravely*; scorning the pain. The comparison is the same as in 480 c *παρέχειν . . . ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ*, and seems to be a Socratic one. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 54. For the construction, see on 456 b.

26. **φάθι ἢ μὴ** (*sc. φάθι*): *affirm or deny*. See on 454 d. e

29. **κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον**: a conditional admission, implying that with a different treatment possibly a different result might be obtained.

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Σω. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἂν σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.

Πωλ. Φαίνεται.

Σω. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ 476
μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην. ἆρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ ᾤου, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾤμην. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;

Πωλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά b
ἐστι, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.

Πωλ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

475 e 30 f. **οὔτ' ἂν κτέ.**: ἄν draws attention to the emphatic words. On the position and repetition, see H. 862, 864; GMT. 223, 226.

34. **ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὁ ἔλεγχος κτέ.**: we might also have had *ὁρᾷς οὖν τὸν ἔλεγχον ὅτι παρὰ κτέ.* But the form chosen by Plato greatly heightens the contrast. Socrates, moreover, is referring to his own words in 472 c *παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων.* Hence also the addition of the expressions *μαρτυρῶν* and *ἐπιψηφίζων* to the more general *ὁμολογῶν*.

476 a 41. **ἆρα μέγιστον**: the more usual particle for "whether" is *εἰ*, but *cf. Phaedo* 70 d *ἴδωμεν ἆρ' οὑτωσὶ γίγνεται ἅπαντα.* H. 1016. In the sentence following, we have *ἆρα* introducing a direct question previously announced by *τῇδε* as in 459 d. 476 a

43. **κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα**: the adverb is necessary, because upon it rests the main point in the proof.

43 f. **ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς**: the position makes the question more pointed.

47. **καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ**: the exhortation to Polus to think well before he speaks is at the same time an intimation to the reader that the principle touched on in the question is of the greatest importance, as indicative of a man's moral views, and b

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St. I. p. 476.

XXXII. Σω. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος;

Πωλ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σω. Ἆρα τοῦτο πάσχον, ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον, οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;

Πωλ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σω. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι; c

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;

Πωλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;

Πωλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτως κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάῃ;

Πωλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι.

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον, οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει; d

Πωλ. Φαίνεται.

476 b hence is not to be accepted without earnest investigation. How necessary this exhortation is, can be perceived from a question of Polus in 477 c.

c XXXII. 14. κάει: the examples are chosen from cauterizing and surgery, because the healing art is in general for the body what the punitive administration of justice is for the soul. See on 456 b. The second example is an advance on the first, in so far as the result of the treatment — corresponding to the general idea πάθος — can be expressed in the substantival form τμῆμα. 476 c

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St. I. p. 476.

Σω. Συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.

Πωλ. Ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

Σω. Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν;

Πωλ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος;

Πωλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὑπό γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.

Σω. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει; e

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὔ;

Πωλ. Δίκαια.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει;

Πωλ. Φαίνεται.

Σω. Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;

Πωλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.

Πωλ. Ναί.

XXXIII. Σω. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ 477
ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.

Πωλ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σω. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;

476 d 26. **συλλήβδην**: turns from the particular to the generic, and extends to all cases the law which has been noticed in special cases. It belongs, of course, to the last clause *οἷον κτέ.*

30. **τὸ δίκην διδόναι**: the article determines the subject. GMT. 790.

e 35. **ὀρθῶς**: denotes in general the proper or appropriate exercise of any function, and thus leads up to **δικαίως**, which is specially ethical. 476 e

XXXIII. 1. **εἴπερ καλὰ κτέ.**: the argument, made according to the modus tollendo ponens with natural abbreviations, rests on the exposition made in 474 d f. 477 a

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Πωλ. Ἔοικεν.

Σω. Ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;

Πωλ. Εἰκός γε.

Σω. Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἆρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν b ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν;

Πωλ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.

Σω. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

Πωλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγεῖ τινα εἶναι;

Πωλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

477 a 8. **τὴν ὠφελίαν**: cognate accusative. After *ὑπολαμβάνω* we must supply *ὠφελεῖσθαι*. The asyndeton which follows is of the very common explanatory class.

13. **ἆρα οὖν**: introduces a new section of the argument, regarding the statement advanced by Socrates in 469 b.

b 14. **κατασκευῇ**: is distinguished from *παρασκευή* in that it denotes a preparation designed to endure; *παρασκευή* is for the emergency. Consequently the constitution of the body, so far as it is the result of physical culture, is naturally a *κατασκευή*.

20. **πονηρίαν**: not *κακίαν*. The latter word, according to the prevailing usage, denotes, as applied to the soul, moral depravity only, as above (a). The former denotes a bad condition in general, which may or may not be due to moral depravity. But as the bad condition usually involves bad constitution, *πονηρία* comes to mean much the same as *κακία*. The use of the words depends upon *κατασκευή*. 477 b

23. **καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα**: shows that the enumeration is not complete. The omitted member is given below in d (*ἀκόλαστον*) and e *ἀκολασία*, and thereby the number of *πονηρίαι* (*i.e.* varieties of *πονηρία*) is made to correspond with the number of cardinal virtues (*ἀρεταί*).

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ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἶρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν; c

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;

ΠΩΛ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὧδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.

ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν; d

ΠΩΛ. Ὡμολόγηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβῃ ἢ ἀμφότερα;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.

477 c 32. **πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες**; Polus shows by the question that he has not yet completely grasped the relationship of the ideas, good and beautiful, bad and ugly (*cf.* 477 a), although it has been twice expounded by Socrates.

d 40. **ἀνιαρός** and **ἀνία**: like **ἀλγεινός** and **ἀλγηδών**, characterize the **λύπη** from its physical side, *i.e.* the pain caused by the punishment. *Cf.* also *Prot.* 355 e and *Gorg.* 499 a, where **ἀνιᾶσθαι** is opposed to **χαίρειν**. With **βλάβῃ** *sc.* **ὑπερβάλλον**, and also with **ἀμφότερα**, which is the adverbial acc. like **τοὐναντίον** and the like. See G. 160, 2; H. 719 b. The words **ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι** do not indeed harmonize with the rest of the sentence and may without injury be cut out, but still they are not unnatural in this careless form of conversational speaking and do fit the following question **ἆρ' ἀλγεινότερον**. 477 d

41. **τούτων**: is of course to be understood in the partitive sense.

45. **ἀπὸ τούτων γε**: 'ex his quidem quae disputata sunt.' Stallbaum.

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St. I. p. 477.

Σω. Ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα τἆλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. e

Πωλ. Φαίνεται.

Σω. Ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;

Πωλ. Φαίνεται.

XXXIV. Σω. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;

Πωλ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σω. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα; 478

Πωλ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σω. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας.

477 d Polus has a suspicion of what is coming and so expresses himself guardedly, as if he wished to leave a door open behind him. On the contrary, Socrates speaks with great decision, and probably has in mind Polus' words in 471 a *θαυμασίως ὡς ἔθλιος γέγονεν*.

46. **ὑπερφυεῖ ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ**: a case of what was originally attraction, but which by long usage has become phraseological. See H. 1003 b; Rid. § 197.

e XXXIV. 2. **χρηματιστική**: this and the *ἰατρική* appear already in 452 a ff., where they are associated 478 with *γυμναστική*.

a 6 f. **εὐπορεῖς**: is used in a transferred sense, as is more frequently 478 the case with *ἀπορεῖν*. "If you are a not at once (*οὕτως*) prepared with an answer." We must imagine a short pause as occurring before *εἰ*. Such halts and explanations by means of examples, analogies, suggestive questions, and the like, are of course in accordance with the artistic design of the dialogue, but also serve to keep the attention of the reader. Note the interrogative form of one of Polus' answers. On *οὕτως* see on 503 d.

10. **ἀκολασταίνοντας**: appears again in *Rep.* 555 d, but otherwise seems to be restricted to comedy.

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Πωλ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;

Σω. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;

Πωλ. Φημί.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;

Πωλ. Δῆλον δή.

Σω. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας. b

Πωλ. Φαίνεται.

Σω. Τί τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;

Πωλ. Τίνων λέγεις;

Σω. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.

Πωλ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;

Πωλ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σω. Ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἦ γάρ;

Πωλ. Ναί. c

Σω. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι.

Πωλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;

478 b 23. **πολὺ διαφέρει**: this utterance comes from Polus' heart because he still continues to regard the practice of law as the proper field for the exercise of the art which he teaches.

c 32. **ἀπαλλάττεται**: the subj. is to be supplied from the previous question of Socrates (*ἆρ' οὖν ... ἰατρευόμενοι*). The trans. use of *ἰατρεύειν* is not common. 478 c

33. **ὑγιῆ**: on the form, see H. 231 b.

35. **ἆρ' οὖν κτέ.**: Socrates proceeds now to fulfil the promise made in 473 a. — **οὕτως**: is explained by the partic. which follows.

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Πωλ. Δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.

Σω. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις.

Πωλ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Σω. Τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτ' ἐν σώματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ; d

Πωλ. Φαίνεταί μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας;

Πωλ. Ἦν γάρ.

Σω. Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη.

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν e ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.

Πωλ. Δῆλον δή.

Σω. Δεύτερος δήπου ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

Πωλ. Ἔοικεν.

Σω. Οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς.

478 c **38. τοῦτ' ἦν κτέ.**: on the gender, see H. 617; G. 138, N. 2 c. The impf. of 'awakening' is often employed with ἄρα or its equivalents (ὡς ἔοικε). See H. 833.

39. τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις: is the substantival, hence the general expression for the previous particular partic. clause. τὴν ἀρχήν is construed with κτῆσις, which thus far retains its verbal nature.

d **49. ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται**: carries out the analogy already so far developed. σωφρονίζειν in the soul corresponds to ἰατρεύειν (κάειν καὶ τέμνειν) in the body. 478 d

52. τοῦτο: *i.e.* τὸ ἔχειν κακίαν ἐν e σώματι, to be supplied from the preceding clause.

54. δεύτερος: *cf.* the Eng. colloquial 'second best.'

56. ὁ νουθετούμενος: contains an intimation that the *improving* punishment need not necessarily be the infliction of physical pain, but may be perceptible only by its effect on the soul. *Cf. Apol.* 26 a τῶν ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν,

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Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλατ-
60 τόμενος.

Πωλ. Φαίνεται.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδι-
κῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε μήτε
νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ 479
65 σὺ φῂς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράν-
νους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;

Πωλ. Ἔοικε.

XXXV. Σω. Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ
διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις
νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην
τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύ-
5 εσθαι, φοβούμενος ὡσπερανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ
τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω; b

478 e ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν. The following expressions can be conceived as denoting progressively severer modes of punishment without going into details. — **ἐπιπληττόμενος**: the act. usually governs the dative. See on 472 a.

59. **ἀδικίαν**: in accordance with the general purpose of the discussion this word is used as a general representative of the various varieties of *κακία* of the soul.

62. **οὗτος**: is pred. and is explained by the preceding clause. The subject is the following rel. clause.

63. **διαπράξηται**: *cf.* 473 c. — The three expressions for the idea of punishment correspond to those above used, since *κολάζειν ὀνείδεσιν* (*Leg.* viii. 847 a) is but little different from *ἐπιπλήττειν*.

479 a XXXV. 2. **ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις**: a case of very natural ellipsis. *Cf.* the analogous Lat. use of t a n q u a m s i, u t s i. When used by itself this expression becomes a relative phrase, equivalent to the Lat. t a n q u a m s i c u t. In this sense it is written as one word. GMT. 227, 868. The comparison to a child occurs in Homer, and is found also elsewhere in Plato, *e.g. Phaedo* 77 d **δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων** and e **ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται**. *Cf.* above, 470 c. 479 a

3. **μὴ διδόναι δίκην**: *cf.* 478 e just above, where the same verb is used with **ὥστε μή**, and below, b, c, where **πᾶν ποιοῦσι** is used like **διαπράξαιτο** in this passage without **ὥστε**.

5 f. **τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι**: the repetition of the art. is unusual, and serves to keep the two ideas separate.

6. **ὅτι ἀλγεινόν**: on the causal *ὅτι* after verbs of fearing, see GMT. 377. b

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Πωλ. Ἔμοιγε.

Σω. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ. ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἆρ' αἰσθάνει τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;

Πωλ. Εἰ μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ.

479 b 8. **ἀγνοῶν γε**: Plato frequently employs participial clauses as a kind of addendum to sentences which are either interrupted by the answer of the respondent or already complete in themselves. — **οἷον**: *what sort of a thing*.

11 f. **καθορᾶν ... ἀγνοεῖν**: is epexegetical to *τοιοῦτόν τι*, and corresponds to *συνισχόμενος . . . φοβούμενος* and *ἀγνοῶν* in the comparison above.

12 f. **μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος**: a harsh use of the comparative gen. equiv. to *ἢ μὴ ὑγιεῖ σώματι*. See Madv. *Syn.* § 90.

13. **συνοικεῖν**: divorces the human personality from the soul and body, by a union of which it exists. With *καθορᾶν κτέ.*, Plato thinks especially of the *νοῦς* to which he opposes that part which, in its subserviency to the lusts and appetites, willingly withdraws from the control of reason. — **σαθρᾷ**: is used of injuries and defects of all kinds, whether of material things, as jars (493 e), or of the body (Dem. *Ol.* ii. 21 *κἂν ῥῆγμα* (*fracture*) *κἂν στρέμμα* (*dislocation*) *κἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σαθρὸν ᾖ*). From this meaning comes its transferred use in application to the soul or the state. Notice that the unhealthy soul is designated as *σαθρά* from a physical point of view, *ἄδικος* in its dealings with its neighbors, and *ἀνόσιος* in its attitude towards the divine. 479 b

15 f. **καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι**: epexegetic partic. to *πᾶν ποιοῦσιν*. c

16. **ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν κτέ.**: is a circumlocution for a third substantive.

18. **τὰ συμβαίνοντα**: "the results" obtained.

19. **συλλογίσασθαι**: "to sum up what has been proved." See on 478 a above, in regard to the answers of Polus.

20. **εἰ μὴ κτέ.**: affirms and admits; but because nothing else can be done.

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St. I. p. 479.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν;

Πωλ. Φαίνεταί γε.

Σω. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι; d

Πωλ. Κινδυνεύει.

Σω. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.

Πωλ. Ἔοικεν.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον οἰόμενος, εἴτ' Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὁστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα; e

Πωλ. Ναί.

479 c **21. ἆρ' οὖν**: regularly introduces a conjecture, which is expected to be confirmed by the other party; ἆρα alone is also often so used; ἆρα οὐ expects distinctly an affirmative answer. Often ἆρ' οὖν approximates to ἆρ' οὐ. *Cf.* 450 a. — **μέγιστον κακόν**: *συμβαίνειν* has (in addition to the inf.) the constr. of *τυγχάνω*. Hence the omission of the partic. is allowable. GMT. 890.

d **24. καὶ μὴν κτέ.**: in this and in the following utterance of Socrates, the question is denoted merely by the tone.

29. δεύτερον κτέ.: *cf.* the similar usage above in 478 e. If the reading is sound, we must infer from the following clause that *τὸ ἀδικεῖν* has the same force as *τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην*. 479 d

34. τὸν Ἀρχέλαον ... τὸν κτέ.: the main force of the example lies in the predicate, *τὸν ... διδόντα*, as the art. shows. Constr. *τόν* with *διδόντα*, to which *ἀδικοῦντα* is subordinate.

37 f. **διαφερόντως**: is construed like e the corresponding verb. *Cf. Apol.* 29 b *ἐγὼ τούτῳ ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων*.

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St. I. p. 479.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;

Πωλ. Φαίνεται.

XXXVI. Σω. Εἶεν· εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, 480
τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὡμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσει, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἕξοντα. οὐ γάρ;

Πωλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε, ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας b
ὕπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσει καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή;

Πωλ. Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σω. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὑτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος ἀδι-

480 a XXXVI. 2. **ἡ μεγάλη** κτέ.: the use of the adj. is a slightly sarcastic allusion to Polus' extravagant encomiums on rhetoric. The rhetorical question has the force of a neg. Hence the following causal clause.

3. **αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν** κτέ.: the prefixing of *αὐτόν* emphasizes the reflexive. H. 688. The subj. of *φυλάττειν* is indefinite; *cf.* 456 d.

4. **ἱκανόν**: the use of this word is an example of *μείωσις*, or understatement, the peculiar characteristic of American humor. A similar case is Ant. *Tetral.* A. *β* 2 *ἐμοὶ δὲ ζῶν τε ἄνθρωπος ἀνατροπεὺς τοῦ οἴκου ἐγένετο ἀποθανών τε . . . ἱκανὰς λύπας . . . προσβέβληκεν.*

480 b 10. **ὕπουλον**: is stronger than *σαθρόν*. The disease leaves the surface, and fastens on the innermost kernel of the soul. We are reminded of the Ovidian Principiis obsta. sero medicina paratur, | cum mala per longas convaluere moras (*Rem. Am.* 91 f.).

14. **τί γὰρ δὴ** κτέ.: the rhetorical question has the force of an emphatic affirmation, *τί* being almost equiv. to *τί ἄλλο*.

16 f. **πατρίδος ἀδικούσης**: the speeches in the assembly are hereby put in the same category with the judicial. — **ἀδικούσης**: is a colloquial repetition of *ἀδικίας*.

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St. I. p. 480.

κούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι τοὐναντίον, κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα c
μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὃς
ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι,
ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ
ὑγιὴς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως
ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν
διώκοντα μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μέν γε πλη- d
γῶν ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ,
δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα,
ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατή-
γορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώ-
μενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων
γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.
φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε;

Πωλ. Ἄτοπα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέν- e
τοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται.

480 b 17 f. **εἰ μὴ εἰ**: *cf. Lach.* 196 a **οὔτε γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἰατρὸν . . . λέγει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτὸν εἶναι.** *Cf.* Lat. nisi si; *e.g.* Cic. *ad Fam.* xiv. 2. 1 noli putare me ad quemquam scribere, nisi si quis ad me scripsit.

c 18. **εἰ ὑπολάβοι τοὐναντίον**: *except in case one should assume, on the contrary, that,* etc.

19 f. **ὃς ἂν** κτέ.: follows a pl. on account of its generic signification, and governs **τῶν φίλων** as a part. gen. Examples in Kr. 58, 4, 5.

23. **μύσαντα**: to go into danger blindly, *i.e.* with closed eyes, — to be blind to the existence of danger, as such, was apparently thought to be a mark of great courage and determination; hence **μύσαντα** is paired here with **ἀνδρείως**. Why one should act so, is explained by **τὸ . . . διώκοντα**. One of the functions of the participle is to express manner; hence it is quite natural to find it side by side with an adverb. 480 c

29. **τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων** κτέ.: see on 473 c. d

30. **ὅπως ἂν** κτέ.: is correlative with **ἐπὶ τοῦτο**. Notice that here the **ὅπως** is a purely final particle, as it was not in a, b above.

34. **ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται**: the personal dat. *σοί* seems strange, since it can neither be understood as 482 b below, **οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς,** e

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35 Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἢ κἀκεῖνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;

Πωλ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.

Σω. Τοὐναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἴ ἄρα δεῖ τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὁντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ
40 αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην 481

480 e nor as 477 d above, *αἴσχιστον ἀδικία . . . ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν*, for *ὁμολογεῖται* (conveniunt, consentanea sunt) has its dat. in *τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν*. But it is not superfluous; its force seems to be this: "but perhaps *you can make it agree* with what precedes." Thus the dat., as well as *ἴσως*, would serve the author's purpose in delineating Polus' character, who by such shallow artifices seeks to weaken his admissions, and, as far as possible, relieve himself from any responsibility in the results, — a design which Socrates balks by his following question. See on 477 d, 478 a, and H. 770, 771.

35. **κἀκεῖνα**: *καί* assumes *εἰ τάδε ἄτοπα δοκεῖ*, thus noticing Polus' observation. — **λυτέον**: a metaphor drawn from such usage as *λύειν γέφυραν*. *Cf. Prot.* 332 e, Xen. *An.* ii. 4. 19. A different meaning appears in *διαλύειν τὸν λόγον*, 458 b, after *διαλύειν τὴν συνουσίαν* in 457 c.

38. **τοὐναντίον**: the heaping up of such kindred ideas as *αὖ, αὖθις, πάλιν* is not uncommon (see examples in Kr. 69, 12); *τοὐναντίον* means "on the contrary"; *αὖ*, "on the other hand"; *μεταβαλόντα* (intransitive), "vice versa." — **εἰ ἄρα**: *if, assuming the ordinary view to be the correct one* (*ἄρα*). — **τινὰ**: is object, and with it *εἴτε . . . ὁντινοῦν* is in apposition. *ἐχθρός* is 480 e a personal enemy, as distinguished from *πολέμιος*, a national enemy.

39. **ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς** *κτέ.*: because experiencing injury might be held as a kind of substitute for the punishment due for inflicting it.

40. **αὐτός**: refers to the subject of *κακῶς ποιεῖν*, which is indefinite. — **τοῦτο** *κτέ.*: the insertion of this clause, which is due to the preceding *ἐὰν μόνον κτέ.*, defers the completion of the sentence to *παντὶ τρόπῳ κτέ.*

42. **πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα**: the 481 a two species of activity do not exclude each other, for the effect of *πράττειν* may be more thoroughly completed by *λέγειν*, and vice versa. — The acc. case is in agreement with the unexpressed indefinite agent of *παρασκευαστέον*. On the case of the agent with verbal adjs., see G. 281, 2; H. 991 a. — **ὅπως μὴ δῷ** *κτέ.*: this sentence is remarkable on account of the variety of the constructions found after *ὅπως*, — three out of the perhaps eight varieties being found, *viz.* subjv., *ἄν* with subjv., fut. indic. We should not attempt to make any sharp distinctions here, for Plato is capable of changing the construction for the sake of variety. We may, however, say this much. *ὅπως μὴ δῷ* is purely final, the conjunction not

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μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον, ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῷ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάν τε χρυσίον ⟨ᾖ⟩ ἡρπακὼς πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκῃ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάν τε θανάτου ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὤν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὤν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν τις χρεία, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὖσα.

XXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· "οὐδὲν" μέντοι "οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν."

481 a differing from ἵνα. When the delinquent is brought before the judge, there is some doubt as to his escape, and ὅπως ἄν (equiv. to ἐάν πως) gives expression to this doubt. In the long sentence following the ἄν gradually fades away, and the most common relative construction with the fut. indic. closes the series. On εἰ δὲ μή after ἐάν, see on 502 b.

43. ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ: in thus stating the opposite alternative, Socrates takes for the moment the standpoint of the orators. That it is only for the moment is seen from *Crito* 49 c οὔτε ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

46. ἀναλίσκῃ: to make the statement of the wrong complete, the way in which the money is wasted is added.

b XXXVII. 1. On the role assigned to Callicles here, see Introd. § 15. After Polus has shown himself incapable of maintaining his views of rhetoric against the superior dialectical skill of Socrates, Callicles enters the discussion with a thought quite similar to the one with which Polus had entered it in 461 b. The view of life on which all of Socrates' deductions rest is so abhorrent to his innermost nature and all his hitherto cherished ideas that he cannot be brought to look upon the principles here advocated as the earnest convictions of a reasonable man. He does not, however, rush into the lists so roughly as Polus, but, being a more polished man of the world, turns first to Chaerephon, who is thoroughly acquainted with Socrates' views. He, however, wittily refers him to the master, in the same words with which Callicles himself had in 447 c referred Socrates to Gorgias.

481 b

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Καλ. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρα- c
τες, πότερόν σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;

Σω. Ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥᾴδιον ἐνδεί- d
ξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας, ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότες,

481 c 5. **νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ**: ἀλλά is used after an expression of asseveration, as in 463 d. The words of Chaerephon contain the challenge, "Why don't you rather turn to Socrates himself?" to which Callicles replies, "But that is just what I do desire." In Callicles' manner of expression we discern his excitable nature as well as his strong faith in his own views, which he is the more surprised to find opposed, not only by Socrates, but also by Chaerephon. Artistically also his words form the text for the discussion which follows.

6. **φῶμεν . . . παίζοντα**: this is a very unusual construction for *φημί*. G. 260, 2, N. 1.

8. **ἀνατετραμμένος**: *cf.* *ἀνατρέπειν τὰ πράγματα, πόλιν, οἰκίαν. For if you be both in earnest, and the thing which you say prove to be* (τυγχάνει) *true, would not the only* (ἄλλο τι ἤ) *conclusion be that the manner of life of us men has been entirely upside down?* — **τῶν ἀνθρώπων**: is emphatically added because Callicles does not intend that under **ἡμῶν** only a limited circle shall be understood. *Cf.* Ar. *Plut.* 500 *ὡς μὲν γὰρ νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ βίος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις* 481 c *διάκειται.*

9. **πάντα τὰ ἐναντία**: like *πᾶν τοὐναντίον, quite the contrary.*

11. **εἰ μή τι κτέ.**: Socrates recognizes indeed the opposition in their views of life, but refers it to the different exercise of a common feeling, — love, — which varies according to the difference in the objects to which it is directed. The comparison of love of wisdom with other varieties of human love is often found in Plato, *e.g. Phaedo* 68 **a.** — **πάθος**: denotes a state of mind brought about by external influences. According to cause and circumstances it may be love, hate, admiration, or scorn. But no variety is peculiar to any single man; this is made clear by the explanatory clause inserted between **πάθος** and **τὸ αὐτό**.

13. **ἴδιον**: contains in itself an idea d of comparison, like **ἄλλο ἕτερον**, and hence takes **ἤ**.

15. **ταὐτόν τι**: the **πάθος** experienced by each one, is first roughly characterized as "about the same thing," and later clearly defined by

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ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἑκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ e κάτω μεταβαλλομένου· ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπονθας· τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλεύμασί τε καὶ λόγοις

481 d the explanatory ἐρῶντε κτέ. The variation from the pl. to the dual is interesting. The lack of a first person dual compels the first pl., with its accompanying partic. πεπονθότες, while the following dual emphasizes the exact similarity of the two experiences.

16. **Ἀλκιβιάδου**: the mental and moral training of the rising youth was largely directed by prominent older men with whom they associated, usually according to individual preference. One of these prominent teachers, and one who made it the business of his life, was Socrates, and among the young men who clustered around him and followed his conversations was Alcibiades, whom Socrates greatly loved for his mental gifts. Owing to his great beauty he was jestingly called Socrates' sweetheart (τὰ παιδικά). *Cf. Prot. init.* Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν. This is the point of the allusion here.

18. **δήμου**: has two allusions. The son of Pyrilampes, a rich Athenian and friend of Pericles, was called Demus. Like his father, he is reported to have been especially beautiful, and is also mentioned by Ar. *Vesp.* 97 ff. as a much admired sweetheart. This fact Socrates skilfully uses to characterize Callicles' relation to the Athenian demus. This people needed, like a boy, a leader and guide; but the orators, instead of governing it, regulated their actions according to its whims. —**τοῦ Πυριλάμπους**: is of course to be understood in the usual way, like τοῦ Κλεινίου. *Cf.* τὸν Πυριλάμπους below, and 513 b.

481 d

18 f. **αἰσθάνομαι . . . οὐ δυναμένου**: on the gen. partic. construction see GMT. 884–6; H. 742, 982. —**δεινοῦ**: is often joined with λέγειν, in order to describe a skilful orator, but can also be used without this addition, in the sense of "skilful," "clever."

20 f. **ἄνω καὶ κάτω**: like Lat. sursum deorsum, with μεταστρέφειν, στρέφειν (511 a), μεταβάλλειν, μεταπίπτειν (493 a) denotes a changeable and uncertain course of action. Variations of the phrase are ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω, and more often ἄνω κάτω.

e

25. **βουλεύμασι**: *i.e.* the fanciful plans and designs of boys.

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οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἑκάστοτε, ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις, θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο ταληθῆ λέγειν, ὅτι, εἰ μή τις παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ 482
παύσει ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καί μοί ἐστιν τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἧττον ἔμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ⟨ἀεὶ⟩ τῶν αὐτῶν· λέγει δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. b
ἢ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἁπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ

481 e 28. **εἰ βούλοιο**: which probably was hardly to be expected.

482 a 31. **ἕτερα τοιαῦτα**: *cf.* above (24), *τοιαῦτα ἕτερα*.

34. **τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν**: in the above-cited passage from *Phaedo* (68 a) we find the word *ἀνθρωπίνων* in the same connexion.

35. **ἔμπληκτος**: *unstable*. *Cf.* Soph. *Ai.* 1358 *τοιοίδε μέντοι φῶτες ἔμπληκτοι βροτῶν*.

36. **ἄλλων . . . τῶν αὐτῶν**: gen. of characteristic is not common in Greek, and is always predicate. *Cf.* Thuc. i. 113 *ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν*. See H. 732 d.

b 37. **παρῆσθα δέ**: change from the rel. to the independent construction. See on 452 d. Here, however, we must supply the pronoun (*αὐτοῖς*) to which *λεγομένοις* is a subordinate temporal partic. equiv. to *ὅτε ἐλέγετο*. We might translate *δέ* "although." 482 b

38. **ἐξέλεγξον ὡς κτέ.**: see on 467 a. Here, to "prove by confuting her." — **ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον**: refers to 480 e *οὐκοῦν ἢ κἀκεῖνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν*. The transition from the personal to the material object is made much easier by the meaning of the verb *ἐξέλεγξον*.

40. **μὰ τὸν κύνα**: the addition of *τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν* is a humorous allusion to the animal worship of the Egyptians. See *Apol.* 21 e. The omission of the art. with *Αἰγυπτίων* is regular.

41. **Καλλικλῆς**: the use of the proper name in contrast with the pronoun *σοί*, and its close connection with the address *ὦ Καλλίκλεις*, is intended to emphasize as sharply as

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Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην, καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἕνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

XXXVIII. Καλ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώ-

482 b possible the inner conflict which must continue to rage in Callicles' soul, so long as one opinion has not decisively vanquished the other.

44. ἀναρμοστεῖν: applies especially to imperfection in the general harmony, while *διαφωνεῖν* is used of the discord between single tones. Two different principles exert their effects upon the soul. — **χορηγοίην**: this liturgy, which has been already mentioned in note on 472 **a**, was of course not possible for Socrates, and could be only for the rich. But in proportion as a victory in this kind of musical competition was looked upon as a great honor, so a failure was a great humiliation. The opt. is ideal, and to be translated "which I might conduct."

c **46. μᾶλλον**: frequently follows a comp. to reiterate the idea with a slight modification (*rather than*). *Cf.* below, 487 **b**, *Phaedo* 79 **e**, and see for other examples, Rid. § 166.

XXXVIII. **1. νεανιεύεσθαι**: "to act like a wild young man." Callicles has in mind especially the insolent, bold, and reckless conduct of the rich and proud Athenian youth. This is usually the meaning of the adjective *νεανικός* (so in our dialogue, 508 **d**, 509 **a**), which, however, is sometimes used only of the freshness and the vigor of youth, as below, 485 **e**. The verb applies especially to the training of the youth by the Sophists, which leads them to light and idle speeches and to a defense of the most conflicting principles without having regard unto the higher and earnest problems of life. *Cf. Phaedrus* 235 **a** *καὶ ἐφαίνετο δή μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος ὡς οἷός τε ὢν ταὐτὰ ἑτέρως τε καὶ ἑτέρως λέγων ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα.* 482 c

2 f. **δημηγόρος, δημηγορεῖν**: indicate dissatisfaction, sometimes with the length of the speeches, as opposed to *διαλέγεσθαι, e.g.* 519 **d**, **e**, *Prot.* 329 **a**, 336 **b**; sometimes, as here and in 494 **d**, with the means employed by those who, unconcerned for the truth, seek only the approbation of the multitude. In the mouth of Callicles, who is the real *δημηγόρος*, this reproach sounds very strange, especially with the addition *ὡς ἀληθῶς*. It is a kind of unconscious self-criticism.

4. πρὸς σέ: *cf.* 485 **b** below, and *Apol.* 21 **c** *πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον*, "at whose hands I had some such experience."

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μενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι d
αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ φαίη· διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναν-
τία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καί σου κατεγέλα, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖν, ὀρθῶς τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας e
αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν

482 d **6. διδάξοι**: the fut. opt. is only found in indir. disc. as a representative of the fut. indicative. It is post-Homeric, the first example occurring in Pindar.

7. αὐτόν: repeats with emphasis the subject Γοργίαν, which is already expressed. *Cf.* Xen. *Cyr.* i. 3. 15 *πειράσομαι τῷ πάππῳ ἀγαθῶν ἱππέων κράτιστος ὢν ἱππεὺς συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ*. The clause with *ὅτι* is causal, and is explanatory of *διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, which is to be connected with *φάναι*, not with *διδάξειν*.

10. ἀγαπᾶν: *cf.* 461 c *ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς*.

11. ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖν: *as it seemed to me*. The phrase is found sometimes with *ὡς* as here and Hdt. ii. 124; sometimes without, as *Meno* 81 a; *ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν* Soph. *El.* 410.

e **15. συμποδισθεὶς ἐπεστομίσθη**: a combination of two metaphors, both of which refer to a horse which has been caught by a noose, and then guided according to a strange will by a bridle which has been forced into its mouth. In the same way Polus, by that unlucky admission, allowed himself to be noosed, and was thus compelled to follow the lead of Socrates, wherever that might take him. 482 e

16. τῷ ὄντι: affirms the justice of the accusation made against Socrates by Polus.

17. φορτικά: a word not uncommon in Plato, is used in *Euthyd.* 287 a of insidious catch-questions. See on *Apol.* 32 a, where combined with *δικανικά* it is used of the tediousness of those detailed discussions from which Socrates, after the manner of an orator before a court, seeks to draw his proofs. Here Callicles probably wants to indicate the vulgarity of such illustrations and talks, as being fit only for the uncultured multitude. The rel. sentence *ἃ φύσει κτέ.* is connected epexegetically with *τοιαῦτα*, and thereby the conclusion from the special case is made of general application. It was indeed from the idea of the *καλόν* that Socrates drew the

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ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν καλά, νόμῳ δέ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντί' ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν 483 ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν νόμον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ

482 e whole argument with which he refuted Polus.

18. **φύσει μέν, νόμῳ δέ**: the opposition of natural right to conventional right (law) was first definitely maintained by Hippias of Elis. *Cf. Prot.* 337 c d, Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4. 14. After him this principle was accepted and made a commonplace by all the Sophists. It is probable that Gorgias himself did not defend it, but his teaching can be traced back to it. This principle Callicles now proceeds to unfold. Of kindred import is also the discussion between Alcibiades and Pericles, related by Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 40 ff.

483 a 21 f. **ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κτέ.**: **τὸ σοφόν** (*artifice, trick*) is used somewhat scornfully in the sense in which the sophistical Eristics employed it, with whom Callicles puts Socrates on a level. Hence he also employs towards him the word **κακουργεῖν**, which was used among the Eristics to denote crafty tripping in discussion. *Cf. Rep.* i. 341 a **οὔτε γὰρ ἄν με λάθοις κακουργῶν**, by which Thrasymachus declares his ability to defend himself against such unfair treatment; so *ib.* 338 d. The same feeling determines the choice of the compound **ὑπερωτᾶν** "to slip artfully into the question," "ask slily". — **τοῦτο τὸ σοφόν**: is epexegetic to **ὅ**. 483 a

23. **ἐὰν δὲ κτέ.**: supply the same verbs as are found in the first member of the sentence.

24. **ὥσπερ αὐτίκα**: *as, for example.* See on 472 d.

26. **ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν**: 'you followed up what he meant "conventionally" by arguing upon it in the "natural" sense.' Cope. *I.e.* Socrates had treated the concession of Polus, and drawn his results from it, as if Polus had therein conceded that to do wrong was by nature, *i.e.* of itself, more ugly than to suffer wrong. "For — so runs the argument of Callicles — that which is by *nature* ugly coincides with what is evil, which latter, however, is the suffering of wrong. But we must not conclude from this that what is by *law* the more ugly is also the greater evil."

27 f. **τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι**: as the passage stands, must be considered as explanatory of the preceding, without close construction.

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St. I. p. 483.

ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό b
γ' ἐστὶν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινός,
ᾧ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ
προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν
μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὗ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς
νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς
αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθεν-
ται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγου- c
σιν. ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων
καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχω-
σιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ
τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν·

483 b 28. **οὐδὲ γάρ**: leads over to a criticism of Socrates' view per se, the question thus far having been his manner of procedure in the case of Polus.

30. **ᾧ κρεῖττον κτέ.**: in the opinion of the masses, the same is true of all who are without the enjoyments of life. *Cf. Phaedo* 65 a. The regular relative after an indefinite (*τινός*) is *ὅστις*, which frequently has a conditional idea, and then takes the cond. neg. *μή*. H. 699 a.

31 f. **αὐτὸς . . . κήδηται**: the same ideas were presented in 480 a. Here every man is expressly thrown upon his own resources and the state abolished.

32. **ἀλλ', οἶμαι κτέ.**: this exposition of the origin of conventional right is designed by Callicles to show the superior authority of the natural right which he advocates. — **οἱ τιθέμενοι**: "the law-makers." The active is used of the law-giver. On the force of the article with the predicate, see H. 669 a; G. 141, N. 8.

33. **καὶ οἱ πολλοί**: it is just this addition which contains the most important point, according to Callicles' real view, though he keeps it in the background, because for him the contrast between stronger and weaker is of more value for his argument. It is this begging of the question to which Socrates first turns his attention in 488 c ff. — **πρὸς αὐτούς**: usually we find *βλέποντες*, but the preposition itself is sufficient. Kr. 68, 39, 5. 483 b

35. **ἐπαίνους, ψόγους**: the people not only makes laws, — *i.e.* commands and prohibitions, the transgression of which is punished by penalties, — but also expresses in manifold ways, by offices, honors, etc., its judgment on the value of men and actions. c

36. Another case of explanatory asyndeton. — **ἐρρωμενεστέρους**: how completely this word has become an adjective is shown by the fact that it is the only partic. which admits comparison.

38. **πλεονεκτεῖν**: is an expression for every effort of self-aggrandizement, and was often used as a political watchword in opposition to *ἰσονομία*. *Cf. τὸ ἴσον*, two lines below.

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ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν φαυλότεροι ὄντες.

XXXIX. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος

483 c 40. **ἀγαπῶσι**: in mockery, because satisfaction is a sign of weakness. *Cf.* what Adimantus says in *Rep.* ii. 366 c *οἶδεν ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἢ γήρως ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν.* — **τὸ ἴσον**: Callicles is thinking of the fundamental principle of democratic states, the *ἰσονομία* and *ἰσότης* of all.

d XXXIX. 4. **αὐτό**: draws especial attention to the following clause, which it introduces. By its proximity to *αὐτή* this emphasis is still more increased. — **ἀμείνω**: is here probably used purposely instead of *κρείττω*, as Callicles had in mind also the mental superiority of the rhetorically educated over the great multitude. Hence, too, *δυνατώτερον*.

5. **δηλοῖ**: can be taken in construction with *φύσις*, or, which is better, as an impersonal verb equiv. to *δῆλόν (δῆλά) ἐστιν*. The subj. is the following *ὅτι* clause, whose own subj., *ταῦτα*, has been attracted to the government of the leading verb.

6. **πολλαχοῦ**: introduces facts in support of the general statement. — **καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις**: the law of nature is the principle which is at the basis of national law. Here is, moreover, an indication of the moral character of those who hold this view, in that they put the *ἄνθρωπος* on the plane of the *ζῷον*. 483 d

7. **ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι**: in international relations this natural law ('might makes right') has preserved its force longer than in the intercourse of individual men; hence *γένος* is equiv. to gens. The clause following, *ὅτι . . . ἔχειν*, is explanatory of *ταῦτα ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει*.

8. **κέκριται**: in 520 e *νενόμισται* is the word.

9. **ἄρχειν**: is the legal, *πλέον ἔχειν* the natural expression of the same idea. — **ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ κτέ.**: is not purely neg., but has somewhat the sense: "What other right had Xerxes than that of nature?" The choice of examples shows that with this selfish, immoral view of life is connected also a lack of *national* feeling. Callicles himself feels the impropriety

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St. I. p. 483.

Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ e
Σκύθας ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον, ὃν ἡμεῖς [τιθέμεθα] πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ 484
τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι,

483 d of declaring Xerxes to be ἀμείνων and δυνατώτερος τῶν Ἑλλήνων, and therefore hastily seeks another example which will not arouse personal feeling.

e 11. **ἄλλα μυρία**: is simply rhetorical exaggeration. The concluding summarizing clause deviates from the regular construction of the sentence, as also in a similar passage in *Apol.* 41 c ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἄν τις δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι κτέ.

12. **οἶμαι**: as well as ἴσως, a couple of lines below, merely softens the expression, without diminishing its positiveness. *Cf.* 473 a.—**τὴν τοῦ δικαίου**: if these words, which we would rather miss, are genuine, we have a case of word-play, which may be justified on the ground of the proposition above, ἡ δέ γε . . . ἀδυνατωτέρου. The same force must be assigned to τοῦ δικαίου φύσει below (484 c), though the form is different.

13. **ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ** κτέ.: a clever play upon the word νόμος. "Nature, too, has its law,—right and custom."

14. **ἡμεῖς**: contains, by the implied contrast, a rebuke. Notice the heaping up of the participles, which, though connected with one verb, are subordinated one to another, quite after the Greek habit. See Kr. 56, 15, with notes. — **πλάττοντες**: the side-idea of artificiality and amateurishness easily attaches itself to this verb. *Cf. Apol.* 17 c μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους. It is applied to laws, as here, also *Leg.* iv. 712 b πειρώμεθα καθάπερ παῖδες πρεσβῦται πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους. 483 e

15 f. **ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες**: *cf. Apol.* 18 b ἐκ παίδων παραλαβόντες. The usual word for 'receiving into school' is the compound. *Cf.* 516 b. The use of the simple verb here implies a forcible compulsory manner of treatment.

16. **ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπᾴδοντες**: the comparison describes with bitterness the suppression of the so-called natural freedom, in that it compares education to the taming of wild beasts (καταδουλούμεθα). κατεπᾴδειν applies to soothing by certain formulae, or charms; γοητεύειν to the employment of forms of magic and witchcraft. Meno uses the same expression regarding the dialectic proof of Socrates, 80 a καὶ νῦν, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις. In a jesting way, without feeling, ἐπᾴδειν is used in *Phaedo* 77 e, ἐπῳδή in *Charm.* 155 e.

18 f. **ἐὰν . . . γένηται**: Callicles does not doubt that this future absolute ruler will come. 484 a

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φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισά-
μενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέ-
τερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους
τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης
ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως
δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκ- b
νυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι

νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων·

484 a 19. **φύσιν ἱκανήν**: "a nature which is equal to all difficulties." There is no understatement, as in 480 a. — All the following expressions are chosen so as to be appropriate to the much-loved comparison with wild beasts. *ἀποσείεσθαι* can apply both to the shaking off of any bond or yoke and to the throwing of his rider by a horse; *διαρρήξας* is used more of breaking a hedge or an enclosure than a halter, *etc.* *ἀπορρήξας* would be more natural for the latter; *cf.* Hom. Z 507 *δεσμὸν ἀπορρήξας*, which passage quite suits the view of Callicles.

20. **διαφυγών**: calls to mind what has been previously said by Polus (473 c). — **καταπατήσας**: depicts the insolence of the victor to the vanquished. In Δ 157 Homer makes Agamemnon say of the perjured Trojans *κατὰ δ' ὅρκια πιστὰ πάτησαν*.

21. **γράμματα** κτέ.: the *γράμματα* denote, in contradistinction to the unwritten laws implanted in man by nature, the "written laws" which limit and regulate the exercise of the will; *μαγγανεύματα* "works of deceit and witchcraft," which fetter the reason; *ἐπῳδαί* "incantations" which palsy the feelings. These ideas correspond in the reverse order to the preceding participles, *κατεπῴδοντες, γοητεύοντες,* 484 a *λέγοντες*, and the participles just in advance *ἀποσεισάμενος . . . διαφυγών* are probably chosen with reference to them. All three ideas serve, moreover, to show from the various sides what objections can be made to the laws which are opposed to nature, and are hence crowded together for greater emphasis.

22. **ἐπαναστάς**: is used of one who has lain prostrate for a time and now unexpectedly shows his strength. — **ἀνεφάνη**: is 'gnomic aorist.' The single past example (aor.) serves as a norm for the general statement (pres.). H. 840; GMT. 155.

23. **ὁ δοῦλος**: as a result of *καταδουλούμεθα* above, 483 e, "the one whom we brought up as a slave." — **ἐξέλαμψε**: *shone forth in splendor*, a poetical word also employed in *Rep.* iv. 435 a.

24. **δοκεῖ δέ μοι**: introduces a new b element, — the authority of Pindar. Knowledge of the poets was a requirement of the culture of the period. *Cf. Prot.* 338 e. The last words of the fragment are restored by Bergk (*Poet. Lyr. Gr.* p. 344, ed. 3) from the citation of the Scholiast as follows: —

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St. I. p. 484.

οὗτος δὲ δή, φησίν,

ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον
ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί· τεκμαίρομαι
ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας —

λέγει οὕτω πως· τὸ γὰρ ᾄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι· λέγει δ' ὅτι οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο τὰς βοῦς, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ c
35 τἆλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.

XL. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσει δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ

484 b ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος ἐπεὶ Γηρυόνα βόας Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρυσθέος ἀναιτήτας τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἤλασεν.

Since we do not know the context in which these verses stand, Pindar's views cannot be determined from them with certainty; but they were probably based on the principles of religious belief. In this νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς Pindar may be thinking of the power of that *fate* which is superior even to the gods themselves. — Geryones, son of Chrysaor ("lightning") and the Oceanid Callirhoe ("beautiful stream"), was a giant with three bodies and three heads. He lived with his dog Orthros, or Orthos, on the fertile island Erytheia, and possessed great herds of cattle. These were stolen from him by Hercules in the expedition celebrated in the story. *Cf.* Preller, *Mythol.*[2] ii. 202–216. — **ἐνδεικνύναι**: is used of all kinds of practical proof; ἀποδεικνύναι, of demonstration.

32. **οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι**: says Callicles, because the exact words of the poem are not at his command. The verb 484 b has the same meaning in *Prot.* 339 b, *Phaedo* 61 b. After ἀπριάτας Callicles breaks off, intending to give the sense of what follows, and resumes the idea with οὔτε πριάμενος.

33. **ἠλάσατο**: the use of the middle instead of the active is normal, but is well suited to Callicles' conception.

34. **ὡς τούτου ὄντος**: the use of ὡς c ascribes this view to Hercules, as his basis of action. τούτου is explained by the clause καὶ βοῦς κτέ.

36. **τὰ τῶν χειρόνων κτέ.**: notice the rhetorical position.

XL. 1. **τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθές**: introduces a new topic, that of the value of philosophy. Its connexion with the preceding lies in the fact that Callicles looks upon philosophy as the *hindrance* which prevents Socrates from recognizing the truth of what he says. — **ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω**: is indefinite, and is employed only to depreciate philosophy and relegate it to a lower plane, as is evident from Callicles' further exposition.

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τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἅψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἠθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίγνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἴς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι

484 c 3. **χαρίεν**: with a pleasing condescension, recognizing its merit, — but what a poor merit! *Cf.* 485 b.

4. **ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ**: "in the time of life suitable for it." What period this is can be gathered from the expressions *πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας* and *περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος*. The words *μετρίως* and *ἅψηται* are also designedly chosen.

5. **διαφθορά**: Callicles assumes almost the tone of an oracle.

d 7. **ἄπειρον γεγονέναι**: "a man cannot practise philosophy and at the same time fulfil the requirements of his civil position."

8. The *καλὸς κἀγαθός*, according to the idea of Callicles, is shown by the addition of *εὐδόκιμος*, to be the man who, through practical activity, obtains reputation and honor. With *μέλλω* we find the pres. and fut. almost equally common, the aor. exceptional.

9. **τῶν νόμων**: that Callicles is laying great stress on the knowledge of the laws in this passage, seems at first sight inconsistent with the view which he has already expressed; but in reality he has shifted his point of 484 d view but little, since he advocates the study of the laws, not for the purpose of following them, but as being necessary for the work of the practical statesman, whether he be in the senate or assembly, or hold any public position. The force, therefore, of *νόμοι* is much that of our "constitution." The *λόγοι οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον κτέ.* belong to the department of jurisprudence in both its divisions, individual and national. *ξυμβόλαια* is characterized in *Rep.* i. 333 a, as the variety of *κοινωνήματα* (*i.e.* mutual intercourse, trade, and commerce) in which *δικαιοσύνη* is of especial value. It denotes, accordingly, treaties and the law-business connected with them.

11 f. **τῶν ἡδονῶν κτέ.**: the enjoyment of life consists, according to Callicles, in satisfying the appetites.

12. **τῶν ἠθῶν**: can be considered as a general comprehensive term, in so far as we understand by it the peculiar traits of mind and character which impart individuality to a man.

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St. I. p. 484.

γίγνονται, ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς e
τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους, κατα-
γέλαστοί εἰσιν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου· λαμ-
πρός τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,

νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν·

ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ τοῦτο, 485
τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως
αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν
ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν· φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας
χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι
φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος
ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα

484 e 15. **ὥσπερ γε**: makes a concession, in order to anticipate the retort which could easily be made here.

16. **διατριβάς**: is used especially of philosophical discussions. *Cf. Apol.* 37 c *οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, Charm.* 153 a *ἅμα ἐπὶ τὰς ξυνήθεις διατριβάς.*

17. **συμβαίνει**: *is in point.* — **τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου**: inasmuch as his works abounded in gnomes and sententious sayings, and he himself was not far removed from the sophistic way of looking at things, Euripides was frequently quoted by sophists and orators, and also by Socrates (Plato). The present passage is from the lost tragedy *Antiope*. See below, 485 e.

18. **ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κτέ.**: the demonstratives are antecedent to the adverbial rel. clause with *ἵνα*, "in which each one is most successful." The words *λαμπρός . . . ἐπείγεται*, by omitting what would not be missed, and reading *κἀπί* for *καὶ ἐπί*, form a trimeter. *Cf.* Ar. *Vesp.* 1431 *ἔρδοι τις ἣν ἕκαστος εἰδείη τέχνην.* 484 e

20. **ἵνα τυγχάνει**: is to be compared with *ὅπου ἂν ᾖ* to show the difference between definite and indefinite antecedent. — **αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ βέλτιστος**: the gen. with sups. may be an extension of the gen. with comparatives. See H. 644 a.

24. **ἀμφοτέρων**: *i.e.* philosophy and politics. — **ὅσον παιδείας χάριν**: *as far as it serves the purpose of education. Cf. Rep.* iii. 403 e *ὅσον τοὺς τύπους, Euthyd.* 273 a *τὴν φύσιν ὅσον.* See H. 719 b; G. 160, 1. The opposite is *ἐπὶ τέχνῃ*, or something similar, as seen from *Prot.* 312 b *τούτων σὺ ἑκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει. Culture* was the watchword of the time. 485 a

25. **καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρόν**: change from the *καλόν* to the *καταγέλαστον*.

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γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσο- b
φοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας.
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι
οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι
φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ, disagreeable.
ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν
τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾷ μου τὰ ὦτα καί μοι
δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις
ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ c
ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὐτὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο
πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ
μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ,
καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς generous.
ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος· d
ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ

485 b 28. **πάσχω πρός**: as 482 c. The comparison, however sensible the thought therein expressed may be, still is not in place here. For it describes only the subjective impression which philosophizing at different periods of life makes on Callicles. It is therefore only a rhetorical reaffirmation of the statement that philosophy is not appropriate for a mature man. In his mind, however, Callicles has still a tertium comparationis which he does not express, *viz.* the objects of philosophical research afford no real interest, hence resemble *παιδία*. Further, so much trouble about single ideas is like *ψελλίζεσθαι* (*stammering*). On the contrary, *σαφῶς διαλέγεσθαι* (*λέγειν*) is the business of orators.

32. **ἐλευθέριον**: Callicles speaks of stammering thus, as contrasted with the restraint which the child must exercise in order to learn to speak clearly, which latter seems to him to be *δουλοπρεπές*. Note also the contrast in *χαρίεν* and *πικρόν*. 485 b

38. **παρὰ νέῳ κτέ.**: *the companion of* (*παρά*) *a youth*. The duplication of the idea is also found in *Prot.* 315 d *νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον*. c

40. **ἐλεύθερον**: is amplified and illustrated by the following clause, *οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα κτέ*. Philosophy gives the youth an opportunity for the practice in mental gymnastics, which is as yet denied him in public life, and thus prepares him for his future career as a speaker in the assembly.

43. **δή**: deictic. This is *just* the case about which Callicles raises the question.

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ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώ-
45 κρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ. ὃ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ
50 τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ e
νεανικὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι.

XLI. Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς· κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς

485 d

44. **δεῖσθαι**: is still stronger than ἄξιον, and declares that it is to the man's own interest to be so dealt with.

47. **τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως**: is emphasized together with the ἀγορά, in opposition with the following ἐν γωνίᾳ. *Cf.* Cic. *de Or.* i. 13. 57 quibus (philosophis) ego ut de his rebus in angulis consumendi otii causa disserant cum concessero, illud tamen oratori tribuam, *etc.*

48. **ὁ ποιητής**: *the poet*, of course, is Homer. He says, I 440, *νήπιον, οὔπω εἰδόθ' ὁμοίοο πτολέμοιο | οὐδ' ἀγορέων, ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσιν.* — **καταδεδυκότι**: "in retirement," as contrasted with the brilliant life of the public man. The word is used somewhat differently in *Rep.* ix. 579 b, where it is said of a tyrant *οὔτ' ἀποδημῆσαι ἔξεστιν (αὐτῷ) οὐδαμόσε οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὅσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί εἰσι, καταδεδυκὼς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῇ.*

49. **μετὰ μειρακίων**: as contrasted with association with men and with the whole people. It is evident that, in spite of Callicles' exaggeration, he is striking continually at Socrates' (and Plato's) occupation. Quite naturally and conversationally *ψιθυρίζοντα* suggests again its opposite, which is added in *ἐλεύθερον φθέγξασθαι*.

485 d

51. **νεανικόν**: for the meaning, see on 482 c above. *Cf.* Dem. *Ol.* iii. 32 *ἔστι δ' οὐδέποτ', οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράττοντας.*

e

XLI. 1. After this general presentation of his views of philosophy, Callicles now proceeds to make a special application to Socrates' case, with apparent personal good-will, it is true, but still with the condescending mien of the superior man of the world.

2 f. **ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα**: the omission of *πρὸς σέ* is hardly felt. Callicles cleverly illustrates his exposition of the opposition between the principles of practical life and this theoretical philosophizing by reference again to the already cited *Antiope* of Euripides. Antiope had borne to Zeus twin sons, Amphion and Zethus, but was afterwards taken by her uncle Lycus to Thebes, where she suffered for a long time the most cruel treatment at the hands of Ly-

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τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι "ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ⟨ἔχων⟩ ὧδε γενναίαν μειρακιώδει τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὔτ' ἂν δίκης 486 βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν λάκοις οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο." καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες — καί μοι μηδέν ἀχθεσθῇς· εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ — οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι

485 e cus' wife, Dirce. Meanwhile, her sons were being brought up by a herdsman in the forest. Amphion devoted himself entirely to music, while the active and restless Zethus spent his time in hunting and the care of his herds. Finally Antiope escapes from her prison, and hurries to her sons. Dirce pursues, overtakes her, and is just in the act of having her bound to a wild steer, when the sons, who had been informed of their parentage by the herdsman, appear on the scene, rescue their mother from the hands of Dirce, and bind her to the steer instead. Dirce was then changed into a fountain. Amphion and Zethus attain the sovereignty in Thebes, and fortify it with walls. In this work Zethus contributed his great bodily strength, while Amphion's lyre drew after him the stones. This difference in character as related in the myth (Apollod. iii. 5. 5 Ζῆθος μὲν οὖν ἐπεμελεῖτο βουφορβίων, Ἀμφίων δὲ κιθαρῳδίαν ἤσκει) suggested to Euripides a dialogue between the brothers, wherein each praises his own calling to the disparagement of the other's. Callicles applies Euripides' words to the opposition between political and philosophical activity.

5 f. The words of Euripides are 485 e
given by Nauck. *Eur. frag.*[2] 185, as follows: —

. . . ἀμελεῖς, ὧν σε φροντίζειν ἐχρῆν·
ψυχῆς ἔχων γὰρ ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν
γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι·
. . . κοὔτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει
ὀρθῶς ὁμιλήσειας οὔτ' ἄλλων ὕπερ
νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιό τι.

Yet these lines do not contain all that seems poetical in this passage. In place of γυναικομίμῳ Callicles naturally, from his point of view, uses μειρακιώδει, which is quite different from νεανικός in its meaning (*boyish*).

7 f. δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν 486 a
λόγον: *would give an opinion in counsels of justice.*

9. ὑπὲρ ἄλλου: is in the mouth of Callicles a very natural change of the word of the poet. The sing. of ἄλλος, ἕτερος, and of τις is easily used in a generic sense.

10. καίτοι: would naturally lead us to expect some qualification of his severe criticism; instead of this he glides over to the rhetorical question, which, while reaffirming his opinion, summons Socrates to decide. *Cf.* b below.

11. σῇ: equiv. to σοῦ. *Cf.* 485 a εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, *Apol.* 20 e ἐπὶ διαβολῇ

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εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' εἰλιγγιῴης ἂν καὶ χασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ τις εὐφυᾶ λαβοῦσα

486 a τῇ ἐμῇ, Hom. Τ 321 σῇ ποθῇ, Soph. *O. C.* 332 σῇ προμηθίᾳ. See H. 694; G. 147, N. 1.

13. **τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας**: has a poetic coloring, but also occurs in Xen. and in *Crat.* 410 e πόρρω ἤδη φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν. *Euthyp.* 4 b. The gen. is partitive. See H. 757; G. 168. — **ἀεὶ**: when used with the art. and partic. has a distributive sense. In the present case its position between πόρρω and φιλοσοφίας is also to be noted.

15. **ἀπάγοι**: this was the summary process called ἀπαγωγή, in which the guilty person, when caught in the act, was immediately arrested and brought before the Eleven. *Cf. Apol.* 32 b. The expression here is simply a rhetorical hyperbola, but it sounds prophetic in view of Socrates' trial later on, and was probably written designedly by the author. See Introd. § 10. — **ἀδικεῖν**: the pres. is the customary tense in accusations. *Apol.* 19 b, 24 b. — **οἶσθ' ὅτι**: parenthetical, with no effect on the construction, much in the same way as the English phraseological 'you know.' The Greek expression is, however, not so colorless as the English, but assumes a recognition of the truth of the observation. 486 a

16 f. **εἰλιγγιῴης, χασμῷο**: vividly portray the confusion and terror of the prisoner. b

17. **ὅτι εἴποις**: this opt. and the preceding χρήσαιο both represent deliberative subjvs. GMT. 186.

18. **ἀναβάς**: the regular expression for appearing before a court. Its origin may have been from the location of the court; *cf.* Lat. descendere in forum and *Apol.* 17 d, 33 d. — **κατηγόρου τυχών**: "if chance so willed it." The words πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ are again designedly given to Callicles by Plato. Socrates' accuser would of necessity be such a man.

19. **θανατοῦ τιμᾶσθαι**: if the crime had no definite punishment fixed by law (ἀγὼν ἀτίμητος), the accuser proposed some special punishment, for which the accused was at liberty to offer a substitute, and the court had to accept one or the other. *Cf. Apol.* 36 b ff. and for the gen. see H. 746 b.

20. According to Nauck, Fr. 186, the following citation from the *Antiope* runs thus: —

πῶς γὰρ σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἔστιν, εἴ τις εὐφυᾶ
λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα.

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τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ, παῦσαι δ' ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε

ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ παῦσαι μελῳδῶν, πολεμίων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει· τοιαῦτ' ἄειδε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν, σκάπτων, ἀρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφεὶς σοφίσματα, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις.

486 c

23. **περισυλᾶσθαι**: implies that the one robbed is vanquished or defenceless, and contains the side-idea of insult added. This inf. as well as *ζῆν* is used freely after *ἔθηκε* to define in what respects the man who follows philosophy becomes *χείρων*.

24. **ἄτιμον**: 'atimia' in various degrees of completeness was a punishment attached to transgressions against the state. Complete 'atimia' involved deprivation of all civil rights. See Busolt, *Gr. Alter.* § 158, and *cf.* Andoc. i. 73–76. According to Callicles, Socrates will bring himself virtually into this condition by his continual philosophizing.

25. **εἰ . . . ἀγροικότερον**: see on 462 e. *Cf.* Lys. *in Andoc.* 24 *προσεψηφίσασθε ὑμεῖς αὐτὸν* (*sc. τὸν ἄτιμον*) *εἴργεσθαι τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ὥστε μὴ ἀδικούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν δύνασθαι δίκην λαβεῖν.*

26. **ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα**: a blow on the head was considered especially dishonorable. — *κόρρη* (old Attic *κόρση*), *κόρη*, *δέρη*, and *ἀθάρη* are the sole exceptions to the rule which requires *α* after *ρ* in Attic.

27. Callicles closes with a further citation from the *Antiope*, which Nauck, Fr. 188, gives thus: —

486 c

— **ἐλέγχων**: is probably, like the corresponding word in the quotation, to be considered as a verb, since the contrast lies not in a single word, but in the whole following clause. Similarly Thrasymachus says, *Rep.* i. 336 c, *μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων*. The verb, used absolutely, designates the kind of philosophical activity which Socrates has just practised against Polus. *Cf.* 472 b.

28. **εὐμουσίαν**: was appropriate in Zethus' speech, as he wished to show his brother wherein the *εὐμουσία*, which he sought in *κιθαρῳδία*, was really to be found; less so in Callicles', who probably is thinking rather of *εὐβουλία*. The contrast to *φρονεῖν* would be *ληρεῖν* or *φλυαρεῖν*. Hence Callicles substitutes *ληρήματα* and *φλυαρίας* (*trifling* and *prattling*) for *σοφίσματα*.

29. **κομψά**: *witty, subtle*, often used with an unfavorable connotation, both of persons and things; but it

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φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις, ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ d
βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.

XLII. Σω. Εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἄσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων, ᾗ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἰ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;

Καλ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες; e

Σω. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ· νῦν οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς τοιούτῳ ἑρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέναι.

Καλ. Τί δή;

Σω. Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἄν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ

486 c is applied especially to the quibbles of the Sophists and Eristics. *Cf.* κομψεύεσθαι in *Lach.* 197 d.

d 31. **τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα**: *i.e.* those subtle distinctions of words and ideas which in Callicles' view yield no advantage; while political activity and its results — these are τὰ μείζω (484 c above).

32. **βίος**: as opposed to κενοῖσι δόμοις means "means of livelihood," an abundance of the good things of life. — **δόξα**: contrasted with ἄτιμον ζῆν.

XLII. 1. The delicate irony which characterizes the reply of Socrates is in striking contrast with the rudeness with which Callicles began, in 482 c above, the exposition of his view of life. — **χρυσῆν**: is pred. of τὴν ψυχήν. "If the soul which I have were of gold."

2. **οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἄσμενον**: the main idea lies in ἄσμενον.

2 f. **τινὰ τῶν λίθων**: equiv. to the more common βάσανος alone.

3. **ᾗ**: after λίθων instead of αἷς. *Cf.* 521 d. 486 d

4. **ἔμελλον κτέ.**: 'The relative fut. after an unreal conditional is ἔμελλον with the infinitive.' Gildersleeve. *Cf.* Isae. ii. 25. — **ὁμολογήσειεν**: the choice of this expression in the comparison is due to the nature of the discussion. The testing which Socrates is undergoing at the hands of Callicles must end in ὁμολογεῖν (*cf.* e ἄν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς).

5. **καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι**: leads back to the idea of θεραπεία τῆς ψυχῆς already discussed in 464 b above, and thus immediately prepares the way for making progress in the investigation. *Cf.* 487 a. — The subject of τεθεραπεῦσθαι must be supplied from μοί.

9. **ἑρμαίῳ**: all unexpected gains e (κέρδος ἀπροσδόκητον) were supposed to come from Hermes, who had among other surnames that of κερδῷος.

11. **ἄν μοι κτέ.**: we miss the less

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ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γάρ, ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς τε 487
ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπι-
15 στήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω, οἳ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τέ εἰσιν βασανίζειν, διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ· τὼ δὲ ξένω τώδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος,
20 σοφὼ μὲν καὶ φίλω ἐστὸν ἐμώ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παρρησίας b
καὶ αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὥ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν
25 μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις, ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν· πεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν

486 e an object to ὁμολογήσῃς since the idea is made especially prominent by the following ταῦτα. *Cf.* 487 e ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι.

12. **δοξάζει**: is a vox media. The same activity of the soul may, according to circumstances, lead to error or to truth. *Cf.* also δόξα ἀληθής and ψευδής. — **ἤδη**: *at once* (j a m), without need of further discussion.

487 a 14. **τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν**: *must of necessity possess three qualities.* The particle ἄρα shows that this lies in the nature of the matter.

15 f. **πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω κτέ.**: Socrates gives examples in *Apol.* 21 b ff.

19. **τὼ δὲ ξένω κτέ.**: Socrates says what follows with an irony which applies especially to Polus; but at the same time it is a significant criticism of the παρρησία of Callicles.

b 21. **μᾶλλον**: see on 482 c.

22. **ὥ γε**: the γε emphasizes the pronoun. The irony from here on is quite distinct, and no longer veiled. 487 b

— **διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ**: an example of 'oxymoron.' Timidity and shame are not usually the basis of boldness. The opposite of τολμᾷ is implied. The reference to 483 a is unmistakable: ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν.

23. **αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ**: the position makes the contradiction beat heavily upon the ear.

24 f. **περὶ τῶν μεγίστων**: in contrast with 486 d τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα. *Cf.* 484 c τὰ μείζω.

26. **πεπαίδευσαι**: see on παιδείας, 485 a. The addition of ὡς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων implies, of course, the usual opposition of the many ignorant to the few capable, and this makes the tone of ἱκανῶς almost bitter.

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Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶ εὔνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας c ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα· καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων, μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύ- d εσθε ἀλλήλοις, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύοντος, ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν μοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὔνους εἶ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι,

487 c 29 f. Of the three companions of Callicles we know but little. Tisander is mentioned only here. Andron appears in *Prot.* 315 c as a defender of Hippias. Nausicydes had, according to Xen. *Mem.* ii. 7. 6, acquired wealth from his business of ἀλφιτοποιία. The deme Cholargus belonged to the tribe Acamantis, Aphidnae to Aiantis.

32. **μέχρι ὅποι**: the use of *μέχρι* with an adverb is unusual. *Cf. Crat.* 412 e, *Symp.* 217 e, and Kr. 66, 1, n. 4.

33. **ἐνίκα**: has a somewhat comic effect, inasmuch as it brings before the mind the image of an earnest and thorough deliberation engaged in by some public body (*e.g.* the senate), followed by the putting of the question. These young men, however, judge philosophy without understanding it.—**προθυμεῖσθαι**: epexegetic inf. to *τοιάδε τις δόξα*.

33 f. **εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν**: recalls the *τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα* above. This cautious decision contrasts remarkably with the *ἐλεύθερον* and *νεανικόν* which 487 c Callicles defends in 485 c, d.

35 f. **ὅπως μὴ . . . διαφθαρέντες**: the d same state of mind is shown in the accusation brought later against Socrates, the second part of which ran thus: *ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.* That this was Callicles' judgment is shown by his words in 484 c ff. above.

37. **ἑταιροτάτοις**: is found also in *Phaedo* 89 d.

39 f. **ὅτι . . . αὐτός τε φῂς** κτέ.: this must not be considered as a valid example of *ὅτι* after *φημί*, which regularly takes the infinitive. The *ὅτι* clause precedes, and may have escaped the speaker's mind when he was about to make the collocation of *αὐτός* and *λόγος*. The occurrence of two forms of *λέγω* in the same clause would likewise have been awkward.—**οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι**: *you are disposed to free speech.* See on 452 e. The omission of the first and second persons of the copula is rare. When *εἶ* is omitted, *σύ* is generally found. On the inf. see on 457 d.

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40 αὐτός τε φῂς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμο-
λογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὑτωσὶ δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί·
ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον e
τοῦτ' ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι
αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν
45 ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδείᾳ οὔτ'
αἰσχύνης παρουσίᾳ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαις
ἄν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῂς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ
ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας.
πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ
50 τούτων ὧν σὺ δή μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποιόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν
ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον 488
καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ
τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρ-
τάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ· σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν

487 d 41. **ἔχει δὴ** κτέ.: with this Socrates recurs to what was said in 486 e.

e 44 ff. **ἂν συνεχώρησας, συγχωρήσαις ἄν**: the time is pushed into the fut. pf. by the previous *βεβασανισμένον ἔσται*, and standing on this assumed plane, Socrates uses naturally the unreal past. The second clause is, as the **αὖ** shows, a second thought, and being of general application, is put into the ideal (potential) optative. The whole sentence shows the narrow line that separates between unreality and ideality.

48. **τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔξει**: the gen., as in the Homeric phrases *τέλος γάμοιο, θανάτοιο*. Every effort must be directed to a terminus or completion. Here the end is perfect truth.

49. **καλλίστη**: refers to its value. It yields a rich return.

488 a 51. **τί χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν**: is the question about which the following discussion revolves. *Cf.* 492 **d**, 500 **c**, 512 **e**, 515 **a**, 521 **a**, 527 **b**, **e**. 488 a

52 f. **κατὰ τὸν βίον**: refers, not to the period of life, but to the manner of living.

53. **τοῦτο**: Heindorf, followed by Cron, construes this word with the following verb. But it is more natural to look upon it as antecedent to the following sentence, *know well this fact*, etc. — **οὐχ ἑκών**: *sc.* according to the Socratic view as to the cause of wrong doing.

54. **νουθετεῖν**: according to the rule, when **ἄρχεσθαι** is used with the inf. the inf. is emphasized; when with the partic. the 'beginning' is emphasized. So *Theaet.* 187 **a** **ἠρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι**, "we *commenced* the discussion on which we are still engaged." — Here, as in 458 **a**, Socrates looks upon the correction of any erroneous views as a favor.

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με, μὴ ἀποστῇς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι, τί ἔστιν τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό, καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν μέν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταὐτὰ πράττοντα ἅπερ ὡμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλᾶκα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσῃς b ὕστερον, ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε, πῶς φῂς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;

XLIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα [ἔλεγον] καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἷός τ' ἦ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέ- c γεις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶν καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι, ὡς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον ταὐτὸν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἧττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότερον

88 b 59. **βλᾶκα**: 'implies feebleness both of mind and character, *a dolt*.' Thompson.

60 f. **ἐπανάλαβε**: we find *ἀναλαβεῖν* in this sense in 506 c and *Apol.* 19 b.

61. **σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος**: see on 484 b.

62. **ἄγειν βίᾳ**: is a freer expression of the sense of Pindar's words.

64. **μὴ λέγεις**: in spite of the addition of *ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι*, the tendency of the question is towards a negative answer, as is also to be gathered from the *ἀλλὰ* of Callicles' answer. 488 b

XLIII. 4. **τότε**: refers to what was c said in 483 d, e, and *ἐνδείκνυσθαι* is accordingly imperfect infinitive. — **ἦ**: appears to be the old Attic form.

9 f. **ὡς ταὐτὸν ὄν**: *on the assumption that*, etc. See on 491 a.

10. **ἢ ἔστι**: begins the second member of the double question introduced by *πότερον*.

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δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ κρείτ- d
τονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν
ἐστιν τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;

Καλ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ
φύσιν; οἳ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνί, ὥσπερ
καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.

Καλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἐστίν.

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελ- e
τίους που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρειτ-
τόνων γε ὄντων;

Καλ. Φημί.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ
σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ
ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; καὶ ὅπως 489
μὴ ἀλώσει ἐνταῦθα σὺ αἰσχυνόμενος· νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὔ,
οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλέον δίκαιον εἶναι,
καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ φθόνει μοι

488 d 12. **ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος**: *cf.* 470 b. The question is, whether the range of each idea is the same. A clear distinction (*σαφῶς διόρισον*) would obviate any false application.

14. **τὸ κρεῖττον** *κτέ.*: the position of the three terms is arbitrary; but Socrates seems to put first the two on which he lays most stress.

17 f. **ὥσπερ . . . ἔλεγες**: this appeal to the statement of Callicles reveals a contradiction between his statements, inasmuch as he had said above, 483 b, that the *πολλοί* were the *ἀσθενεῖς*. 488 d

28 f. **ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες**: the *αὖ* e draws attention again to the above *ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες*. See 483 a–d.

30 f. **ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσει**: an ironical 489 a allusion to Callicles' reproaches of Gorgias and Polus in 482 e.

33. **μὴ φθόνει**: a formula for entreaty and urging, still more frequent in the form *μὴ φθονήσῃς*. Regularly *μή* with pres. imv. prescribes a neg.

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ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν', ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος.

Καλ. Ἀλλ' οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.

Σω. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ b ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων, ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

XLIV. Καλ. Οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνει, τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτῃ, ἑρμαῖον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι c

489 a course of action, with an aor. subjv. negatives a course of action. Socrates wishes at the outset to obviate any tendency to a refusal to answer, or hesitancy.

34. **Καλλίκλεις**: the omission of the *ὦ* is unusual.

35. **βεβαιοῦσθαι**: *to become strengthened in one's opinion.* It is used with *παρά* to designate the quarter from which the influence comes; direct agency would require *ὑπό*. — **ἱκανοῦ διαγνῶναι**: *competent to decide*, with reference to 487 e.

b 40 f. **λέγειν, κατηγορεῖν**: indir. disc. for impf. indicative. The *κατηγορία* proper begins with *ἃ δή*. The use of *δή* implies a fact beyond controversy.

XLIV. 1. **οὑτοσὶ ἀνήρ**: Callicles with this turns to the surrounding listeners to give vent to his indignation. *Cf.* 467 b, 505 c. — **οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν**: Callicles, who looks upon all philosophical activity as *φλυαρία*, 489 b objects to having dialectical treatment applied to him. — **εἰπέ μοι**: the asyndeton renders the question especially incisive, and hence is a measure of excitement. The question *οὐκ αἰσχύνει* is a rhetorical imperative.

2 f. **ὀνόματα θηρεύων**: the same image is employed in *Theaet.* 166 c, with the substantive *ὀνομάτων θήρευσις* to denote logomachy, where the matter at issue has been quite forgotten.

3. **ῥήματι**: *in an expression.* See c on 450 e.

4. Callicles takes his stand on the identity, which he had maintained, of *βελτίων* and *κρείττων*, but reverses the relation of these words to each other; for while above he considered *βελτίων* to be synonymous with *κρείττων*, now he wishes *κρείττων* to be understood in the sense of *βέλτιον*.

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ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα;

Σω. Εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;

Καλ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. d

Σω. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγεῖ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πρᾳότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

489 c 5. **οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω**: he adds, in order to cover this change of conception. See on 456 a.

6. **ἢ οἴει κτέ.**: Callicles allows himself to be clearly recognized as a member of that political party which applied to itself by preference the name *οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί*, and which both during the latter part and after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war obtained for a brief period the ascendency in Athens. — **σύρφετος**: from *σύρω, sweep*. *Cf.* the English colloquial words 'off-scourings' and 'scum.'

8. **ἀξίων πλήν**: without a following gen., instead of which we find *τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι by means of their bodily strength*. Others construe *τῷ* with *σώματι*, making the inf. depend upon some word of ability to be taken from *ἀξίων*, but this is harsh.

9. **αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα**: construe with *λέγειν* as an indignant disclaimer in the shape of a question. 489 c "Or think you I mean that if a rabble be got together, of slaves and all sorts of wretches, good for nothing unless perhaps for feats of physical strength, and these people say this or that, that these their mere dicta are to have the force of law?" Thompson.

12. **αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω**: why Socrates does not express his conjecture, he has already explained in 453 b, c. d

14. **σύ γε**: *you, at least, for your part*. *Cf.* what has just preceded in c.

16. **ἀλλὰ πάλιν**: in what precedes Callicles has really succeeded merely in eluding the expression of any positive view.

18. **προδίδασκε**: the *πρό* in composition indicates the *pro*gress or going forward, which ought to attend teaching.

19. **ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ**: *run away from your school*. *Cf.* 456 d.

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Καλ. Εἰρωνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες. e

Σω. Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος, πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;

Καλ. Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.

Σω. Ὁρᾷς ἄρα, ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;

Καλ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.

Σω. Πολλάκις ἄρα εἷς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων 490 a κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων — τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν — καὶ οὐ ῥήματα θηρεύω — εἰ ὁ εἷς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

Καλ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.

XLV. Σω. Ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν b ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἡμῖν ᾖ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν ᾖ

489 e 21. **μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον**: with *μά* we always infer the negative. The allusion to Zethus, whom Callicles had brought forward as an authority, has a very comic effect.

22. **ἀλλ' ἴθι**: see on 451 a.

25. **ὁρᾷς κτέ.**: alludes to 489 c, where *βέλτιον* and *κρεῖττον* were said by Callicles to be identical. Here he characterizes the *βελτίους* as *ἀμείνους*, showing, as Socrates declares in *δηλοῖς οὐδέν*, that at this time there was no distinction of consequence between these two words.

26. **οὐκ ἐρεῖς**: again asyndetic, as above in b. 489 e

27. **φρονιμωτέρους**: excludes the ambiguity which was still possible with *ἰσχυρότερος*.

29. **μὴ φρονούντων**: the neg. is conditional. 490 a

33. **ῥήματα**: a clear reference to 489 b, c. *ῥῆμα* has rather the force of "phrase."

XLV. 1. **ἔχε δή**: see on 460 a. b

3. **ἐν κοινῷ**: *i.e.* so that, as being public property, it must be distributed.

4. **οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροὶ κτέ.**: added be-

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St. I. p. 490.

φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἰατρὸς ὤν, ἢ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος, φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὤν, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἑκτέον αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἑκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὤν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὠγαθέ;

ΚΑΛ. Περὶ σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; φάθι ἢ μή.

490 b cause it is just in the distribution of food that one would expect bodily strength to form the standard.

5. **περὶ ταῦτα**: the acc. implies some mental activity.

c 10. **ἑκτέον**: the verbal of ἔχω, which is quite rare, shows two forms, this and the more normal one σχετέος, also used by Plato. (in composition).

11. **τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν**: this comes to him according to 490 a, because he is φρονιμώτερος. The dat. is one of cause. νέμειν is an action for which are necessary wisdom, justice, and self-control.

12. **καταχρῆσθαι**: not *misuse*, but *use up*. κατά frequently has the force of "completely" in composition. Kr. 68, 46, 10.

13. **ζημιοῦσθαι**: used metaphorically, of the natural result which follows the over-engorgement of the stomach with food.

14. **τῶν μὲν . . . τῶν δέ**: with reference to b. 490 c

15. **τῷ βελτίστῳ**: used instead of the pron. for the sake of the contrast with ἐλάχιστον.

17. **περὶ σιτία**: this is a very unusual construction. The gen. is the rule with περὶ after λέγω. Cron thinks it is calculated to define the region in which the speeches of Socrates move. The word φλυαρίας serves also to characterize all that precedes. *Cf.* 519 a λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν, the companion passage to this one. *Cf.* also Dem. *Ol.* iii. 29 τὰς ὁδοὺς ἃς ἐπισκευάζομεν, καὶ κρήνας, καὶ λήρους.

19. **πότερον**: the second member d is to be supplied from the following question.

20. **ἢ μή** (*sc.* φάθι): to be understood like οὔ φημι (n e g o).

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Καλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;

Καλ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.

Σω. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιιέναι;

Καλ. Ποίων ἱματίων;

Σω. Ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν.

Καλ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.

Σω. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ γῆν.

Καλ. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σω. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

490 d **24. μανθάνω**: ironic; as if Socrates could by any means judge what Callicles did mean from a general statement of what he did not mean. — **ὑφαντικώτατον**: a sup. coined for the occasion.

26. περιιέναι: *sc.* in order to show off in them; still stronger is the following (31) περιπατεῖν ("strut about").

27. ποίων ἱματίων: expresses indignant contempt. *Cf. Charm.* 174 b ἆρά γε (οἶδε) τὸ πεττευτικόν; ποῖον πεττευτικόν;

e **32. φλυαρεῖς ἔχων**: a manner of speech taken from the common life, and hence especially frequent in the comic poets. *Cf.* τί ἔχων λῃρεῖς; (497 a), τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει; (*Phaedr.* 236 e), τί δῆτα διατρίβεις ἔχων; (Ar. *Eccles.* 1151). ἔχων seems to imply a kind of continual persistence. *You still persist in talking nonsense.* 490 e

33. τοιαῦτα, τοιάδε: correspond in usage to οὗτος and ὅδε. The article divides the examples into classes.

37. ὡς ἀεὶ κτέ.: an exclamation implying a taunt, which was so often directed against Socrates *e.g.* (according to Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4. 6) by the sophist Hippias, who receives about the same answer that Callicles does here, with the ironical addition: σὺ δ' ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυμαθὴς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις. *Cf.* 482 a.

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ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ 491
κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, ὡς
περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρο-
νιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ
ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς
κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, b
ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὦσιν,
ὄντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ
ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.

XLVI. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταὐτὰ
σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῂς
ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφει μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοὐναντίον,

491 a 40. **ἀεὶ σκυτέας** κτέ.: Charicles, one of the thirty, irritated by some keen remark of Socrates, expresses himself similarly in Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 37 *οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων τούτοις τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε.*

41 f. **ὡς ὄντα τὸν λόγον**: the acc. abs. is rare, except with impers. verbs. GMT. 853; G. 278, 2; H. 974. The inference here is that the assumption introduced by the *ὡς* is untenable; in which case we more commonly have *ὥσπερ*.

43. **περὶ τίνων**: due to assimilation after *περὶ τούτων*, for, acc. to the usage, we should expect *περὶ τίνα* after *πλεονεκτεῖ*. *Cf. Lach.* 182 e *οἷς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν, ὅτι ἂν μαθόντες πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον.* The *ἐρεῖς* may also have had some effect. See on 449 d. For *οὐκοῦν ἐρεῖς*, see on 489 e.

46. **ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω**: 491 a see on 456 a and 489 c. Callicles' irritation shows itself again in the side-thrust, *οὐ σκυτοτόμους* κτέ.

46 f. **τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν**: equiv. to *τούτους οἳ κρείττους εἰσίν*. See Kr. 61, 6, 2; H. 878. Such prolepsis usually occurs after verbs which express recognition or make declarations. Here the relative clause is almost pleonastic, but this is the more in harmony with the excited feelings of Callicles.

48. **εἰς . . . πράγματα**: denotes the b object, as *περὶ ταῦτα* (above 490 b) denotes the field, to which the *φρόνησις* is directed; and from it we must take the subject of *οἰκοῖτο*.

50. **ἱκανοὶ ὄντες** κτέ.: is to be considered as explanatory of *ἀνδρεῖοι* and *φρόνιμοι ὦσιν*.

XLVI. 3. **ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοὐναντίον**: this use of *σοῦ*, with which we must

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ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν
τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὡρίζου, c
αὖθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἥκεις
ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους
καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι, τίνας
ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅτι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς
πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ προσήκει
τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλέον ἔχειν d
τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὑτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· ἢ τοῦτο
μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

491 b supply *κατηγορῶ*, is somewhat harsh after *ἐμέ*, with which it contrasts, and leads Cron to prefer to consider *σοῦ* as dependent upon *τοὐναντίον*, in the sense "the opposite of you,"—*i.e.* of what you say,—and the clause with *ὅτι* as epexegetic to *τοὐναντίον*, —a harsh and doubtful construction.

c 5. **τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους**: the art. is employed, because *ἰσχυροτέρους* is not merely a pred. to *τοὺς βελτίους κτέ.*, but both ideas are considered as identical.

6 f. **ἥκεις ἔχων**: as 518 a. In English also we often say, 'here you are with,' *etc.*

7. **τινές**: '*τις* may express indefiniteness of *nature*: "*a sort of.*"' H. 702.

8. **εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι**: *relieve your mind by saying, tell and be done with it. Cf.* below, e **ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω**. The use of the aorist tense of the partic. may be simply a case of attraction; it certainly loses its connotation of past time, being practically identical with the time of the leading verb, as in *Phaedo* 60 c **εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με**. See GMT. 150, 845; H. 856 b. 491 c

12. **τοῦτ' ἐστίν**: does not refer to d *ἄρχειν*, but simply, as often, introduces the following clause.

14. **τί δὲ αὑτῶν**: the indefiniteness of the question shows that it is only designed to draw Callicles' attention to the necessity of some rule governing the actions of the *κρείττους* to one another. According to the connexion we may supply either *ἄρχειν* or *πλέον ἔχειν* to govern the gen., or we may consider it as a free genitive. The idea of a man's governing himself is so entirely new to Callicles that he is unable to catch Socrates' meaning at first.

16. **ἕνα ἕκαστον**: the single concrete case to explain the principle.

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ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. e

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ· τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις, τοὺς σώφρονας.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη, ὅτι οὕτω λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς

491 d 19. **οὐδὲν ποικίλον**: means that the question is about a simple matter, whereas the person addressed imagines something else behind the words. — **ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί**: with this, Socrates calls in the authority of common usage to determine the meaning of *ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν*, which he defines by *σώφρων* and *ἐγκρατὴς ἑαυτοῦ*, with *τῶν ἡδονῶν κτέ.* explanatory.

e 22. **ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ**: is often used ironically. — **ἡδύς**: corresponds best to our *naive*. Callicles means that Socrates still keeps the point of view of a naive — hence interesting (but *cf.* 485 b, c) — child, inasmuch as he has not yet laid aside his childish prejudice in favor of *σωφροσύνη*. Hence the words *τοὺς ἠλιθίους κτέ.* are a criticism of Socrates' view: "you mean those simple-minded fellows, — the temperate." This passage shows that Callicles erases *σωφροσύνη*, as he did *δικαιοσύνη*, from the list of the virtues.

24. **οὕτω**: we should naturally expect *τούτους*. Of course there is a tinge of irony in the allusion to Callicles' words. 491 e

26. **πάνυ γε σφόδρα**: *sc.* *οὕτω λέγεις*. Callicles, of course, means *τοὺς ἠλιθίους*, and makes an effort in what follows to defend his words. For this purpose he unfolds his view of life more completely, and shows especially wherein he finds happiness. The beginning of his discourse bears a rhetorical stamp.

27. **δουλεύων**: not to be conceived literally of human servitude, but rather equiv. to *ἀρχόμενος* and that too *αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ*, which Callicles considers just as bad as if the slavery were to some one else, *ὁτῳοῦν*. The lot of thraldom is considered so unhappy, that Callicles conceives *δουλεύων*, even in the sense which it has here, as the exact opposite to *εὐδαίμων*. That self-control is not consistent with the generally held idea of freedom is spoken plainly in *Meno* 86 d *ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς*, and is at the present day a principle of the opponents of the temperance movement.

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μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι 492
ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν b
δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεί γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων υἱέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχήν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν, ⟨τί⟩ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον ⟨ἂν⟩ εἴη σωφροσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν

492 a 31. **κολάζειν**: in the sense of "discipline" is quite in place here. At the same time its use forms a link between this and the earlier discussion between Polus and Socrates. *ἀκολασία* is the proper opposite to *σωφροσύνη*, and as such is praised by Callicles.

32. **ὑπηρετεῖν**: Callicles says this, without noticing that thereby the servitude (*δουλεία*) in which man stands to his appetites is recognized.

34. **τοὺς τοιούτους**: *viz. τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἀποπιμπλάναι κτέ.*

36. **αἰσχρὸν δή**: with ironical reference to *αἰσχύνην*. — **ὅπερ**: introduces what follows. The reference is to 483 c ff.

b 41. **οἷς ὑπῆρξεν**: *whose fortune it was.* The original meaning of *ὑπάρχειν*, "to be as a foundation," "to begin with," becomes gradually weaker as time goes on. The dat. in the pred. here passes over into the acc. as subj. of the inf. (*ἱκανούς* and *εἶναι*) as is frequently the case, especially in long periods. Kr. 55, 2, 5, 7. The cause here lies in the necessary addition of *αὐτούς*. 492 b

42. **ἀρχήν τινα κτέ.**: the word *ἀρχή* can be applied to any position of power, whether in a democracy or not. Thuc. ii. 65. 9 says of Athens *ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς* (*i.e.* Pericles) *ἀρχή*. The idea of *τυραννίς* is well known; *cf.* Nepos, *Milt.* 8. 3. *δυναστεία* combined with *τυραννίς* is not infrequently (479 a, Thuc. iii. 62. 3) used of oligarchs, but it is also a designation of princes, both smaller and greater (524 e, 525 d).

43. **αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον**: declare as strongly as possible the inappropriateness of the practice of virtue for such men; it becomes for them really a shame and an evil.

44. **τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις**: pur-

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τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδὼν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες εἶεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφρο- c
σύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὑτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν φῂς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ' ἔχει· τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀν-
θρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

XLVII. Σω. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχει d

492 b posely placed at the end of the clause (as above διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν), and to emphasize the contrast, ἀνθρώπων, which is usually wanting, is added in the next clause after τῶν πολλῶν. — οἷς ἐξὸν κτέ.: such connexion of the subordinate to the principal clause is idiomatic in Greek and Latin. *Cf. Symp.* 174 e οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς παῖδά τινα τῶν ἔνδον ἀπαντήσαντα ἄγειν οὗ κατέκειντο οἱ ἄλλοι. Nep. *Thrasy.* 4. 1 huic . . . corona a populo data est; quam quod . . . non vis expresserat nullam habuit invidiam. Notice the necessary shift in ἐξόν and μηδενὸς . . . ὄντος due to the change from impersonal to personal. The participles are both practically concessive, the neg. μή being due to the conditional coloring.

46. τῶν πολλῶν κτέ.: notice the assonance (παρίσωσις) in νόμον, λόγον, ψόγον.

c 48. τοῦ καλοῦ: is said with bitter irony. Callicles shows here, as well as in 486 b above, the code of morals prevalent at that time and which Xen. expresses in the praise awarded to Cyrus, *Anab.* i. 9. 11 φάνερος ἦν εἴ τίς τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ποιήσειεν αὐτὸν, νικᾶν πειρώμενος. 492 c

51. ἣν φῂς σὺ διώκειν: as above 482 e φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν.

52. ἐπικουρίαν: *capacity to help* (one's self); *i.e.* to provide means for pleasure and to ward off hindrances. So also ἐπικουρεῖν and ἐπίκουρος. *Cf.* below, the recapitulation of Socrates.

53. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κτέ.: the subject, which at first is only inferred as the opposite of the three qualities specified, is nearer specified first by the characteristic addition τὰ καλλωπίσματα (*affectations*) and then by a definite expression which at the same time shows Callicles' opinion.

53. φλυαρία κτέ.: is predicate.

XLVII. 1. οὐκ ἀγεννῶς: like γενναίως 475 d, 521 a, transferred from its original application to the free independent conduct proper for a man of noble birth; hence equiv. to "spirited," "brave." — ἐπεξέρχει: an image from war. *Cf.* ἐπιχειρῶμεν 495 c. d

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St. I. p. 492.

τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιάζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. δέομαι οὖν ἐγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῂς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν; e

Καλ. Φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.

Σω. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι.

Καλ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ δὴ οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοί εἰσιν.

Σω. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος.

492 d 2. **τῷ λόγῳ**: refers to the view just stated, the position defended. *Cf. Prot.* 345 **d**, where Socrates says of Simonides *δι' ὅλου τοῦ ᾄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι.* We may, however, consider *ἐπεξέρχει* as used absolutely and *τῷ λόγῳ* as dat. of accompaniment.

6. **εἰ μέλλει τις** (*sc. τοιοῦτος εἶναι*) **οἷον δεῖ** (*αὐτὸν sc. τὸν ἄνθρωπον*) **εἶναι**: the absence of the inf. after *ἐῶντα* is strange; *cf.* 491 e above.

7 f. **ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν**: Socrates wishes to settle beyond all cavil that Callicles sanctions the employment of all means, without limitation and in the broadest sense, to satisfy his desires. As *ἑτοιμάζειν* is in the same construction with *κολαστέον*, we must conceive an idea of obligation connected with it. *Cf. Crito* 51 c *ποιητέον . . . ἢ πείθειν.*

e 8. **τὴν ἀρετήν**: the sole true virtue (*manliness*), which is recognized also by Callicles.

10. **ἄρα**: "it appears," "according to your view." — **οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι** 492 *κτέ.*: the fundamental principle of the e Cynic school (of Antisthenes), which also derived its origin from Socrates. *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* i. 6. 10, where to the sophist Antiphon, who maintains similar principles to those of Callicles here, Socrates says *ἔοικας τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλάχιστον ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου.*

12. **οἱ νεκροὶ** *κτέ.*: Socrates mentions the prevalence of this view in *Phaedo* 65 a *καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν.* Sophocles, however, makes the sorely afflicted Ajax say (*Ai.* 554 f.) *ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν γὰρ μηδὲν ἥδιστος βίος, | ἕως τὸ χαίρειν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μαθῇς.*

14. Now that Callicles has stated exactly the manner in which he looks at life, Socrates proceeds to contrast that view with his own, not directly

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οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ἤδη τοῦ ἔγωγε καὶ 493
ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τυγχάνει δν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν

492 e indeed, but by a series of comparisons and similes, which serve the double purpose of calming the feelings of the listeners and readers after the impassioned speech of Callicles and, by presenting these pictures to the fancy, of preparing their minds for the following dialectical argument.

15. **Εὐριπίδης**: the same poet to whom Callicles has several times appealed. Socrates also can quote for his own purpose. The passage is from the *Polyidus*, and has the second line completed by the words *κάτω νομίζεται*. Quite similar is a passage which has come down to us from another lost tragedy, the *Phrixus*, *τίς οἶδεν εἰ ζῆν τοῦθ' ὃ κέκληται θανεῖν, | τὸ ζῆν δὲ θνήσκειν ἐστί*. See Nauck, *Fr.* 639, 830.

493 a 19 f. **ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσά του**: the following comparisons are probably taken from the book of Philolaus, a Pythagorean who, after having been driven from Italy, wandered to Thebes, and there engaged in teaching and writing. Socrates was acquainted with the Pythagorean teaching probably only orally, from association with his Theban friends Simmias and Cebes. For this reason Plato implies by the manner of expression that this knowledge, which Socrates himself in nowise valued, was as general as possible. See Thompson. 493 a

20 f. **τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι σῆμα**: this comparison, though ascribed to the Pythagoreans, is connected also with the Orphic saying that the body is the custodian of the soul. Plato combines both in the same manner in *Crat.* 400 b *καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ* (*sc.* *τὸ σῶμα*) *εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς*. *Cf.* *Phaedo* 62 b.

21. **τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο**: in order to continue the discussion, a distinction between the separate parts of the soul is necessary. This could not be given here scientifically; but as much as is needful is stated by the comparison. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes three parts of the soul, — *τὸ λογιστικόν*, *τὸ θυμοειδές* (*θυμός*), and *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*. For his present purpose two are sufficient, — the really spiritual, the reason, and that part which clings greedily to the body; for the question to be decided is: Shall life be directed according to the nature of the soul or of the body?

22. **μεταπίπτειν**: the active is found in 481 d, e. *Cf.* 517 b *μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας*.

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ἄνω κάτω. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους· τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς, οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρη- b

493 a 23. **μυθολογῶν**: "speaking in mythical (here allegorical) form," in contradistinction with the dialectical method. *Cf. Phaedo* 61 e **διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν**. — **κομψός**: *of delicate perceptions.* Often with irony, but not here. See on 486 c. **Σικελός** refers to Empedocles, **Ἰταλικός** to Philolaus. Neither was able, in the infancy of the science, to clothe his profound thoughts in philosophical form. *Cf.* Cron-Dyer Introd. to *Apol.* §§ 3 and 8. **Σικελός**, and not **Σικελικός**, may be due to the old love song of Timocreon Rhodius, which began: **Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ | ποτὶ τὰν ματέρ' ἔφα.**

24. παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι: *by a slight variation of the word.* **παράγειν** is otherwise used of etymologies which are effected by small variations in the sound. — **διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικόν**: Philolaus was very fond of such tricks of derivation (*cf.* Boeckh, *Philolaos*, p. 188). Both words are obviously, as was shown above by **ἀναπείθεσθαι** and **μεταπίπτειν**, to be considered as passive, and applying to something that can be easily persuaded. In form **πιθανόν** approaches closest to **πίθον**, and hence stands first. It is usually active, yet it occurs also as a passive, *e.g.* Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 2. 10 **πιθανοὶ δ' οὕτως εἰσί τινες, ὥστε, πρὶν εἰδέναι τὸ προσταττόμενον, πρότερον πείθονται.** — **πειστικόν**: *adapted and inclined to belief*, presupposes also some persuasion.

25. ἀνοήτους: is chosen here as the opposite of **σώφρονες**, on account of its assonance with **ἀμυήτους**, and denotes those who are under the control, not of the **νοῦς**, but of the **ἐπιθυμία**. **ἀμύητοι**, according to the regular usage, denotes those who are not initiated into the mysteries. Hence Plato applies it also, in *Phaedo* 69 c and *Theaet.* 155 e, to those who have not been initiated into wisdom, or Philosophy, which causes — as the mysteries were also designed to do — an actual inner purification of the soul. But here is also probably, at the same time, an allusion to the actual untransferred meaning of **μύειν**, *close*, — *i.e.* the "unconfined." With this agrees the following explanation, **οὐ στεγανόν** and **τετρημένος πίθος**. The **ἀμύητοι** stand open to all the charms of sense and the outer world. 493 a

27. τὸ ἀκόλαστον: an allusion to the expression of Callicles. — **οὐ στεγανόν**: *which does not cover and preserve its contents*, gives cause and introduction for the image of the jar. It is noteworthy that this greedy part of the soul is designated entirely by neg. expressions. b

27 f. ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος: depends on an **ἔλεγε**, which is implied in **ὠνόμασε**. It is true, however, that after a verb of naming we find occasionally a relative clause, as Soph. *O. R.* 780 **καλεῖ (με) πλαστὸς ὡς εἴην πατρί**. The comparison reminds one of the myth of the Danaidae. With the image of the **πίθος** and **κόσκινον** Thompson compares Shaks. *Cym.* i. 7

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μένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τοὐναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν
30 Ἅιδου — τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων — οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ c
ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπήκασεν τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημέ-
35 νην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν πως οἷός τε ὦ, πεῖσαι

493 b 'The cloyed will, That satiate yet unsatisfied desire, That tub both filled and running,' and *All's Well* i. 3. 193 'Yet in this captious and untenable sieve, I still pour in the waters of my love, And lack not to lose still.'

28. **ἀπεικάσας**: the necessary objects in the acc. and dat. are to be supplied from the context. — **τοὐναντίον**: construe with *σοί*.

29 f. **ἐν Ἅιδου**: the following etymological explanation is found also elsewhere. It draws attention to a consideration of the beyond and the life after death, which plays an important part in the close of the dialogue. *Cf. Phaedo* 80 d, 81 c, d.

30. **οὗτοι**: points back, but is at the same time fixed by the addition *οἱ ἀμύητοι*.

32. **ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ**: "likewise." The objects are different, but their defects are similar.

c 33. **ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων**: Socrates again refers to his authority, because he is still engaged with the details of the simile.

34. **τὴν τῶν ἀμυήτων**: emphatically added, because what follows applies only to *οἱ ἀμύητοι*. The soul is here, as a whole, compared to a perforated sieve, whereas, just before, 493 c only a part of it was compared with the jar, because thereby was meant only the part attached to the body. But the other part, the soul proper, is brought into service to this bodily part, so that it affords material for it, and even assumes its nature. *Cf. Phaedo* 66 d *δουλεύοντες τῇ τοῦ σώματος θεραπείᾳ*.

35. **ἀπιστίαν**: no contradiction to the above *πειστικόν*, which was said only of the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* of the soul. By yielding to the sensual, the soul loses its power of reception and retention, of belief and knowledge.

36. **ἐπιεικῶς**: *reasonably, fairly,* and then *very likely, indeed.* — **ὑπό τι**: *somewhat,* like *ὑπό* in *ὑποάμουσος Rep.* viii. 548 e, belongs to *ἄτοπον*. Rid. § 131 cites *Phaedr.* 242 d *ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ* (*λόγον*). *Cf.* in Lat. subabsurdus, subrusticus, *etc.* — **μήν**: *yet, moreover,* like the more usual *μέντοι*.

37. **σοί**: in Greek, when a pron. has been expressed once with one of the verbs of a series, it is not necessary to express it a second time, even though the second verb would require a different case, as here.

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μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἑλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσει;

ΚΑΛ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἴνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ

493 c 38. **μεταθέσθαι**: denotes the change of an opinion or statement. *Cf. Rep.* i. 334 e **ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς . . . θέσθαι.**

38 f. **ἀντὶ . . . ἑλέσθαι**: epexegetic, instead of **ὥστε ἑλέσθαι.**

39. **κοσμίως**: chiastically contrasted with **ἀκολάστως.**

40. **πότερον πείθω**: the question shows that Socrates himself attaches no especial cogency to the comparison. *Cf.* below, **μυθολογῶ.**

d 41. **μετατίθεσαι**: here equiv. to **μεταθέμενος ἡγεῖ.** Mutasne ita sententiam ut statuas feliciores esse modestos libidinosis? Heindorf.

44. **τοῦτο**: refers to the second part of the double question.

XLVIII. 1. **φέρε δή**: the employment of another simile after the preceding one is strange; but possibly the second contains an advance on the first, inasmuch as it extends the consideration from the nature to the life. It may, however, be only another version of the first one, as the scholiast suggests: **ἦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο μὲν τῶν Πυθαγορείων οἰκεῖον, τοῦτο δὲ Σωκράτους, ὡς σαφέστερόν τε καὶ πληκτικώτερον.** 493 d

2. **γυμνασίου**: it is not necessary to refer this strictly to the philosophical school already mentioned. It rather has the meaning of "place of general exercise," the domain of imagination and fancy from which Socrates (Plato) draws his new image. On the 'brachylogy' in **τῇ νῦν** ("where we obtained the one just given"), see Kr. 48, 13, 9.

4. **πίθοι πολλοί**: by these are to be understood only the separate desires. Pleasures are the materials with which the jars are filled.

5. **ὑγιεῖς**: in the physical sense, e "undamaged," but with a pre-understanding of the moral judgment in regard to them; hence the contrast is formed by **σαθρά**, as in 479 b.

6. **πολλῶν**: *viz.* **τοιούτων χρημάτων** or **νεμάτων.** The common manner of

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σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτέ τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δ' ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύ- 494
πας· ἆρα τοιούτου ἑκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;

Καλ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ b
ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρεῖν.

493 e expression would be ἄλλοι ἄλλων πολλῶν or ἄλλοι ἄλλων πολλοὶ πολλῶν.

7. **χαλεπά**: used absolutely and explained by the addition of καὶ . . . ἐκποριζόμενα. *Cf.* below (11), where the supplement is self-evident.

8. **ὁ μὲν ἕτερος**: *i.e.* ὁ σώφρων.

9 f. **ἕνεκα τούτων**: "so far as it depends upon the filling of the casks or desires." *Cf. Theaet.* 148 d προθυμίας μὲν ἕνεκα φανεῖται.

11. **πορίζεσθαι**: probably middle. Kr. 55, 3, 8; H. 813.

494 a 13. **ἤ**: *i.e.* εἰ δὲ μή (πιμπλαίη).

14. **ἆρα τοιούτου κτέ.**: comprehensive resumption of the protasis beginning with εἰ δυοῖν.

16. **πείθω τι**: the adverbial acc. of the indef. neut. pron. is frequent. See H. 719 b; G. 160, 2. The repetition of πείθω shows that Socrates attaches no value to the comparison as a proof, for one simile can be offset by another, but it helps to clarify the idea. 494 a

20. **τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν**: epexegetical to τοῦτο . . . ὃ κτέ., in order to draw attention again to the earlier remark. — We must supply naturally the same subject to πληρώσῃ as to ζῆν.

22. **ἐπιρρεῖν**: Callicles takes up b the simile of Socrates; but at the same time, in this treatment of it there may be some traces of the teaching of Gorgias, if, as is supposed, he accepted Empedocles' ideas of efflux and afflux in his views of physics. *Cf. Meno* 76 c βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι; — Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλέα; καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται. In this light the word πορίζεσθαι gains especial importance.

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Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς;

Καλ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Σω. Χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεωῶντα ἐσθίειν;

Καλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν; c

Καλ. Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦν χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

XLIX. Σω. Εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνεῖ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπέ, εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.

494 b 25. **ἐκροαῖς**: this compound with ἐκ is very unusual, but also here very exact.

27. **χαραδριοῦ**: according to Arist. *Anim. Hist.* ix. 11, the χαραδριός was a bird of ugly voice and color, which lived in chasms and clefts of the rock, and came forth only at night. Others describe it as a very greedy bird, ὃς ἅμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει. It is this peculiarity which explains the reference here. The duck has that reputation with us. — **ἀλλ' οὐ**: we might also have simple οὐ (456 e), or καὶ οὐ (Kr. 59, 1, 10).

28. **τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις**: *viz.* as the above (ἀλλ' . . . ἐπιρρεῖν) used expressions. The following answer of Callicles, λέγω κτέ., saves Socrates the trouble of enumeration. — **τὸ τοιόνδε**: see on 490 e.

c XLIX. 1. **εὖγε**: the verb is regularly omitted with this exclamation, 494 c which is usually ironic. By the words τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας, Callicles gives Socrates an open field for attack. Hence the ironical praise. Callicles need only continue to make such rash statements to be soon silenced.

2. **ὡς ἔοικε**: by this expression Socrates reminds Callicles of the principle he had laid down in 482 e (*cf.* 489 a), in order, by this ironical praise of his determination which shrinks from no consequence, to make acceptable the diversion of the discussion to less pleasant subjects. At the same time, he shows that he feels himself compelled, by the results of Callicles' moral view, to carry the investigation into this field.

4. **ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι**: the gen., on account of the meaning

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ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημη- d
γόρος.

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου μόνον.

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῴη, ἢ ἔτι τί σε e
ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινεῖ, ἐάν τίς σε τὰ [ἐχόμενα] τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ· καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὁ τῶν κιναίδων βίος, οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;

ΣΩ. Ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὃς

494 c of the adverb (*cf.* *φθονεῖν τινί τινος*). — **κνῆσθαι**: contracted like *ζῆν, ψῆν, etc.* *Cf.* *πεινῆν* in **b** above.

d 6. **ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ κτέ.**: rudeness instead of response. — **δημηγόρος**: see on 482 **c**.

8. **τοιγάρτοι**: this strong inferential particle (*cf.* 471 **c**) serves to compel Callicles, who would gladly have evaded the answer by the general reproach *ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ*, to a definite answer, by reference to 487 **a**, **b**.

10. **ἀνδρεῖος**: with an allusion to 491 **b**. It is contrasted with *ἐκπλαγῆναι*, because, besides *φρόνησις*, bravery is the only virtue recognized by Callicles as necessary for a statesman. He must, therefore, display this quality himself.

16 f. **τὰ ἐχόμενα**: used absolutely would not indeed be unexampled (*cf.* Isoc. vi. 29 *ἐκ τῶν ἐχομένων γνώσεσθε*), but in connection with *τούτοις ἐφεξῆς* is pleonastic. Otherwise Plato's usage is either *τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα* (*Rep.* iii. 389 **e**) or *τὰ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς* (*Tim.* 30 **c**, *Phileb.* 34 **d**). 494 e

18. **κεφάλαιον**: without the article is rather uncommon (*cf.* 453 **a**, 472 **c**), but does occasionally occur. *Cf.* Dem. ii. 31. — **οὗτος**: points emphatically back to *ὁ τῶν κιναίδων βίος*, which has already received especial stress through the preceding word *κεφάλαιον*.

21. **εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων**: is the same reproach which was made above, 482 **e**.

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ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν,
εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι 495
ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῂς
εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων, ὃ οὐκ
ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἵνα δή μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ᾖ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν
ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους,
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ
παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. b

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο,
οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει, μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα
πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως
ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

494 e 24. **ἀνέδην**: *without limitation*, from the same root as *ἀνίημι*. — **οὕτω**: see on 468 c *ἁπλῶς οὕτως*.

495 a 26. **ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν**: the last attempt to come to an understanding. *Cf. Crito* 44 b. The answer of Callicles tends to bring into the foreground the question of the identity or opposition of the agreeable and the good.

29. **ἀνομολογούμενος**: is not to be connected with *ἀνομολογεῖσθαι*, "to repeat an admission already made and to come to an agreement," but is from *ὁμολογούμενος* in composition with **a**- privative. By this expression Callicles makes plain the recklessness of his thinking and the obstinacy of his disposition. The sentence is condensed by the omission of a self-evident clause: "in order that I may not make my statement inconsistent, (which I will do) if I say," *etc.*

31. **διαφθείρεις τοὺς πρώτους λόγους**: *cf. Prot.* 360 a *διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας*. Callicles' words in 491 e and elsewhere gave reason to expect that he would speak his sentiments roundly without any hesitation. *Cf.* 492 d. 495 a

32. **ἱκανῶς . . . ἐξετάζοις**: has reference to 487 e *ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ' ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς*. — **εἴπερ . . . ἐρεῖς**: "if you *will persist* in speaking," with a decidedly unfavorable color.

33. **σαυτῷ**: rather stronger than *σοί*.

34. **καὶ γὰρ σύ**: complete the sentence from what precedes. b

36. **ἄθρει**: like *σκοπεῖν* and similar verbs has the construction of verbs of fear.

37. **αἰνιχθέντα**: denotes the consequences previously intimated, though not definitely stated, by Socrates.

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ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζει;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

L. ΣΩ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος; c

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε· ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔλεγον γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ. d

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς

495 b 40. **ὡς σύ γε οἴει**: evasive, as 473 b. The following question inquires whether Callicles still holds to his previous statement, while accepting the consequences of it.

c L. 1. **ἐπιχειρῶμεν**: see on 492 d *ἐπεξέρχει*. Notice the determination and assurance of the answers of Callicles.

4. **διελοῦ**: because it is a question of distinction between ideas.

7. **νυνδὴ ἔλεγες**: inasmuch as Callicles had in 491 a, b classed together *ἀνδρεῖοι* and *φρόνιμοι*.

10. **ὡς ἕτερον** (*sc.* *ὄν*): the omission of the partic. in the acc. abs. with an adj. and *ὡς* is very rare; *e.g.* 495 c *Prot.* 323 b *ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἀμωσγέπως μετέχειν αὐτῆς*. But Heindorf supplies *ὄν*.

14. **ὦ σοφώτατε σύ**: a humorously d ironical intimation that Socrates was asking something quite self-evident. But Callicles should not recognize an *ἐπιστήμη* and an *ἀνδρεία*, in addition to "the good," if this is to find its realization in *ἡδονή*. The argument which begins 497 d is based upon this contradiction.

17. **ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα**: this use of *ὅπως* with the fut. is distinctively a colloquialism, the majority of exam-

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ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.

Καλ. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα; ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;

Σω. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν e αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγεῖ πάθος πεπονθέναι;

Καλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου.

Καλ. Πῶς λέγεις;

Σω. Οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλ- 496
μία;

495 d ples being found in Aristophanes. For statistics, see GMT. 274.

17 f. **Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεύς**: a humorous imitation of the custom which prevailed in the public assembly, according to which any one who introduced a motion or resolution had to add to his own name the name of the deme to which he belonged; *cf.* the famous line which used to afford Philip of Macedon so much amusement, *Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους Παιανιεὺς τάδ' εἶπεν.* Callicles falls in with the humor immediately. *Ἀχαρναί* belonged to the *φυλὴ Οἰνηίς*, *Ἀλωπεκή* to the *φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς*.

19. **τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ**: does not properly belong in this summing up (*ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα*) of the foregoing steps, which define expressly the fact that *ἐπιστήμη* and *ἀνδρεία* on the one hand are quite distinct from *ἡδονή* (*τὸ ἡδύ*) on the other. Still, by reason of the identity of *ἡδύ* and *ἀγαθόν* maintained by Callicles, the *ἀγαθόν* would be very easily substituted for the *ἡδύ*. 495 d

23. **αὐτὸς αὑτόν**: "himself," *i.e.* his own mind. e

27. **ἐναντία**: *i.e.* logically contrary and contradictory ideas, between which a mean is not to be thought of.

32. **ἀπολαβών**: used absolutely equiv. to "separately." *Cf. Rep.* iii. 392 e *ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἀδύνατοι λέγειν, οὐ κατὰ ὅλον, ἀλλ' ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράσομαί σοι ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι.* The gen. *τοῦ σώματος* depends on *περὶ ὅτου* (*μέρους*) *βούλει*.

33. **ἄνθρωπος**: the same as *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* above. 496 a

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Καλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;

Καλ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

Σω. Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται, ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;

Καλ. Ἥκιστά γε.

Σω. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται· ἦ γάρ;

Καλ. Σφόδρα γε. b

Σω. Ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;

Καλ. Φημί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Ἦ καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;

Καλ. Πάντως δήπου.

Σω. Ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρα ἄττα, ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται c ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.

496 a 37. **οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν**: by the addition of *οὖν*, the relative seems to acquire the force of an indefinite. See Kr. 51, 15, 3; H. 285, 1002 a.

42. **θαυμάσιον . . . γίγνεται**: "the result (*γίγνεται*) so stated is unreasonable." Note that the Greek uses the ind. of the necessary conclusion, whereas Eng. would prefer the ideal 496 a 'would be.'

58 f. **καὶ εὖ μάλα κτέ.**: with this c formula Socrates warns Callicles of the importance of being careful in his response, — a warning which the latter ignores in the reckless assurance of his answer.

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Καλ. Ἀλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

LI. Σω. Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.

Καλ. Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ.

Σω. Καὶ ἐγώ· μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί;

Καλ. Φημί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;

Καλ. Σφόδρα γε.

Σω. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;

Καλ. Ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

Σω. Εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῂς εἶναι;

Καλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή;

496 c LI. **1 f. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον**: the question, by coming late in the sentence, gains in animation. *Cf.* Rid. §§ 309, 310.

2 f. αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν: added by Socrates that Callicles may not think at the same time of the satisfaction of the hunger. How close that idea lay is shown by Callicles' answer, in which he tries to guard himself by adding this idea.

d **5. καὶ ἐγώ· μανθάνω**: the asyndetic union of two such expressions, one expressing assent, the other comprehension, is quite isolated and contrary to usage. *Cf.* 474 c, 490 d. — **ἀλλ' οὖν**: *but in any case,* frequently associated with *γέ*. *Cf.* 506 b and *Apol.* 27 c ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, 34 e, *Prot.* 327 c ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοί. 496 d

9. σφόδρα γε: see on *μάλιστα* in e below.

12. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα: further questions are superfluous.

16. τούτου οὗ λέγεις κτέ.: the concrete example *διψῶντα πίνειν* Socrates uses to distinguish and characterize the two ideas clearly. The generaliz-

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ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Λυπούμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῂς εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὡμολόγηκας. 497

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

496 e ation that pain and pleasure can both be present in the same act follows later.

22. **μάλιστα**: like *σφόδρα γε* in d above, gives emphatic assent. *μάλιστα* has become the general word for "yes" in modern Greek, almost to the exclusion of *ναί*.

29 f. **εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος**: for Socrates' argument it is immaterial whether pleasure and pain are looked upon as something bodily or something psychical; for psychology, not so. But here the question is only of the nature of the ideas themselves, the peculiarity of their association at the same place and time, which distinguishes them from that other class of mutually exclusive ideas. 496 e

34. **φῂς**: with reference to 495 e. The answer of Callicles shows that he still maintains his statement.

40. **οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει**: Callicles avoids admitting his defeat by complaining of Socrates' methods. *Cf.* 511 a. *σοφίζεσθαι* is much the same as "subtilize," "quibble." 497 a

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St. I. p. 497.

Σω. Οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόιθί γε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν —

Καλ. Τί ἔχων ληρεῖς;

Σω. Ἵνα εἰδῇς, ὡς σοφὸς ὢν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπανται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν; b

Καλ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.

Γορ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.

Καλ. Ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία. σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.

Γορ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται.

Καλ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, c ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

497 a 41. **ἀκκίζεσθαι**: 'this word and its derivative *ἀκκισμός* are used to denote any kind of mock modesty or prudery, especially, though not exclusively, on the part of women.' Thompson. To Socrates' words of encouragement Callicles angrily replies, "What nonsense are you still talking?" whereby, however, Socrates is not deterred from continuing his talk in the courtly manner which is characteristic of him. On the phrase *ἔχων ληρεῖς* see on 490 e.

b 47. **οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις**: Callicles sees that from this new turn Socrates will draw the same conclusion which he has drawn above (*ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*). Hence he repeatedly refuses to answer, and so shows plainly that he wishes to break off the conversation. This leads to the deprecatory remark of Gorgias.

48. **μηδαμῶς**: *don't!* To be completed by some such general phrase as *οὕτω ποιήσῃς*. The omission of the verb is common. *Cf. Symp.* 175 b *μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἐᾶτε αὐτόν.* — That Gorgias here enters as mediator is quite in keeping with the role assigned him in this dialogue, in accordance with which he is distinguished from his companions by his personal dignity. See Introd. § 13. 497 b

53. **τιμή**: in a judicial sense, "the penalty decreed by the court." Hence the words *οὐ σὴ κτέ.* are equivalent to "this is no fault of yours," "the blame cannot be laid upon you." — **ὑπόσχες**: equiv. to *ὑπ' σεαυτόν*. See on *παρασχεῖν* 456 b and 475 d.

55. Callicles allows himself to be c persuaded by Gorgias to continue the conversation, but not without repeated expression of his disinclina-

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St. I. p. 497.

LII. Σω. Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες, ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.

Καλ. Φημί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;

Καλ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται; d

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὡμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;

Καλ. Ἔγωγε· τί οὖν δή;

Σω. Ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσω οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται,

497 c tion. — στενά: *mean, paltry,* is in keeping with the view expressed by Callicles in 485 d of the relative provinces of philosophy and politics.

LII. 1 f. τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι κτέ.: two kinds of Eleusinian mysteries were distinguished, the greater and the lesser. In the great procession which on the 20th of Boedromion (September) conducted Iacchus to Eleusis, no one could take part who had not received previously at Athens the less and preparatory consecration (*μύησις, κάθαρσις, προτέλεια*) in the month Anthesterion (February). By this he became eligible to initiation into the Greater Mysteries; and after initiation, as an initiated member (*μύστης*), to the *ἐποπτεία* or view of the mysterious sacred relics and participation in the holy rites which were connected with the arrival of the procession at Eleusis and took place in the so-called *τελεστήριον*. — Socrates meets with most cutting irony the disdainful contempt with which Callicles regards dialectical methods. A different simile for the same matter is found in 514 e. 497 c

3. ὅθεν ἀπέλιπες: the interrupted argument is resumed again by Socrates at the point where it had been broken off by Callicles' refusal to answer.

7. ἡδονῶν: corresponding with what precedes we might expect *ἡδόμενος*. The noun is used owing to *ἐπιθυμιῶν*, which stands on the same plane as *πεινῶν* and as a kind of *ἔνδεια* (496 d) is an *ἀνιαρόν*. Hence the employment of *λυπῶν* below.

14. τί οὖν δή: *well! what then?* See on 453 b and 515 e. d

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St. I. p. 497.

τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων. πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδ' ἐπίσκεψαι· οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖ- e
σθαι. ἄθρει δέ· τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.

ΚΑΛ. Εἶδον.

497 d 17. **ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων**: this seems otiose after the preceding sentence. If genuine, it must be considered as mere conversational fulness.

19. **τῇδε**: refers naturally, according to the regular usage, to the argument begun in *τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς κτέ.* The introduction of this argument is, however, delayed by the parenthetical clause *οἶμαι . . . ἄθρει δέ.* In this clause *ταύτῃ*, though in sense also applicable to the argument which follows, is in form to be connected with *τῇδε.* The subject of *ὁμολογεῖσθαι* is general, and can be supplied from the clause *πῶς οὖν κτέ.*

e 20 f. **τοὺς ἀγαθούς, τοὺς κακούς**: the art. as in 490 e collects the individuals into a class or species. *ἀγαθῶν* is used on account of its nearness to *ἀγαθούς*, otherwise we should expect *ἀρετῶν* as in 506 d. The way in which we arrive at these ideas of distinction between species is shown by the same expressions which are employed in other places to explain the relation of the ideas to the things themselves. So besides *παρουσία* (*παρεῖναι*) we find *κοινωνία* and of things also *μετέχειν* employed. 497 e

23 f. **ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς**: "unreasoning and cowardly creatures." The absence of the art. does not cause obscurity, because the connexion shows *ἀγαθούς* to be the predicate. In the words *ἀνδρείους κτέ.* Socrates is referring to 489 e and 491 b.

30. **τί τοῦτο**: see on 448 b above.

32. **εἶδον**: the tense is due to the preceding question. English would require 'I have seen.' This would be permissible also in Greek. The aor. of verbs of perception states the fact; the pf. retains the image.

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St. I. p. 498.

Σω. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα; 498

Καλ. Φημί.

Σω. Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;

Καλ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν.

Σω. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;

Καλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

Καλ. Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε. b

Σω. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;

Καλ. Σφόδρα γε.

Σω. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν.

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

Καλ. Ἀμφότεροι.

Σω. Ἆρα ὁμοίως;

Καλ. Μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.

Σω. Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;

497 e negation of the fact involves the negation of the image; hence the neg. is usually followed by the aorist. The pf. with the neg. is, however, also found; *cf. Prot.* 310 e. But the difference in the force is evident. In 38, below, the tense may be due to the desire for consistency, or to ἤδη.

498 a 38. ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο: gives us to understand that Socrates was expecting a more definite answer.

b 43. ἀμφότεροι μᾶλλον: Callicles tries to return such answers as will not afford Socrates any chance for argument. Such action borders on rudeness, and is almost equivalent to a refusal to answer. The addition that he makes, however, gives Socrates a hold. The answers which follow show that Callicles is not stating his real sentiments. The artistic design of the author is therefore now to make his defeat seem all the more decisive. 498 b

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55 Καλ. Ἴσως.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φῄς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων; c

Καλ. Φημί.

60 Σω. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;

65 Καλ. Φημί.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ [οἱ ἀγαθοὶ] καὶ κακοὶ εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;

LIII. Καλ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις. d

Σω. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῄς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;

498 c **66. ἆρ' οὖν κτέ.**: this conclusion comes from the fact that Socrates, on the basis of the view set forth by Callicles in 491 e ff., uses in the predicate *ἀγαθοί* in place of *χαίρουσι*, and *κακοί* in place of *λυποῦνται*, whereas these same words in the subject have an entirely different meaning, which is to be seen from the explanation of Callicles in 491 c d. The two predicates are to be conceived as belonging to two different sentences, thus: *οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί* and *οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ παραπλησίως εἰσὶ κακοί*.

d **LIII. 1. ἀλλὰ λέγεις**: this statement of Callicles may be meant in earnest, inasmuch as the previous words of Socrates are really somewhat confusing, although they are simply a paradoxical conclusion from Callicles' paradoxical propositions. But by confessing his inability to comprehend, Callicles gives Socrates the opportunity of supplying a proof of his previous exposition, and setting forth the principles upon which it rests. The distinction made in 497 e now becomes of value. 498 d

3. **κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν**: both the subj. as well as the subst. on which the gen. depends are to be supplied from the context. Note the chiasmus of the arrangement. — **τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ κτέ.**: the preds. are *τὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς ἀνίας*, the art. defining a class. The art. with *ἀγαθά* refers back to *ἀγαθῶν*. We should also expect one with *κακά*.

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Καλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;

Καλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;

Καλ. Πάρεστιν.

Σω. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῂς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῄς; e

Καλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἷ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἷ ἂν ἀνιῶνται;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οἳ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἳ δ' ἧττον ἧττον, οἳ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν φῂς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς;

Καλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν 499 μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;

498 e 20. **οἳ μέν γε μᾶλλον** κτέ.: is to be completed from the context thus: *οἳ μὲν (ἂν) μᾶλλον (χαίρωσι) μᾶλλον (ἀγαθοί)* κτέ.

28. **δὶς γὰρ καὶ τρίς**: this proverb is ascribed to Empedocles. Plato employs it also in *Phil.* 59 e, where we read: *τὸ δὶς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπαναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ.* *Cf.* Soph. *Phil.* 1238 *δὶς ταὐτὰ βούλει καὶ τρὶς ἀναπολεῖν μ' ἔπη.* The first *καί* means *also*, and its force extends over both members, as *Phaedo* 63 e *ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς πίνειν τούς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας.* 498 e

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ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταὐτα συμβαί- b
νει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταὐτὰ φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

LIV. ΚΑΛ. Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἅσμενος ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι
5 τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.

499 b 43. **τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα**: refer probably to the discussion of 494 a–495 a, where Socrates had urged Callicles to reflect whether he was determined to abide by his statement that *ἡδύ* and *ἀγαθόν* are the same.

LIV. 1. **πάλαι τοι κτέ.**: like all who try only to gain their point, not to arrive at the truth, Callicles seeks to evade the now inevitable confession of his error by representing his previous statement as a mere joke. But *cf.* 495 a–c.

3. **τούτου**: *ἔχεσθαι, to hold fast*, takes the gen. See G. 171, 1; H. 738. — **ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια**: boys easily receive as genuine what one tries to impose upon them. Farther than this, 499 b the comparison is not to be pressed. — **ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει**: see on 468 e. Callicles tries to heighten the probability that he was only joking, by himself characterizing his first statement as nonsensical.

5. **ἡδονάς**: the natural position would be *τὰς μὲν ἡδονὰς βελτίους κτέ.* The reason for the post-position is that the word is an afterthought of Callicles, added from the sudden consciousness that *τὰς μέν* was not sufficiently definite. *Just as if you suppose that I*, etc., *do not believe that some are better, — pleasures, I mean, — others worse.*

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Σω. Ἰοὺ ἰού, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ, καί μοι c
ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν αὖ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ
δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς
ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου·
νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν
παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ
διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις,
ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἦ γάρ;

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ d
βλαβεραί;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ
κακόν τι;

499 c 6. **ἰοὺ ἰού**: exclamation of surprise and wonder, usually with a side-idea of ill-treatment (*σχετλιαστικὸν ἐπίρρημα*), as Ar. *Nub.* 1 *ἰοὺ ἰού, ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεύ, τὸ χρῆμα τῶν νυκτῶν ὅσον ἀπέραντον*, but it also expresses pleasure, as *e.g. Rep.* iv. 432 d *καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδών, Ἰοὺ ἰού, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων· κινδυνεύομέν τι ἔχειν ἴχνος (trace) καί μοι δοκεῖ οὐ πάνυ τι ἐκφευξεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς. Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις, ἦ δ' ὅς.* — **πανοῦργος**: sometimes associated with *δεινός*, denotes a rather excessive adroitness, bordering on rascality, as "artful," "sly"; also "knavish."

7. **ὥσπερ παιδί**: by a delicate use of his own comparison, Socrates characterizes Callicles' conduct in acting as if he were dealing with boys, not men, as improper and unworthy. — **τότε μὲν αὖ**: it must be confessed that *αὖ* in this position gives trouble. Cron thinks that it recalls a similar allegation in 491 b; but that is rather far-fetched.

8. **καίτοι** *κτέ.*: in 495 a Socrates' faith in Callicles' *παρρησία* is shaken; in 497 a, that in his *σοφία*, and now, that in his *εὔνοια*. 499 c

9. **ἑκόντος εἶναι**: on the use of *εἶναι* in phrases, see GMT. 780 and H. 956 a.

10 f. **κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον**: a common way of introducing a proverb; *cf. Symp.* 195 b.

11. **τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν** *κτέ.*: a mixture of two proverbs. The first one means literally, to "treat well what is at hand," *i.e.* 'to make the best of what one has,' according to the English saying. In almost the same sense we use the more colloquial 'grin and bear it.' The second proverb, *δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον*, applies more exactly to the case in point, the *διδόμενον* being naturally *τὸ λεγόμενον*. An English proverb which has much the same force is, 'do not look a gift-horse in the mouth.' After *τοῦτο, τὸ διδόμενον* serves for a relative clause.

18. **κακαί**: we should naturally ex- d

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Καλ. Φημί.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς; ἆρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων κακαί;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί; e

Καλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;

Καλ. Δῆλον δή.

Σω. Ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἆρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ 500 σὺ ἐκ τρίτων;

Καλ. Ἔγωγε.

Σω. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.

499 d pect βλαβεραί, but κακός is elsewhere also used in this sense.

24. αὗται μέν: resumes αἱ μὲν . . . τοῦ σώματος.

e 37 f. τέλος . . . τὸ ἀγαθόν: *cf.* 468 a ff. The subst. embraces in one idea what has been said, and thus 500 a gives it a form of general application.

39. σύμψηφος: reminds again of the formal vote, and hence sounds somewhat solemn. *Cf.* 501 c and 473 e f.

40. ἐκ τρίτων: "of the third part." Thompson. *Cf. Symp.* 213 b ὑπολύετε, παῖδες, Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων (*i.e.* with Agathon and Socrates) κατακέηται. In *Tim.* 54 a ἐκ τρίτου is used in much the same sense.

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ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι, ποῖα ἀγαθά — τῶν ἡδέων — ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον.

ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

LV. ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γάρ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν. καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἷον δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ' ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς

500 a 45. **παντὸς ἀνδρός**: possessive gen. in pred. See H. 732 a, c.

45 f. **ποῖα . . . τῶν ἡδέων**: the position of the gen. shows that it is an example of *ἐπιφορά*, based on the conclusion drawn in 499 b. The use of *ὁποῖα* after *ποῖα* may be due to euphonic reasons, or to its distance from the beginning of the question.

46. **τεχνικοῦ**: *i.e.* of a man who understands the matter thoroughly, who is a master of his profession (whether art or science). Only this man can decide what is to be done and what not. The same point is made in *Crito* 47 a.

LV. 1. **ὧν αὖ**: the *αὖ* belongs to the dem. included in the relative. The arguments which Socrates again calls to mind were set forth in 464 b ff.

b 3. **παρασκευαί**: *contrivances*. This word, which is not found in the passage referred to, is used generally instead of *ἐπιτηδεύσεις*, *θεραπεῖαι*, as drawing more attention to the end in view (*μεχρὶ ἡδονῆς*). The prep. shows that the contrivances are not claimed to reach *ἡδονή*, but must be varied and directed until the object is compassed; hence *παρασκευάζουσαι* is conative. — **αὐτὸ τοῦτο**: *i.e.* the general idea, *ἡδονή*.

6 f. **τῶν μέν, τῶν δέ**: take up *αἱ μέν, αἱ δέ*. On the part. gen. with *τιθέναι*, see G. 169, 2; H. 732 a.

8. **πρὸς φιλίου**: so 519 e. *Cf. Phaedr.* 234 e *εἰπὲ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου*. This adjuration is designed to remind Callicles of his ostentatious profession of *εὔνοια*, which he had so quickly forgotten.

9. **μήτε αὐτός**: finds its correlative in *μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ*, while *μηδέ* serves only to connect the two sections of the first member. — **ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς** *κτέ.*: implies perverseness in addition to chance. *Cf.* 495 a, b, and 499 c.

500 b

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παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γάρ, ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν c
εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὄντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελο- d
μένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν τούτῳ διττὼ τὼ βίω, σκέψασθαι, τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὔπω οἶσθα τί λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

500 c 12. **οὗ**: depends upon *μᾶλλον* and is explained in *ἢ τοῦτο*. *Cf. Crito* 44 c *τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους*. See Kr. 47, 27, 8. — **σπουδάσειε**: in reference to an investigation which one should seriously prosecute.

12 f. **σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων**: indicates that the question is important for every one, not merely for statesmen and philosophers.

14. **τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δή**: ironically added as a matter already decided, because Callicles had so defined the sphere of the "real man."

17. **ἐπὶ τόνδε**: anacoluthic, as if *ἐπὶ πότερον χρὴ βίον παρακαλεῖν* had preceded, whereas with *πότερον* we must supply *τοῦτον, i.e. τὸν τρόπον ζῆν χρή*.

18. **διαφέρων**: on the pred. use of the partic., see GMT. 830.

19. **ὡς ἄρτι ἐπεχείρησα**: we think at first of the question raised in 491 d ff. as to the nature of self-control, which leads naturally to a distinction between what is good and what is pleasant, but we are also reminded of the earlier conversation with Polus and Gorgias (464 b) in which a distinction was drawn between true arts and various tricks of dexterity, which are designed only to cajole. 500 c

20. **εἰ ἔστιν κτέ.**: to be conceived, d not as an interr. clause depending upon *ὁμολογήσαντας*, but as the protasis of a logical conditional sentence, the apodosis of which is formed by *βέλτιστόν ἐστιν . . . σκέψασθαι*. The further investigation as to *τί διαφέρετον* can only take place in case the existence of these two views of life is definitely settled. — **ὁμολογήσαντας**: as well as *διελομένους* and *διαιρεῖσθαι*, whose meaning is defined by its reference to 495 c, are used absolutely.

22. **ὁπότερον βιωτέον**: *sc. βίον*. *Cf.* 485 d and *Apol.* 38 a *ὁ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ*.

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Σω. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ — αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μή· σύμφῃς; e

Καλ. Οὕτως φημί.

LVI. Σω. Ἴθι δή, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποικὴ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ δ' ἰατρική, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου 501 οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρική· ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστιν

500 d 27. **τὴν μὲν κτέ.**: explains **ἑκατέρου κτέ.** by substituting for the somewhat philosophical phrase (**μελέτην . . . κτήσεως**) one less technical (**θήραν**). But before Socrates proceeds further he deems it necessary to have these assumptions definitely agreed to, since, although they are indeed the result of the preceding investigations, Callicles has not expressly acceded to them.

e LVI. 1. **πρὸς τούσδε**: the distinctions between various ideas which have been drawn in ch. XVIII.–XX. serve for Polus as well as Gorgias, inasmuch as the latter entered the discussion again in 463 e of his own accord.

2. **διομολόγησαι**: the **διά** implies 'finally,' 'definitely.' We should be more apt to use the **καί** in the demonstrative instead of the relative clause. — **ἔδοξα**: Cron thinks the use of the aor. instead of the pres. implies that Callicles must have already at the time come to a decision, though he had not expressed one. But while such was doubtless the case, it is not easy to draw such a conclusion from the tense, for the Greeks in such an expression looked rather to the idea of the whole complex. 500 e

4. **ἡ δ' ἰατρική**: the clause is to be completed from the first member. The following **ἡ μὲν . . . ἡ δὲ κτέ.** are arranged chiastically. 501 a

5. **αἰτίαν**: *cf.* 465 a, where the reference was especially to the means employed (**ὧν προσφέρει**); here it is more general (**ὧν πράττει**).

6. **ἡ δ' ἰατρική**: the addition of the substantive at the end of the first member was not necessary for clearness, but very conducive to it. Similarly *Prot.* 351 a.

7. **ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς κτέ.**: another case of anacoluthon. If the speaker had followed the line of construction begun in the previous clause, we should have had some

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ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σῳζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ' οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμηθίαν τινὰ ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου

501 a such phrase as *οὔτε τὴν φύσιν κτέ.*, on which *τῆς ἡδονῆς* would depend, as in the case of *τούτου* above. In true conversational style, however, he is diverted from his line of thought by the relative clause, and proceeds to a detailed account of the method of the *ἐμπειρία* which *κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται*. The result is that *τῆς ἡδονῆς* is left without government, and that too without the speaker or hearers noticing it.

9. **ἀλόγως**: as 465 a *ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα*, because the distinctive feature of a *τέχνη* consists in its ability *δοῦναι λόγον*. This must not be conceived as closely modifying *διαριθμησαμένη*, but as being a general criticism on *οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη* ("quite foolishly").

10. **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**: probably belongs to the following negation. *Cf. Apol.* 17 a *ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν*. See on 450 b.

12. **ᾧ δή**: refers to the whole preceding clause, *i.e.* equiv. to *τῷ σῴζεσθαι μνήμην κτέ.* 501 b

14. **τοιαῦται ἄλλαι**: "according to their nature similar, but different in their application." Supply *δοκοῦσιν* out of the preceding *δοκεῖ*.

15. **προμηθίαν τοῦ βελτίστου**: designed to be in sharp contrast with the *μνήμην τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι* above.

16 f. **ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ**: *i.e.* in the case of the body.

18. **ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων κτέ.**: is a circumlocutory reference to *φύσις*, as *οὔτε μέλον* in the following member is to *αἰτία*. The abs. partic. *μέλον* is likewise combined with an appos. partic. in *Phaedr.* 235 a *ὡς οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου*.

22. **καὶ περὶ ἄλλο**: indefinite and merely preparatory. c

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ἄν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφῃς;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν; d

ΚΑΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλάς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲ σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

LVII. ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι. πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν. οὐ e δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;

501 c 23. **ἀσκέπτως ἔχων**: like ἀμελῶν or ὀλιγωρῶν. *Cf.* above, b.

24. **συγκατατίθεσαι**: reminds again of voting (as above, 500 a *σύμψηφος*). It is regularly used without an obj. Here we must consider **δόξαν** as taking the place of the word *ψῆφον*, to be construed with this verb after the analogy of the regular phrase *θέσθαι ψῆφον*. See Thompson. *συγκατατίθεσθαι* has also the meaning "lay aside for future use."

26. **οὐκ ἔγωγε κτέ.**: an emphatic assent (see on 453 d). But Callicles weakens it by the addition of *ἵνα . . . χαρίσωμαι*, referring to 497 b, c.

d 28 f. **περὶ δὲ δύο κτέ.**: this extension to several souls was necessary in order that the investigation might be directed to political activity.

31. **μηδέ**: "without." 501 d

LVII. 4. **τὴν αὐλητικήν**: Socrates so chooses his examples that he passes from species to species in an ascending scale, and at the same time gradually approaches nearer to rhetoric. Playing the flute passed for the lowest species of music. *Cf.* the boyish words of Alcibiades in Plut. *Alc.* 2 *αὐλεῖτωσαν Θηβαίων παῖδες· οὐ γὰρ ἴσασι διαλέγεσθαι.* In Athens it was left mostly to such as made a business of it. Female flute-players were accustomed to appear at banquets. The instrument was probably more like a clarionet than a flute.

6. **διώκειν, φροντίζειν**: these infinitives, while in sense epexegetic to *τοιαύτη εἶναι*, are syntactically dependent on **δοκεῖ**. See on 487 c.

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ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἦ ἡγεῖ τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦ-

501 e 9. **ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν**: Plato considers as a species of flattery only that kind of cithara-playing which was practised in the musical contests at the public festivals. On the other hand, he recognizes a variety of this music which may be helpful to the proper cultivation of the soul of the individual who practises it, and indeed may elevate his moral feeling. This he himself recommends in *Rep.* iii. 399 d f. Cithara-playing was a part of the education of all young Athenians.

11. **ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία**: *διδασκαλία* denotes the drill of the chorus for orchestral exhibition as well as for singing. It was the business of the poet. Hdt. i. 23 says of Arion *ἐόντα κιθαρῳδὸν τῶν τότε ἐόντων οὐδενὸς δεύτερον καὶ διθύραμβον πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν ποιήσαντά τε καὶ ὀνομάσαντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ*. What is to be understood here by choruses is explained by the addition *ἡ διθυράμβων ποίησις*. It is not all *choric* lyric which is condemned, but only that part of it which from its connexion with the Dionysus cult had found entrance into Athens and had there been much fostered by the state, which entrusted both native and foreign musicians with the arrangement and production of the dithyramb at the Dionysiac festivals, where contests (*ἀγῶνες*) took place in it. The 501 e founder of dithyrambic melic was the just-named Arion of Methymne (B.C. 600), who resided at the court of Periander of Corinth. He was said to have introduced the *strophic* arrangement, and the so-called *cyclic* chorus (consisting of fifty members), which was thus named because the chorus was arranged in a circle around the altar. The second period of the dithyramb begins with the settling in Athens of Lasus of Hermione, a contemporary of the Pisistratidae and a teacher of Pindar. But it soon degenerated in Athens by excessive over-refinement and fantastic cultivation, until it received a new impulse towards the end of the Peloponnesian war by the more artistic cultivation of the dramatic and musical elements by Philoxenus of Cythera.

13. **Κινησίας**: a very popular dithyrambic poet about the middle of the Peloponnesian war, who deserves a great deal of censure for having helped to debase dithyrambic poetry. He tried to produce a striking effect by fantastic, misty, and often immoral subjects, combined with a pompous diction, excess of imagery, and shallow figures of speech. And he succeeded in a way, for he was ridiculed by the comic

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τον, ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει
χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν; 502

Καλ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε πέρι.

Σω. Τί δέ; ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μελης ἦ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον· ἡνία γὰρ ᾄδων τοὺς θεατάς· ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἥ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ηὑρῆσθαι;

Καλ. Ἔμοιγε.

Σω. Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς

501 e poets Strattis (who composed a comedy upon him), Plato Comicus, and also Aristophanes in the *Clouds* and the *Frogs*, as a sinner against art and taste, — one of those who are called in *Nub.* 333 *κυκλίων χορῶν ᾀσματοκάμπται*. Of his father Meles we know less; he was certainly less important than Cinesias, though he also is ridiculed by the comic poets.

502 a 15. **τῶν θεατῶν**: just as in English the general designation for the people who fill the theatre is 'audience,' whether the performance be an opera or a drama, so the Greeks used *θεαταί*, "the spectators," as a general designation for the crowds who thronged the Dionysiac theatre, no matter what sort of a performance was given. So, just below (20), we find *ἡνία γὰρ ᾄδων τοὺς θεατάς*.

21. **οὐχὶ ἥ τε κιθαρῳδική**: this conclusion we must suppose to be permitted because at the moment Callicles can cite no example to the contrary. *κιθαριστική* (above, 501 e) and *κιθαρῳδική*, which are properly distinct (*cf.* *κιθάρισις* and *κιθαρῳδία* *Io* 533 b), are here interchanged in accordance with colloquial usage. To fix the meaning of *κιθάρισις*, the adj. *ψιλή* was added. *Cf. Legg.* 669 e. 502 a

24. **ἡ σεμνή**: viewed in the light of the result which Socrates deduces, this word as well as *θαυμαστή* may be considered ironic. But tragedy was regularly designated *σεμνή*, "venerated," as being the most noble presentation of poetry before the public mind, both from its sage maxims and from the moral effect which was ascribed to it. Socrates' actual view of poetry is well stated in *Apol.* 22 b, c *ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί*. b

25. **ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε**: the order of the whole sentence is involved; *τί δὲ δή (ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο) ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν*. After giving the general question, Socrates follows it by a disjunctive special one. The repetition of the art. *ἡ* is illustrated by Stallbaum from *Symp.* 213 e *τὴν τούτου ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλήν*. It is not common.

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Ens Dissertation Dr. Brounsen: "Plato's attack on the Poets"

St. I. p. 502.

τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδή, ὥς σοι δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ᾖ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ᾄσεται, ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν ἐάν τε μή; ποτέρως σοὶ δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις;

Καλ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν c ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ κολακείαν εἶναι;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό

502 b For the construction ἐπί τινι, *cf. Lach.* 183 a ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων σπουδάζουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 11 σπουδάζειν . . . ἐφ' οἷς οὐδ' ἂν μαινόμενος σπουδάσειεν. We find περί τι in *Phaedo* 64 d φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς. For the pf. equiv. to a pres., *cf.* the passage from *Phaedo* just quoted.

25 f. **πότερόν ἐστιν . . . ὥς σοι δοκεῖ**: the more usual idiom would require πότερον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι.

27 ff. **ἐὰν μέν, εἰ δέ**: this variation in the employment of the cond. particles has come to be a rule; *i.e.* the negative of an ἐὰν μέν clause is introduced by εἰ δέ. If the condition is particular, we find εἰ with the fut. indic.; if generic, εἰ with the pres. indic., which latter is frequently omitted. In the earlier usage the custom was to give the favorable condition first; hence εἰ δὲ μή comes to have an unpleasant or unfavorable connotation, as here. *Cf.* also 481 b. 502 b The omission of μέν after ἐάν is probably due to its employment with ἡδύ. On the repetition of μέν and δέ with both clauses, see on 512 a.

29. **ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον**: the connexion of these two words with καί seems somewhat strange, when one considers both the relation of the ideas themselves and the fact that they are preceded by ἡδὺ μὲν . . . πονηρὸν δέ. The design is probably to emphasize the co-existence of the two ideas, and not their distinctness. There is no contradiction to ἀηδές in the following ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν κτέ.; it refers to the manner in which the spectators will receive his words, concerning which the poet has no reason to trouble himself, provided what he says is correct. — On the omission of ὄν, see GMT. 902; H. 984 a.

30. **λέξει καὶ ᾄσεται**: *viz.* in the dialogue and choruses.

39. **περιέλοιτο**: Socrates conceives c

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This is part of his uncompromising theory of life "Tragic human soul beleaguered by sin". Snider

Socrates was more practical man than was Plato.

τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;

Καλ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι;

Καλ. Φημί.

Σω. Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική. d

Καλ. Φαίνεται.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;

Καλ. Ἔμοιγε.

Σω. Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ηὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι.

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

LVIII. Σω. Εἶεν· τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον

502 c the difference between prose and poetry to lie simply in the dress, which in the case of poetry surrounds the thought as the shell does the kernel, and is only so far of value.

40. **μέλος**: *i.e.* the musical element, the melody, which is especially prominent in lyric productions. — **ῥυθμόν**: *i.e.* the regular movement, at the basis of which lies the *μέτρον*, syllable and verse measure.

41. **γίγνονται**: *prove to be.*

d 46. **δημηγορία**: here employed without any unpleasant connotation. It might seem somewhat strange that Callicles so readily admits that *δημηγορία* is *ῥητορική*, — an admission on which the whole deduction rests. The reason may be that these word-artists were very prone to extol the universality of their art, without regard to consequences. See Socrates' conversation with Gorgias (especially ch. XI.). 502 d

52. **οἷον . . . γυναικῶν**: one is certainly justified in assuming according to this passage that women were admitted to the tragedies; whether they also had the right to attend the comedies remains doubtful. The admission of slaves to the theatre was always restricted.

LVIII. 1. **εἶεν**: marks the conclusion of one part of the argument, *viz.* the premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. Its employment here, however, also draws especial emphasis to the fact that these premises are definitely settled.

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St. I. p. 502.

ῥητορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δήμους e
τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν;
πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ
ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλ-
τιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὑτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς
τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὡρμημένοι, καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ
ἰδίου τοῦ αὑτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ
προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι
μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα,
οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν; 503

Καλ. Οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἳ
κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ
οἷους σὺ λέγεις.

Σω. Ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν

502 e 2. **ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν**: in the political sense of the word. *Cf.* Soph. *Ant.* 737 *πόλις γὰρ οὐκ ἔσθ' ἥτις ἀνδρός ἐσθ' ἑνός.*

3. **τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων**: is ironic. They consider themselves to be free men, although they are really, even according to the true opinion of Callicles (*cf.* 489 c above), slaves. *Cf.* Dem. *Ol.* iii. 30 *τὸ μὲν πρότερον στρατεύεσθαι τολμῶν αὐτὸς ὁ δῆμος δεσπότης τῶν πολιτευομένων ἦν καὶ κύριος αὐτὸς ἁπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, — νῦν δὲ τοὐναντίον κύριοι μὲν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα πράττεται, ὑμεῖς δ' ὁ δῆμος ἐν ὑπηρέτου καὶ προσθήκης μέρει γεγένησθε.*

6. **ἢ καὶ οὗτοι** *κτέ.*: testimony to the correctness of this statement is found in the very numerous references and complaints found in the orators, notably Demosthenes. Of course, Plato meant by *τὸ βέλτιστον* something a little different from the orators. *Cf.* Isoc. *de Pace* § 5 *καὶ γάρ τοι πεποιήκατε τοὺς ῥήτορας μελε-* 502 e *τᾶν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν οὐ τὰ μέλλοντα τῇ πόλει συνοίσειν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀρέσκοντας ὑμῖν λόγους ἐροῦσιν.* The apparent pleonasm arising from the recurrence of the same idea in but slightly varied form is artistic in showing that this thought lay uppermost in the speaker's mind.

8. **ὥσπερ παισί**: reminds of 464 d.

12. **οὐκ ἁπλοῦν**: the word has its 503 a fundamental meaning. The question requires a *double* answer. *Cf. Lach.* 188 c *ἁπλοῦν τό γ' ἐμὸν περὶ λόγων ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ διπλοῦν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δέξαιμί τῳ φιλόλογος εἶναι καὶ αὖ μισόλογος. Cf.* also 468 c *ἁπλῶς οὕτως.*

15. **εἰ γὰρ καί**: *καί* does not belong to *τοῦτο*, but to *εἰ*. Socrates expresses himself as satisfied with the division made by Callicles, but recognizes even under this condition at least the possibility of a good, commendable rhetoric.

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ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικήν. ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν, δι' ὃντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν

503 a 19. **εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα**: Demosthenes, who in many speeches combats the *πρὸς ἡδονήν* and *πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν*, says in *Ol.* iii. 18, in harmony with Plato's teaching, *ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὰ βέλτιστα ἀντὶ τῶν ἡδέων, ἂν μὴ συναμφότερα ἐξῇ, λαμβάνειν.*

b 21. **τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν**: *speak of as such.*

21 f. **τί οὐχὶ . . . ἔφρασας**: in passionate questions *τί οὐ* is usually construed with the aorist. The question marks impatience that a thing which is future is not past. The idea is usually modal, "why *will* you not?" *Cf. Phaedo* 86 **d** *εἴ τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο.* Different in 468 **c**.

26. **αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν**: a *ῥῆμα μέσον* (vox media). Originally "to bear the blame," it was gradually worn down until it became merely a circumlocution for *λέγεσθαι*, as *Theaet.* 169 **a** *ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν*, or *Rep.* iv. 435 **e** *οἱ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν* (*sc. θυμοειδεῖς* 503 b *εἶναι*). Usually, however, it retains its bad sense, *e.g. Apol.* 38 **c** *ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν — ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε.*

28. **οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν**: when *τίς* c instead of the more regular *ὅστις* is used after a neg., it should be conceived rather as a direct question. See on 447 **d**.

29. **Θεμιστοκλέα κτέ.**: it is noteworthy that Callicles passes over Aristides, whom Socrates mentions later with respect, and whom also Demosthenes in *Ol.* iii. 21 speaks of among the statesmen who were still honored down to his time. But Callicles was probably hardly able to appreciate the uprightness and unselfishness of Aristides, which was displayed so prominently in the formation of the Delian League. — **ἀκούεις**: Greek, like the Eng., often uses the pres. of the verbs of perception where the pf. would be more exact. See GMT. 28; H. 827.

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γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;

Σω. Εἰ ἔστιν γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἦν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, d ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χείρω, μή· τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι· τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

Καλ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.

LIX. Σω. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὑρήσεις· ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι, εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγο-

503 c 30 f. **Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα**: we must guard against drawing the conclusion from this passage that this dialogue was intended to be understood as held soon after Pericles' death. See Introd. § 18. For *νεωστί* simply means "lately" as compared with the other statesmen mentioned, and the interval between that and the date of the dialogue may still have been a great one. *Cf.* Hdt. vi. 40. See also on 523 b. The same is true of the Lat. nuper, as we see from Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 50. 126 Quid ea, quae nuper, id est paucis ante seculis, medicorum ingeniis reperta sunt.

31. οὗ ἀκήκοας: *sc.* *λέγοντος*. A possible reference to 455 e.

32. εἰ ἔστιν γε κτέ.: "yes, if, etc." The answer is so closely connected with the preceding question that there is no need of supplying an apod. In the second member, **εἰ δὲ μὴ κτέ.**, for which we must supply a pred. from the first, instead of the expected criticism of the men mentioned we have a question based on the principle just proved. 503 c

34. τοῦτο: *viz.* *τὸ . . . ἀποπιμπλάναι*. As a pred. supply *ἀρετὴ ἀληθής ἐστιν*. We should expect after *ἀλλ' ὅπερ . . .* *ὁμολογεῖν* some expression corresponding to *τὸ . . . ἀποπιμπλάναι*, instead of which we find *ὅτι κτέ.*, due to *ὁμολογεῖν*, with which we must again supply *ἀρετὴ ἀληθής ἐστιν* to govern *ἀποτελεῖν*.

34 f. ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ: refers to 499 e. *τοῦτο δέ* continues the recapitulation, and refers to 500 a. Instead of *τέχνην τινά*, which we should expect, we find by an anacoluthon the nom. as if *ὡμολογήθη* preceded. On the neglect of the assimilation in *τοῦτο*, see Kr. 61, 7, 4.

39. οὐκ ἔχω: Callicles does not d understand the standard of judgment, to the exposition of which Socrates now turns.

LIX. 2. **οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα**: *quietly, just as we are.* *οὕτως* is frequently used by itself to denote "under the conditions or circumstances in which we are at present," and often with

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νεν. φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ, ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων
5 πρός τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέπον- e
τες πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυ-
10 πηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὁντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσηται τεταγμέ- 504
νον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα· καὶ οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι

503 d an adverb when it is to be translated separately. Sometimes it follows the adverb, and sometimes it has itself an explanatory addition, as *Prot.* 351 c ἁπλῶς οὕτω, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς. *Cf.* 460 e, 464 b, 468 c, 478 a, 494 d.

4 f. **ἀποβλέπων πρός τι**: *with a view to something*, which must, in contrast with **εἰκῇ**, be a definite object, as is afterwards more clearly shown. See on 474 d.

e 5 ff. **οἱ ἄλλοι . . . προσφέρει**: a case of part. apposition. See G. 137, N. 2; H. 624 d. *Cf.* 450 d. The thought with *προσφέρει* is of the single articles out of which the object is to be made.—**δημιουργοί**: see on 452 a.

8. **ὅπως ἂν . . . σχῇ**: a general rel. sentence, giving the opposite to **εἰκῇ**, "that it may acquire for itself some form." The second aor. of **ἔχειν** is the only second aor. which seems to have an ingressive force. See Gildersleeve's note to Morris' Thuc. i. 12. 3.—**εἶδος**: *i.e.* the outward appearance which an object displays, its figure and form, an image of which the artist of course carries in his mind and gazes upon with the eye of fancy. 503 e

8 f. **εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν**: with such conversational expressions we should refrain from supplying any definite apod., as doubtless none was felt. The force of this phrase approaches that of a mild imv., *σκόπει*, after which the objective clause follows naturally with **ὡς**. The subject **ἕκαστος** distributes the **τοὺς ζωγράφους** which has been appropriated as the obj. of **ἰδεῖν**.

13. **συστήσηται**: is applicable to the form as a whole, because it is only by the harmony of its several parts (**τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἁρμόττειν**) that it exists. *Cf. Phaedr.* 269 c τὸ δ' ἕκαστα . . . λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι. 504 a

14. **κεκοσμημένον**: this word, as well as *κόσμος* below (19), has, of course, no reference to any external adornment, but only to an endowment with such qualities as are requisite for the **ἀρετή** of the whole. See on e below.

14 f. **οἵ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί**: would require properly some such

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St. I. p. 504.

δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί. b

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου τινός;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθε καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;

ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ c

504 a pred. as κοσμοῦσιν ἕκαστος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον. But the general thought is here, as often, to be completed by a kind of zeugma from the special one to which the discussion hurries.

15. οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν: *sc.* in 500 e, which in turn refers to 464 b ff. — The body serves in general as an analogy for the soul.

18. ἔστω: the imv. indicates only a tentative concession, which Callicles reserves the privilege of recalling if he chooses. The same feeling is felt in ἀνάγκη συνομολογεῖν below.

b 24. καὶ μὴν κτέ.: is to be completed with necessary changes from the preceding question of Socrates (τάξεως ἄρα κτέ.). By καὶ μήν (*and indeed*) we pass to the more important part of the argument. Here also the general ideas τάξις and κόσμος receive special limitations. 504 b

29 f. τῷ γιγνομένῳ: belongs to ὄνομά ἐστιν, while ἐν τῷ σώματι, in looser relation to the whole, denotes the range to which the question extends.

31. ἴσως λέγεις: in the answer of Callicles shows that, while indeed according to his feelings he would regard such a relation as false and impossible, his reason compels him to admit its truth.

32. ἐγγιγνομένῳ: the use of the c compound verb here, in place of the simple one in the other member of the comparison, is probably due to its close connexion with ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

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τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνῳ τὸ ὄνομα.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσιν καὶ κοσμήσεσιν νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῂς ἢ οὔ; d

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

LX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς

504 c 35. **τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις**: on the meaning of the interr. form, see on 503 b. The question is of the nature of an evasion of the answer, which Callicles pushes upon Socrates to escape responsibility. *Cf.* 470 b.

37. **φάθι**: see on 475 e. — **εἰ δὲ μή**: see on 502 b. — **ἔλεγχε**: with this and *ἐπίτρεπε* (*yield*) the neuter object ("what I say") is understood. In a similar way *ἐπιτρέπειν* is used absolutely, *Apol.* 35 b and elsewhere.

40. **ἀρετή**: used at first in the general sense of "proper function or condition," so that it can afterwards appear in its moral force without thereby the standard of judgment being changed.

d 42 f. **νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος**: *sc.* *ὄνομα εἶναι*. Both expressions are found elsewhere associated in order to express the idea as fully and completely as possible, *e.g.* *Crito* 53 c. Here there is the more reason to add *νόμος* because Callicles had previously used this word in the passage where he first gave expression to his scorn of right and law (ch. XXXVIII. ff.). The corresponding disposition is also elsewhere called *κόσμιος*. *Cf.* the passage in *Crito* *τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους*. Apropos is *Phaedo* 114 e *κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑαυτῆς κόσμῳ σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ*. 504 d

44. **ταῦτα**: with free reference to what precedes and without assimilation to the predicate, denotes the qualities expressed by *νόμιμοι* and *κόσμιοι*.

45. **ἔστω**: see on a above.

LX. 1. **πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων**: in the choice of words Socrates goes back to what was said in 503 e.

2. **προσοίσει κτέ.**: *cf.* above, 503 e. Although it is by the *λόγοι* especially that the soul will be shaped, yet

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ψυχαῖς, οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολί- e
5 ταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίῃ. συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ;

10 ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἡδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτε πλέον, ἢ τοὐναντίον κατά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλατ-
15 τον; ἔστι ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω. 505

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

20 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα

504 d other influences may be brought to bear, just as the orator or statesman (a good specimen of such an orator was Demosthenes) has power to cause gifts to be made to the people — as, for example, the *θεωρικόν*, the *δικαστικόν*, the *στρατιωτικόν*, and the *βουλευτικόν*, and the division of booty, public spectacles, *etc.* — and also to be taken away from them, for example, by taxes (*εἰσφοραί*) or the abolition of the gifts mentioned. — The connexion forbids us to think of any rougher kind of deprivation, which seemed to Polus (466 c) so enviable a privilege of power.

5. **αὐτοῦ**: poss. gen., to be closely connected with *τοῖς πολίταις* ("his *fellow*-citizens"). 504 e

13. **ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει**: the generic idea causes the negative *μή*.

14. **τοὐναντίον**: is certainly adverbial, and to be attached to *ἔλαττον* (*ὀνήσει*). The sense of this difficult passage seems to be something like this: "What advantage is there in giving to a sick man anything which cannot profit him, more or less"; literally, "sometimes more, or on the contrary, at least rightly considered, less."

22 f. **ὑγιαίνοντα . . . πολλά**: is added to make the contrast stronger. 505 a

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μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἐῶσιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;

Καλ. Ἔγωγε. b

Σω. Περὶ δὲ ψυχήν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται· φῂς ἢ οὔ;

Καλ. Φημί.

Σω. Οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ᾤου.

Καλ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον c τινὰ ἐρώτα.

Σω. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.

505 a b 23 f. **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**: see on 450 b.

28. **ἀνόητος κτέ.**: see in the discussion with Polus the remark at 477 b, where the *πονηρία* of the soul is described in the same way.

29. **ἀνόσιος**: Plato prefers to use only two endings with this adj., which usually, especially in later Greek, has three. The common collocation, as in the present passage, with several other adjs. of only two endings, may perhaps explain his usage.

33. **οὕτω . . . ἄμεινον**: *sc.* than if it were differently dealt with. *Cf.* 468 b.

38. **ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ᾤου**: refers naturally to the second member, for which a predicate is to be supplied from the first. Socrates has in mind 491 e ff. The contradiction between this admission and the statement made at the first (*νυνδή*), Callicles seeks, in his accustomed manner, to evade. 505 b

41 f. **αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων**: Callicles has given in the investigation also a *practical* example of that *ἀκολασία* which he had defended in theory. For him the investigation is only a trial of wits. In *οὗτος ἀνὴρ κτέ.* we may have a reminiscence of the expression used by Callicles of Socrates in 489 b. c

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Καλ. Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.

Σω. Εἶεν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;

Καλ. Αὐτὸς γνώσει.

Σω. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιίῃ. ἀπόκρωαι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

LXI. Καλ. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέξει.

Σω. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῆ γε τὸν λόγον καταλείπωμεν.

Καλ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;

505 c 46. **καταλύομεν**: this idiomatic use of the pres. instead of the fut. of a course of action to be immediately taken is also idiomatic in Latin and English. See Kr. 53, 1, 9. In a somewhat similar manner the pres. is used of the immediate consequence by Dem. *de Falsa Leg.* 32 *εἰ δέ φησιν οὗτος, δειξάτω καὶ παρασχέσθω, κἀγὼ καταβαίνω. Cf.* 513 c.

47. **αὐτὸς γνώσει**: refuses to answer. "You will have to decide that."

d 48. **οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους**: to say nothing of a *λόγος* which is directed to a definite object. The proverb, which Socrates quotes, seems to rest upon a religious feeling, in accordance with which myths had to be completely narrated in order not to draw upon the narrator the anger of the deity. *Cf. Phileb.* 66 d *τὸ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις, Euthyd.* 301 e *τὸν κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθέναι.* — **θέμις**: "right acc. to sacred law." 505 d

50. **περιίῃ**: the change from the pl. (*τοὺς μύθους*) to the sing. is explained by the freedom of conversation. *Cf. Prot.* 319 d *τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθὼν . . . συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ.*

LXI. 1. **ὡς βίαιος εἶ**: *cf.* 491 e *ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ.* — **βίαιος**: usually in contrast with *πείθειν, e.g. Polit.* 304 d *εἴτε διὰ πειθοῦς εἴτε διά τινος βίας* is applied here by Callicles to Socrates' persistent argument; *cf. Apol.* 35 d *εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην.*

4. **τίς οὖν κτέ.**: since the question assumes the necessity that some one take the role of respondent, a causal clause follows.

4 f. **μὴ . . . καταλείπωμεν**: *for let us no longer leave*, etc.

6. **αὐτὸς δὲ κτέ.**: the question has

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Σω. Ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο e
ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι; ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει
ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι
ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέ-
ναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστιν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος·
κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι
μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ 506
ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμ-

505 d a tone of reproof. *αὐτός* is opposed to *ἄλλῳ διαλεγόμενος*. The requirements of the question can be fulfilled in two ways, — either in continuous discourse, as 464 b–466 a, or in the form of a dialogue, which Socrates employs later (ch. LXII.).

e 8. **τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου**: Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but early went to Sicily (Megara) and devoted himself there to the study of medicine and philosophy, especially the Pythagorean and Empedoclean. But his claim to fame rests on his comedies. He stands at the head of the Sicilian comic poets, being noted for the ethical nature of his poetry. It was full of sententious sayings, and thereby aroused Plato's interest to the highest degree. He flourished during the Persian war, under the government of Gelo. The verse here cited reads, according to Athenaeus:

τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δύ' ἄνδρες ἔλεγον
εἷς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω (*i.e. ἀποχράω, I am sufficient.*

Socrates means that he is himself assuming a burden which according to the nature of the matter requires two. The answer is in construction connected with the question of Callicles in order to disclose for the others' consideration the doubtful side, as it were, of such a demand. With this 505 e the following *ἀτάρ* (*however*) agrees.

11. **φιλονίκως ἔχειν**: see on 457 d. Socrates wishes to direct ambition only to proper objects.

12. **τί ψεῦδος**: *ψεῦδος* is frequently found opposed to *ἀληθές*. *Cf. Apol.* 34 e *εἴτε οὖν ἀληθὲς, εἴτε οὖν ψεῦδος, Euthyd.* 272 a *ἐάν τε ψεῦδος ἐάν τε ἀληθὲς ᾖ*. The article with *ἀληθές* is due to its position. We should also have in like manner *τὸ ψεῦδος*, did it precede *τί ἐστιν*. Cron thinks it denotes that truth is *single*, while error has many forms.

14 f. **ἐὰν . . . δοκῶ, χρὴ κτέ.**: is an 506 a anticipatory cond. sentence, *χρή* with the inf. having the force of an imv. *Cf. ἐπιλαμβάνου* in b below.

15. **ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ**: Socrates is about to combine the two roles of questioner and respondent, and hence will have to assent to his own statements.

15 f. **ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι**: with the gen., means to "break in upon a discourse for the purpose of contesting a point," as in *Rep.* i. 336 b *καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὥρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου*. On the other hand *ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι*, used below in b, means simply "to arrest the discussion." See on 469 c.

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βάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχεω. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τὶ φαίνηται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῶμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.

Real Socratic doctrine.

Γορ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διιόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.

Σω. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπεραῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. καὶ με ἐὰν ἐξελέγχῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι

506 a 17. **ἂν τὶ φαίνηται** κτέ.: the emphasis is on the indefinite, as in 472 a.

21. **ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ** κτέ.: on the assumption by Gorgias of the role of mediator, and the justice of his claim to speak in the name of all, see Introd. § 13 *fin.* *Cf.* 497 b. His request to proceed is a part of the artistic machinery of the dialogue, in that it affords an opportunity for a general summary of what has been already learned in the discussion, which was necessary in order to proceed intelligently. — **οὐ . . . πω**: a rather unusual 'tmesis,' of which another example is found in *Meno* 72 d *οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.*

b 23. **βούλομαι γὰρ** κτέ.: with these words Gorgias expresses his approbation of Callicles' opinion that a respondent is not necessary. The chestnuts are good, — but just as good without the intervention of the cat. Hence *γάρ* to give a reason for the continuance of the discussion, *καὶ αὐτός* to show his agreement with Callicles, and *αὐτοῦ* to exclude the idea of co-operation. The following *καὶ αὐτός* in the answer of Socrates corresponds to the similar expression of Gorgias. 506 b

26 f. **Ἀμφίονος**: Socrates answers with a pleasant allusion to 485 e. He will really assume the character of Amphion, which had been imputed to him, and as Amphion had in the plays of Euripides defended his calling, so will he prove that the claim of philosophy to be followed as a calling in life is a just and weighty one.

27. **ἀπέδωκα**: the indic. is due to assimilation with the preceding indic. with *ἄν* of the unfulfilled condition.

28 f. **ἀλλ' οὖν . . . ἐπιλαμβάνου**: see on 496 d and a above.

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ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψει.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὦ ἀγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

LXII. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἆρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν; Οὐ ταὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕνεκα
e τοῦ ἡδέος; Τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο, οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος d ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, ὅσ' ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλί-
ιυ κλεις. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ σκεύους

506 c

31 f. **εὐεργέτης ἀναγεγράψει**: this phrase is found in Hdt. viii. 85, and was doubtless technical, the fut. pf. expressing like the legal pf. the finality and fixity of the action. It was quite common for Greek states to confer the title of *εὐεργέτης* on citizens or strangers, especially foreign statesmen or princes, for services rendered them. The decree conferring the honor was engraved on stone and preserved. In *Apol.* 36 d Socrates claims the title for himself. The greatest benefit consists, according to 458 a, in freeing a man from error.

33. **ὦ ἀγαθέ**: a friendly manner of address, which frequently, however, has an ironical coloring, or a tone of condescension, depreciation, or correction. So in Lat., o bone, *cf.* Hor. *Sat.* ii. 3. 31; or bone vir in comedy.

LXII. 3. **ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν**: *sc.* in 495 c ff. *Cf.* especially 500 d.

6. **παραγενομένου, παρόντος**: the words may have been designedly chosen with reference to the nature of the ideas **ἡδύ** and **ἀγαθόν**, the former being only a condition, the latter an actuality. 506 c

5. **ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν κτέ.**: on the *ἡδύ*, *cf.* what Callicles has himself remarked in 494 a, b, above, and especially *Phileb.* 53 c *ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν, ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς.* On the *ἀγαθόν*, *cf.* above 468 b *ἕνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες* and *Phileb.* 54 c *οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἄν*—*Τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι.* This distinction, however, even if intended, is not preserved, as can be seen from the following (8) *ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης*. See on 497 e.

10. **ἀρετή**: the subst. to denote the d form in which the Good manifests itself in persons and things. According to its real nature the Good re-

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καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν· ἆρα ἔστιν ταῦτα; Ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι. Τάξει ἆρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου; Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. Κόσμος e
τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου; Ἀνάγκη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Ἡ δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων; Πολλὴ 507
ἀνάγκη. Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.

Καλ. Λέγ', ὠγαθέ.

Σω. Λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθή ἐστιν, ἡ τοὐναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακὴ ἐστιν· ἦν δὲ αὕτη ἡ

506 d mains one and the same, but its manifestation (the ἀρετή) assumes various names according to circumstances.

11. τῷ εἰκῇ: on the use of the art. with adverbs, see Kr. 50, 5, 10. The dat. is in the same construction as those following.

12 f. τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ: the two latter words simply complete the first. We might translate them as adjs. The addition of κάλλιστα seems to admit the possibility of a kind of ἀρετή being brought about by other means than τάξει κτέ.

e 16. ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος: the nature of each thing conditions the peculiarity of its κόσμος. Hence this may receive different names, according to the conditions.

507 a 22 f. σύ . . . δίδασκε: Socrates turns now again to Callicles and tries to draw him into the conversation, because the argument has now been brought just to the point where Callicles broke it off before. 507 a

24. λέγε: *go on with your exposition.* This answer is a refusal to cooperate and at the same time a neg. answer to εἰ ἔχεις.

25 ff. The idea of σωφροσύνη is defined in the most general way by the expression τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. We attain to the idea of righteousness and piety by restricting the προσήκοντα to definite domains, according to the personages (men and gods) towards whom we have duties to perform. We attain to the idea of bravery by distinguishing between especial divisions of the idea πράττειν. Accordingly, we have on the one side διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν, on the other ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν.

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ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε σώφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττων. Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω. Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἃ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα

507 b 36. **ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας**: added by Socrates in his enumeration because it is just in these spheres that *σωφροσύνη* is usually exercised. The point at which bravery necessarily coincides with it comes out in this way most emphatically. The exhibition of bravery under such conditions is also discussed in *Lach.* ch. xviii.

c 39 f. **ἀγαθὸν . . . τελέως**: '*the perfection of goodness.*' Cope. All the virtues combined make the *ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα*. Wisdom is omitted, probably because Socrates has in mind only the earlier discussion, and besides he is taking for the moment the popular point of view; hence the collocation of *ὅσιον* with *δίκαιον*, as in *Protagoras*. Besides, as Socrates' view was that all evil-acting springs from ignorance, the fact that a man was *δίκαιος*, *ἀνδρεῖος*, and *ὅσιος* would presuppose the possession of wisdom. 507 c

41. **τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα κτέ.**: not in the sense "he who is fortunate," so often found, but in the sense of the clause *εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ* preceding; otherwise it would be equivalent to *μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα*, and the syllogism would gain nothing. Plato therefore conceives *εὖ πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ* the necessary basis for *μακάριον εἶναι*, and the latter as the natural result of the former. Hence there is no case of a fallacia secundum dictionem (by the use of homonyms or *ἀμφιβολία*), but the conclusion *ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἄθλιος* is correctly and legitimately obtained by a combination of the second statement with the first and without any fallacious or sophistical reasoning.

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ἄθλιον· οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπῄνεις.

LXIII. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καί φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ d ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι, πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ

507 c LXIII. 1 f. **καί φημι ταῦτα**: the repetition of *ταῦτα* causes these principles to appear especially weighty.

2 f. **τὸν βουλόμενον . . . διωκτέον**: the verbal is equivalent here to *δεῖ* with the inf. The regular case for the agent is the dat.; the acc. is rare. See H. 991 a, and *cf.* 480 e. The position of *ὡς ἔοικεν*, which belongs to the whole clause, is noteworthy.

d 4. **ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν**: *i.e. to the full extent of his power*, a phrase whose origin can be readily seen. *Cf.* Hdt. vi. 116 *οὗτοι μὲν δὴ περιέπλεον Σούνιον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον τάχιστα ἐβοήθεον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ ἔφθησαν ἀπικόμενοι πρὶν ἢ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἥκειν*, and Thuc. ii. 90. 4 *Πελοποννήσιοι . . . ἔπλεον ὡς εἶχε τάχους ἕκαστος ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους*. On the use of the gen. with such adverbs as *ὡς, ἄριστα*, and *ἱκανῶς*, and *ἔχειν*, see G. 168, 3; H. 757 a.

5. **παρασκευαστέον**: in a middle sense, as is frequently the case with verbals, but only when used impersonally.

7. **ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις**: disjunctive apposition to *ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων*. Contrasted with *πόλις, ἰδιώτης* denotes the individual; with *ἄρχων*, the common man who holds no office; with *δημιουργός* and similar words, one who is not versed in a certain thing. — **ἐπιθετέον δίκην**: Socrates deduces from the principles proven exactly the conclusions which, in his argument with Polus, had so offended Callicles. *Cf.* 480, 481. 507 d

9 f. **πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ**: "all the powers of the body and soul." *Cf.* the passage quoted below (10), and *Crito* 46 b *τὰ ἐμά*. The construction of *καὶ πάντα κτέ.* shows another example of the common Greek idiom of following a rel. by a demonstrative. See on 452 d. — **εἰς τοῦτο**: takes up again *οὗτος ὁ σκοπός* for the purpose of recapitulating in its correlative clause, *ὅπως κτέ.*, the substance of what has been explained; *οὕτω* again reiterates in one word the whole previous participial clause, and connects it with *πράττειν*, which has the same construction as *ζῆν*. The positive directions summarized in *οὕτω* are still further fixed (after Plato's habit) by the following negative direction

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10 αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη
παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι,
οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἐῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ e
ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, ληστοῦ
βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλὴς ἂν
εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος· ὅτῳ δὲ
μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη· φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ
Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους 508
τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ

506 d in the epexegetical participial clause *οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἐῶντα . . . πληροῦν*. After *πληροῦν* we find the parenthetical criticism *ἀνήνυτον κακόν*, while the life of the man who attempts what is deprecated in the participial clause, is characterized very emphatically by the appositional tag which completes this rambling, intensely conversational sentence.

10. **συντείνοντα**: the image is that of drawing the bow and aiming, to the employment of which, *σκόπος* has led the way. We find in *Rep.* ix. 591 c the same image in a similar connexion, *ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείνας βίωσεται.*

e 13. **ἀνήνυτον κακόν**: "an evil to which there is no end." The striving to satisfy the desires is also called an *ἀνήνυτον ἔργον* in *Phaedo* 84 a, and compared with the web of Penelope, which was begun every day anew. On the apposition, see G. 137, 3; H. 626.

13 f. **ληστοῦ βίον ζῶντα**: for the appositional partic. see Kr. 56, 15, 3.

15. **ἀδύνατος**: in an active sense.

16. **κοινωνία**: in passing, Socrates shows that the only foundation for an all-embracing view of the world is found in correct moral principle. Both in nature and in the universe 507 e the harmony of the parts with each other and with the whole is essential for existence. The state, and, proceeding further, the moral condition of the individual soul, should therefore be modelled on the principle of general order which pervades the world. — **οἱ σοφοί**: those especially meant are the Pythagoreans, to whose views Plato had had recourse before. *Cf.* 493 a. Pythagoras is said first to have applied to the world the name *κόσμος*. He was followed by Empedocles with his scientific system, according to which there are two principles in the world, — love, *φιλότης* (*στοργή*, *Ἀφροδίτη*, *ἁρμονίη*), and hate, *νεῖκος*. The former is the cause of association and union, the latter of separation and disunion. *Cf.* Emped. 94, Karst. *Ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,* | *Ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει.*

18. **συνέχειν**: the subj. of the inf. 508 a is *τὴν κοινωνίαν*, as is shown by the art. as well as the connexion. *Cf. Soph.* 242 e *τὸ ὂν . . . ἔχθρᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ συνέχεται.* The omission of the art. in enumerations is common. See on 450 d.

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σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα
κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται· σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. εἶεν· ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν,

508 a 19. **δικαιότητα**: an unusual word for justice, formed like *κοσμιότης* and *ἰσότης*. It was probably chosen here on account of the assonance. Similarly *Prot.* 331 b *ταὐτόν ἐστι δικαιότης ὁσιότητι*. Xenophon also uses the word.

22. **καὶ ταῦτα**: the regular Greek expression for "and that too." See H. 612 a.

22 f. **ἡ γεωμετρική**: adds a limitation to the *ἰσότης*, that absolute equality, which is impossible in any government. *ἰσότης* alone is purely arithmetical equality ($a = b$); *ἰσότης γεωμετρική* is ratio or proportion ($a : b :: c : d$). Plato distinguishes between two kinds of *ἰσότης* in *Leg.* vi. 757 b, the one *τὴν μέτρῳ ἴσην καὶ σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ*, the arithmetical; the second, *τὴν ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα*, the geometric, which is not comprehensible by every man, and which is dependent upon the judgment and decision of the gods. Of this he says (*ib.*): *τῷ μὲν μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον.* On this *ἰσότης*, which is here opposed to *πλεονεξία*, is founded the administration of justice in the state (*ib. τὸ πολιτικὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον*). Aristotle also (*Nic. Eth.* v. 6, 7, Bekk.) refers *τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιον* back to *ἀναλογία*, *i.e.* to *ἰσότης λόγων*, and adds, *καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί*. Isocrates expresses himself to the same effect in *Areop.* (vii.) 20 ff., where he says of Solon and Cleisthenes, *μέγιστον αὐτοῖς συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὸ καλῶς οἰκεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι δυοῖν ἰσοτήτοιν νομιζομέναιν εἶναι, καὶ τῆς μὲν ταὐτὸν ἅπασιν ἀπονεμούσης, τῆς δὲ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστοις, οὐκ ἠγνόουν τὴν χρησιμωτέραν κτέ.* Thompson also quotes Plut. *Mor.* 719 b, according to which Lycurgus 'expelled from Lacedaemon arithmetical equality, holding it to be democratic and levelling in principle, and introduced the geometric, as better suited to a temperate oligarchy and monarchy.' 508 a

24. **γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς**: Plato considered mathematics as a necessary preliminary to philosophy. Hence the well-known *μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω μου τὴν στέγην* upon his house.

25. **εἶεν**: see on 466 c. *Cf.* 472 d, 480 a. — **ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ κτέ.**: the alternative appears as the obvious and necessary result of what precedes. The meaning and construction are similar to 482 b (*ὡς οὐ κτέ.*). See on 467 a.

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ὡς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσει εὐδαίμονες οἱ b
εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι ⟨ἄθλιοι⟩, ἢ εἰ οὕτος ἀληθής
ἐστιν, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα,
ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρου, εἰ
30 σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ
αὐτοῦ καὶ υἱέος καὶ ἑταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ
ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον· καὶ ἃ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ᾧου συγχω-
ρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
ὅσῳπερ αἴσχιον, τοσούτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρ- c
35 θῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστή-
μονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην
ὁμολογῆσαι.

LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων σκεψώμεθα, τί ποτ'
ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἆρα καλῶς λέγεται ἢ οὔ, ὡς
ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν
φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγί-
5 στων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτι-
μοι [τοῦ ἐθέλοντος], ἄν τε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν d

508 b 27. **οἱ ἄθλιοι ἄθλιοι**: if the emendation is correct, we have an example of chiasmus, as in 498 d.

28. **τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα**: the sing. *τί* inquires for the general result, which may include various details. See Kr. 61, 8, 2.

32. **ἃ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ** κτέ.: with this Socrates avoids the accusation that he may have defended those principles only for the sake of confuting his adversary. They are seen now to be quite necessarily bound together with a moral view of life. Note the difference in the tenses, *συγχωρεῖν* (equiv. to *συνεχώρει*) and below (37) *ὁμολογῆσαι* (equiv. to *ὡμολόγησε*).

c LXIV. 3. **ὡς οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ** κτέ.: this objection Callicles had only 508 c brought forward as a possibility, not as an actual fact (486 a, b). Socrates treats it as the latter, but even thus it does not misrepresent Callicles' sentiments.

5 f. **ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι**: see on 486 c. As the reading stands, *τοῦ ἐθέλοντος* must be considered as a variant for *ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ*. In spite of Plato's fondness for *ποικιλία*, it is hardly likely that he would use *βούλεσθαι* and *θέλειν* as identical in meaning.

6 f. **τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο**: in apposition to the whole clause, but more especially to the words which follow. See on 447 a. For the meaning, see on 482 c. d

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δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, ἐάν τε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάν τε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς ὅστις πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι· οὗ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως αἴσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἴσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε λόγοις οὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις,

508 d 10. **ὅστις**: *viz.* *ἐστίν*. The omission of the verb in the dependent question is very uncommon.

11. **ἔτι**: almost equivalent to *ἔτι πλεονάκις*.

e 13. **τέμνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα**: may be a delicate allusion to 473 c (*ἐκτέμνηται*) as *τὸ βαλλάντιον* and *κλέπτειν* to 486 c (*ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν*), but it is more probable, owing to its common association with *βαλλάντιον*, that *τέμνεσθαι* is used generally like the Lat. secari. In view of Socrates' poverty, this savors of humor.

14. **βαλλάντιον**: a leathern purse for carrying money, which was fastened to the girdle. The *βαλλαντιοτόμοι* (*cut-purses*) were men who made a business of slipping off such purses in the market-places and the baths, and against whom it was difficult to protect one's self. This sentence is also a commentary on the mischievous results of the principle defended by Callicles, which was sure to introduce the most outrageous kinds of *ἀδικία*. Apropos of this, *cf.* also the view of Thrasymachus in *Rep.* i. 344, especially b *καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ κτέ., οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται· ἐπειδὰν δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσηται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται.* 598 e

509 a 20 f. **καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν**: see on 462 e. The *καὶ εἰ* shows that the word used is correct, though harsh. See crit. note on 503 a. The definite indic. is used in order to excuse the unusual comparison of arguments to iron and steel fetters. The simile is well chosen, and is a good retort on Callicles, who in 484 a had

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ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσί, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μεῖζον μεγίστου ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἆρα οὐ ταύτην, ἥτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοη-

509 a characterized the laws and moral rules as bonds which the true man must break through (*διαρρήξας*).

22. **οὑτωσί**: "as matters stand," *i.e.* so far as these principles have been tested. They may be attacked with new arguments, in which case new defences would have to be made. — **εἰ μὴ λύσεις**: the stern minatory conditional form. See on 502 b.

23. **νεανικώτερος**: *i.e.* who is more powerful and courageous, just as Callicles surpassed Polus, and Polus Gorgias. — **ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος**: *cf.* 506 a *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω.*

25 f. **ὧν . . . ἐντετύχηκα**: on this unusual kind of attraction, see G. 153, 2; H. 996 a. We miss a mention of the persons with *ὥσπερ νῦν*.

26 f. **μὴ οὐ**: after a negatived leading verb, the negative of the inf. is generally made by *μὴ οὐ*. See Madv. *Syn.* § 211; GMT. 815.

27. **αὖ τίθημι**: *sc.* as against the opposing opinions of all others. This statement now, taken as a basis (*εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει*) leads to a conclusion which 509 a is given in the form of a question. *τίθημι* is frequently used of the laying down of a principle or assumption. *Cf. Rep.* ii. 361 b *τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον, Theaet.* 191 c.

29 f. **τούτου μεῖζον μεγίστου ὄντος**: b notice the comparison of the superlative.

33. **ἀλλά**: introduces a more definite and detailed statement of a thought involved in the previous question.

34. **ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην κτέ.**: a noteworthy instance of the employment of a very common construction, which is as old as Homer (Kr. Di. 55, 3, 8). Logically we should expect *ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν αἴσχιστον εἶναι.* But *βοήθειαν*, being uppermost in the speaker's mind, is made the subject, instead of cognate accusative, drawing also the predicate after it (see on 449 b, c). In this way *μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν* is characterized as a species, and the

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θεῖν μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως, ὡς ἑκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἕκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνη τοῦ μή. ἆρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

LXV. ΣΩ. Δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὐτῷ, ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν, τήν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται

509 b most shameful species, of *βοήθεια*, which was pretty exactly Plato's opinion of the assistance which the orators were in the habit of rendering to themselves and their friends before a court. This assimilation is extended to the following clauses, *δευτέραν etc.*, for the sake of consistency.

c 38. **ἐφ' ἕκαστα**: *viz. κακά*, which are conceived as the enemy to be fought. Instead of *αἰσχύνη* we should have expected *αἰσχύνην*.

41. **οὐκ ἄλλως**: it is remarkable that after his utterances in 505 d Callicles allows himself to be again drawn into the discussion. Ἑκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ; For that the answer slips from him unconsciously, instead of being a willing admission, seems to follow from ἔστω σοι τοῦτο (510 a), where his earlier disposition again becomes plain. 509 c

LXV. 1. **τοῦ ἀδικεῖν** *κτέ.*: in apposition to the *δυοῖν*.

4. **ἀμφοτέρας**: the following investigation takes up each of the two cases separately.

6. **δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν**: what has been determined in 466 d regarding *δύνασθαι* and *βούλεσθαι* still holds good, but is expanded in what follows. d

7. **ἀδικήσεται**: the fut. middle as a passive occurs more commonly with pure verbs. See Kr. 39, 11; H. 496.

9. **δῆλον δὴ** *κτέ.*: the form of the answer shows very willing agreement, which applies, however, only to this particular point.

10. **τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ** *κτέ.*: *cf. Phaedo* 78 d *τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον*

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St. I. p. 509.

ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει — ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, e
ὡς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; τί οὐκ
αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι
15 δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπρο-
σθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὔ, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν
μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας
πάντας ἀδικεῖν;

Καλ. Ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπε- 510
20 ράνῃς τὸν λόγον.

Σω. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ
δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσομεν.

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν
25 ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ
ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν
τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας
ἑταῖρον εἶναι.

509 d **ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων . . .; ἆρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει κτέ.** It is not necessary to supply *περί* or some other word; when put thus freely at the beginning of the sentence, the genitive is held up to view and the case lost sight of. See Rid. § 27. The acc. also is occasionally thus 'freely' used. *Cf.* Lyc. 28 *καὶ ταῦτα ἐμοῦ θεωρήσατε, ὡς δικαίαν τὴν ἐξέτασιν ποιουμένου περὶ τούτων.*

e 12. **δύναμιν καὶ τέχνην . . . μάθῃ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ**: an example of chiasmus. Knowledge is preserved and strengthened by practice.

13. **ὡς . . . ἀδικήσει**: the causal use of *ὡς* is not common. See Kr. 65, 8; H. 925. — **αὐτά**: for the neut. pl. referring to two preceding fem. sings. see Kr. 58, 3, 5; H. 630, 633.

13 f. **τί οὐκ . . . ἀπεκρίνω**: see on 503 b. 509 e

17. **βουλόμενον**: for the usual *ἑκόντα*, in order not to diminish the contrast between *δύναμις* and *βούλησις*. Besides, it has just been shown to Polus that he who does wrong does only what *seems* to him good, not what he *wishes*, because the *wish* is always for the good.

22. **ἀδικήσομεν**: according to (the amended) Dawes' canon *ὅπως* in object clauses cannot be construed with the first aor. subjv. either act. or middle. See GMT. 363, 364. 510 a

28. **ἑταῖρον**: the common word to express party affiliation (hence also *ἑταιρεῖαι*, "clubs"), as in *Apol.* 21 a *ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρος.*

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St. I. p. 510.

Καλ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἑτοίμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, b
ἄν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

LXVI. Σω. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, "ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ." οὐ καὶ σοί;

Καλ. Ἔμοιγε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέ- c
σθαι;

Καλ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

510 b 29. ὁρᾷς κτέ.: expression of joy that Socrates, with whom Callicles has had so often to agree unwillingly and under protest, now speaks quite to his liking. This view is the one thought of his life. *Cf.* 475 a.

LXVI. 1. σκόπει . . . ἐάν σοι δοκῶ κτέ.: for the construction with σκόπει see H. 1016 c, and on 452 c. *Cf.* above in a. 'What is worth noticing upon this usage is that ἐάν gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual εἰ. The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas εἰ would limit the speaker's foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. ἐάν is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as this, which relate to the conduct of a dialogue.' Rid. § 64.

2. ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ: does not denote an unlimited reciprocality, but a restricted one, as is shown by the following ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. 510 b

3. ὅνπερ . . . λέγουσιν: *which the wise men of old mean when they say* (λέγουσιν). The following proverb occurs very early, *e.g.* in Homer ρ 218 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον. Plato often employs it, *e.g. Prot.* 337 d τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, *Symp.* 195 b ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ὁμοῖον ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει, *Lys.* 214 b τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι. Of kindred import is the well-known verse ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπε, γέρων δέ τε τέρπε γέροντα, alluded to in *Phaedr.* 240 c.

6. ὅπου τύραννός κτέ.: '*where a savage and illiterate ruler is lord and master.*' Cope. In what follows, τούτου refers to τύραννος, τούτῳ through αὐτόν to the τις.

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St. I. p. 510.

Σω. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.

Καλ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

Σω. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὢν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; d

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοίη, αὖτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν

510 c 12. **οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως**: is to be completed according to the previous remark of Socrates.

16. **ἄξιος λόγου φίλος**: pred. after *λείπεται*. According to the nature of the case none other could come under consideration as lasting friends of the tyrant, even if they should show themselves friendly for a time.

17. **ταὐτὰ ψέγειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν**: like *τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι* is the external sign of a similarity of disposition and friendliness. See on 473 a.

18. **ὑποκεῖσθαι**: in the elsewhere not uncommon meaning, "to be subject to." Its use here is to emphasize the degradation in the eyes of a free man. *Cf.* also *Crito* 53 e *ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων.*

d 19. **χαίρων ἀδικήσει**: the partic. denotes the result of the verb. "He will have no reason to rejoice," *i.e.* he will not injure him with impunity. *Cf.* Soph. *O. R.* 363 *ἀλλ' οὔ τι χαίρων δίς γε πημονὰς ἐρεῖς.*

22. **εἰ ἄρα τις**: the case which Socrates here assumes in illustration 510 d serves not only to enliven the discourse, but also to show (as opposed to the objections of ch. XL.) how unworthy and debased an object would have to be set before educators if the possession of power in the state is to be the leading aim of mankind. — Noteworthy is the use of the direct question after the introductory protasis, and furthermore the omission of some apodosis corresponding to the protasis, like *γνοίη ἂν ὅτι*, in place of which we find *ὡς ἔοικεν*. Kr. gives other similar examples in 65, 5, 14. Similar cases occur in Latin. — **ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει**: see on 468 e. The position is noteworthy.

23. **μηδείς με ἀδικοίη**: *μή* was the negative of the wish, underlying the question, and is thus retained. It is therefore not necessary, with GMT. 292, 2, to suppose an idea of prevention to be involved. *How could I obtain great power and no one do (prevent any one from doing,* GMT.) *me wrong?*

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αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοῖος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύ- e
νασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράξεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὁμοῖος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὑτωσὶ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἷῳ τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην· ἢ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ 511
ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἑκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα;

510 e **30. διαπεπράξεται**: the fut. pf. is employed to express finality or fixedness. Cope translates, "he will establish for himself a lasting immunity from," *etc.* See on 469 d.

35. ἐπὶ τὸ οἷῳ τε εἶναι: this is considered by Callicles and Polus as an end to be desired. — On the change of case, *οἷῳ* and *ἀδικοῦντα*, see on 492 b.

511 a **40. καὶ δύναμιν**: the way to become powerful, says Socrates above, is to imitate the *δεσπότης*. Hence *καὶ δύναμιν* is the power (*τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι*) obtained by this *μίμησις* (*ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοῖος ἔσται*).

41. ὅπῃ στρέφεις: the last conclusion of Socrates is not agreeable to Callicles, who therefore declares it an arbitrary perversion of the argument. The *στρέφειν ἄνω κάτω* (see on 481 e), the twisting this way and that of words and ideas so that their sense was reversed, was an important department of Eristic. 511 a

43. ἐὰν βούληται: the use of *βούλεσθαι* again shows that the detailed explanation by Socrates of the difference between *βούλεσθαι* and *δοκεῖν* (ch. XXIII. f.) was in vain. Hence Socrates himself ceases to regard it in his answer.

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Σω. Οἶδα, ὠγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ b
σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε,
ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν
καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὄντα.

Καλ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;

Σω. Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἴει
δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρό-
νον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας, αἳ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ
τῶν κινδύνων σῴζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἣν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ c
μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασῴ-
ζουσαν.

Καλ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

LXVII. Σω. Τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπι-
στήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

511 b 45. **εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί**: "otherwise I would have to be deaf." *Cf. Prot.* 349 c **κάλλιστον . . . εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε.**

46. **πολλάκις**: 486 b, 466 c, *et al.*

48. **ἀποκτενεῖ μέν κτέ.**: *cf.* Plut. *Agis* 20 *ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἄγις ἐπὶ τὴν στραγγάλην πορευόμενος, ὡς εἶδέ τινα τῶν ὑπηρετῶν δακρύοντα καὶ περιπαθοῦντα, "παῦσαί με" εἶπεν, "ὦ ἄνθρωπε, κλαίων. καὶ γὰρ οὕτως παρανόμως καὶ ἀδίκως ἀπολλύμενος κρείττων εἰμὶ τῶν ἀναιρούντων."*

50. **καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν**: καί is climactic and the art. emphatic. "So far from this circumstance mitigating the outrage, is it not just *the revolting part of it*," *i.e.* especially revolting? Callicles puts himself in the place of the one who suffers the wrong, but with a feeling quite the reverse to that of Agis, quoted in the preceding note. In a similar manner Apollodorus says in [Xen.] *Apol.* 28 *Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαλεπώτατα φέρω ὅτι ὁρῶ σε ἀδίκως ἀποθνῄσκοντα. τὸν δὲ λέγεται καταψήσαντα αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπεῖν, Σὺ δέ, ὦ φίλτατε Ἀπολλόδωρε, μᾶλλον ἂν ἐβούλου με ὁρᾶν δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκοντα;* 511 b

51. **ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει**: assumes that the statement has already been proved by the course of the argument. *Cf.* 527 c.

52 f. **δεῖν . . . ζῆν**: against such an over-valuation of life Socrates declares himself also in *Apol.* 28, 29; *Crito* 48 b.

55. **τὴν ῥητορικήν**: the position is very emphatic. For examples of the rel. clause preceding the antecedent, see Kr. 51, 11. c

57. **συμβουλεύων**: connected in construction with the last words of Socrates, as is frequently the case in answers. *Cf.* 451 d **ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ**, 473 b **ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως.** See Kr. 56, 8, 7.

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Καλ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Σω. Καὶ μὴν σῴζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν, οὗ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπι-
στήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγώ σοι μεί- d
ζονα ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικήν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς
σῴζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα, ἐκ τῶν
ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική· καὶ αὕτη μὲν
προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶν καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται
ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ
ταὐτὰ διαπραττομένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης
δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δύ' ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ
Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν πάμπολυ, ταύτης τῆς
μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασα ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν e

511 c LXVII. 5. **τοιοῦτον**: has its correlative in *οὗ*, which, like other relative adverbs, often stands for a prepositional phrase, as here equiv. to *ἐν ᾧ*. Frequently we find *τι* added to *τοιοῦτον*. The sense of *τοιοῦτον* is made clear by the context.

d 8. **τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα**: probably this phrase was a common one, and we must therefore not press a contrast between *τὰ σώματα* and *τὰς ψυχάς*, which latter refers especially to their lives. Thompson supposes, with some probability, that *σώματα* refers to the other members of the passenger's family, who may be conceived as belonging to him. Perhaps "goods and chattels" may be as good a rendering as any.

10. **προσεσταλμένη**: "retired," *i.e.* unpretending. Still stronger is *συνεσταλμένος*, as *e.g.* in Isoc. *Panath.* 230 *ἀπῄει φρονιμώτερος γεγενημένος καὶ συνεσταλμένην ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν* ("with a feeling of humility").

11. **ἐσχηματισμένη**: *cf. Soph.* 268 a *ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους* 511 d *ὡς εἰδῶς ἐσχημάτισται* ("which he has pretended to know").

12. **τῇ δικανικῇ**: used by Socrates instead of *τῇ ῥητορικῇ* because this species of the art affords the most room for comparison.

13. **δύ' ὀβολούς**: *i.e.* about six cents. The price was accordingly very low, if, as is shown by what follows, the fare from Egypt or Pontus (a dangerous voyage besides) for a whole family, including baggage, was only two drachmae, or about thirty-five cents. — **ἐπράξατο**: 'gnomic' or 'empiric' aorist.

15. **αὐτόν**: the regular designation e for the master of the house, who is frequently opposed to the rest of the family as here. See on 447 c. The order of enumeration is noteworthy as showing the low estimation in which the women were held. The pl. may be due to assimilation to *παῖδας*, as we say "wife and child," or it may be collective, "women folks."

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καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσασ' εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, οὔστινάς τε ὠφέληκεν τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὔστινας ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους 512 ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἷ ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχάς. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώμα-

511 e 18. **παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν**: also effective in the portrayal of the seaman's unpretending nature.

19. **ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι**: *with unassuming carriage,* has nothing to do with the dress, but merely with the deportment (*cf.* above, *προσεσταλμένη*). Perhaps there is a slight hit at Gorgias' pompous manner. See Introd. § 5 *fin.*

19 f. **λογίζεσθαι ... ἐπίσταται**: naturally not meant in full earnest, and not without some color of irony. The change of tense in *ὠφέληκε* and *ἔβλαψε* is probably due merely to the frequency of the form.

20 f. **οὔστινας ὠφέληκε κτέ.**: reminds us of Matt. xviii. 6, where of those who offend it is said: *συμφέρει αὐτῷ ἵνα ... καταποντισθῇ ἐν τῷ πελάγει τῆς θαλάσσης.*

512 a 23. **ἢ οἷ ἀνέβησαν**: it is a Greek peculiarity to compare different states by employing the gen. of the reflexive. Here a clause takes its place.

24. **λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ**: the force of the neg. extends over the whole sentence, which is developed antithetically. Since both leading clauses are hypothetical, we have a double employment of *μέν* and *δέ*. The first member of the antithesis is given first only for the sake of the contrast; we should use a subordinate clause in English, and lay the most stress on the second member, and, too, on its conclusion. *Cf. Apol.* 28 e *ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, εἰ ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἔτακτον ἕμενον — τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν — ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.* See on 502 b and 499 d.

26. **ἄθλιος ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν**: some such idea as this frequently occurs in Plato; for example, in the *Republic* and *Laws*. *Cf. Crito* 47 d, e *ἐὰν διολέσωμεν (sc. τὸ σῶμα) ἆρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ;* Οὐδαμῶς. Socrates makes there a similar estimate of the relationship of soul to body.

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τος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει, ἄν τε ἐκ θαλάττης ἄν τε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἐάν τε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθενοῦν σώσῃ· ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ b ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν. ✗

LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σῴζοντα ἡμᾶς· οὐδέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σῴζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σῴζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ c ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὡς οὐδὲν τἆλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ

512 b LXVIII. 1. **νόμος**: *usage, custom. Cf. τὰ νομιζόμενα.*

3. **μηχανοποιόν**: Socrates has in mind the constructors of great machines which were used in the defence of beleaguered cities, and of which the second Punic war offers a celebrated example. The military engineer saves at the same time the lives of many men, — the orator only one life at a time. — **μὴ** (οὐχ) **ὅτι**: see on 450 e.

4. **ἐλάττω δύναται σῴζειν**: this use of the neut. acc. is extended from the cognate. *Cf. Apol.* 30 c *ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε.* On the pl., *cf.* the adverbial use of the neut. pl. by Thucydides. 'A chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.' Rid. § 43.

5. **μή σοι δοκεῖ**: the answer assumed in the following *καίτοι* would run as above: *μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.* For the interrogative *μή*, see G. 282, 2. — **κατὰ . . . εἶναι**: *to be comparable to, i.e.* worthy to be put upon the same plane with. *Cf. Apol.* 17 b *ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ.* 512 b

7. **τὸ πρᾶγμα**: "his business." — **καταχώσειεν**: *would cover under a mass, e.g.* of arrows, like obruere. *Cf.* Hdt. vii. 225 *ἐν τούτῳ σφέας τῷ χώρῳ ἀλεξομένους . . . κατέχωσαν οἱ βάρβαροι βάλλοντες.* The use of this word brings up the image of war and the hurling machines of the *μηχανοποιοί*, whose weapons, however, in this case are to be *λόγοι* instead of *λίθοι*. c

8. **λέγων**: the omission of an object clause is accounted for by the addition of *παρακαλῶν*, which at the same time extends and defines *λέγων*. The use of *δεῖν* is rather strange; it would go better with *λέγων*. Perhaps there is a mixture of two constructions. For the matter, *cf.* 486 c.

9. **ὡς κτέ.**: see on 509 e.

9 f. **ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος**: *for his case is strong enough.*

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λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ ὑεῖ αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ' ἂν αὖ τῷ σαυτοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον; οἶδ' d
ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔστω ἀρετή, τὸ σῴζειν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποιός τις ἔτυχεν, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἰατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, ὅσαι τοῦ σῴζειν ἕνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾖ ἢ τὸ σῴζειν τε καὶ σῴζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ

512 c 11. **ἀποκαλέσαις**: *call slightingly*. *Cf.* Soph. *Ai.* 726 *τὸν τοῦ μανέντος κἀπιβουλευτοῦ στρατοῦ ξύναιμον ἀποκαλοῦντες*. The displacement of the first *οὔτε* from its normal position is common enough.

14. **ἐξ ὧν**: stands either for *ἐκ τούτων ἐξ ὧν* ("for the reasons for which you praise your art") or *ἐκ τούτων ἃ* ("from that which you say in praise of your art"), more likely the latter. See H. 996 a.

d 16. **βελτίων καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων**: such combinations are common. *Cf. Phaedr.* 246 a *θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε καὶ ἡνίοχοι αὐτοί τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν*, Lys. *in Agor.* 18 *δοῦλον καὶ ἐκ δούλων ὄντα*, Soph. *Phil.* 384 *πρὸς τοῦ κακίστου κἀκ κακῶν Ὀδυσσέως*, 874 *εὐγενὴς γὰρ ἡ φύσις κἀξ εὐγενῶν*, Paul *ad Phil.* iii. 5 *Ἑβραῖος ἐξ Ἑβραίων*. — In this passage, moreover, we see in its worst colors the opposition between the theory championed by Callicles and his actual practices. The former is a kind of sophistical latitudinarianism; the latter, the narrow-mindedness of Greek tradition. 512 d

17. **μὴ ἔστιν**: the regular accentuation of *ἐστι* after *μή* and *τοῦτο*.

18. **ὄντα**: constr. with the understood subject of *σῴζειν*. — **ὁποιός τις ἔτυχεν**: "without regard to moral qualities."

22 f. **μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν κτέ.**: the change from the subjv. to the indic. *ἐστί* may be due to forgetfulness on the part of the speaker, who, after giving the keynote to the sentence with the *μὴ γάρ* at the beginning, shifts to the independent, straightforward indic. construction. If the *ἐστί* is to be construed rigidly with *μή*, understanding again *ὅρα*, then we must consider that Socrates rejected the subjv., which may refer either to the present or the future, for the indic., which leaves no ambiguity as to its time sphere. That Socrates is aware of the grammatically uncertain structure of his sentence is shown by the *τοῦθ' ὅρα* below. But see Goodwin's view, GMT. 269.

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τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς e
ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέ-
ψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξίν,
ὅτι τὴν εἱμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ
σκεπτέον, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι
ὡς ἄριστα βιοίη, ἆρα ἐξομοιῶν αὑτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ
ἐν ᾗ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σε ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι 513
τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλὴς εἶναι
καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτε-

512 e 23 f. **τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα**: has reference to the lengthy exposition of Callicles in ch. XXXVIII. ff., especially 485 c, d, where the activity of Socrates is characterized as unmanly. Wherein true manliness consists, Socrates shows in his defence, *Apol.* ch. XVI. f. and XXIX.—**ἐατέον**: *cf.* 484 c *ἐάσας φιλοσοφίαν*. For the construction, see on 507 c.

24 f. **ἐπιτρέψαντα . . . τῷ θεῷ**: this feeling of submission to God's decrees Socrates preserved even to his death. *Cf. Apol.* 41 d *οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι.*

25. **περὶ τούτων**: for emphasis, instead of the simple acc. *ταῦτα*. But see Rid. § 106.—**ταῖς γυναιξίν**: because these hold more firmly to what is old and time-honored, both in dialect (*cf. Crat.* 418 c *αἱ γυναῖκες μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σῴζουσι*, Cic. *de Or.* iii. 12. 45) and in belief. This same old belief is expressed by Hector Z 488, *μοῖραν* (*i.e. τὴν εἱμαρμένην*) *δ' οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν*. It is ridiculed as an old wives' tale by the Epicurean Velleius in Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* i. 20. 55 as follows: Hinc vobis exstitit primum *illa fatalis necessitas quam εἱμαρμένην dicitis*, ut, quidquid accidat, id ex aeterna veritate causarumque continuatione fluxisse dicatis. Quanti autem haec philosophia aestimanda est cui tamquam *aniculis* et iis quidem indoctis, *fato fieri videantur omnia?* By the words *ἐπιτρέψαντα κτέ.*, Socrates declares in a delicate way that this belief of the women harmonizes with the principles of true manliness better than the view of the highly cultured Callicles. 512 e

26. **οὐδ' ἂν εἷς**: *οὐδείς* is separated for the sake of emphasis. See G. 77, 1, 2; H. 290 a.—**τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ**: see on 452 c. *ἐπί* denotes the immediate succession.

27. **μέλλοι**: is optative by assimilation to the potential *ἂν βιοίη*.

29. **καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα**: introduces the application to Callicles and his relation to the Athenian state. In sense the clause depends on *σκεπτέον* above, but loosely. 513 a

31. **τοῦθ' ὅρα**: returns to the beginning, since the sense has become

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λεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς
35 ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἴει ὀντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἥτις σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνα- b
σθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ
40 εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὁμοῖον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει,

513 a somewhat obscured by the intervening additions. The use of *σοὶ καὶ ἐμοί* resumes the previous unemphatic *σέ*, inasmuch as each one wishes to obtain the others' acceptance of his own view of life.

33. **τὰς Θετταλίδας**: the Thessalian women were very skilful in sorcery and poisoning. They stood in close relation to the night-goddess Hecate; hence people ascribed to them the power to draw the moon from the heavens. Strepsiades says in Ar. *Nub.* 749 *γυναῖκα φαρμακίδ'· εἰ πριάμενος Θετταλὴν | καθέλοιμι νύκτωρ τὴν σελήνην κτέ.* *Cf.* Hor. *Epod.* 5. 45 quae sidera excantata voce Thessala | lunamque caelo deripit. For this, however, the goddess exacted punishment, for Suidas says *αἱ τὴν σελήνην καθαιροῦσαι Θετταλίδες λέγονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τῶν παίδων (v. l. ποδῶν) στερίσκεσθαι. εἴρηται ἐπὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ κακὰ ἐπισπωμένων ἡ παροιμία.* *Cf.* also Plin. *N. H.* xxx. 1. 2 (6). Aristophanes' designation of them under the name *φαρμακίς*, while it implies that their art consisted in the manipulation of drugs, does not limit us to that view, because Herodotus, vii. 114, uses the verb *φαρμακεύειν* in speaking of the sacrifice of white horses by the Magi to the river Strymon. 513 a

33 f. **σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις**: *at the risk of our dearest interests.* For the asyndeton, see on 450 b. — **τὰ φίλτατα**: denotes the soul and its *ἀρετή*, as in *Prot.* 314 a *ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύῃς καὶ κινδυνεύῃς.* In *αἵρεσις* lies a play on *καθαιρεῖν*.

35. **ὀντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων**: recalls the promises made for rhetoric by Gorgias.

39. **μιμητήν**: imitation is not to be thought of, for immoral action with a correct moral feeling is impossible. Hence the similarity must be original (*αὐτοφυῶς*). b

41. **φιλίαν τῷ δήμῳ**: substantives involving action, either physical or mental, sometimes take the construction of their corresponding adjs. or verbs. *Cf.* 522 d *βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ*, *Apol.* 30 a *τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.* H. 765 a.

42. **καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους**: see on 481 d.

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St. I. p. 513.

ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· c
τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι
χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται· εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο
λέγεις, ὦ φίλη κεφαλή, λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλ-
λίκλεις;

LXIX. Καλ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ
λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος·
οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.

Σω. Ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις ἴσως καὶ βέλ-
τιον ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσει. ἀναμνή- d
σθητι δ' οὖν, ὅτι δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ
ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς

513 b **44. πολιτικὸς εἶναι**: since these words would be understood if not present, the special insertion of them can only serve to emphasize the identity of wish and result.

c **45. τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων**: as an illustration of the sentiment, *cf.* Dem. *Ol.* iii. 19 ἀλλ' *οἶμαι μέγα τοῖς τοιούτοις ὑπάρχει* ("comes to the aid of") *λόγοις ἡ παρ' ἑκάστου βούλησις.*

47. ὦ φίλη κεφαλή: a humorously pathetic mode of address, borrowed from the Homeric usage (Θ 281 *et al.*). *Cf.* also Soph. *O. R.* 950 *ὦ φίλτατον γυναικὸς Ἰοκάστης κάρα etc.* Our use of the word 'heart' in tender address is analogous. *Cf.* Shaks. *Love's Labor Lost*, v. 3: 'Good heart, what grace hast thou thus to reprove?' *etc.*

LXIX. **2. τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος**: namely that they listen gladly only to that which harmonizes with their opinions, and are very loath to offer on the altar of more perfect knowledge the views they have come to cherish; hence they remain undecided, as Meno says, *Meno* 95 c *ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.* The candor of Callicles here as compared with his earlier obstinacy is quite remarkable. For the asyndeton, see on 450 b. 513 c

5. ἴσως: this addition shows that the fulfilment of the condition is still very doubtful. *Cf.* Socrates' remarks on the necessity of time to convince, in *Apol.* 19 a, 37 a, b, quoted on 455 a.

d **7. δ' οὖν**: *but then*, emphasizes, in contrast to the uncertain hope just expressed, what *must* happen *in any case*. *Cf. Apol.* 17 a. The Latin equivalent is certe. Socrates has in mind at the moment ch. LV. f., where, however, reference was made to the conversation with Gorgias and Polus in ch. XIX. f.

8. ἕκαστον: subject to *θεραπεύειν*.

8 f. πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν: epexegetic to *μίαν* (*sc.* *παρασκευήν*). *μὴ καταχαριζόμενον* limits *ὁμιλεῖν* which belongs also to *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον*, and

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ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ
10 καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἃ
τότε ὡριζόμεθα;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὖσα· ἦ γάρ;

15 Καλ. Ἔστω εἰ βούλει σοι οὕτως. e

Σω. Ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε
σῶμα τυγχάνει ὂν εἴτε ψυχή, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστιν τῇ πόλει
20 καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς
πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπρο-
σθεν ηὑρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδε-
μίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ κἀγαθὴ ἡ διάνοια ᾖ τῶν 514

513 d requires the supplying of an indefinite subject. See on 512 d ὄντα.

10. καταχαριζόμενον: used in *Apol.* 35 c with the acc. (τὰ δίκαια). διαμάχεσθαι frequently takes περί τινος. See also on 502 b, 503 a.

e 15. εἰ βούλει: added by Callicles here, as εἴ σοι ἥδιον in 514 a, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι 516 b, to avoid responsibility. It is almost parenthetical.

16. ἡ . . . ἑτέρα: there is no need of an explanatory appositional clause corresponding to ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, since the inference from d is sufficient. The lacking verb (τυγχάνει οὖσα) on account of the parallelism must be taken from the preceding words of Socrates. ὅπως . . . τοῦτο is added to correspond to ἀγεννὴς . . . κολακεία, thus, "is directed to that end, *viz.*" *etc.* The connexion is a loose one.

20. θεραπεύειν: the addition of the inf. here is an afterthought, after the object which in sense belongs to it has been already proleptically connected with the preceding verb. *Cf. Crito* 52 c ἐπιθυμία σε . . . ἄλλων νόμων ἕλαβεν εἰδέναι. See Kr. 61, 6, 8; Rid. § 180. 513 e

20 f. ὡς . . . ποιοῦντας: connected (as a correlative) epexegetically with οὕτως. *Cf. Phaedo* 59 a σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτὲ μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες. The position of the οὕτως, which in sense is to be construed with θεραπεύειν, is due to the form of the sentence. The partics. agree in case with the unexpressed subj. of θεραπεύειν, *viz.* ἡμᾶς.

23. ἐὰν μὴ κτέ.: explains ἄνευ δὴ τούτου. — διάνοια: *i.e.* the inner activity of the soul itself, its reasoning, thinking; hence it is often used for the mode of thought, the disposition, and even for the soul itself. 514 a

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μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχήν τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν. θῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον.

Σω. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὔ; b

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα ᾠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν· καὶ εἰ μὲν ηὑρίσκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ c μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ᾠκοδομημένα ἡμῖν,

514 a 27. **εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν κτέ.**: by a series of analogies Socrates tries to show that the profession of statecraft implies various preliminary qualifications, and that the incipient statesman ought to be subjected to an examination as to his education and previous habits, instead of following the Athenian practice. *Cf. Prot.* 319 d *ἐπειδὰν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως δέῃ βουλεύσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος ναύκληρος, πλούσιος πένης, γενναῖος ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς ἐπιπλήττει ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθὼν οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ*, Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2. 1–7.

28. **δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες**: almost equivalent to **δημοσιεύοντες.** — **τῶν πραγμάτων**: must be considered as part. gen. after **δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες**, and is not to be construed with the following clause, with Cron. 514 a

29. **ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν**: these are themselves the greatest public works, but the addition of *μέγιστα* serves to emphasize the importance of the matter and the responsibility of the person.

30. **πότερον**: the second member of the double question is found in the **ἢ οὔ** which follows the repeated **ἔδει ἄν** below. — **ἔδει ἄν**: instead of **ἔδει**, shows that the whole condition is purely fictitious and unreal. The simple **ἔδει** would have drawn attention only to the inf. GMT. 423.

35. **δεύτερον αὖ τόδε**: to be completed from the preceding **πότερον κτέ.** b

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πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ διὰ ἡμῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων νοῦν ἐχόντων ἦν ἂν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἴχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἦν ἄν που ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ᾽ αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι ἢ οὔ; d

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἐγώ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, "φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς

514 c 41. **ἰδίᾳ διὰ ἡμῶν**: would lead us to expect as a contrast *κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων*. But *κοινῇ* is omitted as self-evident, while *ἰδίᾳ* gives a certain definiteness to *διὰ ἡμῶν*.

42. **διακειμένων** (*viz.* *ἡμῶν*) : is used absolutely; *νοῦν ἐχόντων* is to be connected with *ἦν* as above, 500 a *παντὸς ἀνδρός*.

45. **οὕτω δέ** : correlative with *οὕτω μέν*. See on 512 a. — **ἀνόητον ἦν ἄν** : *cf.* below, e *καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν* and *ἀνόητον ἂν εἶναι*.

d LXX. 1. **οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα** : these words would seem to indicate the conclusion of the induction and the transition to its application to the question under discussion. Meanwhile, however, Socrates cites another example which is still closer to his idea. Hence *τά τε ἄλλα καί*, which at the same time sums up and emphasizes. — **κἄν** : is to be resolved into *καὶ ἄν*, the *καί* being correlative with *τέ*, and not going with *εἰ* in the sense "even." For the repetition of the *ἄν*, two lines below, see 465 c, d, and on 475 e.

2. **δημοσιεύειν**: the general word 514 d to denote the public practice of any profession or business which is for the benefit of the community. See on 452 a *δημιουργός*. In the case of physicians, are included not merely those who are in the service of the government, but also private practitioners. See on 455 b.

3. **ὡς . . . ὄντες** : expresses in a different form what is found above, a, in the phrase *ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά*, *viz.* the department of activity to which attention is drawn.

4. **φέρε κτέ.** : change to direct quotation occurs frequently as here, without the employment of a definite verb of saying. — **δέ** : often employed in lively questions which are closely connected with the words of another. So here. Socrates offers himself to the state as a physician, *but* in what state of health is his own body? *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 26 (in the myth of Prodicus, after Κακία had praised her gifts) *καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀκούσας ταῦτα, Ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα δέ σοι τί ἐστι;*

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ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;" κἂν ἐγώ, οἶμαι, περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ηὑρίσκομεν δι' ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

514 d 6. **ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος**: *cf.* 502 d and 515 a. The distinction between slaves and freemen, which was always present to the mind of a Greek, is emphasized here because it was common for slaves to be treated by less skilled physicians, who might themselves be slaves, as we learn from *Legg.* iv. 720 c *ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ξυννοεῖς ὅτι δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων ὄντων τῶν καμνόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς μὲν δούλους σχεδόν τι οἱ δοῦλοι τὰ πολλὰ ἰατρεύουσι.* *Cf.* Herm. *Gr. Alt.* iv.[3] § 38.

e 11. **ἀνθρώπους**: from the particular to the general, which also includes the particular. We should say "people" in the same way. It is remarkable, however, how quickly Socrates returns to the first person in the next clause. One must have in mind an individual before he can give particulars.

12. **ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι**: is the contrast to *κατορθῶσαι*. When one is beginning in a profession much is necessarily, from inexperience, done at a risk, and may or may not succeed. For the phrase *ὅπως ἐτύχομεν*, *cf.* 521 c, *Crito* 45 d *τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσι*, "the success of your sons is left as far as you are concerned to the caprice of chance." *Prot.* 353 b *ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο λέγουσι*, qui quidquid in buccam venit dicunt. The usual inference is unfavorable. The partic. is to be supplied from the following verb. 514 e

14. **εἰ τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν**: the proverb denotes, "to begin with the large instead of with the small." *Cf.* *Lach.* 187 a *εἰ γὰρ νῦν, πρῶτον ἄρξεσθε παιδεύειν, σκοπεῖν χρὴ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ὑμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὑέσι τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισί, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὑμῖν συμβαίνῃ ἐν πίθῳ ἡ κεραμεία γιγνομένη.* A proverb from the potter's art was natural among the Athenians, where the art flourished (Κεραμεικός).

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Σω. Νῦν δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς 515
ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ
παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψό-
μεθα ἀλλήλους, "φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τωὰ βελτίω πεποίηκε
τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὤν, ἄδικός
τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλός τε
κἀγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;"
λέγε μοι, ἐάν τίς σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί b
ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ
συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστιν τι
ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;

Καλ. Φιλόνικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

LXXI. Σω. Ἀλλ' οὐ φιλονικίᾳ γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς
ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι, ὁντινά ποτε τρόπον οἴει δεῖν
πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν. ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν
ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι c
πολῖται ὦμεν; ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο
δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὡμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὔ;

515 a 19. **ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν**: a pathetic address. See on 513 c.

20. **ἄρτι ἄρχει**: on the age of Callicles at the time of this dialogue, see Introd. § 15. — On the matter, *cf. Apol.* 36 c *ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως.*

22. **φέρε κτέ.**: see on 514 d.

23 f. **ἄδικός τε κτέ.**: various kinds of *πονηρία*, as contrasted with the corresponding virtues. *Cf.* 491 e ff.

b 28. **εἴπερ κτέ.**: Socrates' opinion can be readily perceived. Between these repeated questions we must assume short pauses. On the possessive pronoun followed by the gen., see H. 691; G. 137, N. 1. 515 b

30. **φιλόνικος εἶ**: the accusation is a confession of weakness, having much the same force as Crito's answer (*Crito* 54 d) *ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.* See on 457 d.

LXXI. 3. **ἐν ἡμῖν**: *cf. ἐν τοῖς πολίταις, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ.* In spite of the addition of *δεῖν*, no subject for *πολιτεύεσθαι* is expressed. But we should not feel the ellipsis in English, and often make such without noticing it. — **ἡμῖν**: seems to be a kind of ethical dat. See G. 184, 3, N. 6; H. 770. Cope translates the clause, 'whether we shall find you concerning yourself about anything else,' *etc.*

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ἀποκρίνου. ὡμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. d

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων; ἐποίει ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.

515 c 7. **ὑπὲρ σοῦ**: *cf. Apol.* 22 e *ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, so that I asked myself in the name of the oracle.*

11. **πολῖται**: the idea of this word (as also of *πολιτεύεσθαι*) approaches so near that of "statesmen" that it is frequently used in that sense; *e.g.* in the speech of Diodotus against Cleon (Thuc. iii. 42. 5) *χρὴ τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην μὴ ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦντας ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον λέγοντα.* *Cf.* below, e. Above we find *πολιτικὸς ἀνήρ* and also *ἀνήρ* simply, used in the same sense; *cf.* 517 a.

d 15. **ἐποίει**: *sc.* in the course of his activity as a statesman. — **ἀντὶ χειρόνων**: the brachylogy is here harder than in the case where the relation is reversed; *e.g. Polit.* 308 a *ἀντ' ἐλευθέρων γενόμενοι δοῦλοι.* We might have expected *ἐκ.*

17. **ἤρχετο λέγειν**: here denotes not so much Pericles' first appearance before the people as the first period of his political life. This began even before the death of Ephialtes, who, owing to the machinations of his enemies, was murdered shortly after the banishment of Cimon (460 B.C.). The height of Pericles' power was reached after the death of Cimon and the banishment of Thucydides, son of Melesias (443 B.C.). — On the construction of *ἄρχεσθαι*, see on 488 a. 515 d

18. **τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν**: Socrates is referring again, not so much to Pericles' last oratorical efforts, but to the last period of his political activity, which fell within the first years of the Peloponnesian war. On the result of his last speech (430 B.C.) Thucydides (ii. 65) remarks: *Τοιαῦτα δὲ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειρᾶτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὀργῆς παραλύειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην. οἱ δὲ δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπείθοντο . . . οὐ μέντοι πρότερόν γε οἱ ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐζημίωσαν χρήμασιν.* — On the neut. pl., see on 512 b and Kr. 46, 3, 2.

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Σω. Οὐκ ἴσως δή, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκῃ ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης. e

Καλ. Τί οὖν δή;

Σω. Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.

Καλ. Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

515 d 20. **ἀνάγκῃ**: is adverbial dat. corresponding to the adverb ἴσως.

e 22. **τί οὖν δή**: see on 453 b and 497 d. The reply of Socrates shows that he intends Callicles himself to draw the necessary inference from what he proceeds to bring forward.

26. **ἀργοὺς** κτέ.: this accusation is based upon a suspicion that Pericles, in order to bring about certain desirable measures in the government, employed bribery disguised under the names of *μισθὸς στρατιωτικός*, *δικαστικός*, *ἐκκλησιαστικός*, and *θεωρικός*, of which, however, only the first two can be ascribed to Pericles. On this dole the Athenian citizens could live in a poor way at the expense of the state, and they lost perhaps some of that energy which was characteristic of them in earlier times. — **δειλούς**: the Athenians became timid, as a natural consequence of their inactivity, in that they (much later however) withdrew from personal war service, and depended on mercenaries exclusively.

27. **λάλους**: to activity in the real service of the state, principally of course in the assembly, was soon joined a desire to seek entertainment in public. For here their curiosity, a natural failing, was nourished by continual gossip and talk. This was the case in the time of Demosthenes (*Phil.* i. 10), of Paul (*Acts* xvii. 18), and is the case at the present day. See on 461 e. — **φιλαργύρους**: the desire to obtain money from the public treasury became continually stronger and more universal, and wrought great damage to the government. At the time of Demosthenes the continuance of the *θεωρικόν* was especially injurious, because the means for military purposes were thereby greatly curtailed. Plato's criticism of Pericles was always unfavorable, which, however, is not to be wondered at, since his youth fell during the years of Athenian depression, which the oligarchy ascribed to the mistakes of the great democratical leader. — **μισθοφορίαν**: on the growth and effects of this policy at Athens and elsewhere, see Grote, Hist. xi. 281 (c. lxxxvii.).

515 e 29. **τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων**: the Laconian imitators (*λακωνίζοντες*, *λακωνομανοῦντες*) in Athens were thus

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Σω. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηὐδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν ὑπ' 516
35 αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

LXXII. Καλ. Τί οὖν; τούτου ἕνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;

Σω. Ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ

515 e named from having their ears often broken in the πυγμή by the straps with which the hands were covered (see Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv.[3] § 37, p. 347). They formed a party, hostile to the democracy, which saw in Lacedaemon the model of a noble state, and looked to her for help. They practised Lacedaemonian severity in all external matters; hence they wore mustaches, short mantles, *etc.*, and practised gymnastics very diligently. To harden the body, they even engaged in boxing, which was forbidden in Sparta. They became naturally, therefore, butts for ridicule. *Cf. Prot.* 342 b. — By this remark Callicles here accuses Socrates of partisanship.

516 a **34. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί**: with bitter irony. If they were really good, the righteousness of the judgment of Pericles would have been recognized; but if this judgment was unrighteous, then Pericles did not make them good. — **ὑπ' αὐτοῦ**: γίγνομαι, as passive of ποιῶ, requires ὑπό for the agent.

35 f. **κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ** κτέ.: in the second year of the Peloponnesian war, when Pericles returned from an expedition against the Spartan coast, the slumbering discontent of the people, caused by the devastation of Attica by the Spartans and the ravages of the plague in Athens, broke out against him in the form of an accusation as a result of which he was fined a sum of money, the amount of which (15, 50, 80 talents) is not certain. Thuc. ii. 59; 65. See on 515 d. That the ostensible charge was embezzlement of the public funds is supported by this passage alone, but that various rumors were current of his dishonesty can be gathered from the story of Alcibiades' advice to him in Plut. *Alcib.* vii. Περικλεῖ δὲ βουλόμενος ἐντυχεῖν ἐπὶ θύρας ἦλθεν αὐτοῦ. πυθόμενος δὲ μὴ σχολάζειν, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν καθ' ἑαυτόν, ὅπως ἀποδώσει λόγον Ἀθηναίοις, ἀπιὼν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης· "εἶτα" ἔφη "βέλτιον οὐκ ἦν σκοπεῖν αὐτόν, ὅπως οὐκ ἀποδώσει λόγον Ἀθηναίοις;"

LXXII. **4. εἰ παραλαβών**: not designed as an epexegesis to τοιοῦτος ὤν, which merely gives the general

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λακτίζοντας [ἑαυτὸν] μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητὴς ὁστισοῦν ὁτουοῦν ζῴου, ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέ- b
λαβε; δοκεῖ ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότερον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἓν τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά; c

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος. σὺ δὲ τί φῄς; οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἵους παρέλαβε, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.

516 a idea which runs through all the preceding thought, but added to give those details to the simile which seem to be requisite. — **παραλαβών**: *receiving for training*. See on 483 e. — The position of the words λακτίζοντας, κυρίττοντας, and δάκνοντας is probably merely a chance one.

6. **ἀπέδειξε**: the word means "to show or prove as the result of a process," often in mathematical reasoning; here as the result of training. *Cf.* below c **ἀπέφηνεν**. Hence also the expression **ἀποδεικνύναι τινὰ στρατηγόν**. See on 484 b.

b 10. **ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι**: see on 513 e. The reply of Socrates is full of irony. 516 b

11. **ἀποκρινάμενος**: for the tense, see on 491 c.

16. **ἔδει**: without ἄν. See on 514 a.

17. **ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων**: see on 515 d.

20. **οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος**: there is no such direct assertion in any passage of Homer, but the same sense is seen in ζ 120, ι 175 **ἦ ῥ' οἵ γ' ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι**. Here, moreover, the leading thought is the utter exclusion of any idea of **δικαιοσύνη** from the **ἄγριοι**. c

24. **ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλοντο**: *cf.* *Apol.* 25 d **ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται**

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Καλ. Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;

Σω. Εἰ δοκῶ γέ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

Καλ. Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους;

Καλ. Ἔστω. d

Σω. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

Καλ. Οὐ σύ γε φῄς.

Σω. Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὡμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ e

516 c ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι. For ὅν, see on 453 e. The ellipsis is to be supplied from what precedes.

d 33. οὐ . . . φῄς: see on 450 d.

35. ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτόν: Cimon was a supporter of the Lacedaemonian league, and also caused the Athenians to send aid to the Spartans in the third Messenian war. But when the Athenians were dismissed in so humiliating a manner at Ithome, his opponent, Pericles, turning to account the indignation of the people, succeeded in effecting his banishment in B.C. 461. The term of banishment by ostracism was limited by law to ten years. But Cimon was recalled about B.C. 457, also at the instance of Pericles. Since ostracism (Herm. *Gr. Alter.* i. § 130) was properly not a punishment, Socrates, in the words ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἔτη μὴ ἀκούσειαν, is merely making a point against the influence of Cimon in the state.

37. Themistocles was banished in B.C. 471, and went to Argos. Here he was accused by the Spartans of participation in the treason of Pausanias, or μηδισμός, and to escape investigations fled to the Persian king, a step which was followed by the confiscation of his magnificent property at Athens. 516 d

38. προσεζημίωσαν: *and in addition they punished*, etc. *Cf. Apol.* 20 a σφίσιν ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. — τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι: this short adverbial expression seems to have been used simply as a distinguishing epithet, and it is not likely that the Greeks supplied or felt any ellipsis such as is suggested by Cron, *viz.* τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι (Μαραθῶνι alone) παραταξάμενον (μαχεσάμενον) or νικήσαντα. The epithet is the more emphatic as the victors at Marathon (Μαραθωνομάχαι Ar. *Nub.* 986) were unusually revered by posterity. In consequence of the unfortunate expe- c

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βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύ-
τανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί,
ὡς σὺ φῄς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὔκουν οἵ γε
ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν
ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσιν τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ
ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότ' ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐκ ἔστι
ταῦτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὔτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί· ἢ δοκεῖ
σοι;

Καλ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Σω. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, 517
ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολι-
τικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὡμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν
οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς
ἄνδρας· οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες,
ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ
ἐχρῶντο — οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον — οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

516 e dition against Paros, Miltiades was, on the prosecution of Xanthippus, declared guilty of ἀπάτησις τοῦ δήμου, and fined fifty talents. According to Hdt. vi. 136, his adversary demanded the penalty of death, which was averted by the intercession of friends.

39. εἰ μὴ διά: "if it had not been for." The prytanis probably exerted his influence before the division, though this whole story seems to be much overdrawn.

40 f. εἰ ἦσαν . . . ἔπασχον: opposition to generic present. *Cf.* 471 a. Goodwin (GMT. 410) considers this as a case of real opposition to the past.

41. οὔκουν κτέ.: the neg. contained in οὔκουν (Kr. 69, 51, 2) applies not to the second member alone, but to the two members together; the co-existence of the two clauses is denied. This form sharply emphasizes the self-contradiction which is fundamental in Callicles' view. — The results of the whole argument are now summed up as briefly as possible. 516 e

50. σὺ δὲ κτέ.: with ὡμολόγεις must be supplied the participial clause of the preceding sentence. From this also we must take a verb of saying to govern a τινάς also to be supplied from οὐδένα of the clause τῶν . . . ἔμπροσθεν. 517 a

52. ἐξ ἴσου: has almost the force of an adj. See Kr. 43, 4, 5; H. 798 f.

54. οὐ γὰρ ἐξέπεσον: we find additions, such as ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος, ἀρχῆς, τυραννίδος, and the like; also δόξης, οὐσίας (ἐκ τῶν ἐόντων, Hdt. iii. 14). The verb ἐκπίπτειν serves thus as a passive to ἐκβάλλειν, though the image is that of a chariot driver who is

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LXXIII. Καλ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται, οἷα b τούτων ὃς βούλει εἴργασται.

Σω. Ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει· ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ c πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὃν διαλεγόμεθα, οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ

517 a thrown out. *Cf.* the English phrase 'fall through,' as applied to a design or project. — **οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ**: *sc.* with which they might have saved themselves, according to Callicles' view (511 c, 486 b), but which Pericles despised.

LXXIII. 1. **ἀλλὰ μέντοι . . . μή ποτε**: "But yet, the men of the present day are at least far from being able to," *etc.*

b 3. **ὃς** (ὅστις) **βούλει**: used like the Lat. quivis, by a looseness of construction. *Cf. Phileb.* 43 d *τριῶν οὖν ὄντων ἡμῖν ὄντινων βούλει, Crat.* 432 a *ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός.* Rid. § 189.

4 f. **ὅς γε διακόνους εἶναι**: *as far, that is, as their being servants of the city is concerned.* See Madv. *Syn.* § 151, GMT. 781, for examples. The distinction here drawn rests also, as is quickly shown, on what has been demonstrated in ch. XIX. ff. But it 517 b is more extensive.

7. **μεταβιβάζειν**: "to give another direction to." See on 493 a. This verb and *ἐπιτρέπειν* are resumed by *οὐδὲν τούτων*, and depend on *διέφερον*. A similar passage (without the intervening acc.) is *Prot.* 328 a *ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀγαπητόν.*

8. **ἐπιτρέπειν**: we must supply a dat. from the preceding acc. See on 460 d. The verb has a slightly different sense in 504 c.

10. **τούτων**: note the variety in the use of the pronouns; *τούτων* is the same as *τῶν νῦν* above, and hence *ἐκεῖνοι* is required to take the place of *τούτους* above.

11. **ναῦς κτέ.**: *cf.* 455 d. c

12. **εἶναι**: equiv. to *ὅτι ἦσαν.*

15. **εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ περιφερόμενοι**: similar in form, but not in meaning, to

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ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅτι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ οὖν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὡμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι, ὡς ἄρα διττὴ αὖτη τις ἡ πραγματεία ἐστὶν καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονική ἐστιν, ᾗ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ ῥιγῷ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾷον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ πoριστικὸν εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἢ ὀψοποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ σκυτοδεψόν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν

517 c the English phrase "argument in a circle," *i.e.* a coming back again to the point of departure. *Cf. Rep.* v. 456 b **ἥκομεν εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι.**

16. ἀλλήλων: is to be connected, as a kind of subjective or possessive gen., with the following indirect question. See H. 733; Kr. 47, 10, 8. "Each other's language."

17. διττὴ κτέ.: notice the position of the **τις**, which belongs to **διττή**, "a kind of doubled." See on 491 c.

d **19. ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα**: the second member of the correlation is divided into two parts of which the first is indicated by **ὅτι ἔστιν τις** κτέ. (below, e), and the other by **τὴν δὲ . . . δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων** (518 a). — **ᾗ . . . εἶναι**: the shift from the regular indir. disc. indic. to an inf. is not uncommon. *Cf. Rep.* x. 616 b **ἔφη ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους ὅθεν καθορᾶν ἄνωθεν** κτέ. Rid. § 281; GMT. 755.

21 f. ἄλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται κτέ.: *anything else, that the body comes to want.*

24. πoριστικὸν εἶναι κτέ.: in what follows, three varieties are distin- 517 d guished. The **κάπηλος** is the small dealer, hawker or shopkeeper, who deals properly with products of the land (among which are included wines in 518 b); the **ἔμπορος** is the regular merchant and wholesale dealer. *Cf. Prot.* 313 c. The **δημιουργός** is the one who prepares from the raw material the various articles demanded by the needs of the body.

26. σκυτοδεψόν: is unusual for **βυρσοδέψης** (*tanner*). e

27. ὄντα τοιοῦτον: includes under one expression all the divisions and subdivisions of the **πoριστικὸν εἶναι**, but owing to the introduction of **θαυμαστόν ἐστιν** the construction is changed and the partic. takes the place of the inf. What Socrates wishes to explain is that one who attends to the needs of the body, even though he may understand nothing of either gymnastics or medicine, may very easily himself become possessed of the idea that he is the genuine conserver of the body, as well as inspire the same belief in others.

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εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι, ὅτι ἔστιν τις παρὰ ταύτας ἁπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶν σώματος θεραπεία, ἥνπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἐστιν εἰς ἀρετὴν σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε 518
καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώμα πραγματείας, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταὐτὰ οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, τότε μέν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτε λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἥκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων, ὅτι ἄνθρωποι καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ b
οἵτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, οἵτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιΐαν συγγεγραφὼς τὴν

517 e **28. παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι**: added as a restrictive explanation to the preceding *τοῖς ἄλλοις*, which is far too general a statement for Socrates.

28 f. παρὰ ταύτας ἁπάσας: see on *τὰς ἄλλας κτέ.* below, 518 a.

518 a **34. δουλοπρεπεῖς**: plays on 485 b and similar expressions in the earlier conversation with Callicles, *e.g.* 485 d. The attributes of rhetoric and philosophy are just reversed.

36. τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας: "arts ordinarily designated as such."

b **45. Θεαρίων**: and the following-named persons are sometimes mentioned by later authors, Μίθαικος for example, among those whom Athenaeus xii. 12 cites as authors of works on cookery (*τὰ ὀψαρτυτικά*). The title of his work can be surmised from this passage. That the art of cookery, especially in rich and proud Syracuse, was early developed, Plato testifies in *Rep.* iii. 404 d *Συρακοσίαν τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψου.* *Cf.* Hor. *Od.* iii. 1. 18 Siculae dapes. The *ἀρτοκόπος* is at the same time a cake-baker. The *ἄρτος* made from wheat meal was a festival dainty, as is to be judged from Athenaeus iv. 14 *Σόλων δὲ τοῖς ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτουμένοις μᾶζαν παρέχειν κελεύει, ἄρτον δὲ ταῖς ἑορταῖς προσπαρατιθέναι.* Sarambus probably had a wine-shop. 518 b

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Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. c

LXXIV. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγανάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι "ἄνθρωπε, ἐπαίεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαΐοντας καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἵ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν d καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας· οἱ δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντές τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ ἡ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῷ ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ

518 c LXXIV. 1. **ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγανάκτεις**: as Callicles really did when Socrates proved to him that he understood nothing at all of statecraft.

2. **ὅτι**: see on 521 b.

3. **παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους**: the addition of *ἀνθρώπους* ("fellows") is contemptuous.

4. **καλὸν κἀγαθὸν**: is used by Plato regularly of persons. Schanz, ii. 2 *proll.* 1, has collected only sixteen cases where it is not so used. Three such examples are found in the *Gorgias, viz.* 514 a, 526 a, in addition to the present passage. — **περὶ αὐτῶν**: refers according to sense to *γυμναστικῆς*, but is made general in view of b above.

4 f. **ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν**: see on 514 e. Here, "if they so chance," *i.e.* perhaps.

d 6 f. **προσαπολοῦσιν . . . σάρκας**: Demosthenes expresses the same idea by a somewhat different simile in *Ol.* i. 15 *ὥσπερ οἱ δανειζόμενοι ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις τόκοις μικρὸν εὐπορήσαντες χρόνον ὕστερον καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπέστησαν.* Also with the following *ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσιν παρόντες cf.* Dem. *Ol.* i. 16 *ἐγὼδὲ οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθ' ὅτι πολλάκις ὑμεῖς οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστάτους περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπόντας ἐν ὀργῇ ποιεῖσθε ἄν τι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβῇ, Phil.* ii. 34 *ὁρῶ γὰρ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἐνίους οὐκ εἰς τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς ὑπὸ χεῖρα μάλιστα τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφιέντας.* 518 d

7. **οἱ δ' αὖ**: the construction is loose, but the context prevents ambiguity.

10 f. **ἥκῃ φέρουσα**: gives a picture, — "it is actually at hand, bringing disease with it," — for the more prosaic "has brought about disease." See on 491 c.

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ψέξουσιν καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἷοί τ' ὦσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιάσουσιν."
καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζει· e
ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τούτους εἰστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν, καί φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης 519
καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν b
ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι.
αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν

518 e 16. **τούτους**: is defined by the following *τὴν πόλιν*. With *καί φασι* the subject changes, so that *αὐτούς* refers to the same as *οἵ*, while *τούτους* furnishes the subject for *καί φασι*.

18. **οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστι**: the first term denotes an external swelling or bloated condition, which may, however, for the time have all the appearance of health; the latter, the internal and hence invisible seat of disease.

519 a 20. **φόρων**: duties and imposts which the Athenians imposed upon *other* states, but expended only for their own interests.

21. **καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν**: with a side hit at 490 c and a more definite reference to 455 e. *Cf.* Dem. *Ol.* iii. 29, quoted on 490 c. 519 a

22 f. **τοὺς τότε παρόντας κτέ.**: again the same thought as in d above.

25. **σοῦ . . . ἐπιλήψονται**: contains an allusion to 486 a. For the partitive gen., see H. 738 a, and on 469 c. — **καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου**: on the value of this prophecy of Socrates for determining the date of this discussion, see Introd. § 19. For the reader, the life of Alcibiades will serve as a most convincing proof of the soundness of Socrates' statements.

29. **ὁρῶ, ἀκούω**: Socrates desires b to emphasize that in the past as well as the present the same thing has been repeating itself.

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μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος· τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψευδός ἐστιν. προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως
35 οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἧς c
προστατεῖ· κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τἆλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατ-
40 ηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν, ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς, τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν· καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώ- d
τερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόν-
45 τας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ὃ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ

519 b 31. **ἀγανακτούντων**: depends upon *αἰσθάνομαι* with the omission of *αὐτῶν*. The pl. is due to the plural idea, and to the *ἀνδρῶν*. The statement holds good for *all*, though the action affects the individual only.

33. **ἄρα**: postpositive, as in *Prot.* 355 b *ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστι κατάδηλον ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἄρα.* Here it serves to characterize the assumption as a result that follows of itself.

c 35. **οὐδ' ἂν εἷς**: see on 512 e.

36. **ὅσοι κτέ.**: loose connexion. The same case, "as well in regard to those who, *etc.* . . . as, *etc.*"

37. **προσποιοῦνται**: Socrates is thinking of the task which each class assumes, *viz.* to make the subject of their treatment better, to endow him with virtue. The pretended statesman promises this result to the whole body of citizens; the sophist, to the individual. *Cf.* 519 c Isocr. xiii. 5 f.

40. **σφᾶς αὐτούς**: *themselves indeed*, with more emphasis than the simple *σφᾶς*, which is more usual as the indir. reflexive. *Cf.* 520 b.

d 42. **καί**: but little different from *καί τοι* (*and yet*) in rejoinders, especially to statements made by the speaker. *Cf. Apol.* 29 b *καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστίν;* Dem. vi. 16 *καὶ τίς ἂν ταῦτα πιστεύσειεν;*

43. **ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς κτέ.**: *sc.* as one must assume, according to the statement of the sophists. The addition of *ἐξαιρεθέντας ἀδικίαν . . . ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ* (just here lies the *ἀδικία*) *ὃ οὐκ ἔχουσιν* serves to bring out very strongly the want of consistency in the theory.

44. **σχόντας**: *after they had gotten.* See on 503 e. *Cf. Apol.* 19 a, Soph. *El.* 1256 *μόλις γὰρ ἔσχον νῦν ἐλεύθερον στόμα.*

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σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ ἑταῖρε; ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

LXXV. Καλ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;

Σω. Ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, e ἐπειδή μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ, εἰπὲ πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ, ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;

Καλ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;

Καλ. Ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδ- 520 ενὸς ἀξίων;

Σω. Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλω αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἴει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταὐτόν, ὦ

519 d 46. **ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν**: here denotes the delivery of a long, connected discourse as opposed to dialectic investigation. It is also a reply to Callicles' accusation in 482 c *ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν.*

e LXXV. 3. **ἔοικά γε** (*sc.* *οἷός τ' εἶναι κτἑ.*): is a partial assent to the assertion implied in Callicles' question, "You would doubtless be quite capable," *etc.* — The following clause with *γοῦν* seems to be urged in proof, but it is really more of a complaint. — **συχνοὺς . . . τῶν λόγων**: *cf.* 465 e *συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα.* The part. gen. emphasizes the distinctness of the arguments. — For the agreement of the adjective in gender and number with the subst., *cf.* Xen. *Cyr.* iii. 2. 2 *πολλὴν τῆς χώρας*, iv. 5. 4 *τῶν ἄρτων τοὺς ἡμίσεις.* 519 e

5. **πρὸς φιλίου**: see on 500 b.

10. **παιδεύειν . . . εἰς ἀρετήν**: *cf.* Xen. *Cyn.* 13. 3 *ἐπ' ἀρετήν.*

11. **ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις**: *what would one have to say?* "One need not waste words over such people." Callicles, although at bottom himself a sophist, affects to despise the class in accordance with Gorgias' view concerning them. See Introd. § 8, especially note 22. 520 a

15. **ὅταν τύχωσιν**: has here much the force of "occasionally." See on 518 c.

16. **ταὐτόν**: emphatic asyndeton, which as an answer to the question immediately preceding has the effect of a negation.

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μακάρι', ἐστὶν σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστιν σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς. μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ᾧμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι, ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὓς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀπο-

520 a 17. ἢ ἐγγὺς κτέ.: on the use of the adverb, see Kr. 62, 2, 4. τι goes with it as τις with the adj., "pretty nearly." See on 491 c.

b 20. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κτέ.: *cf.* 464 b ff.

22. καὶ ᾧμην: the position of καί here, which would properly be connected with μόνοις, is due to the desire to emphasize this latter word by putting it at the head of the sentence.

23. τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι: that which receives their training, whether it be a whole commonwealth or an individual. The abstract neut. generalizes, as in *Prot.* 312 c, where of the sophists themselves it is said: καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ' (*i.e.* what a sophist is) ἀγνοεῖς οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὐτ' εἰ κακῷ πράγματι.

25. ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ κτέ.: *without, at the same time. Cf. Phaedr.* 245 d τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι. Cron supplies from οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν the words ἀνάγκην εἶναι, but it is very doubtful whether the Greeks felt the ellipsis. *Cf.* 471 d.

520 b

c 29. προέσθαι τὴν εὐεργεσίαν: every piece of instruction given the scholar by the teacher is looked upon as a benefit, and the pay is simply a compensation for benefit received. To προέσθαι, which of itself denotes a freewill gift, is added ἄνευ μισθοῦ in order to make more plain the contrast with the practice of the sophists, which ran so counter to the customary ideas of the Greeks (*cf. Apol.* 19 e f., 31 b, 33 a). The practice of Protagoras, as it is told us in *Prot.* 328 b, c, is noteworthy in this connexion.

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στερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ πρόοιτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ d βραδυτῆτι, οἶμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικίᾳ· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

LXXVI. ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔοικέ γε. e

ΣΩ. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντιν' ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὖτη

520 c **34. ὅτι μάλιστα**: to be connected with the partic. clause ἅμα μεταδιδούς, simul atque tradit. — **ἅμα**: on the adv. with the partic., see H. 976; GMT. 858.

d **39 f. οὐδὲν δεινὸν** κτέ.: see on 517 a, and *cf. Apol.* 28 b οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. It has much the force of the English, 'there is no danger that,' etc. See Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil* iii. 204.

LXXVI. 1 f. **τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλάς**: almost equiv. to τὰς περὶ ἄλλων συμβουλάς.

5 f. **ὅντιν' ἄν τις τρόπον** κτέ.: epexegetic to ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, "this matter." The ἀρετὴ πολιτική which the sophists professed to teach included both sides, — management of one's own household and of the state. *Cf. Prot.* 318 e τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περί τε τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. 520 e

7. **μὴ φάναι . . . ἐὰν μή**: generic conditional of the present. The first μή is due to the infinitive.

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τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν· ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν. 521

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι, τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; τἀληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων· καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.

520 e 11 f. **ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν**: the old way of writing was *ἀντευποιεῖν*; but a verb can retain its original form only when compounded with a preposition. See H. 581. Gratitude is only a kind of justice.

12. **ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι**: *sc.* as testimony to the fact that the teacher has really made him better. The common form of the conditional, where the second member is the converse of the first, is *ἐὰν μέν . . . εἰ δὲ μή*. See on 502 b. The use of *εἰ* with fut. indic. also in the first member emphasizes the rarity of the case. The subject of *εὖ ποιήσας* is indefinite, 'any one,' as of *μὴ φάναι* above.

521 a 16 f. **τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως**: denotes political activity in the sense shown in ch. LVI. above, and in accordance with the principles deduced in ch. XIX. ff. The correct answer to the question propounded would be: "As matters are, I invite you to neither mode; for the one is immoral, the other (as Socrates also makes plain in *Apol.* 31 d f.), for the present impossible." Hence, also, Socrates intimates that the only way of engaging in true politics is at present limited in Athens to the improvement of individuals in private intercourse. The use of the article with *θεραπείαν* implies that both kinds have been previously mentioned, — as is more definitely stated in the following explanation. *Cf. Crat.* 439 a *εἰ οὖν ἔστιν μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα δι' ὀνομάτων τὰ πράγματα μανθάνειν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτῶν, ποτέρα ἂν εἴη καλλίων ἡ μάθησις.* 521 a

17. **τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι**: *cf. Apol.* 29 b *αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος (ἀμαθία) ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν.* According to Madv. *Syn.* 49 a, the epexegetic gen. is usually found only with the inf.

18. **ὡς ἰατρόν**: see on 514 d. — **ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα**: the two words *ὡς ἰατρόν* have caused a shift in the construction where we should have expected (*cf.* 513 d) something like *ἢ τὴν τοῦ καταχαρίζεσθαι κτέ.* In the answer of Callicles we have a simple verbal quotation of Socrates' words, without the speaker's troubling himself to observe any fixed construction. One might supply *παρακαλῶ σε.*

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Καλ. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα. b

Σω. Κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.

Καλ. Εἰ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις —

Σω. Μὴ εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι "ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἕξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ λαβὼν c ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς."

LXXVII. Καλ. Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἂν ἓν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν

521 b **24. κολακεύσοντα**: pronounces such a judgment upon διακονήσοντα that its opposition to the idea γενναῖος (γενναιότατε, γενναίως εἰπέ) is strongly emphasized.

25. εἰ σοι Μυσόν γε κτέ.: when two conditional clauses are contrasted by εἰ μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ μή, we not infrequently find the conclusion of the first condition omitted. GMT. 482; H. 904 a. The sense of this passage seems to be: "Yes! if you prefer to use the vilest name for it." The Mysians were so despised that even slaves brought from Mysia were as little thought of as the Sardi venales at Rome. Hence Μυσῶν ἔσχατος was a proverb (*Theaet.* 209 b τὸ λεγόμενον Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον), meaning "the vilest of the vile." Cic. *pro Flacc.* 27 Quid porro in Graeco sermone tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam si quis despicatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse dicatur? κολακεύειν was an unpleasant word to the Greek ear, and doubtless offended the euphemistic taste of Callicles. *Cf.* the English proverb, 'to call a spade a spade.' — ὡς: see on 509 e. — This passage has troubled the editors. 521 b

27. ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας: 486 a, b, 511 b. Polus, however, had already said the same.

29. ἐάν τι ἔχω: to be compared with χρήσεται αὐτοῖς in the line below.

30. ὅτι ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος: ὅτι is often used to introduce a direct quotation. For examples, see Spieker, *Am. Jour. Phil.* v. 220.

LXXVII. **1. ὡς μοι δοκεῖς**: to be understood as a sportive exclamation. *Cf.* 490 e. c

2. μηδ' ἂν ἕν: see on 512 e. — **ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδών**: "as if you dwelt outside the world," where no one could reach you.

2 f. ἂν εἰσαχθείς: see on 458 a, and *cf.* Xen. *An.* i. 1. 10 αἰτεῖ εἰς δισχιλίους ξένους καὶ τριῶν μηνῶν μισθόν, ὡς οὕτως περιγενόμενος ἂν τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν.

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εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.

Σω. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὀντινοῦν ἄν, ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὃ σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς μ' ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι· καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἴπω δι' ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς,

521 c The difference in the participles is the same as it would be in direct discourse: *οἰκῶ ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθείην*. *Cf.* 486 b.

5. **ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί**: the particle **ἄρα** has the force, "as it seems," as frequently. Socrates is not to be understood as saying that he is *ἀνόητος*, but only that according to Callicles' view he would be.

6. **ὀντινοῦν ἄν, ὅτι τύχοι**: "any one may experience anything." The more usual mood would be subjv. *ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ*, instead of optative. But the opt. is not uncommonly found by attraction in relative sentences which are dependent on clauses with *ἄν* (either opt. or indic.). GMT. 558. On the subject-matter, *cf. Meno* 94 e *ἐγὼ* (Anytus is introduced as speaking) *μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι. ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾷδιόν (ῥᾳδίον) ἐστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ· ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνυ.* *Apol.* 31 d, e, and Dem. *Ol.* iii. 11 ff. also agree with this. 521 c

7 ff. **τόδε . . . προσδοκῶ**: these words sound like a prophecy in the mouth of Socrates, but were probably intended by Plato as a severe criticism on his accusers. d

8. **περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων**: referring to the nature of the punishment to be undergone. *Cf.* above, b. — **ὅ**: where we should more naturally have *ὃν*, but see on 486 d.

13. **ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος**: this limitation is intended to be exact, as the repetition of *μόνος* shows. On the matter, see *Apol.* 30 d ff.

16. **οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον**: the repetition in a changed form of the idea already expressed serves to heighten the contrast. See on *οὗτος* 452 e. e

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τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἥκει λόγος, ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι "ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχναίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, 522 πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ηὐώ-

521 e 18. **τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα**: this employment of Callicles' epithet (*cf.* 486 c) is probably not without design on Socrates' part, according to whose view it applies better to rhetoric than to philosophy.

19. **ὁ αὐτὸς . . . λόγος**: in the passage referred to (464 d) Socrates is actually speaking to Gorgias, who has taken Polus' place for the time, but what he says applies just as well to Polus, as is seen by reference to 463 e and 465 a.

19 f. **κρινοῦμαι**: probably passive; but if so, it is the only example in Attic prose (see Kr. 39, 11, A). On the other hand, the fut. middle of *ἀδικέω* is regularly used for fut. passive. *Cf.* 509 d, and see H. 496 a.

22. **ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς**: *cf.* 486 a *εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος*. How *ἐν τούτοις* is to be understood, is shown by *τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς* below.

23. **ὦ παῖδες**: what follows as far as *εὐώχουν ὑμᾶς* is a parody on the accusation made against Socrates, especially in so far as he was declared to be a corrupter of the young.

24. **ἀνήρ**: without the art. because it is disparaging. But see H. 674. — **τοὺς νεωτάτους**: instead of *τοὺς νέους*, because the supposed judge himself is a child. 521 e

24 f. **διαφθείρει καὶ ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ**: are loosely connected with *κακὰ εἴργασται* as denoting two species of the evils complained of, — *διαφθείρει* the more severe treatment by *τέμνων τε καὶ κάων*, — *ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ*, the less severe by *ἰσχναίνων καὶ πνίγων*. The latter is explained by *πικρότατα κτέ.* and *πεινῆν . . . ἀναγκάζων* in chiastic position. It denotes, therefore, the condition of wretchedness and discomfort brought about by fasting and nauseating medicines. While *διαφθείρει* reminds one of the accusation before the court, *ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ* applies especially to the customary criticisms which were made against Socrates. See on 522 b below.

27. **οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγώ**: a compressed expression, in which *οὐ*, though really without a verb, is connected with the following clause as equiv. to *οὐκ εὐωχῶν, ὥσπερ κτέ.* *Cf. Symp.* 179 d, e (*θεοὶ*) *ἐποίησαν τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ* ('Ορφέως) *ὑπὸ γυναικῶν γενέσθαι οὐχ ὥσπερ* 'Αχιλλέα . . . *ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν.* *Cf.* Dem. *Phil.* i. 34. Translate *οὐχ ὥσπερ* by "whereas." 522 a

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χουν ὑμᾶς·" τί ἂν οἴει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι "ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς," πόσον οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;

Καλ. Ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι, ὅτι χρὴ εἰπεῖν; b

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

LXXVIII. Σω. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδ' ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελίας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν

522 a 30. **πόσον**: not *τί*, because the uproar would be characterized by volume rather than by distinctness.

31. **ἀναβοῆσαι**: *sc.* as the judges of Socrates really did. Hence the repeated entreaty of Socrates, *μὴ θορυβεῖτε*. *Cf. Apol.* 30 c *ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε*.

32. **ἴσως κτέ.**: is, according to the sense, a decisive affirmation, though it is given unwillingly and grudgingly. — **οἴεσθαί γε χρή**: is not very appropriate here; it is frequently employed where the speaker answers himself, *e.g. Crito* 53 c *καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον ἂν φαίνεσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί γε χρή*, *Prot.* 325 c.

33. **ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ κτέ.**: *cf.* Hdt. ix. 98 *ἐν ἀπορίῃ εἴχοντο ὅτι ποιέωσι*.

LXXVIII. 2. **οὔτε γάρ**: the corresponding member to this is *ἐάν τέ τίς με κτέ.*

b 4 f. **ἐγὼ δὲ** (*while I*) . . . **πορίζεται**: is outside of the regular construction.

5. **ἢ νεωτέρους**: in view of *τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους* we might expect *τοὺς νεωτέρους*. If the reading is sound, we must look upon *νεωτέρους* as entirely indefinite in the sense of "young people," and *τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους* as "the older" as compared with them, *e.g.* their fathers, *etc.* 522 b

6. **ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα**: this accusation was actually made against Socrates, as we see from *Meno* 79 e, where Meno says, *ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν*, and Socrates himself says in *Theaet.* 149 a *λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.* — **τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κτέ.**: an example is afforded by *Apol.* 29 d ff., where Socrates represents himself as saying to any one he meets, *ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν κτέ., χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς*

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λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι "δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω c τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί," οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

ΚΑΛ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἓν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὐτῷ, μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρη- d κὼς μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ

522 b βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; *Cf.* Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 49 ff.

7. **λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους**: corresponds to πικρότατα πώματα διδούς in the comparison.

8. **ὅτι δικαίως** κτέ.: Socrates really speaks in this vein in *Apol.* 30 e ff.

c 10. **ὅτι ἂν τύχω**: see on 521 c.

12. **καὶ ἀδύνατος ὤν**: in form coordinate with, but in sense explanatory of, **οὕτως διακείμενος**, which refers to what precedes.

14. **εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε** κτέ.: the apod. is to be sought in the implied affirmation to the question **δοκεῖ σοι καλῶς ἔχειν**. *Cf.* 503 c. The addition of **ἕν** to the pron. makes it very emphatic, as in *Rep.* vii. 537 b (though here the order is different) μία καὶ αὕτη τῶν βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη.

15. **βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη**: not to be considered as a circumlocutory perfect; but the partic. denotes a condition brought about by a course of action (**εἰρηκὼς μήτε εἰργασμένος**) which, begun in the past, still continues. 522 c

17. **αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια**: the use of τις instead of the art. shows that d Socrates feels he is stretching language a little. The dat. is after the analogy of the preceding dat. with the partic.; but see on 513 b.

19. **ἐξελέγχοι**: *should confute me by showing*. Hence the partic. follows the analogy of verbs of showing.

20 f. **καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις**: "whether . . . or."

21. **μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου**: the disgrace, to the mind of Socrates, consists, not in the fact that one suffers a defeat at the hands of his adversary **ἐναντίον πολλῶν**, but in the unsuspected weakness which is thus laid bare. Hence, so far as the purpose in hand is concerned, ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν would be equivalent to ἀδικίαν.

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διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν· εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ τελευτῴην ἔγωγε, εὖ e οἶδα ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ Corpse?
μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τἆλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.

LXXIX. ΣΩ. "Ακουε δή," φασί, "μάλα καλοῦ λόγου," 523
ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς

522 d 23. **εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς** κτέ.: so Socrates also declares after his sentence, *Apol.* 38 d **ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἳ' ἂν ὑμῖν ἥδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν**, and in 38 e, after he has given a characterization of that rhetoric to the use of which he would not lower himself, **οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν.**

e 24 f. **αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ** κτέ.: the fear of death Socrates declares also in the *Apology* to be due to the worst kind of ignorance, — that which thinks it knows what it does not know. "Death is commonly considered an evil, although no one knows but that it is the greatest good (*Apol.* 29 a, 37 b). On the other hand, evil is to be greatly feared for its consequences, both here and hereafter." **τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν** is the "act of dying," **τὸ τεθνάναι**, the resulting condition, death, which latter Socrates discusses in *Apol.* 40 c.

26. **ἀλόγιστος**: *cf. Apol.* 37 c **οὕτως** 522 e **ἀλόγιστος . . . ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι.**

29. **λόγον**: denotes here, not a dialectical proof, but a "story," a "tale." *Cf.* **λογογράφος. κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα** is used in the same way in *Apol.* 40 c.

LXXIX. 1. **ἄκουε δή**: a solemn be- 523 a ginning, in order to stimulate interest. Similarly *Tim.* 20 d **ἄκουε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγου μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς, *Theaet.* 201 d **ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος.** The gen. with **ἀκούω** gives the **λόγος** almost the authority of a person. See G. 171, 2, N. 1; H. 742 c.

2. The distinction between **λόγος** and **μῦθος**, which are often contrasted, is that **λόγος** is said of the true and the actual; **μῦθος**, of the fictitious. By this distinction Socrates wishes to call attention to the fact that a truth lies at the basis of the following myth, while the dress of it is a matter of indifference, — not that he actually believes the story as it stands. In this light we must also consider

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ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσει-
5 δῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων b

523 a his statement ὡς ἀληθῆ κτέ., looking to his explanation in *Phaedo* 114 d τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί, ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεί περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν. See Thompson's note.

3 f. **ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος λέγει**: Socrates refers to O 187 ff., where Poseidon says:—

τρεῖς γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφεοὶ οὓς τέκετο Ῥέα,
Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ' Ἀΐδης ἐνέροισιν ἀνάσσων.
τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς·
ἦ τοι ἐγὼν ἔλαχον πολιὴν ἅλα ναιέμεν αἰεί
παλλομένων, Ἀΐδης δ' ἔλαχε ζόφον ἠερόεντα,
Ζεὺς δ' ἔλαχ' οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσιν
γαῖα δ' ἔτι ξυνὴ πάντων καὶ μακρὸς Ὄλυμπος.

Socrates commences with this passage so as to be able to assume therefrom an empire of the dead, or the existence of the soul after death, as an admitted fact which requires no proof.

5. **παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον**: by making thus the sway over the world a matter of inheritance simply, Socrates avoids the common story of hostile relations between Cronus and his sons. 523 a

6 f. **ἦν οὖν νόμος ἐπὶ Κρόνου . . . ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς**: that is, the fundamental distinction between good and evil is also an eternal one. The addition of *ἐν θεοῖς* is appropriate, inasmuch as the law which was in force during the reign of Cronus is made perpetual by being adopted by his successors, the gods. — **καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν**: *from that time to the present.*

8 f. **εἰς μακάρων νήσους**: according to Homer, δ 564, Zeus transferred his favorites (Rhadamanthys and Menelaus, the latter a son-in-law of Zeus, are especially mentioned) *alive* to the Ἠλύσιον πεδίον, where they pass a blissful existence. The first mention of the *Islands* of the Blessed is found in Hesiod (ἔργα κ. ἡ. 170), who makes them the place to which the men of the fourth race, the heroes and chieftains of the Trojan war are sent *after death* as their reward. The *punishment*, on the other hand, of the men of the second and third races is that after death they must wander in Hades (*ib.* 152 ἐς εὐρώεντα δόμον κρυεροῦ Ἄϊδαο). The myth is then further developed, and the Isles of the Blessed become gradually in the common belief, largely through Pindar's influence, the abode of all the righteous after death. *Cf.* Pind. *Ol.* II. 75 ff. (Gildersleeve). b

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νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν,
τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης
δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ
δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες
ᾗ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν. κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο· ὅ τε
οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόν-
τες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῷεν σφίσιν ἄνθρωποι
ἑκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεύς· "ἀλλ' ἐγώ," ἔφη, c
"παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι

523 b
ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἑστρὶς
ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν
ἀδίκων ἔχειν
ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου
τύρσιν· ἔνθα μακάρων
νᾶσος ὠκεανίδες
αὖραι περιπνέουσιν, κτέ.

Tartarus was originally, according to Homer, the prison of the Titans; *cf.* Θ 13, 478. Plato alone makes it the prison of *all* wrong-doers. The term *μακάρων νήσους* became stereotyped very early; hence we never find the prose word *μακαρίων* used in it.

9. **ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ**: on the omission of the art., see G. 142, 4, N. 5; H. 672 b.

11 f. **τούτων δὲ δικασταί**: the representation of a court of the dead, with other judges besides Pluto himself, and *before* the souls enter Hades, is first found in the Platonic version of the myth.

12. **ἔτι νεωστί**: (*still more recently, when*, etc.) is contrasted with *ἐπὶ Κρόνου*, so that *τοῦ Διὸς . . . ἔχοντος* forms the explanation of it. Heindorf connects *ἔτι νεωστί* with *ἔχοντος*, and translates: recente adhuc Iovis imperio. See on 503 c.

13. **ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων**: this presentation is quite in harmony with the mythical form which Socrates adopts. The object is to show the contrast between a judgment which is human, uncertain, and based on external appearances, and the true one, which is based on accurate inspection of the unveiled truth. For this purpose the human tribunal is supposed in the myth to have existed first; the second tribunal is then made by Plato to *arise* as a substitute for the first, although naturally it must be conceived as existent ever since the creation of man. The first tribunal admits of the same criticism as the one in use among men deserves. 523 b

15. **οἱ ἐπιμεληταί**: who these are remains uncertain. The addition *οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων* shows that they abode there, though their functions probably extended also to Tartarus. On the attraction of the preposition, see G. 191, N. 6; H. 788 a.

17. **ἑκατέρωσε**: *i.e.* as well to Tartarus as to the Isles of the Blessed; hence **ἀνάξιοι** refers both to reward and punishment.

18. **νῦν μὲν γὰρ κτέ.**: note the repeated employment of *γάρ*, which cor- c

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δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ," ἔφη, "οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν," ἦ δ' ὅς, "ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν· οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν," ἔφη, "παυστέον ἐστὶν προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον. νῦν γὰρ προῖσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμ-

523 c responds well to the strongly marked (repeated ἔφη) direct speech.

21. ἠμφιεσμένοι: the 'clothing' is to be understood in the wider sense, as everything external which would affect the estimation of a man, — *e.g.* beauty of person, noble origin, wealth, *etc.* *Cf.* 451 e, and *Prot.* 319 c κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ᾖ καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων.

22 f. ἔρχονται κτέ.: here the Attic court is visible behind the myth.

d 25. πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς: sense-perception is, according to Plato, always untrustworthy, and hence the knowledge gained through it is always uncertain, often untrue. With that, Socrates contrasts the knowledge which is gained by the immediate and thoughtful action of the soul itself, which he represents here as soul-perception.

27. ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται: "comes before them," "puts itself in their way." Their wrappings become a hindrance to perception of the truth.

28 f. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν: introduces the preliminaries which must first be settled. 523 d

30. τοῦτο: is the condition of προείδησις mentioned in the previous clause. Closely connected with it is αὐτῶν as a gen. of possession, such as we see occurring with θαυμάζειν, *e.g.* *Phaedo* 89 a ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ (*in him*) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο κτέ., *Apol.* 17 a μάλιστα αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα. The regular const. with both verbs is an acc. of the person with a gen. of the thing.

31. τῷ Προμηθεῖ: in the Attic cult, Prometheus was honored next to Hephaestus and Athena as a benefactor of mankind. As such he bore the surname πυρφόρος, under which name Sophocles celebrates him in *Oedipus Coloneus*, where he says of the neighborhood which Oedipus enters (*O. C.* 54 ff.): χῶρος μὲν ἱερὸς πᾶς δδ' ἐστ', ἔχει δέ νιν | σεμνὸς Ποσειδῶν ἠδ' ὁ πυρφόρος θεὸς | Τιτὰν Προμηθεύς. Of his enmity with Zeus, which Aeschylus, following Hesiod, made the

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νοὺς κριτέον ἁπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνε- e
σθαι. καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ
ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος
35 ἑκάστου, ἐρῆμον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα
ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρί-
σις ᾖ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς
ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς υἱεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας,
Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν·

523 d central point of his magnificent poem, there is no mention either in Sophocles or in Plato, who also, in the *Prot.* 320 d, in the myth of the Gods related by the sophist, says: *προσέταξαν Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμῆσαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἑκάστοις ὡς πρέπει.* As a Titan he is called the son of Iapetus. — Not to be mistaken is the allusion to Aeschylus *P. V.* 248–251, though with a modification of the tone:

ΠΡ. *Θνητοὺς ἔπαυσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον.*

ΧΟΡ. *Τὸ ποῖον εὑρὼν τῆσδε φάρμακον νόσου;*

ΠΡ. *Τυφλὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατῴκισα.*

ΧΟΡ. *Μέγ' ὠφέλημα τοῦτ' ἐδωρήσω βροτοῖς.*

— **ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ**: see on 481 a and 480 d. Whether the manner of bringing about this desired object was also prescribed to Prometheus, or left to his own ingenuity, is not said. — **αὐτῶν**: must be taken as the gen. of the person, with *τοῦτο* as object of *παύσῃ*. As a rule we have the reverse.

e 32. **ἁπάντων τούτων**: *i.e.* clothes, *etc.*, mentioned above. — **τεθνεῶτας γὰρ κτέ.**: does not give the reason, but simply the explanation of the preceding expression; for *τεθνεῶτας κτέ.* is no basis for *γυμνοὺς κτέ.*, but rather the reverse.

33 f. **αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυ-** 523 e **χήν**: emphasizes the immediateness of the scrutiny on the side both of object and subject.

34. **ἐξαίφνης**: combined, just like *ἅμα*, with the partic., which it either precedes or follows. See on 520 c.

37. **πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς**: on account of his position as king of the gods, for *πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας.* Hes. *ἔργα κ. ἡ.* 267.

38 f. **ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας . . . Εὐρώπης**: the prep. *ἐκ* can be used of parentage or of place of origin; here the latter. According to Hom. Ξ 321 f. Minos and Rhadamanthys were sons of Europa, and born in Crete, of which Minos was afterwards king, while Aeacus was called the son of Aegina. Minos was famed as a wise law-giver, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus for their wisdom, justice, and piety. — The Greeks of Plato's time divided the earth into two parts. *Cf.* Isoc. *Paneg.* 179 *τῆς γῆς ἁπάσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κειμένης, δίχα τετμημένης καὶ τῆς μὲν Ἀσίας, τῆς δ' Εὐρώπης καλουμένης.* Plato must accordingly reckon Crete as belonging to Asia, unless we are to conceive that he had in mind the fact that Phoenix or Agenor, father of Phoenix and Cadmus and grandfather of Europa, was king of Phoenicia. To these three, which are also

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οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, 524
ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ, ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων
νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας
Ῥαδάμανθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίῳ δὲ
πρεσβεῖα δώσω ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορῇτόν τι τὼ ἑτέρω, ἵνα
ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ᾖ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις."

LXXX. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι b
λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῇτον ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἥττον ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν

523 e mentioned by Dem. *de Cor.* (xviii.) 127, the Attic hero Triptolemus is added in *Apol.* 41 a.

524 a 40. **ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι**: Socrates is thinking of the 'asphodel meadow' of Hom. λ 539, 573. According to Homer, it seems to have stretched through the whole of Hades, and to have been the abiding place of the shades. *Cf.* ω 13 αἶψα δ' ἴκοντο κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα | ἔνθα τε ναίουσι ψυχαί, εἴδωλα καμόντων. Plato places it at the entrance of Hades.

41. **ἐν τῷ τριόδῳ**: epexegetical apposition according to the *σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος*. For the matter, *cf.* Verg. *Aen.* vi. 540 hic locus est, partis ubi se via findit in ambas: | dextera quae Ditis magni sub moenia tendit, | hac iter Elysium nobis; ac laeva malorum | exercet poenas et ad impia Tartara mittit. — **τὼ ὁδώ**: the fem. dual of the art. does not occur in Attic. See H. 272 a, Meisterhans,[2] 46, 17 e.

44. **ἐπιδιακρίνειν**: "to give the final verdict." The office here assigned to Minos is not the same which Homer (λ 568) makes him fill. *Cf.* 526 d. 524 a

45. **περὶ τῆς πορείας**: not concerning their course on earth, but as to whether they shall take the road to Tartarus or that to the Isles of the Blessed. *Cf. Phaedo* 107 d *ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας.*

LXXX. 2 ff. The conclusions which b are drawn from the story here narrated do not begin until d below, *ἐπειδὰν οὖν*. The intervening statements contain supplementary matter, which is drawn by very easy deductions, partly from philosophy, partly from experience.

3. **ὁ θάνατος κτέ.**: *cf. Phaedo* 64 c *εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν εἶναι.*

6. **οὐ πολὺ ἥττον**: would lead us to expect something like *ἢ ὅτε ἔζη*.

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ἕξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ, ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα
τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθή-
ματα ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα c
φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὰν
ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας, καὶ εἰ παχύ, παχὺς καὶ ἀπο-
θανόντος, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως· καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν,
κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ
ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστί-
γων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα
ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· ⟨καὶ⟩ κατεαγότα εἴ του. ἦν μέλη ἢ
διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἐνὶ d
δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα
ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα

524 b The transition to the rel. clause is caused by the expression ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν.

7. ἕξιν: by ἕξις is to be understood the general appearance and condition which a body assumes in virtue of its inner nature, not that nature itself, and not a condition due solely to external agencies. *Cf. Theaet.* 153 b. — ἥνπερ κτέ.: on the omission of the verb, see Kr. 62, 4, 1; H. 613. — τό τε σῶμα κτέ.: the correlative member follows in a different form in d ταὐτὸν δή μοι κτέ. The reason for the change lies in the long-drawn-out οἷον clause, through which the speaker loses the construction.

8. θεραπεύματα, παθήματα: the marks borne by the body are divided into two classes from the point of view of subject and object. See on παθήματα in d below. On the -μα termination, see G. 129, 4; H. 553, 1.

c 10. ἀμφότερα: see on 477 d.

12. κομᾶν: to wear the hair long, somewhat after the fashion of the Spartans, was customary at Athens only up to the age of the Ephebus, with the exception of such men as from their rank (ἱππεῖς), or love of display, chose thus to adorn themselves. Hair cut quite short, however, was considered ἀνδραποδώδης θρίξ. See Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv.[3] § 23. 524 c

14. οὐλάς: as the explanation ἴχνη . . . πληγῶν shows, this word denotes not the fresh wounds (ὠτειλαί), but the scars which remained after they had healed.

17 f. ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ: *sc.* εἰπεῖν, like ὡς d συνελόντι εἰπεῖν. See on 462 b.

18. τὸ σῶμα: *in regard to body.* Constr. with οἷος εἶναι, which depends upon παρεσκεύαστο (*he had formed himself*). So also the middle with the inf. in 507 d, 511 b.

19 ταῦτα: though referring generally to the preceding clause, is used according to the constructio ad sensum, inasmuch as the traces are meant; so that ἢ πάντα κτέ. very readily follows it.

19 f. ἐπί τινα χρόνον: more indefi-

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χρόνον. ταὐτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ε ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς,

524 d nite than *Phaedo* 80 c, where Socrates says of the same thing ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον.

20. **ταὐτὸν δὴ κτέ.**: the analogy of the soul with the body is discussed first in a general way, and then as far as possible worked out in details.

22. **τὰ τῆς φύσεως**: see on 450 c, 453 e.

23. **τὰ παθήματα**: in stating (above, b) the condition of the body, when separated from the soul, Socrates (Plato) uses the expression θεραπεύματα καὶ παθήματα. Here, referring to the soul, he uses παθήματα alone. At the basis of this variation seems to lie some such theory as the following: The human body is susceptible of improvement, by care and training; this care must be exerted by the man himself; hence θεραπεύματα are the results of this care. On the other hand, a lack of care will subject the body to the evil effect of outside evil influences, and thereby to deterioration; παθήματα are the results of this outside influence. The soul is not susceptible of improvement, being perfect at the outset; but lack of care will, just as in the case of the body, subject the soul to the influence of outside forces. There is therefore no place for θεραπεύματα when speaking of the soul. 524 d

24. **ἔσχεν**: see on 503 e, 519 d.— **ἐπειδὰν οὖν**: Socrates resumes his story where he had broken off at the conclusion of ch. LXXIX.

25. **οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας**: an example of distributive apposition. See on 450 c, 503 d. The correlative second member is simply indicated in 526 c by the words ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα κτέ.

26. **ἐπιστήσας**: "he halts them." They would probably otherwise go their own way. e

27. **ὅτου ἐστιν**: see on 447 d.

28. **τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως**: why just this example is chosen, is seen from what is said in 470 e.— **ἐπιλαβόμενος**: see on 519 a.

29. **κατεῖδεν**: another case of 'gnomic aorist,' which gives a certain degree of liveliness to the recital. So εἶδεν, ἀπέπεμψεν. See on 484 a.— **οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν κτέ.**: the following passage can be traced in Tac. *Ann.* vi. 6 neque frustra praestantissimus sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus, quando

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ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἑκάστη ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οἷ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη. 525

LXXXI. Προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι b

524 e ut corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur.

30. **διαμεμαστιγωμένην**: after the analogy of the body, which belongs to a *μαστιγίας* (*cf.* above in c). Likewise *σκολιὰ καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθύ* corresponds to *διεστραμμένα*, and *καὶ . . . εἶδεν* may also have some connexion with *παχύς* above c.

525 a 31. **ἃ**: refers to both the previously named conditions; see on *ταῦτα* above, d. Socrates shows us the immoral condition of the soul under three aspects: 1. The vital principle of morality is *δικαιοσύνη*, hence *ἀδικία* is placed first. Beside this, as its worst form, stands perjury, the punishment of which after death was assumed even in the Homeric age; *cf.* Γ 278, Τ 259 *Ἐρινύες, αἵ θ' ὑπὸ γαῖαν | ἀνθρώπους τίνυνται ὅ τις κ' ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ.* *ἀδικία* accordingly *corrupts the very nature itself* of the soul. 2. The natural *development* of the soul depends upon its knowledge of the *truth*. Lies restrict that development, and hence warp and twist the soul. This image at the same time corresponds to the familiar view of the nature of truth. 525 a

3. Since the activity of the soul is from within outwards, there is need of fixed, definite *limits*. If this quality — *σωφροσύνη* — is lacking, or rather if it lapses into *ἀκολασία*, which according to its surrounding conditions appears as *ἐξουσία*, *τρυφή*, and *ὕβρις* (*ἀκρατία* is a general term, applicable to all forms), then the proper relation between the *separate parts* of the soul is destroyed, and its *form* as a whole becomes unsymmetrical and ugly. One naturally thinks of the extension which the *ἐπιθυμίαι* strive for.

36. **ἀτίμως**: corresponds to the *ἀτιμία* imposed by earthly judges. — **εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς**: for the gen., see G. 182, 2, and on 486 a.

LXXXI. 1. **προσήκει κτέ.**: the purpose of the punishment determines also its measure. To the consideration of this point, Socrates now turns. b

2. **τιμωρουμένῳ**: the passive of the middle. See H. 409 a; Kr. 52, 10, 11.

3. **ἢ παραδείγματι κτέ.**: in this

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ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ φοβούμενοι βελτίους
γίγνωνται. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην
διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι, οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα
ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυ-
νῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφελία καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου·
οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἳ δ' ἂν c
τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι
γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι
αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι
δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέ-
γιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας
τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ

525 b also, as is shown by what follows, the object is improvement, but of others rather than the one punished. The terror-theory is put in the mouth of the Sophist in the *Protagoras*, who says *Prot.* 324 b ὁ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. Plato's theory concerning the punishments of the lower world implies, though it does not expressly mention, the doctrine of the wandering habits of souls which he expounds in other treatises. For the dat., *cf.* 479 e, and see G. 136, N. 3; H. 941.

4. **φοβούμενοι**: because fear leads to reflection, reflection to more correct views, which result in avoidance of evil and corrupt moral habits.

5. **ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες**: the second partic. is logically subordinate to the first ("by undergoing"), though formally co-ordinate. See on 460 d. The correlative to *οἱ μὲν κτέ.* is *οἳ δ' ἂν κτέ.*, in c, which assumes that form on account of his proximity to *οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα κτέ.* 525 b

10. **ἀνίατοι**: since wrong-doing strikes at the very nature of the soul, the soul becomes more or less injured with every new evil deed. And indeed it may go so far in the path of wickedness as to be at last incapable of turning back; that is, it may become incurable. *Cf. Phaedo* 113 e *οἳ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων κτέ.* We must note, however, that the punishment is not determined according to the evil acts as such, — these the judge may not even know, — but by the condition of the soul as brought about by them. c

11. **τὰ παραδείγματα**: the art. is employed on account of the previous mention of this in b, as a result to be gained.

15. **παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους**: as we are accustomed to hang up warnings that the passer-by may think over them carefully.

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ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. ὧν ἐγώ φημι ἕνα καὶ d
Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς
εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ
Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκεν
τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον e
καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν· Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλί-

525 c 16. **ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ**: both expressions are placed side by side by the *σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος*.

17. **θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα**: the second substantive gives the design of the first.

d 18. **Ἀρχέλαον**: *cf.* 470 d–471 d.

20 f. **εἶναι . . . γεγονότας**: participial periphrasis. See Kr. 56, 3, 3, and crit. note on 510 b.

21. **δυναστῶν**: men possessed of power, not merely in monarchical and oligarchical, but also in democratical states; hence the addition of the explanation with *καί*. *Cf.* 479 a, 524 e, 526 b and see on 492 b. Below (30) in the same sense we find *ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων*.

22. **διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν**: *cf.* above, 525 a. The expression very forcibly reminds us of the representations of Polus and Callicles, when praising what they conceived to be the highest happiness.

23. **τούτοις**: "to these statements," "to this view of the matter."

25 f. **Τάνταλον, Σίσυφον, Τιτυόν**: *cf.* Hom. λ 576–600. All three were rulers: Tantalus, the founder of the house of the Pelopidae, was king in Sipylus; Sisyphus, in Corinth; Tityus, in Euboea. Thersites was a bad and despicable man, but his sphere of action was limited and he experienced rough treatment even during his lifetime; B 211–277. 525 e

28. **ἐξῆν**: *sc. τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνειν*. This was the reason why Thersites was not held to be *ἀνίατος*.

29. **εὐδαιμονέστερος**: Socrates here expresses himself with less exactness than in 473 c.—**ἀλλὰ γάρ**: *for, you see.* The clause thus introduced serves a two-fold purpose. It expresses more plainly and definitely what had already been implied above, and it paves the way, by the words *καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροί*, for the new thought which begins with *οὐδὲ μήν*.

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κλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις 526 ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως b διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν.

LXXXII. Ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν, οὔθ' ὅστις οὔθ' ὁντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ

525 e 30. **καί**: "also." Is closely connected with *τῶν δυναμένων*.

526 a 32 f. **ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων**: *cf.* 482 d *οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον*. The acc. is rare and states simply the obj.; the gen. gives the cause, and may be a person or a thing. With the person is generally found either a participial or an adverbial clause. See H. 784.

33. **γιγνομένων**: after *ἐγγίγνεσθαι*, as *Crito* 44 d *ἐργάζεσθαι* after *ἐξεργάζεσθαι*, is quite in accordance with the customary usage. — **χαλεπὸν γάρ**: in our admiration for the 'self-made' man we forget that he has had every incentive to rise, while we withhold our sympathy from fallen greatness, which has had every temptation to fall.

35. **ὀλίγοι**: as also *οἱ σφόδρα πονηροί*. The most stand in the mean, according to *Phaedo* 90 a, b *οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ* 526 a *κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν κτέ.*;

37 f. **τὴν τοῦ διαχειρίζειν**: notice b the epexegetic gen. See on 521 a.

38. **ἃ . . . ἐπιτρέπῃ**: *sc.* power or property, or whatever it be. Plato is probably thinking of Aristides' position as general of the confederate army during the war against the Persians and as one of the founders of the Delian league, by which especially he gained his reputation for probity. *Cf.* Plut. *Arist.* especially ch. XXIII.–XXV. The *καί* before *εἷς* has almost the force of "and that, too."

LXXXII. 1. **ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον**: goes back to 524 e.

3. **οὔθ' ὅστις κτέ.**: *sc.* as was the case in life, when the name of the man was followed by the name of his father to indicate his family.

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τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάν τε ἰάσιμος ἐάν τε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε c ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου, ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός· ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει· ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὁμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν d

χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς

526 b 4. **ἐπισημηνάμενος**: in accordance with the results of his scrutiny, the judge puts upon him a mark and thus decides his fate. *Cf. Rep.* x. 614 c *σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων*, — also of the judges of the dead.

c 6 f. **ἄλλην κτέ.**: the omission of *ψυχήν* is so harsh that Heindorf inserts it — but unnecessarily — after *ἢ ἄλλου τινός*. These latter words form with what follows (*μάλιστα μέν* instead of *ἤ*, "whether philosopher or not, but especially," *etc.*) an explanatory apposition to the general idea, *ἰδιώτου*.

7. **μετ' ἀληθείας**: *cf.* the opposite description in 525 a above.

9. **τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος**: 'to attend to one's own business,' was for a Greek to be both *σώφρων* and *δίκαιος*. That this did not, however, exclude him from taking interest in other people's lives is shown by Socrates' words in *Apol.* 33 a *τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος*. The contrary of this phrase is *πολυπραγμονεῖν*, "to meddle officiously with, and to attack unreasonably the rights of others." *Cf. Apol.* 31 c. 526 c

12. **ῥάβδον ἔχων**: the staff was the badge of public authority, and was borne by heralds, seers, priests, generals, and others, but especially by judges. *Cf.* Dem. *de Cor.* (xviii.) 210 *καὶ παραλαμβάνειν γε ἅμα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ καὶ τῷ συμβόλῳ τὸ φρόνημα τὸ τῆς πόλεως νομίζειν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν δεῖ*. Also *σκῆπτρον* (from *σκήπτεσθαι, to lean on*, ρ 199) had originally this value; *e.g.* A 234 ff., β 37, but became later the name for the badge of a ruler alone.

15. The quotation is from Hom. λ 569. d

17. **ἀποφανοῦμαι**: the simple *φανοῦμαι* is always middle, in the sense "appear"; the compound *ἀπο-* is almost always transitive or active in sense, "present," "show."

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St. I. p. 526.

ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν· χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνῄσκω ἀποθνῄσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους e πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι, ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾖ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν, ἐπειδάν 527 σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσει καὶ εἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακιεῖ.

LXXXIII. Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλή-

526 e 23. **ἀντιπαρακαλῶ**: with reference to 521 a and 485 e ff. — **τὸν ἀγῶνα**: brings up before us at once the public games, at which a prize was awarded. The name is quite applicable to the progress of human life, which is really a contest between different systems as practised by different men. *Cf.* the passage from *Phaedo* quoted on 527 e. But a judicial trial was also called *ἀγών*, and such a one awaits every man at the last judgment. *Cf. Apol.* 34 c *εἰ δ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη.*

25. **ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει κτέ.**: corresponds closely to the objections urged by Callicles in 486 a, b, *νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος κτέ.* In what follows, the words *καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης* express even an augmentation of the insult. 526 e

LXXXIII. 2. **ὥσπερ γραός**: *cf.* the proverb *ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος Theaet.* 176 b. So also in Latin, German, and English. *Cf.* Hor. *Sat.* ii. 6. 77 Cervius haec inter vicinus garrit anilis | ex re fabellas. 527 a

4. **ἀληθέστερα**: of course in comparison with other views which can show less claim to truth. *Cf.* 493 d. Grades of truth are conceivable as steps in that approximation to the perfect truth which abides with God. This approximation is nothing more or less than knowledge, which has the stronger claim to be considered truth the better foundation it has.

5. **σοφώτατοί ἐστε**: such (ironi-

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νων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι, b
ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε
φαίνεται συμφέρων. ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων
ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον
ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλ-
λον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ
εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακὸς
γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ
τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι c
δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν
περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς,
φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον
ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἷ ἀφικό-
μενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος
σημαίνει. καὶ ἔασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου
καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε d

527 a cal) flattery was submitted to by the Sophists the more easily since modesty did not prevent them from applying this epithet to themselves. *Cf. Prot.* 337 d, where Hippias says *ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων κτέ.*

b 7. **ἐκεῖσε**: like *ἐκεῖ*, of life beyond the grave; opposed to *ἐνθάδε* 525 b. The terminus in quem is used, inasmuch as the effect is meant, which reaches even to the beyond.

9. **ἠρεμεῖ**: "stands fast and immovable against all attacks."

11. **οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν κτέ.**: as Aeschylus makes the messenger of Amphiaraus say in *Sept. c. Theb.* 592 *οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει.* These words, as is well known, were applied by the Athenians to Aristides. Plut. *Arist.* iii. *fin.* The two modes of life discussed admit of distinction according to *appearance* and *reality*. 527 b

14. **τὸ γίγνεσθαι**: *sc. δίκαιον.* c

17. **ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον**: epexegetic to *οὕτω*.

19. **ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος**: begins the conclusion, which is peculiarly pathetic. — **ἐνταῦθα**: "in the direction of the attainment of our own perfection." See on *ἐκεῖσε* above in b. *Cf. Apol.* 36 c *ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ᾖα, οἷ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι.* For the adverb of 'place where' with a verb of motion, see on 456 b.

20 f. **ὡς . . . σημαίνει**: *cf.* 511 b.

22 f. **σύ γε θαρρῶν**: thrown in with d emphasis, because what follows in-

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St. I. p. 527.

θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾖς καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρε-
25 τήν. κἄπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὁποῖον ἄν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλεύεσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ
30 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦ- e
τον ἥκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας· ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει, ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ
35 οὖν ἑπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.

527 d flicts the deepest disgrace, **πατάξαι**. With **πατάξαι** the repetition in thought of **ἔασόν τινα** is the easiest construction. On the common object of the three infs., see on 493 c **σοί**.

23. **τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην κτέ.**: says Socrates, with reference to 527 a and 486 c.

23 f. **οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει**: external rough treatment will not affect the real man.

25. **κἄπειτα**: refers to **ἀσκῶν**, but it is more exactly defined by **οὕτω . . . ἀσκήσαντες**. — **τότε ἤδη**: emphatic position. The addition **ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι** indicates that they may then find something more important to do.

26. **ἐπιθησόμεθα κτέ.**: *cf.* 521 d. This is the answer to Callicles' advice in 484 c ff. On the other hand, **ὁποῖον ἄν τι ὑμῖν δοκῇ** can serve for Polus. *Cf.* 466 c ff. 527 d

27. **τότε**: explained by **βελτίους κτέ.**

28. **ὡς . . . ἔχειν**: a polite expression which can hardly be misunderstood by those present.

31. **ἀπαιδευσίας**: in contrast to the **παιδεία** on which Callicles and Polus prided themselves. See on 461 b, c. e
— **ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι**: the **λόγος** is treated as a living being, to whose guidance one can trust himself. It is the principle from which all other moral regulations proceed.

33. **οὗτος**: finds its explanation in **καὶ . . . τεθνάναι.**

34 f. For the conclusion, *cf. Phaedo* 114 c **ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.**

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CRITICAL APPENDIX.

EDITIONS.

a. COMPLETE EDITIONS OF PLATO.

The following are the most important: —

Platonis Opera quae extant omnia ex nova Ioannis Serrani interpretatione. Henrici Stephani de quorundam locorum interpretatione iudicium, et multorum contextus Graeci emendatio. 3 *voll.* Folio. Paris, 1578. (The pages of this edition, divided into paragraphs ⟨a, b, c, d, e⟩, have been adopted as a standard of reference in later editions.)

Platonis Dialogi (Gr. et Lat.) ex recensione Imm. Bekker. 8 *voll.* Berolini, 1816–1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation of Mss.)

Platonis Opera Omnia rec., prolegg. et comm. illustr. Godofredus Stallbaum. 10 *voll.* Lipsiae, 1827–1877.

Platonis Dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Ex rec. C. F. Hermann. 6 *voll.* Lipsiae, 1851–53.

Platonis Opera quae feruntur omnia ad codices denuo collatos ed. Martinus Schanz. Lipsiae, 1875–.

b. SEPARATE EDITIONS OF THE GORGIAS.

The following are the principal more recent editions of the *Gorgias* alone: —

Platons Gorgias. Erklärt von Heinrich Kratz. Stuttgart, 1864.

The Gorgias of Plato, with notes by Theodore D. Woolsey. Revised edition. Hartford, 1869 (reprint of the ed. of 1848).

The Gorgias of Plato, with English Notes, Introduction, and Appendix. By W. H. Thompson. London, 1871.

Platonis Gorgias, emendatus atque illustratus nec non prolegomenis et indice instructus. Edidit R. B. Hirschig. Traiecti ad Rhenum, 1873.

Platos Ausgewählte Dialoge. Erklärt von C. Schmelzer. Zweiter Band, *Gorgias.* Berlin, 1883.

Platons Gorgias. Erklärt von Julius Deuschle. Vierte Auflage, bearbeitet von C. W. J. Cron. Leipzig, 1886. (This edition is the basis of the present work.)

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In addition to the complete translation by Jowett may be mentioned the scholarly work —

Plato's Gorgias, literally translated. By E. M. Cope. London, 1883.

CRITICAL NOTES.

In the notes which follow, the first reading is that of the present edition; the second, the variant, — usually the reading of Schanz in his edition of 1881 (*Platonis Opera*, vol. viii., Lipsiae), or of the Mss. which his investigations have shown to have the most weight, *viz.* the Bodleianus or Clarkianus B ('second hand,' b), or the Venetian T ('second hand,' t). Other manuscripts sometimes cited are classed generally as cod. or codd., including those designated by Schanz as 'apographa.'

TITLE. In the Mss. we find the following addition: ἢ περὶ ῥητορικῆς. ἀνατρεπτικός. Schanz brackets the last word.

447 a. καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν: is bracketed by S, following Cobet. Hirschig also *ad loc.* gives weighty reasons for the omission of the words. They may readily have crept in from a marginal gloss on *κατόπιν . . . ἥκομεν*, but a little fulness at the opening of the dialogue is not out of place.

447 b. καὶ: before *ἐπιδείξεται* is bracketed by S, to make the connexion close with *ὅταν βούλησθε*, — a case of unnecessary accuracy.

447 d. ἀποκρίνεσθαι: B T. *ἀποκρινεῖσθαι* S after cod. and Coräes. But the customary tense in advertisements is the present.

448 b. τί δὲ τοῦτο: Cron, Kr. (62, 3, 11), and others supply *ἐστίν* instead of *διαφέρει*.

448 b. τίνα: B T. *τί* Cron following S, Buttmann, and Olympiodorus. It is true that the shift from *τίνα* to *ὅπερ* is harsh; but in view of the employment of *τίνα* with *ἐκαλοῦμεν* and *καλοῖμεν* it is better to retain the masculine. A more obvious emendation would be *ὅνπερ* for *ὅπερ*.

448 c. ηὑρημέναι: S. *εὑρημέναι* B T. But in 514 d, B shows *ηὑρίσκομεν*. See on *ηὑρηκέναι* 459 c below. — On the Gorgianic peculiarities of this passage, *cf.* Volkmann, *Rhetorik der Griechen u. Römer*, c. 38; Blass, *Att. Bered.*² i. 68 ff.; *Rhet. Graeci* ed. Spengel, especially vol. iii. In later times it became common to ascribe all kinds of rhetorical figures to the invention of Gorgias. *Cf.* Suid. Γοργίας· *οὗτος πρῶτος τῷ ῥητορικῷ εἴδει τῆς παιδείας δύναμίν τε φραστικὴν καὶ τέχνην ἔδωκε, τροπαῖς τε καὶ μεταφοραῖς καὶ ἀλληγορίαις καὶ ὑπαλλαγαῖς καὶ καταχρήσεσι καὶ ἀναδιπλώσεσι καὶ ἐπαναλήψεσι καὶ ἀποστροφαῖς καὶ παρισώσεσιν ἐχρήσατο.*

448 e. μᾶλα γε: the eds. *μάλα* S (B T ?).

448 e. ἠρώτα: S following Bekker. *ἐρωτᾷ* B T.

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449 b. ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ (ὑπισχνει b): S. ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ B T. If there is no gap after ἀποθέσθαι, we should naturally expect ὅπερ ἂν ὑπισχνῇ — a reading which is advocated by Morstadt. In any case, however, such an admonition to Gorgias, before he has had time to answer the question ἆρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἂν κτέ., is extremely harsh, and renders it probable that a reply of Gorgias has fallen out. For this reason, S supposes a gap before ὅπερ, and adopts the reading of b as given in the text. Cron reads ὑπισχνεῖ without the gap.

449 c. ὧν φημι: Cron, Hirschig, *etc.* ὧν φημί S, Thompson, *etc.*

449 c. μηδένα ἂν . . . εἰπεῖν: the use of μή with the inf. even after verbs of saying was probably original, but the οὐ drove μή almost completely out. Examples are given in GMT. 685 *fin.*, and the whole subject is discussed by Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* i. 48 ff. In addition to this passage, cited on p. 49, n. 3, Professor Gildersleeve would now add *Rep.* vi. 497 b.

449 d. οὕτως: T S. οὕτω B Cron.

450 a. ἐλέγομεν: cod. Heindorf, S. λέγομεν B T.

450 d. πεττευτική: B T. παιδευτική (or πιστευτική) Richter. — Olympiodorus explains the equality of ἔργον and λόγον in the πεττεία as follows: ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥίπτειν τὰς ψήφους (prob. equiv. to κύβος or πεττός) καὶ ἐπιλέγουσί τινα οἷον ς' ϵ' δ' ἢ τριέκτα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. This would seem to indicate a game similar to our 'backgammon.' But that the λόγος element goes beyond this is seen from *Rep.* ii. 374 c πεττευτικὸς ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χράμενος, *Polit.* 292 e ἴσμεν γὰρ ὅτι χιλίων ἀνδρῶν ἄκροι πεττεύται τοσοῦτοι (50) πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν οὐκ ἂν γένοιντό ποτε. In view of this and other considerations, Kleist, *JJ.* cxxxix. 477 (1889), thinks the reference here is to a definite theory of the πεττεία. See also Cron, *Beitr.* 83 ff., and for a discussion of the details of the game, Herm. *Gr. Alter.*[8] iv. § 55.

450 e. οὐχ ὅτι: The examples cited for this rare and exclusively Platonic construction are, besides this, *Prot.* 336 d Σωκράτη ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καί φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι, *Lys.* 220 a οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν, ὡς περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμεθα χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ, *Theaet.* 157 b τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. It is to be noticed that in *Lys.* 220 a alone the οὐχ ὅτι clause precedes. The sense, and also the feeling, is very closely given by the English, "not but that"; the other rendering, "although," fails to give the color. The common explanation is to supply some verb of saying, but that will not account for the second negative required. The question has been touched upon by Kratz in the appendix to his edition, by Münscher (*JJ.*, 1870), to whom Cron replies in *Beiträge*, 198 ff., and by Kühner, ii. 525, 4 b, who also recognizes the difficulty. Other scholars are inclined to look for the solution in the use of οὐ as a 'free negative.' The speaker anticipates the question, "Do you judge so, from the statements the party in question has made?" "No! because he actually said the contrary, in so many words."

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450 e. **ἐν τοῖς λόγοις**: cod. Heindorf, S. *τοῖς λόγοις* B T.

451 b. **περιττόν**: the word *γνῶσις*, which follows in the Mss., is bracketed by S after Bekker.

451 b. **ὅσα ἂν . . . τυγχάνῃ**: B T. *ὅσα . . . τυγχάνει* S after Ast. But no specific combination of odd and even is thought of, but merely their general relations up to any magnitude. But see Kleist, *JJ.* cxxxix. 479, and critical note to 453 e.

451 d. **τις**: codd. S. *τινῶν* B T.

451 d. **τί ἐστι**: S after Heindorf. *ἐστι* B T: a case of 'haplography.'

451 d. **οὗ**: B T. *ὃ* S after Hirschig.

451 e. **τὸ σκολιόν**: the name was derived from *σκολιός, crooked, bent,* but variously explained. Some refer it to the order of succession of the singers, who alternated either around the table or in a zigzag across it; others, either to the air as compared with the solemn *νόμος ὄρθιος*, or to the verse-measure of the song, which, as the oldest kind of the especially logaoedic *μέλος*, was thus named to distinguish it from the hexameter. *Cf.* Engelbrecht, *De Scoliorum Poesi*, and Gildersleeve, *Pindar*, I. E. xvi.

452 a. **παιδοτρίβης**: for the manner in which the distinction between *παιδοτρίβης* and *γυμναστής* gradually faded out, as well as the particulars of training of Greek youth, see Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv.[3] § 36, p. 335 ff.; Grasberger, *Erziehung und Unterricht im klass. Alterthum*, i. p. 265 ff.

452 a. **καὶ εἶποι**: B T S. *καὶ εἴποι ἄν* Hirschig. But see note.

452 a. **ὑγίεια**: is omitted by S following Hirschig. As the text stands, it is impossible to construe *ὑγίεια*. But even with it omitted we are troubled by the following *δέ*, for which we should expect *γάρ*. Perhaps the true solution has not been reached. It might be possible to read *ὦ Σώκρατες; ὑγίεια;*

452 b. **θαυμάζοιμι τἄν**: B T S. *θαυμάζοιμί τἄν* Cron.

452 c. **αὐτῷ**: B. *αὐτῷ* T S.

452 e. For Anaximenes' views of oratory, *cf.* his *Ars Rhetorica*, ed. Spengel, c. 1.

453 a. **πειθοῦς δημιουργός**: the originator of this definition cannot be definitely fixed. Thompson quotes *Prolegomena ad Hermogenem*, where it is ascribed to Corax and Tisias, and Quint. ii. 15. 4, where Isocrates is credited with it.

453 b. **ἐστὶν** (*πειθώ*): S. *ἐστιν* T. *ἐστὶ* B, Cron.

453 c. **καὶ ποῦ**: B T. *ἢ οὔ* S after Deuschle. (Woolsey had previously made the same emendation in his edition of 1842.) These two words have given endless trouble to the editors, and occasioned numerous emendations, for which see Schanz's note. They seem genuine. In the first place, it is hard to explain how they got in, if they are not genuine. Then, they are read by one of the scholiasts, who makes an attempt to explain them with the words *ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ στοᾷ*. With the Greeks especially, everything with name had to have local habitation. The way of fixing an individual was to

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give his own name, his father's, and the place of abode. Socrates is here simply (unconsciously, it may be) following out this Greek habit. The τὰ ποῖα corresponds to the genitive, and ποῦ marks the scene of his labors. That Socrates does not follow up his comparison in the following question is not remarkable, nor is it necessary that he should follow it up, as Thompson thinks; and the omission of the words by Olympiodorus cannot be placed against the concurrent testimony of B and T. Apply the method to Simonides (Semonides) of Amorgus and Simonides of Ceus. Packard, *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877, p. 11, defends the conjecture ἢ οὔ.

453 e. **λέγωμεν**: T S. λέγομεν B.

453 e. **ὅσον ἐστίν**: B T S. Rejected by Kratz. Kleist, *JJ.* cxxxix. 479, wishes to translate ὅσα in ὅσα ἂν τυγχάνῃ, in 451 b above, by quotcumque, and not quantacumque, 'wie viele arten es auf beiden seiten geben mag.' For the sake of consistency, he would also substitute ὅσα for ὅσον in this passage. See Cron, *Beiträge*, p. 91 ff. But see note.

454 a. **ἐστιν**: B. ἐστι T. ἐστὶν S.

454 a. **ῥητορικὴ ἐστιν**: B. ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶν S.

454 c. **ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω**: on the use of γάρ to resume an interrupted thought, see Shilleto's crit. note to Dem. *de Falsa Leg.* 107 (96), quoted by Thompson.

454 d. **δ'**: S (B T?). δέ eds.

454 d. **αὖ**: B T. δὴ S.

455 a. **πειστικὸς**: t S. πιστικὸς B T Cron.

455 b. **ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως**: *cf.* also *Gorg.* 514 d, and for details of treatment, *etc.*, see Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv.[3] § 38.

455 d. **τὰ νεώρια κτὲ.**: to Themistocles was due the fortification of Athens itself (Thuc. i. 90–93), as well as the erection and fortification of the Piraeus, with its commercial-harbor, ἐμπόριον, and its war-harbor, κανθάρου or Κανθάρου λιμήν, for both of which the Athenians formerly used the open bay of Phalerum. The dockyards were built to hold four hundred ships. The so-called Long Walls, whose erection had probably been suggested by Themistocles, connected with the city the whole coast, from the southeastern end of the bay of Phalerum to the northwestern end of the peninsula of Piraeus, together with its three harbors (in addition to the chief harbor just mentioned, also Ζέα and Μουνυχία on the southeastern side). They consisted of the shorter Phalerian wall of thirty-five stades, and the longer Piraean (Thuc. i. 107) wall of forty stades. To the latter was afterwards added about the time of the τριακοντούτεις σπονδαί, for greater security, a second wall, parallel and six hundred feet distant. These two are often distinguished as τὸ βόρειον and τὸ νότιον τεῖχος, and are called by late authors τὰ μακρὰ σκέλη. For details of location, see Bursian, *Geographie von Griechenland*, i. p. 265 ff., and Lolling's *Hellenische Landeskunde* (Müller's *Handb. der Klass. Altertumsw.* iii.) pp. 118, 299 ff.

455 e. **τῶν**: B T. τῆς S after Buttmann. τῆς τῶν Schaefer, Hirschig.

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456 a. **εἰ**: B T. *τί, εἰ* S after Madvig.

456 b. **ὅπῃ**: B T. *ὅποι* S after codd. and Heindorf.

456 d. **ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα**: the last two words are bracketed by S after Findeisen, who puts a colon before *ὅτι* and a comma after *ἐχθρῶν*. With either reading an easy asyndeton is involved; and while *τούτου ἕνεκα* is rather redundant, it conflicts neither with sense nor construction. — On the **ὁπλομαχία** *cf. Lach. init. τεθέασθε μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν ὅπλοις κτἑ., Euthyd.* 273 c. For the development of this practice, see Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv.[3] § 35.

456 d. **ἀποκτεινύναι**: B S. **ἀποκτιννύναι** T. Schanz, vol. viii. *proll.* p. vi f. shows from the Mss. that the form **ἀποκτεινύναι** is better attested for the *Gorgias*, though in other dialogues the weight of evidence seems to be in favor of the second form.

456 e. **μὴ ὑπάρχοντας**: for the different varieties of asyndeton and their effect on the style, see Rehdantz, Dem. *Phil. Reden* Index, under the word 'asyndeton,' and Volkmann, *Rhetorik d. Gr. u. Röm.* § 48.

457 c. **λόγων**: B T. *φιλολόγων* S. *λογίων* Madvig. *ἀνθρώπων* Cobet. Any of these emendations would make the text more exact, it is true, but would not give any other advantage than that of formal exactness, there being no ambiguity of meaning as the passage stands.

457 d. **φιλονικοῦντας**: S (vol. vii. *prolegg.*). *φιλονεικοῦντας* B T.

457 d. **λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ**: is bracketed by S after Hirschig.

457 e. **οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα**: Cobet maintains that *οὐ πάνυ* is an unqualified negation in classic Greek, although the sense "not entirely" is common in later authors. Cope and Riddell demand the weaker force here; and this corresponds much better with Socrates's whole bearing. See the discussion in App. to Cope's translation.

458 b. **χρῆν**: B T. *χρὴ* S with codd. See the note. The context, as well as *ἔδει* in the margin, b t, makes for the impf.

458 b. **παροῦσιν**: T S. *παροῦσι* B.

458 c. **μή τινας**: Madv. *Syn.* § 124, 1, and Kr. 54, 8, 12, consider the *μή* in this case to have an interrogative force, "whether." It is better to look at the indic. as an attempt to avoid any ambiguity, since the subjv. may have two sides, the indic. but one. See GMT. 369, 1.

458 c. **κατέχομεν**: B t S. *κατέχωμεν* T.

458 d. **ὥστε χαριεῖσθε**: on **ὥστε** with the inf. to express tendency, 'so as to,' without specifying as to the reality of the occurrence, and with the indic. to express actual result, see Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 161 ff.

458 d. **ἐρωτᾶν ... βούλεται**: is bracketed by S after Badham, perhaps rightly.

459 c. **ηὑρηκέναι**: S. *εὑρηκέναι* B T. *Cf.* 448 c. The evidence of inscriptions shows that after the middle of the fourth century, verbs in *εὑ-* were not augmented; the latest inscription containing *ηὑ-* dates from 321 B.C. See Reinach, *Traité d' Épigraphie Grecque*, 285, Meisterhans, *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*,[2] § 64, 14.

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459 c. **λόγου**: B T. *λόγον* S after Hermann. See Thompson's note.

460 c. The reading here adopted is that of Thompson, which differs from Hirschig's only in the position of *ἀεί*. Schanz, followed by Cron, brackets *οὐκοῦν . . . φαίνεταί γε*; but, as Thompson points out, the words *οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν* seem to require an intermediate step in the argument, while to retain the words *τὸν ῥητορικὸν . . . τὸν δὲ* in their present position is to disturb badly the otherwise plain course of reasoning. See the notes of Thompson and Hirschig *ad loc.*

461 b. **ἢ οἴει**: S with the eds. *ἢ* B T Cron. Packard, *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877, p. 12, defends the explanation given in the note, which is now generally accepted.

461 c. **ἑταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς** (*υἱεῖς*): t and eds. *ἑταίρους υἱεῖς* B T. *ἑταίρους* S. I have adopted the first reading with a slight change in the spelling ('*υἱός* est un forme ionienne et vulgaire,' Reinach, *Epig.* p. 270; *cf.* Meisterhans, § 17, 4), though it must be confessed that *υἱεῖς* is decidedly suspicious.

462 d. **οὐδεμία κτέ.**: S, following Hirschig, divides the words as follows: ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία — *φαθί.* ΠΩ. *Φημὶ δή.* ΣΩ. *Ἐμπειρία τις. τίνος φαθί.* ΠΩ. *Φημὶ δή.* ΣΩ. *Χάριτος . . .* Πῶλε. But one can hardly conceive how Polus could have failed to catch the spirit of the play, after Socrates had shown the way.

463 e. **ἡ ῥητορική**: T Aristides S. *ῥητορική* B Cron. In 451 a, 454 a, the article is omitted in both Mss., though it might stand as well there as here.

464 b. **ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ**: Aristides, S after Heindorf. *ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς* B T.

464 d. **ὅπερ**: b Aristides. *ὅπου* B T. *ὑπὸ ὃ* S.

465 b. **οὖσα καὶ**: codd. *καὶ* B T S.

465 b. **ἐσθήσει**: S after Coraes. *αἰσθήσει* B T. *ἐσθῆτι* Aristides, — which would correspond better to usage than *ἐσθήσει*. See Schanz's note for the many emendations.

465 c. **διέστηκεν**: B T S. *διέστηκε μὲν* cod., the editions.

465 c. **χρήσωνται**: T S after Bekker. *χρήσονται* B Cron. *Cf.* 465 e.

466 a. **ἆρ'**: S. *ἄρ'* B. *ἀρ'* T Cron.

466 b. **δοκοῦσιν**: T S. *δοκοῦσι* B Cron.

466 d. **ὅτι**: cod. S eds. *εἰ ὅτι* B T. *εἰ οὐχὶ* cod., Hermann, Cron.

466 d. **ἐρωτήματα**: codd. S. *τὰ ἐρωτήματα* B T.

466 e. **οὐκοῦν**: *οὐκ οὖν* S after Hermann, who defends this reading in the words: 'negativa responsio dislungi particulas postulat.' But, as Cron justly observes, Polus anticipated no such negative reply, but rather the contrary. He fails to see any difference in the two expressions used by Socrates; which makes the case for *οὐκοῦν* overwhelming.

466 e. **φῂς**: S after Baiter. *ἔφης* B T, Cron, eds. The passages in which this anomalous form occurs are as follows: Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 1, 23; Pl. *Gorg.* 466, 496 (*φῂς* Baiter, S), *Euthyd.* 293 (*-ησθα* Baiter); Aeschines, ii. 86 (*-ησθα* Franke, Weidner); Aeschy. *Ag.* 1613 (*φῂς* Dindorf, Hermann) and five pas-

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sages from Lucian. The only passage remaining unchanged apparently is Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 1. 23, where it is true, as Cron says, that *φῇς* cannot be read; but a change to *ἔφησθα* is not difficult, and then, as the word is put into the mouth of a foreigner, Cyrus, it might have been designed. Phrynichus (ed. Rutherford, p. 225) says *ἔφης*: *ἔστι μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον ἔφησθα.* Lobeck questions the truth of this statement, and Rutherford denies flatly that *ἔφης* is Attic. Almost all modern editors agree with Rutherford.

466 e. **ἀποδείξεις . . . ἐξελέγξας**: B T. *ἀποδείξας ἐξελέγξεις* S after Hirschig. It is true that Hirschig's reading makes the thought a little more exact, for strictly speaking the refutation consists in the proof. But, at the same time, the best proof of Polus's position would be the refutation of Socrates; so that in either case the general result is much the same.

467 a. **κεκτήσονται. ἦ**: *κεκτήσονται, ἢ* S.

467 b. **τούτου πρόσθεν**: is bracketed by S after Schleiermacher. Its genuineness had been already questioned by Heindorf.

467 b. **ὑπερφυᾶ**: S. *ὑπερφυῆ* B T Cron. Meisterhans, § 58, 11, says: 'In the acc. sing. the ending *ᾶ* instead of *ῆ* is found when a vowel precedes. In the case of *ὑγιᾶ*, we find a variation in the use of *ᾶ* and *ῆ* after 360 B.C.' The same seems to hold true for the neut. pl. *Cf.* 486 b.

467 d. **πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν**: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

468 a. **ἕνεκα**: S. *ἕνεκεν* B T Cron and eds. Meisterhans, § 83, 26: 'The forms in *-εν* (*ἕνεκεν, εἵνεκεν, οὕνεκεν*) are entirely foreign to Attic.' The earliest example of *ἕνεκεν* is after 350 B.C.

468 e. **ὡς δὴ σὺ κτέ.**: Cron considers the construction here to be causal at bottom. Others regard it as exclamatory.

469 a. **ζηλωτόν**: B T. *ζηλωτός* cod. S after Ast, who remarks (Tom. xi. p. 169 f.): 'Quod conieceram (*Praef.* p. vi. T. 1) *ζηλωτός* id confirmatum nunc video a Flor. d., idque tam praegressa quam sequentia videntur flagitare.' But the reading of the codex itself rests probably upon an emendation, and the neuter is merely a case of colloquial inexactness. *Cf.* a similar case in *Legg.* v. 730 c, where it is said that 'who would be happy, must be truthful,' *πιστὸς γὰρ, ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος, ᾧ φίλον ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον· ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους. ὧν οὐδέτερον ζηλωτόν.* Here probably no one will employ an emendation, although the author continues: *ἄφιλος γὰρ δὴ πᾶς ὅ τε ἄπιστος καὶ ἀμαθής.*

469 b. **ἐλεεινόν γε**: S after Stobaeus. *ἐλεεινὸν δὲ* B T.

469 e. **ἥντιν' ἄν σοι δοκῇ**: codd. S. *δόκοι* B T.

470 a. **πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε**: S. *πράττειν ἀγαθόν τε* Cron. *ἀγαθόν τι* Heindorf. Although the idea is plain enough, the arrangement of the words has caused great difficulty. Schleiermacher, followed by Cron, construes *ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι* closely with *ὠφελίμως πράττειν*, under the article, thus making *τέ* a 'postscript' *τέ*. To do this, he has to take *φαίνεται* as a complete predicate, in

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the sense, "seem good or correct." Ast wrenches the construction so as to supply a predicate, *μέγα δύνασθαι*, to *φαίνεται*, and follows it by *ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι*, making the contrast *κακόν* (*sc.* *εἶναι*) *καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι* in chiastic position. But as Cron observes, it is quite out of the question to connect a *τέ* clause with a supplied predicate. Thompson uses the heroic treatment of bracketing the first *τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι* and the last *δύνασθαι* after *σμικρόν*. Most of the eds. — and this is best — put a comma after *πράττειν*, and construe *ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι* and *καὶ τοῦτο κτέ.* together. This is not without difficulties, as Cron shows. The second clause deviates from the construction, but of this Plato shows several examples in this same dialogue. Socrates changes his expression to bring out with greater emphasis the *ἐὰν μέν* clause: "and that (*καὶ τοῦτο*), it seems, is the real *μέγα δύνασθαι*." This translation obviates the objection to *τοῦτο*. Cron does not like the *τὸ* with the second *μέγα δύνασθαι*, but the *τό* seems to have much the force of the English emphatic *the*, and that force can be brought out by adding the word 'real.' By thus making *τοῦτο* a reiteration of *ἐὰν μὲν κτέ.*, we have the contrast *εἰ δὲ μή* coming regularly with *ἐστίν* to be supplied after *κακόν*.

470 a. **δύνασθαι· σκεψώμεθα**: S. *δύνασθαι, σκεψώμεθα* Cron after Hermann.

470 b. **ταὐτὸ**: is bracketed as a dittograph by S, who refers to a similar case in *Theaet.* 186 **d**. This is not unlikely; but at the same time we can explain the word as it stands as showing a trace of sophistical quibbling.

470 d. **ἐχθές**: on the form, Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, § 295, says: '*ἐχθές* was the regular Attic form, the old Ionic *χθές* being naturally retained in phrases like *χθές τε καὶ πρῴην* and occasionally, as in Ar. *Nub.* 353, *Vesp.* 242, to help the metre. After a word ending in a vowel, *ἐχθές* yielded to its older rival even in prose.'

470 d. **οὐκ οἶδα — ἄδικος** (471 **a**): is translated by Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* v. 12 as follows: Haud scio, nunquam enim cum eo collocatus sum. — Ain' tu? an aliter id scire non potes? — Nullo modo — Tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege magno potes dicere, beatusne sit? — An ego possim, quum ignorem quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus? — Quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas? — Ita prorsus existimo: bonos beatos, improbos miseros — Miser ergo Archelaus? — Certe, si iniustus.

470 e. **κἀγαθὸν**: S. *καὶ ἀγαθὸν* B T. Schanz, vol. ii. 2, *Prolegg.* § 1, shows that we find regularly *καλὸς κἀγαθός*, more rarely, *καλός τε κἀγαθός*, but not *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός*, or *καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός*.

471 b. **νὸν**: S. *νῖν* B T Cron. See critical note on 461 **c**.

471 b. On the general stylistic effect of the partic. see Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* ix. 136 ff., who discusses this passage, showing that we should naturally expect such an outburst from Polus, '**Πῶλος** by name and *πῶλος* by nature.'

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471 c. **τοῦ Περδίκκου**: cod. S. *τὸν Περδίκκου* B T. Cron, *Beiträge*, p. 118, thinks that perhaps it would be better to join *τὸν γνήσιον* with *τὸν ἀδελφόν*, in which case *τὸν Περδίκκου υἱόν* would be a gloss by a later hand.

471 c. **ἑπτέτη**: S after Ast. *ἑπταετῆ* B T. But Heindorf had already observed, before Ast, with the approval of Lobeck, *Phryn.* 407, 'Atticum magis esse ex grammaticorum praeceptis *ἑπτέτη*.'

471 d. **ἐπῄνεσα**: B T. *ἐπῄνεσα* † S after Cobet.

471 d. **τοῦ δὲ . . . ἠμελημένου**: Thompson construes this clause under *ἐπῄνεσα* in its full sense, considering that Socrates ironically calls his remark in 448 d (*δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος . . . ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι*) a compliment. This view has found a supporter in Packard, *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877, 14. But the passage seems to be rather playful than ironic; and it is not uncommon in Greek to supply a colorless verb of saying from a preceding verb which involves it.

471 d. **ὠγαθέ**: *ὦγαθέ* B T. *ὦ 'γαθέ* S.

472 a. **εἶναι τί**: S. *εἶναί τι* B T Cron. S is right in thinking the greater emphasis to be upon *τί*. This understatement implies much more importance, actual or pretended, in the persons mentioned than would be felt if *εἶναι* had the emphasis.

472 d. **ἔστιν**: S after Hermann. *ἐστιν* B T.

472 d. **ἐν Πυθίου**: cod. S. *ἐν Πυθοῖ* B T. Heindorf recommends *ἐν Πυθίῳ*, referring to the note of Suidas: *Πύθιον ἱερὸν Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀθήνησιν ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου γεγονός, εἰς ὃ τοὺς τρίποδας ἐτίθεσαν οἱ τῷ κυκλίῳ χορῷ νικήσαντες τὰ Θαργήλια.* But we find also in Thuc. vi. 54. 7 *ἐν Πυθίου*. In C. I. A. i. 422, we have a dedication by Aristocrates, son of Scellius, which may have belonged to this offering. See Roberts, *Introduction to Greek Epigraphy*, i. p. 97.

472 e. **πάντως . . . μέντοι**: S after Stobaeus. *ἁπάντων . . . μὲν τοίνυν* B T.

473 b. **ἴσως**: is bracketed by S, following a suspicion of Heindorf, who, however, afterwards recalled his suspicion by referring to *Phaedrus* 233 e.

473 b. **ἀδικῶν**: is bracketed by S after Dobree. But Socrates' words in d, *ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων*, seem to favor the retention of *ἀδικῶν* here.

473 c. **καταπιττωθῇ**: such punishments were but rarely inflicted in the Hellenic states, and were never sanctioned by law. When inflicted, they were dictated only by the fury of the moment, as we learn from Ath. xii. 26, p. 524 *πρῶτον μὲν κρατήσας ὁ δῆμος καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἐκβαλὼν καὶ συναγαγὼν τὰ τέκνα τῶν φυγόντων εἰς ἀλωνίας, βοῦς συναγαγόντες συνηλόησαν καὶ παρανομωτάτῳ θανάτῳ διεφθειραν· τοιγάρτοι πάλιν οἱ πλούσιοι κρατήσαντες ἅπαντας, ὧν κύριοι κατέστησαν, μετὰ τῶν τέκνων κατεπίττωσαν.* Routh identified the punishment here mentioned with the Latin tunica molesta, alluded to by Juv. viii. 235, on which Mayor gives references; among others Plut. *de ser. num. vind.* 9 'some men are just like children, who often when they behold malefactors in the theatres in tunics of gold and purple shawls, crowned and dancing the pyrrich, admire and envy them as happy; until they are seen goaded and

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scourged and discharging fire from that flowered and costly attire' (*πῦρ ἀνιέντες ἐκ τῆς ἀνθινῆς ἐκείνης καὶ πολυτελοῦς ἐσθῆτος*). *Cf.* Herm. *Gr. Alter.* ii. 1,[8] § 18.

473 c. **εὐδαιμονέστερος**: cod. S. *εὐδαιμονέστατος* B T.

473 d. **διδοὺς δίκην**: cod. *δίκην δοὺς* S after Schmidt. *διδοὺς* B T. The pres. is better than the aor. because the punishment is kept up.

473 e. **διαφεύγων**: B T. *διαφυγὼν* cod. S. Socrates is speaking generally.

473 e. **ἐροῦ τινα**: Stallbaum. *ἔρου τινὰ* B T. *ἐροῦ τινὰ* S.

474 b. **ἀδικεῖν.**: S as Heindorf and Ast, following Ficinus, demanded. *ἀδικεῖν;* the eds.

474 c. **εἶναι, τὸ**: *εἶναι τὸ* S and eds. Cron regards *πότερον* as an adj. with *τὸ ἀδικεῖν κτέ.* in apposition.

474 c. **τί δὲ δή;· αἴσχιον**: Heindorf. *τί δὲ δὴ αἴσχιον* S after Aldus.

474 c. **αἴσχιον;**: eds. *αἴσχιον.* S.

474 e. **τὰ καλά, ἦ**: B S. *τὰ καλὰ τοῦ* T. *τὰ* omitted, cod. *καλὰ τοῦ* Thompson.

475 a. **θάτερον**: is said to be a Doric form, adopted into Attic, but this is doubtful. Attic inscriptions always have *ἕτερος*. Reinach, *Epig.* p. 249, thinks that originally in Attic *ἕτερον* may have been pronounced *ἅτερον*. But Smyth, *The Vowel System of the Ionic Dialects* (*Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1889), p. 20, claims *ἅτερος* itself for Attic. This claim, if true, would imply that old Attic has two forms, *ἅτερος* and *ἕτερος*, the former of which became fixed in the form *θάτερον*, dying out otherwise. Others hold the very reasonable view that *θἄτερα* was a familiar form and *θἄτερον* carelessly taken for the singular.

475 b. **κακῷ**: B T. *κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις* S after Hirschig. Perhaps it is easier to bear with the inexactness than to explain the omission.

475 d. **χρόνῳ**: B T. Cron would either omit this word as not agreeing with the connexion, or change it to *λόγῳ* after Findeisen. But the usage is phraseological, and for that reason defensible.

476 c. **κάει . . . κάεσθαι**: codd. S. *καίει . . . καίεσθαι* B T. So also in the following examples; but in 479 a, B T both have *κάεσθαι*. The spelling of this verb is still an open question. Only two inscriptions contain present forms, and they are both before 400 B.C., and both show the diphthong. Meisterhans, § 63, 24.

477 a. **ὧδε**: S eds. *ᾧδε* B Cron.

477 d. **ὁμφότερα**: Rid., § 17, classes this with such expressions as *καὶ ταῦτα*, under the head of acc. in apposition. See another example in 524 c.

478 b. **τί**: B Stobaeus S. *τί οὖν* T. *ὃν λέγεις*, which follows *ἐστιν* in B T, is bracketed by S after Bekker and Ficinus.

478 c. **καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι**: is bracketed by S after Morstadt. It is true that the addition is unnecessary, and even illogical, but it serves to emphasize the result of the endurance.

478 c. **ἔοικε**: B. *ἔοικεν* T S.

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479 a. **μὴ διδόναι δίκην κτέ.**: this passage shows well the narrow line which sometimes separates the tendential from the substantival acc. with the inf. and may help to explain the way in which *ὥστε*, which with the inf. is post-Homeric, came to be introduced to fix the idea of tendency. See Gildersleeve, *The Consecutive Sentence in Greek, Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 161 ff.

479 b. **οὕτω**: B T. *οὕτως* S and eds.

479 c. **εἰ μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως**: codd. eds. *εἰ σοί γε ἄλλως* B T. *εἰ σοί γε* S, who compares *Hipp.* ii. 367 d *εἴ γε σὺ βούλει*. But the interpolation of *ἄλλως* is hard to explain, while *μή* could easily have dropped out, under the influence of itacism.

479 d. **ἀδικεῖν**: B T. *ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην* S after Hirschig.

480 a. **ἀδικήσει**: S after Heindorf. *ἀδικέσῃ* B T.

480 b. **ποιήσει**: S after Heindorf. *ποιήσῃ* B T.

480 b. **λέγωμεν**: B T. *λέγομεν* codd. S.

480 c. **τοὐναντίον**: Deuschle. *ἐπὶ τοὐναντιόν* B T S Cron. Cron, following Heindorf, thinks that we must supply *χρήσιμον εἶναι*, which would make *ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον* correspond to *ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι*. But this would leave *δεῖν* unaccounted for. Thompson supposes *ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον* to be a phrase equivalent to *εἰς τοὐναντίον Soph.* 221 a, or *κατὰ τοὐναντίον Tim.* 36 d, or *ἐξ ἐναντίας*, which is common enough. And if the *ἐπὶ* is kept, this is the only way of regarding it. But it is the sole example in such a phrase, and Deuschle bracketed it for that reason.

480 c. **δὲ**: B T. *τε* S with codd. and Heindorf.

480 e. **ἢ κἀκεῖνα** (*κακεῖνα* B T). *ἢ κεῖνα* S after Hirschig.

481 a. **ᾗ ἡρπακὼς**: S. *ἡρπακὼς* B T. *ἡρπακὼς ᾗ* cod.

481 a. **ἀναλίσκῃ**: S after L, Dindorf, and Coraes. *ἀναλίσκηται* B T.

481 c. **φῶμεν**: B T. *θῶμεν* S after Madvig, who declares (*Adversaria*, i. 410) the connexion of a participle with *φάναι* not to be Greek. But *λέγειν* can be so construed, and we find *φάναι* followed by *μή* as if it were a verb of asseveration, which latter could take a participle.

481 d. **ὕδιον**: according to Rid. § 173, Plato combines with *ἤ* the following: *διπλοῦς, πολλαπλάσιος, διαφερόντως* (*διαφέρειν*), *ἀνομοῖος, ἐναντίος, τίς.*

481 d. **ὅτι** (*ὅ τι*) **ἂν φῇ**: S with cod. and Ast. *ὅτι ὅπως ἂν φῇ* B. *ὅτι ὅπως ἂν ἀντιφῇ* T. *ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ* eds. after Bekker. It is a good example to show how variations might arise.

482 a. **ἃ νῦν**: Cron, who claims the authority of B T for the omission of *ἀεί*. But S (with the eds.) reads *ἀεί* without noting any change in B T, and it is perhaps better to restore it to the text here before *ἃ νῦν*.

482 a. **ἔμπληκτος**: is explained by the scholiasts and grammarians by *ἄστατος, εὐμετάβολος* (inconstans), with which agrees *Lysis* 214 c *μηδέποτε ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους.*

482 a. **ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν**: cod. S. *τῶν αὐτῶν* B T.

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482 b. **Αἰγυπτίων**: B T. *Αἰγύπτιον* S after Stallbaum, following Olympiodorus, to obviate the omission of the art.; but see Reinach, *Epig.* p. 275: 'Jusqu'au IVe siècle et mème jusqu'au IIIe on ne trouve que rarement le nom d'un peuple, d'un dème etc. précédé de l'article.'

482 b. **κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε**: S after Van Heusde. *κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστόν τε* B T. *κρεῖττον ἀνάρμοστόν τε εἶναι* Ast after Heindorf.

482 d. **διδάξοι**: B T. *διδάξει* codd.

482 e. **ἐναντί'**: S on the basis of the reading of B, which according to S is *ἔναντι*. *ἐναντία* T.

483 a. **τοῦτο τὸ σοφόν**: Rid., § 15, considers this and similar cases as acc. in apposition to the sentence. *Cf. Theaet.* 167 b *ἃ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν*, and other examples, *Prot.* 352 e, *Theaet.* 158 b.

483 a. **κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι**: B T. *κάκιον . . . ἀδικεῖσθαι* S after H. Stephanus, — perhaps correctly.

483 c. **τὸ ἴσον**: on the principles of democratic government as conceived by the Greeks, the equality of the individuals as well as their subservience to law, see Busolt, *Gr. Alter.* i. § 45 (Müller's *Handbuch*, iv.).

483 e. **τὴν τοῦ δικαίου**: is bracketed by S after Schleiermacher.

483 e. **τὸν τῆς φύσεως**: eds. *τὸν φύσεως* S (B T ?).

483 e. **τιθέμεθα**: is bracketed by S after Hermann.

484 a. **διαφυγών**: is bracketed by S after Naber, *καὶ διαφυγών* by Morstadt. Cron prefers the latter, but *καταπατήσας* would continue the metaphor of the escaping beast much better as a co-ordinate participle than it could as a subordinate.

484 c. **διαφθορά**: the speech of Callicles affords a good example of the *σεμνότης* which Aristides (*Rhet. Gr.* ed. Spengel, ii. 468) says is caused by the employment of *ὀνοματικαὶ λέξεις ἀντὶ ῥηματικῶν*.

484 e. **καὶ ἐπὶ**: B T S. *κἀπὶ* eds.

484 e. **τυγχάνει**: T S. *τυγχάνῃ* B.

485 b. **καὶ παίζοντας**: is bracketed by S after Morstadt.

485 b. **ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παίζον**: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

485 c. **ἢ παίζοντα ὁρᾷ**: is bracketed by Morstadt.

485 e. **ψυχῆς ἔχων**: Nauck. *ψυχῆς* B T S.

485 e. **διαπρέπεις**: B T. *διατρέπεις* S after Grotius. It can hardly be said that the emendation of Schanz is any more satisfactory than the text. I have followed Nauck in inserting *ἔχων* to make the construction better Greek. But most likely the correct reading of the passage is beyond the efforts of the eds. The trouble with *διαπρέπεις* is that while not unknown to Euripides' vocabulary, it is never used transitively; hence Nauck's insertion, for which Cron suggests *λαχών*, which would serve as well. In this way *διαπρέπειν* would be used just as we find it in Eur. *Alc.* 602, where Admetus says to his father, with bitter irony, *ἦ τἄρα πάντων διαπρέπεις ἀψυχίᾳ.*

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485 e. **οὔτ' ἂν . . . λόγον**: these words are shown by the metre, *οὔτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι*, as well as by the form *βουλαῖσι*, to have belonged in some form to Euripides. This has led Hartung to add them to the fg. with slight changes, though Nauck and Schanz do not feel justified in so doing.

486 a. **λάκους**: S after Bonitz. *λάβοις* B T. *λάκοις* is not a prose word, but is very common in Euripides.

486 b. **εἰλιγγιᾷς**: B T S. *ἰλιγγιᾷς* b t Cron. Schanz, VII. Prolegg. § 1, compares all the passages, and refers to the note of Suidas: *εἰλιγγιῶ· τὸ μὲν βῆμα διὰ διφθόγγου, ἀντὶ τοῦ σκοτοδινιῶ — τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ἴλιγγος διὰ τοῦ ι.*

486 b. **εὐφυᾶ**: S. *εὐφυῆ* B T. *Cf.* crit. note on 467 b.

486 c. **κόρρης**: the retention of *η* after the *ρ* in the words given in the note is explained as due to the fact that the older forms were *κόρση, δέρση, etc.*, and that afterwards assimilation took place, as in the case of *θάρσος* to *θάρρος*. Curt. *Stud.* i. *a* 248.

486 c. **πιθοῦ**: S after Cobet. *πείθου* B T Cron.

486 c. **ταῦτ' ἀφείς**: eds. *ταῦτα ἀφείς* S (B T ?).

486 d. **ἄσμενον**: B S. *ἄσμενον* eds.

486 d. **ᾗ**: B T. *αἷς* S after Stallbaum. *αἳ* cod. This deviation from the more rigid construction is quite comprehensible in the freedom of conversation. *Cf.* 521 b.

486 e. **ἂν**: B T. **ἂν** S after Bekker.

486 e. **ταῦτ' ἤδη**: eds. *ταῦτα ἤδη* S (B T ?).

487 c. **Τείσανδρον**: S with inscriptions. *Τίσανδρον* B T Cron.

487 d. **ταὐτὰ**: S after Ficinus. *ταῦτα* B T. Cron remarks that *ἐμοί* makes for the first reading, for with *ταῦτα* we would more usually find *ταῦτά μοι*.

487 e. **ἡ στὴ**: B T S. *στὴ* eds.

488 a. **ἔστιν**: S Thompson. *ἐστιν* B Cron. *ἐστι* T.

488 a. **ταὐτὰ**: B S. *ταῦτα* T eds.

488 b. **πλέον**: S after Heindorf. *πλεῖον* B T.

488 b. **ἔλεγον**: is omitted by S, following common Greek usage. Both the position and the sense make for the omission.

489 a. **τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις**: B T. *τοῦτ' ὦ Καλλίκλεις* S after Heindorf.

489 c. **ἑρμαῖον**: B S. *ἕρμαιον* T.

489 c. **συλλεγῇ**: T b S. *συλλέγῃ* B.

489 c. **φῶσιν κτέ.**: the omission of an object to *φῶσιν* has caused a great deal of trouble, and it is certainly harsh to consider the word as used absolutely in the sense "declare," "speak"; but such must be done as yet, for the emendations and other explanations are not satisfactory. Schanz changes *αὐτά* to *ἅττα*. Cron construes *αὐτὰ . . . νόμιμα* with *φῶσιν*, and translates: 'Or do you think I mean (by the statement that *τὸ βέλτιον* and *τὸ κρεῖττον* are the same) that (*i.e.* the case) when . . . and these say that this and nothing else is lawful,' *viz.* **ἃ ἂν φῶσιν**. But this is too trying a species of mental gymnastics for conversation.

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489 c. **αὐτά**: B T. *ἅττα* S after Heindorf, possibly with right. Some eds. insert comma after *αὐτά*. Cron omits comma both after *φῶσιν* and *αὐτά*.

489 d. **τί**: B T eds. *τίνας* S after Routh.

490 a. **ῥήματα**: cod. *ῥήματι* (defended by Winckelmann) B T. *ῥῆμά τι* Deuschle. *ῥημάτια* S after Badham.

490 a. **ἔστιν**: S and eds. *ἐστιν* B. *ἐστὶν* T Cron.

490 b. **ἄθροοι**: T S. *ἄθροοι* B Cron.

490 c. **ἐν δὲ τῷ**: codd. *ἐν τῷ δὲ* B T S, referring to Kr. 68, 5, 1.

490 c. **περὶ σιτία**: B T. Thompson follows Hirschig in bracketing the words, which certainly are here a violation of usage. *Cf.* his note *ad loc.*

491 a. **ὡς**: B T S. *ὅσπερ* Baiter.

491 d. **ἑταῖρε;**: cod. Bekker S. *ἑταῖρε τί ἢ τί ἀρχομένους* B. *ἑταῖρε τί ἢ τί ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους* T. Many attempts have been made to emend this passage. Schanz gives the emendations of Stephanus, Cron, Bernardakes, Ast, Hermann, Stallbaum, Schuster, Madvig, Kratz, Kleanthes, Heindorf, Beck, E. Jahn, Findeisen, Baiter.

492 b. **εἶεν**: S. *εἶησαν* B T Cron.

492 c. **ταῦτ' ἐστὶν**: B. *ταῦτ' ἐστὶ* T. *ταῦτ' ἄρα* S.

492 d. **ἀμόθεν**: S after Bekker. *ἄλλοθέν* B T.

492 e. **ἤδη**: B T S. *ἦ δὴ* Hermann, Cron. *ὅπερ ἤδη* cod. Thompson.

493 a. **πειστικὸν**: Iamblichus, S. *πιστικὸν* B T Stobaeus. *Cf.* 455 a.

493 a. **τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων**: B T. *τῶν ἀμυήτων* S after Madvig. But the passage offers an additional difficulty in *αὐτοῦ* where we desire *αὐτῆς*. If *αὐτοῦ* is genuine, we must conceive the clause *τὸ . . . στεγανόν* as in part. opposition to *τοῦτο*. This would make *αὐτοῦ* partitive genitive instead of possessive, which Cron insists upon calling it.

493 c. **ἀπῄκασε**: T (in the margin) S. *ἀπείκασε* B T.

493 c. **μετατίθεσαι**: cod. eds. *μετατίθεσθαι* B T S. Ast attempts to defend the reading of the Mss. by translating, 'Do I also persuade you to change your opinion to this, that,' *etc.* But, as Cron remarks, this gives an utterly impossible construction for *καί*, and besides there is no meaning in "also."

494 c. **πληροῦν**: S after Stephanus. *πληροῦντα* B T. *πληροῦν, πληροῦντα καὶ χαίροντα* Heindorf.

494 e. **κνησιῶ**: S after Heindorf. *κνησιοῖ* B T. *κνησιῷ* Bekker, Cron. *κνησιᾷ* Coraës.

494 e. **ἐχόμενα**: is bracketed by S.

495 a. **ἀγαθαὶ**: codd. S. *αἱ ἀγαθαὶ* B T. Heindorf appeals to 501 b; but since Bekker that has been read *ἢ βελτίων*, instead of *ἢ βελτίων*.

495 d. **ἀγαθοῦ**: B T. *ἡδέος* H. Schmidt, to make the clause correspond more accurately with the previous discussion. See the discussion in Cron, *Beiträge*, p. 156, 209.

496 a. **ἄνθρωπος**: S after Bekker. *ἄνθρωπος* B T Cron.

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496 b. ἀπολλύει: B according to Gaisford. ἀπόλλυσι S after Cobet's dictum that forms in -ύω are not Attic. Thompson quotes Porson on Eur. *Medea*, 744: 'Observandum est hac forma, ea nempe ubi ύω pro υμι in fine verbi ponitur nunquam uti Tragicos; rarissime veteres Comicos; saepius mediae, saepissime novae Comoediae poetas. Paullatim et parce adhiberi coepta est sub mediam fere Aristophanis aetatem; tantum enim occurrit ὀμνύῃ *Av.* 1610, συμπαραμιγνύων in ultima eius fabula Pluto 719. Cetera loca, ubi usurpari videtur, aut emendata sunt aut emendanda.' The evidence of the inscriptions seems to substantiate this. Meisterhans, § 74, 14, says: 'Regarding the transition of verbs in -νυμι to the -ω conjugation, we find in 5th cent. B.C. ὀμνύτω, ὀμνύντων, ὀμνύναι. The 4th cent. still shows ὀμνύναι, but also ὄμνυον (336 B.C.). Only after the 2d cent. does the inf. take the -ω ending; στρωννύειν, ὀμνύειν.'

496 c. ἄνθρωπος: S after Bekker. ἄνθρωπος B T Cron.

496 d. καὶ ἐγώ· μανθάνω: Hermann. καὶ ἐγὼ μανθάνω B T. Μανθάνω S after Ast.

496 e. φῇς: S after Baiter and Deuschle. ἔφης B T Cron. *Cf.* critical note on 466 e.

497 a. ἀκκίζει: the scholiasts connect the word with a certain woman named Ἀκκώ, who was so foolish that she took from the loom a half-finished garment, and, clad in it, conversed with her own image in a mirror. The story is varied in the different accounts, and the connexion between Ἀκκώ and this verb is very uncertain. We learn from Plutarch that Ἀκκώ was used like Μορμώ, *etc.*, as a bugbear to terrify children, and we find its employment as early as Pindar, *fg.* 127, — which makes the loom story highly improbable.

497 a. ἔμπροσθεν —: Cron. ἔμπροσθεν; S. The interrogation after the imv. is difficult to account for.

497 a. τί ἔχων λῃρεῖς;: S after Badham. ὅτι ἔχων λῃρεῖς B T, without any division of persons.

497 d. ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων: is bracketed by S after Deuschle.

497 e. ἄφρονας: B T. τοὺς ἄφρονας cod. S after Heindorf, who holds, however, the addition of the article to be unnecessary.

498 b. ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον: B T. ἔμοιγε, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως οἱ δειλοί S after a conjecture of Hermann. This addition would, however, make superfluous the following questions, ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον κτέ.

498 c. ἀγαθοὶ: Routh. ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ B T. S brackets the words ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί εἰσιν.

499 b. ἰοὺ ἰού: T. ἰοῦ ἰοῦ B S. According to Cron, the authority seems to be on the side of the first accentuation, even when the expression is a joyful one.

499 d. ἆρα: S with Hermann after Heindorf. εἴ ἄρα B T.

499 e. ἕνεκα: S. ἕνεκεν B T Cron. See critical note on 468 a.

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500 a. **ἀγαθά — τῶν ἡδέων — ἐστὶν**: this reading follows a suggestion of Professor Gildersleeve in regard to the recitation of the passage. *ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν* B T eds.

500 a. **ἀναμνησθῶμεν**: S. *ἀναμνησθῶμεν* B eds.

500 c. **ἐπὶ**: is bracketed by S after Findeisen.

500 d. **εἰ ἔστιν κτέ.**: an example of the Schema Pindaricum, on which see Thompson *ad loc.* Gildersleeve on Pindar, *Ol.* xi(x) 61, and R. S. Haydon, *Am. Jour. Phil.* xi. No. 2.

501 a. **ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς κτέ.**: it is impossible to look upon *τῆς ἡδονῆς* as a "free gen.," because the *τούτου* of the preceding clause has given the key to this, neither can Cron's explanation of it as 'gen. of belonging' ('angehörigkeit connexion'), with the translation "that which is directed to," be deemed satisfactory. Hirschig inserts *ἡ* before *τῆς*, supplying, and, as it seems, necessarily, *τέχνη*, in which case there would be a tacit acknowledgment of a *τέχνη τῆς ἡδονῆς* — an admission the very opposite of what Socrates intends, for he emphatically insists that the *παρασκευὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς* rests on *ἐμπειρία* only.

501 c. **ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ κτέ.**: Cron, referring to Kr. 69, 32, 16. 17, considers this a case of the use of *καί* in clauses of purpose to add emphasis in the sense 'ja,' 'doch.' But while this use of *καί* is undoubted (*cf. Rep.* i. 346 a *μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν*) it seems much more natural here to make it correlative with the following *καί*, "both . . . and."

501 d. **ἀθρόαις**: T S Cron. *ἀθρόαις* B eds.

502 a. **ηὑρῆσθαι**: S. *εὑρῆσθαι* B T.

502 b. **τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ . . . ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερον**: S places the mark of interrogation after *δή*, construes with Hermann, *ἡ σεμνὴ . . .* with *πότερον* and brackets *ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν* after Cobet. The remedy is violent and perhaps needless.

502 b. **ἐσπουδακέναι**: Curtius, *Verb.* ii. p. 154 ff., distinguishes five classes of perfects which are used originally as presents, *viz.* perfects of sound (*κέκραγα*), of sight and smell (*ὄδωδα*), of gesture (*δειδέχαται, η* 72), of emotion (*δέδοικα*), and intensive perfects. Under the same categories fall all those perfects which, though originally full perfects, have acquired a present meaning; *e.g. ἐγρήγορα, τέθνηκα, πεφόβημαι, ἐσπούδακα, πέφυκα, etc.*

502 b. **ὡς σοι** (*ὡς σοὶ* T) **δοκεῖ**: B T. *ὥς μοι δοκεῖ, ὥς σοι δοκεῖν*, Kratz.

502 c. **σοὶ**: S. *σοι* Cron and eds.

502 d. **ῥητορικὴ**: codd. S after Heindorf. *ἡ ῥητορικὴ* B T.

502 d. **ηὑρήκαμεν**: S. *εὑρήκαμεν* B T.

503 a. **εἰ γὰρ καί**: according to Kr. 65, 5, 15, *καὶ εἰ* implies that the statement of the leading clause is absolutely unassailable, even in the extreme case which *καὶ εἰ* introduces; with *εἰ καί* the realization of the condition, which may easily happen, is still a matter of no importance, as far as the statement of the leading clause is concerned. *Cf.* also Madv. *Syn.* § 194 d.

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503 a. **τοῦτο**: codd. Aristides, Heindorf, S. *τοῦτο ὃ* B T.

503 d. **εἶναι· τοιοῦτον**: B T. S marks a gap after *εἶναι*, and omits the weakly attested *ἔχεις εἰπεῖν* after *γεγονέναι*. Heindorf thinks that some word like *ἐφάνη, ὡμολόγηται* is to be added, or *εἶναι* changed into *εἴη ἄν*. See the numerous conjectures in S.

503 e. **προσφέρει δὲ προσφέρει**: this reading of cod. has been adopted by the eds. since Heindorf. It is not certainly Plato's, of course, but it fills the space and makes sense. *προσφέρει* B T. S marks a gap after this word.

503 e. **αὐτοῦ**: codd. S. *αὐτῶν* B. *αὐτῶν* T.

504 c. **ἐκείνῳ**: S after Heindorf. *ἐκεῖνο* B T.

504 e. **αὐτοῦ**: B T. *αὐτῷ* Deuschle. *δι' αὐτοῦ* conjectured, but not adopted by S.

504 e. **πλέον, ἢ τοὐναντίον κατά γε**: B T. *πλέον ἢ τοὐναντίον, κατά γε* S after Schleiermacher's first edition. This passage has given a good deal of trouble, and the explanation given in the note is only the lesser of two evils. The second construction, that of S., Schleiermacher, and others, is thus paraphrased by Thompson: "What is the use of administering to a diseased body a variety of dishes when these will frequently be of no more service to it than abstinence and mortification (*τοὐναντίον πολλῶν σιτίων κτέ.*), nay, rightly considered will do it even less good than abstinence?" This view makes excellent sense, but is open to several objections. 1. The use of *τοὐναντίον* is harsh and probably unexampled. 2. There is a case of asyndeton before *κατά* which Woolsey, a good critic, pronounced intolerable, and which Heindorf was moved to avoid by the insertion of *ἤ*, an impossible remedy owing to the preceding *ἤ* (*than*). 3. This view involves the supplying of the positive *ὀνήσει* from the preceding *μὴ ὀνήσει*. No complete collection of examples of this usage seems to have been made. Kühner, ii. § 597 n., cites the following cases where a positive verb is supplied from a negative. Hom. E 819 *οὔ μ' εἴας μακαρέσσι θεοῖς ἀντικρὺ μάχεσθαι, ἀτὰρ* (*sc. ἐκέλευες*), Eur. *Ph.* 1217 *τί μ' οὐκ εἴασας ἐξ εὐαγγέλου φήμης ἀπελθεῖν ἀλλὰ* (*sc. ἐκέλευες*), Soph. *O. R.* 236 *τὸν ἄνδρ' ἀπαυδῶ τοῦτον . . . ὠθεῖν δ' ἀπ' οἴκων* (*sc. αὐδῶ*), Eur. *Supp.* 467 *ἐγὼ δ' ἀπαυδῶ Ἄδραστον εἰς γῆν τῆνδε μὴ παριέναι εἰ δ' ἔστιν κτέ.* (*sc. αὐδῶ*), Soph. *E.* 71 f. *καὶ μή μ' ἄτιμον τῆσδ' ἀποστείλητε γῆς, ἀλλ'* (*sc. στέλλετε*), Hdt. VII. 104 *ὁ νόμος . . . οὐκ ἐῶν φεύγειν ἀλλὰ* (*sc. κελεύων*), IX. 2 *οὐδὲ ἐῶν ἰέναι ἀλλὰ* (*sc. κελεύων*), Pl. *Apol.* 36 b *ἀμελήσας, ὧν οἱ πολλοί* (*sc. ἐπιμελοῦνται*). Add Soph. *O. R.* 818 *ὃν μὴ ἔξεστι . . . ὠθεῖν δ' ἀπ' οἴκων* (*sc. χρή*), Hdt. v. 82 *ἡ δὲ Πυθίη οὐδέτερα τούτων ἔα ἀλλὰ* (*sc. ἐκέλευε*), VII. 143 *οἳ οὐκ ἔων . . . ἀλλὰ* (*sc. ἐκέλευον*). It will be noticed that the range in these passages is limited, and in every case (except *Apol.* 36 b) the positive is to be supplied after a disjunctive conjunction. A few cases are cited where adjs. are involved, but here also we find the conjunction. The peculiar passage Eur. *O.* 717 is different. No example, accordingly, is cited to support the usage of the text (according to Thompson's view). On the other hand the interpretation

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advocated in the text is not free from objections. τοὐναντίον seems an unnecessarily strong adversative. Perhaps it would be better to consider the passage as a case of colloquial inexactness.

505 a. ἐμπίμπλασθαι: T S. ἐμπίπλασθαι B. See Schanz, vol. xii. *praef.* § 15.

505 c. καταλύομεν: B T. καταλύσομεν S after Stephanus.

506 a. ἄν τι: S. ἄν τι B T Cron. See note on 472 a.

506 b. ἕως . . . ἀπέδωκα: the construction employed here must be carefully distinguished from the common use of the aor. indic. after ἕως of a definite past fact. See GMT. 613, 2 and *Am. Jour. Phil.* iv. 416 n.

506 c. ἀχθεσθήσομαι: B T eds. ἀχθέσομαι Thompson after Hirschig, on the ground that the longer form is not Attic.

506 c. ὦ ἀγαθέ: B. ἄγαθέ T. ὠγαθέ S.

506 d. οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ: B T. οὗτοι εἰκῇ cod. Sauppe S. That εἰκῇ can be used with an article is proven by the passages quoted by Stallbaum: *Phileb.* 28 d τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν, *Tim.* 34 c μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος τε καὶ εἰκῇ. A kindred expression is found *Phileb.* 45 d ἡδονάς . . . τῷ σφόδρα καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας.

506 d. κάλλιστα: is bracketed by S after Coraës. We could very easily do without it.

508 b. οἱ ἄθλιοι ἄθλιοι: S after Heindorf. οἱ ἄθλιοι B T. ἄθλιοι οἱ ἄθλιοι Bekker. Ast and Vahlen both defend the Mss. reading, but unsuccessfully.

508 c. ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ: is bracketed by S after Morstadt, τοῦ ἐθέλοντος by Hirschig. On the ground of meaning and usage the latter is to be preferred.

508 d. ἀποκτεῖναι: B T. ἀποκτεινύναι S, to avoid change of tense.

509 a. ἐστιν: B T. ἔστιν S after Hermann (ἔστι).

509 a. ὥσπερ νῦν: B T. ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμῖν Coraës.

509 b. τίνα ἄν: B T. τίνα δὴ S after Hirschig.

509 b. τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν: B T. τὴν αἰσχιστην † βοήθειαν S. Morstadt brackets τῆν αἰσχίστην — οἰκείοις, Cobet even more.

509 c. τοῦ ἀδικεῖν κτέ.: on the gen. abs. with the articular inf. see *Am. Jour. Phil.* iii. 201, where *Crito* 44 d, *Polit.* 310 e, *Euthyd.* 285 d, are cited as being, in addition to the present passages, the only cases in Plato.

510 a. ἐστὶ: B. ἐστὶν T S.

510 a. ἀδικήσομεν: S after Heindorf. ἀδικήσωμεν B T.

510 b. ἑτοῖμος: S according to the rule of Herodian and other grammarians. ἕτοιμός B T.

510 b. ἐστιν ἄρχων: Cron seems to consider this a case of participial periphrasis for the verb; but Alexander, in his article, *Am. Jour. Phil.* iv. 291, does not so regard, or at least does not mention it, and it is more likely from the following adjs. that ἄρχων is substantival.

510 b. ὁμοῖος: S. ὅμοιος B T. See on ἑτοῖμος above.

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510 c. **οὕτως**: S. *οὗτος* B T eds.

510 d. **ταύτῃ**: cod. S. *αὐτῇ* B T, defended by Ast.

510 d. **ἀδικοίη, αὕτῃ**: S with the second Basle ed. *ἀδικοῖ ἡ αὐτὴ* B T.

511 c. **συμβουλεύων**: cod. S after Wyttenbach and Heindorf. *συμβουλεύω* B T.

511 d. **τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα**: Packard (*Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877) considers *σώματα* an emphatic repetition of *ψυχάς*, the variation in the words being due to the frequency of the phrase *σώματα καὶ χρήματα*. He translates: "The art of navigation, which saves not only lives, but both lives and property."

511 e. **γυναῖκας**: B T. *γυναῖκα* S after Naber. Morstadt brackets *καὶ παῖδας* and *καὶ γυναῖκας*, and it must be said that *ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον*, which refers back to *σώματα* in d above, seems to favor this course.

512 a. **οἷ**: B T S with Ast and Winckelmann. *οἷοι* t codd.

512 a. **ὀνήσει**: S after Deuschle. *ὀνήσειεν* B T. *ὀνήσειεν ἂν* Heindorf.

512 c. **αὖ τῷ σαυτοῦ**: *αὐτὸς τῷ σαυτοῦ* codd. Cron. *αὐτὸς* B T. *αὖ* S. But there seems to be some need of an antithesis to *τῷ υἱεῖ αὐτοῦ*.

512 d. **ἔστιν**: T S and eds. *ἐστιν* B Cron. Cron defends his manner of accentuation on the ground that the emphasis is on *ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω*.

512 d. **ᾗ ἢ τὸ**: S after Heindorf. *ἢ τὸ* B. *ᾗ τὸ* T. *ᾗ τοῦ* eds.

512 d. **μὴ γὰρ**: B T. *ἢ γὰρ* S following a suspicion of Ast. *καὶ γὰρ* Buttmann. *ἠδὺ γὰρ* Hermann. *εἶη γὰρ* Madvig.

512 e. **ὁποσονδὴ** (*ὁπόσον δὴ*): codd. Antoninus S. *ὁπόσον δὲ* B T.

512 e. **βιοίη**: S. *βιῴη* B T Cron.

513 a. **σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις**: the prep. *σύν* is intensely personal, and always involves in the action of the verb the case it governs. In the classic Attic there seems to be no difference in meaning, only one in frequency, between it and *μετά*. It is regularly retained in legal phrases and in old formulae, as here, where the personal idea was originally predominant. *Cf.* Gildersleeve, *μετά and σύν*, *Am. Jour. Phil.* viii. 218; Meisterhans,[2] § 83, 35. 47. 48.

513 b. **πολιτικὸς**: is bracketed by S after Heindorf and Ast, probably rightly.

513 c. **τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει**: this dat. (equiv. to 'according to,') is probably an extension of the dat. of interest; though Cron, following Kr. 48, 15, 4, looks at it as developed from the side of means.

513 c. **πολλάκις ἴσως**: is bracketed by S; *ἴσως*, Schaefer. Ast conjectures that *ἴσως* is to be put before *πεισθήσει*.

513 d. **ἀναμνήσθητι**: S. *ἀναμνήσθητι* B Cron.

513 d. **θεραπεύειν καὶ**: *θεραπεύειν, καὶ* S after Stallbaum. This would make *ἕκαστον* the object to *θεραπεύειν*, and *καὶ σῶμα κτέ.* in apposition with it, — a view which is held by Schleiermacher and Ast. On the other hand, Kratz agrees with Cron in making *ἕκαστον* the subj. of *θεραπεύειν*.

513 e. **σοι**: B T. *σοὶ* S and eds. with comma before and after *εἰ βούλει*.

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513 e. **θεραπεύομεν**: B T. *θεραπεύομεν . . .* S, on the basis of a free rendering of Aristides which adds *σπουδαῖον καὶ καλόν*.

514 a. **θῶμεν**: B T. *φῶμεν* S after Madvig. *Cf.* 481 c.

514 a. **πράξοντες**: b S with eds. *πράξαντες* B T Stallbaum, Cron. *τάξαντες* Madvig. This passage has given a great deal of trouble. The Mss. reading seems to be utterly indefensible. Stallbaum, followed by Cron, regards the aor. as ingressive and equiv. to *ἐπιχειρήσαντες πρᾶξαι*, but it is very doubtful whether the aor. of *πράττειν* can be thus used. No example is cited for it. On the other hand the fut. is not free from criticism.

514 b. **τὴν τέχνην ἣ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα**: is omitted by S, being only found on the margin of B T. Heindorf reads *ἠπιστάμεθα* in both cases, while Cobet omits *ἣ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα*.

514 c. **ἰδίᾳ διὰ ἡμῶν**: S after Madvig (*δι' ἡμῶν*). *ἰδίᾳ ἡμῶν* B T (defended by Ast). *διὰ ἡμῶν* Voemel. *ἴδια ἡμῶν* Heindorf.

514 c. **ἄν που**: S. *δήπου* B T Cron.

515 c. **πολῖται**: S after Hirschig. *οἱ πολῖται* B T. The apposition seems too harsh to be natural.

515 d. **ναί**: B T S after Stallbaum. *ἐποίει* the eds. after Aldus.

515 d. **ἀνάγκῃ**: S. *ἀνάγκη* B T Cron, eds.

516 a. **ἑαυτόν**: is bracketed by S after cod. and Ast, but retained by Cron.

516 b. **ἐπεμέλετο**: so B T eds. This is the only passage cited for Plato where this form of the imperf. is found. The evidence of the inscriptions is not conclusive. Meisterhans,[2] § 63, 4, says that after 380 B.C. the form *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* is almost universal (*ἐπιμέλεσθαι*: *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*: : 4 : 34); in regard to the usage before this time, owing to the uncertainty of the orthography, no certain conclusion can be reached. It seems likely, however, that Plato would hardly have varied his usage within six lines (*cf.* *ἐπεμελεῖτο* 18 below). In any case, L. Dindorf's claim that forms of *ἐπιμέλεσθαι* should be everywhere written in Plato is not borne out by inscriptions.

516 d. **προσεζημίωσαν**: B T. *πρὸς ἐζημίωσαν* S after Hermann. *Cf. Prot.* 311 d *καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες*.

516 e. **ἐν Μαραθῶνι**: B T. *Μαραθῶνι* S.

517 b. **μὴ**: B T. *οὐ μὴ* S after Madvig. But Schanz repudiates this emendation in *Grammatische Bemerkungen Rhein. Mus.* XLI 152 ff., and now agrees with Ast, who (p. 432) regards *πολλοῦ δεῖ μὴ* as equivalent to *οὐ μὴ* with the subjunctive. The similar case in *Epist.* vii. 344 c he regards as an imitation, and therefore a confirmation, of a manner of expression not found elsewhere in Plato. Rid. § 60 also regards *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ* as a substitute for *οὐ*, giving (in § 259) other examples where *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ* fill the place of a negative. Cron in his latest edition accedes to this view although in his third edition he looked upon *μή* with the subjv. as an unusual const. for the simple inf. after *δεῖ*, *δεῖ* taking the place of a negatived verb of fear. Kühner § 589, 1, N. 1, says the passage is elliptical, "aber wahrlich es fehlt

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viel daran, dasz man *besorgt sein sollte, ob nicht* Einer der jetzt Lebenden solche Werke ausführen werde." Goodwin does not treat the question. In spite of the agreement of later editions, Cron seems to have been on the right track in his earlier edition. In the first place the position is against the explanation that πολλοῦ γε δεῖ is equivalent to οὐ. Then there is no occasion here for the strong οὐ μή construction. Callicles wants merely to say, "But at least you will admit that the men of the present day are far from being able to accomplish such acts." The usual const. (itself very rare) after δεῖ in this sense is the infinitive; but the inf. denies the fact, while Callicles would deny the likelihood merely. We have then a shift from the object construction to the final. Similar but not entirely parallel are passages like *Phaedo* 70 **a** τὰ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾖ, and the use of ἄδηλον μή in *Phaedo* 91 **d**.

517 **d**. ἐστὶν: B T. ἔστιν S after Vögelin.

517 **d**. ἀλλ' ὦν: codd. S. ἄλλων ὦν B T (defended by Ast). τἄλλα Heindorf after Ficinus.

518 **a**. περὶ σῶμα πραγματείας: S after Cobet. περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν B T Cron. Cron admits that the change is desirable, but contends that it is not necessary. If the traditional reading is kept, σώματος must depend on πραματείαν, the whole clause meaning, "as regards the treatment of the body."

518 **a**. τότε: B T S. τοτὲ the eds.

518 **a**. ὅτε: S after Madvig (Heindorf had already suggested it). ὅτι B T.

518 **d**. δὴ: S after Heindorf. δὲ B T.

519 **d**. καὶ: B T. καίτοι S after Heindorf. The τοι might easily have fallen out before τούτου.

521 **a**. Καλλίκλεις: B T. ὦ Καλλίκλεις S after codd. and Bekker.

521 **b**. εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν κτέ.: since Bekker, this passage has been explained as in the text. Before him, the editors vexed themselves greatly over it. Heindorf remarks: Locum mendosissimum 'verisimillima, opinor, emendatione sanavit Cornarius, corrigens, Εἰ μή σοι Μυσῶν γίγνεσθαι ἥδιον λείαν . . . Unus tamen in hac lectione verborum ordo non satis placet, propiusque etiam videtur ad veritatem accessisse magnus ille Casaubonus, cuius ex notulis hanc correctionem protulit Routhius: Εἰ μή σοι Μυσῶν γε ἥδιον εἶναι λείαν. . . Λεία inter Platonicas voces laudatus a Timaeo *Lex.* p. 174, ubi hanc vocem in Platone reperisse se negat Ruhnkenius. Huic igitur sedem suam inventam putamus.' The sense would then be: "If you do not prefer to fall a prey to the worst of mankind."

521 **b**. χρήσεται: B T. χρήσηται S.

521 **c**. δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες: Stephanus. δοκεῖ Σώκρατες B T. δοκεῖ Σωκράτης S. δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύεις (for πιστεύειν) Heindorf with Aldus and the two Basle editions.

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521 d. **δ**: B T. **ὃν** S with cod. and Heindorf. *Cf.* 486 d.

521 e. **ἀνὴρ**: B T. **ἀνὴρ** S after Bekker.

521 e. **καὶ αὐτοὺς . . . διαφθείρει**: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

522 a. **ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ**: is bracketed by S after Madvig and Cobet. By means of these omissions the connexion is made more exact, but there is also a loss to the description of several points which could hardly have been added by an interpolator. Madvig declares *ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ* to be an idea entirely foreign to medical theory; but while this may be technically true, the phrase is well adapted to describe that state of feeling into which the patient comes after taking nauseous medicines, the result of which is often choking and gasping. *Cf. Rep.* viii. 556 d *ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν.* As opposed to this, *διαφθείρει* applies to heroic treatment which leaves traces or scars behind. The addition of these two varieties to *κακὰ εἴργασται* certainly gives color to the picture.

522 a. **πώματα**: S after Bekker. *πόματα* B T. In his collection of examples, vol. xii. *praef.* § 2, Schanz shows that *πώματα* is found everywhere except in *Phaedo* 117 b, *Gorg.* 522 a.

522 a. **ηὐώχουν**: S. *εὐώχουν* B T Cron.

522 a. **εἰ εἶποι**: S after codd. Stephanus. *εἶποι* B T.

522 a. **πόσον**: S after codd. Dobree. *ὁπόσον* B T Cron. Schanz conjectures *τί.*

522 a. **οἴεσθαί γε χρή**: has been transferred perhaps to the wrong place in the course of the tradition. It would suit much better at the close of the preceding words of Socrates, but is hardly appropriate in the mouth of Callicles after *ἴσως.* Hence Heindorf and Ast unite it closely with *ἴσως.* Hirschig and Cobet omit it.

522 c. **ἓν**: S after Heindorf and Coraës. *ἐν* B T.

522 d. **γάρ τις**: B T. *γὰρ ἡ* S after Cobet.

523 b. **οἱ ἐκ μακάρων**: S after Plutarch. *ἐκ μακάρων* B T.

523 b. **σφίσιν**: S after Stobaeus, Plutarch. *σφὶν* B. *σφιν* T.

523 e. **ἐρῆμον**: S. *ἔρημον* B T. See 510 b.

524 c. **οὐλάς**: is bracketed by S after Heindorf.

524 c. **καὶ κατεαγότα**: S. *κατεαγότα* B T. *κατεαγότα τε* Cron, Thompson.

524 e. **Ῥαδάμανθυν**: *Ῥαδάμανθυν, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης παρὰ τὸν Αἰακόν* cod.

524 e. **οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας**: Lucian probably had this passage in mind in *Cataplus* c. 24 *ὁπόσα ἄν τις ὑμῶν πονηρὰ ἐργάσηται παρὰ τὸν βίον, καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀφανῆ στίγματα ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς περιφέρει.* See Kittredge, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vi. 165, and Gildersleeve, *Essays and Studies*, p. 344. The idea that after death the soul retains marks and scars resulting from evil deeds done in the body is said by Josephus to have been common among the Jews in his day.

525 b. **παραδείγματι**: S after cod. and Forster. *παράδειγμά τι* B T. *παράδειγμα* Eusebius, approved by Cobet.

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525 d. **τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων**: Eusebius, Thompson. *τοὺς τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων* B. *τοὺς τῶν παραδειγμάτων* T. *τούτων* S after Heindorf. *τύπους τῶν παραδειγμάτων* Madvig.

525 e. **οὐ γὰρ . . . οἷς ἐξῆν**: is bracketed by S after Morstadt. In favor of the omission is the rather difficult ellipsis, as well as the disagreement of the remark with 473 d *δυοῖν ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος οὐκ ἂν εἴη*, according to which we should have *ἧττον ἄθλιος* instead of *εὐδαιμονέστερος*.

526 b. **ἀρετὴν τὴν**: cod. S. *ἀρετὴν* B T.

527 a. **εἰλιγγιάσεις**: B S. *ἰλλιγγιάσεις* T Cron. See on 486 b.

527 a. **καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως**: B T. *ἐπὶ κόρρης* S after Cobet.

527 c. **ὁ λόγος**: cod. S. *ὁ σὸς λόγος* B T.

527 d. **πατάξαι**: B T eds. The insertion *σύ γε θαρρῶν* has caused the editors some trouble in the construction of *πατάξαι*. It is easiest and most natural to supply *ἔασόν τινα*. Stephanus, however, wrote *πάταξαι*. This was objected to by Routh and championed by Van Heusde. It is doubtful whether there is any authority for using the middle in the sense "allow yourself to be," *etc.* Cobet also feeling some difficulty proposes to insert *πάρεχε*. But the explanation offered in the note, renders emendations unnecessary.

527 d. **ὡς τι ὄντας**: S. *ὥς τι ὄντας* Cron and eds. *Cf.* 472 a.

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

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